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ABSTRACT
The "Achilles heel" of regional planning in the past has 
consistently proved to be the failure to achieve success in 
implementing plans. Most scholars acknowledge this reality, 
but disagree over its explanation, thus, the inadequate 
theoretical base for planning practice.
The essential question behind this dissertation is: What
makes decision-makers adopt and implement a given planing 
product? This concern is based on the perception of planning 
as a process that depends not merely on the plan's content and 
competency, but on the way planners choose to integrate their 
proposals into the decision-making environment within which 
they operate. Since a plan's approval does not necessarily 
imply its implementation, it is in the interest of planners to 
promote implementation. Accordingly, this dissertation 
proposes a methodological framework to guide planners in 
creating a highly implementable product.
The framework encompasses three elements: the region, 
with its perceived relative condition guiding the 
determination of its expected future; the decision-making 
environment, and the potential to exercise different 
planning functions within it; and the planning approach 
which is forged into a strategic perspective that integrates 
planners' skills and imagination, creating a firm basis for 
guiding the integration of a planning product into a specific 
decision-making system, as a means to promote its 
implementation.
The framework is tested through the examination of a 
particular planning experience in the Galil region of Israel. 
These two parts, when put together, enable planners to apply 
prevailing knowledge and skills so as to bridge the gap 
between plan-making and implementation.
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Chapter 1: OVERVIEW
This dissertation is concerned with the subject of 
regional planning; its task is to propose a planning 
approach that can lead to a highly implementable planning 
product, one with a potential for promoting actual actions.
This area of concern is marked by its very rich base of 
theoretical positions and research studies grounded in a 
wide variety of social science disciplines. Indeed, the 
literature developed over the course of the past 40 years 
has much to offer to the understanding of different aspects 
of regional systems and planning functions - the way they 
are structured and operate, the means by which to analyse 
historical processes, and future prospects. Whereas during 
the 1950s and 1960s regional systems, planning processes, 
and regional planning were approached from rather unified 
perspectives (design-engineering and social-welfare oriented 
perceptions, each for a time dominant), the last two decades 
are marked by a great diversity of theoretical approaches 
and practical considerations of both "regions" and 
"planning". This change is thought to be a result of the 
combined effect of changes in the socio-economic, political, 
legislative, and technological environment of planning 
practice on the one hand, and an accumulated worldwide 
experience with planning practice on the other (Maclenan and 
Parr, 1979; Kelman, Clevel, Forester, Goldsmith, 1980; 
Healey, McDougall and Thomas, 1982).
Regional analysis in the past two decades fundamentally 
has held to a consistent view of "regions", according to
9
which the region's spatial system is a concrete expression 
of social, economic, and political processes that are an 
integral part of a wider system(s) placed in a certain 
historical context (in contrast to the pre-1970 belief that 
the description of the spatial distribution of components 
was a sufficient base for regional analysis). This basic 
attitude is applied in the analysis of regional systems from 
different perspectives - physical, environmental, social, 
political, or economic, all subject to the purpose of the 
research and the analyst's objectives.
Unlike this fairly unified theoretical and practical 
approach toward regional analysis, planning is subject to a 
diversity of theoretical positions and a general 
disagreement over which aspects and indicators are most 
important for planning theory and those forming the essence 
of planning practice. This diversity brings to mind the case 
of the blind people describing an elephant - the question of 
what an elephant is depends on the part they actually touch: 
examination of the tail, the legs, or the trunk, each leads 
to a different "elephant". Nevertheless, the literature 
related to planning issues has much to offer both 
theoreticians and practitioners. Therefore, it is important 
and useful to integrate an analysis of accumulated planning 
experience and the widening theoretical debate into future 
planning practice and analysis.
Broadly speaking, among the great variety of aspects 
that the literature reveals, several normative and practical 
questions are discussed that are of particular relevance for 
this dissertation (the following is a limited selection of
10
the issues addressed by scholars, and by no means a 
conclusive list of available studies and scholars that have 
contributed to planning theory and practice):
How should the planning product be formulated? (Faludi, 
1973; Lindblom, 1959; Etzioni, 1967; Friend and Hickling, 
1987). How do and should planners actually operate in the 
social-political system? (Davidoff, 1965; Gans, 1968; 
Eversley, 1973; Duleavy, 1980a; Bilski, 1980), and whose 
interests do they serve? (Altshuler, 1965; Castells, 1977; 
Massey and Cataleno, 1978). What should the planning product 
look like? (RTPI 1980 conference). What are the various 
aspects of the environment within which planners operate 
that deserve attention: the institutional context of
planning practice (Dennis, 1970; Friend, 1980), the 
legislative base for planning practice (McAuslan, 1979; 
Jowell, 1977), the conflicts structuring the wide socio­
economic system (Gans, 1968; Poulantzas, 1973; Dunleavy, 
1980a), and the interrelations between social and spatial 
structures? (Harvey, 1973). What is the effect of the crisis 
of the modern state economy (Stilwell, 1980; Sawers and 
Tabb, 1984), and the importance of worldwide economic 
changes and multinational corporations? (Holland, 1976). 
Finally, what is the relevance of interpersonal interactions 
in planning practice (Friedmann, 1973), the availability of 
multidirectional flows of influence within socio-political 
organisations (Dunleavy, 1980a), and planners' expectations 
derived from their profession and role in social 
administrative organisations? (Baer, 1977; Broadbent, 1977; 
Baum, 1980).
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Nevertheless, when we come to the assessment of 
planning practice, most perspectives are united along the 
idea that planning practice is problematic. Regional 
planning, according to this rationale, represents the 
extreme case of the difficulties embodied in planning - 
complicated systems subject to planning initiatives (that 
often express rather ambitious goals) that do not create 
"easy" grounds for planning practice. Although different 
types of planning initiative influences can be identified in 
both Western and Third World countries, and although the 
extent to which plans are considered to have achieved their 
goals may vary according to the analytical criteria chosen 
for such assessment, the "destiny" of plans is mostly 
accepted (either purposefully or by implication from 
reality) to be an academic exercise. As noted by Friedmann 
(1979), "the failure to score significant success" (p. 1) is 
the "Achilles' heel" of planning practice and theory of the 
past two decades (to say the least).
My interest in planning and implementation stems from 
my work experience as a planner, during which time I became 
aware of a certain gap between two "segments" of "planning": 
formation of plans, on the one hand, and their 
implementation (or their actual use in decision-making 
processes related to the object of planning) on the other 
hand. I gradually became aware of three conflicting trends 
that dominate the reality of planning practice: 
a. Numerous plans do not reach the stage of 
materialisation, or even that of being considered for 
carrying out. Some plans simply appear irrelevant by
12
the time they are concluded and published; others may 
be stopped with the excuse of being "politically 
dangerous", or due to spending cuts. Above all, even in 
cases where a plan was initiated for a specific 
customer, its implementation is by no means guaranteed, 
and in many cases plans are utilised to justify 
decisions and actions that are already taken.
The vast majority of plans, and especially regional 
plans, are very similar, both in their basic objectives 
and the way they are articulated. Most plans contain 
elements of long-run elimination of regional economic 
inequality, population dispersal, and decentralisation 
of large urban-metropolitan areas. Moreover, plans tend 
to be structured according to the principles of the 
rational problem-solving approach, presenting their 
proposals in an analysis-goals-means-ends order, to the 
extent that in many cases only specific data and 
informative details serve to distinguish between them. 
This planning approach is still seen in spite of the 
fact that most practitioners' training over the last 
two decades has been critical of this "rational- 
comprehensive" approach.
Although regional plans are implemented insufficiently 
and planners face immense difficulties in promoting 
implementation, the planning function persists. 
Planners have a role in public regulatory 
organisations, they operate in private consultancy 
offices and as consultants to public decision-makers
and private organisations, they form an officially 
accepted research discipline, and they are involved 
constantly in academic training. At the same time, the 
planning profession is said to be "in a state of 
malaise" (Baer, 1977), and planners themselves suffer 
from a certain lack of confidence, especially those who 
question the relevance of the available theoretical 
base and its links to practice.
These observations are echoed by various scholars, many 
of whom seek explanations and means to change the situation. 
Their attitude varies from a call to increase planners' 
legislative authority and available resources (Inbar, 1980), 
through proposals to improve the deficiencies of planning 
theory (Healey, McDougall and Thomas, 1982), to a rather 
"fatalistic" view of planners as unable to contribute to the 
establishment of fundamental socio-economic changes as long 
as they operate in accordance with the principal rules of 
the modern capitalist state apparatus (the neo-Marxist 
approaches).
This reality of regional planning raises two lines of 
interest. On the one hand, there are normative questions 
regarding the essence of the planning profession (such as 
the goals of planning in general and regional planning in 
particular, or the justifications of planning practice and 
planners' expectations); on the other hand, there is the 
pragmatic question of how this reality can be changed - how 
should planners improve their performances, regardless of 
the competence of the ideas expressed in the planning
14
product that stem from planners' perceptions of the above 
normative aspects. In view of the richness of planning 
discussions and theoretical insights into the normative 
questions, the concern with planning performance becomes a 
matter of bridging the gap between the two practices: plan- 
making and plan implementation. Indeed, it is our task in 
this dissertation to propose a methodological framework that 
enables this gap to be bridged by establishing a coherent 
framework for actions that is relevant to concrete cases. 
This dissertation, then, is essentially concerned with the 
question of what makes the output of planners' strategic 
initiative be adopted and actually implemented by decision­
makers .
This dissertation rests on the premise that planning 
practice is feasible, and that it is not a matter of merely 
academic concern. It is further assumed that planners are 
equipped with a wide theoretical knowledge and the technical 
tools that provide them with the skills necessary for the 
promotion of plans' implementation. Finally, it is 
acknowledged that planners are not in direct control of the 
decision-making processes that prevail in specific contexts. 
By implication, planning practice is largely a function of 
the way in which planners integrate the planning product 
into the existing political, economic, and social system. 
This, in turn, is a function of two elements: the extent to 
which a certain system enables planners to penetrate into 
the decision-making process, and the extent to which 
planners' professional and personal attributes enable them 
to gain access to the major decision-making apparatus.
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In practice, therefore, planning analysis should treat 
the way the planning product is proposed to function in the 
field (or, interpreted to practice) as a matter of equal 
importance to its content. The latter aspect is thoroughly 
discussed in the literature, as noted above. The 
considerations given to the practicalities of planning 
currently are insufficient, as reality shows.
Accordingly, how may planners integrate the planning product 
into the environment they wish to influence? What are the 
tools required for operating in such an environment? How 
should planners make the most of the tools they are 
basically equipped with? These are the main questions this 
dissertation tackles.
The answers to these questions are expected to contribute to 
an improved performance of planning processes, while 
permitting the planner's individual input to affect the type 
of process he wishes to influence, the determination of the 
theoretical and ideological justification for his actions, 
and the establishment of the environment within which he 
wishes to operate.
This dissertation consists of two major parts. Part one 
sets up the methodological principles of the proposed 
planning approach; the way "regions" should be viewed and 
the components of regional systems most relevant to the 
promotion of its competitive advantage are discussed in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is concerned with identifying the 
decision-making determinants vulnerable to planning 
practice, and the types of responses planners may derive 
from their "partners" in the planning process. Chapter 4
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presents regional strategy as a practical tool that can 
enable planners to integrate skills and establish a 
framework for influencing decision-making regarding the 
regional processes in question. This strategy should embody 
planners' attitudes toward vulnerable decision-making 
determinants, and assessments of the region's relative 
strengths (with both enriched by planners' imaginative and 
analytical skills). It should also be interpreted to 
concrete and manageable set of proposals. Finally, although 
parts of the strategic perspective or the strategy in all my 
be distributed, the overall effectiveness of the planners' 
performance rests on the combined effect of their strategic 
perspective and their active attempts to promote its 
integration into a concrete decision-making system.
Part two of the dissertation presents an analysis of 
the planning experience in Western Galil, Israel, during the 
years 1985-1986, under the aegis of the planning system of 
the Rural Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency for 
Israel. Even though the proposed framework was not in place 
at that time, the relevance of this specific case study 
seems quite clear. Over a long period of time, Western Galil 
has been the subject of various planning initiatives, some 
of which actually reached fruition but most of which 
flowered only on library shelves. Clearly, the difference 
between the former and the latter are of interest. What is 
more, among the several plans that were implemented during 
the past 40 years, the Segev and Region 2000 plans deserve 
special attention by virtue of their continuity over time 
and the evolution in the planning approach that occurred 
during the course of implementation. At the commencement of
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this dissertation, decision-making processes related to 
Western Galil seemed closely linked to planning practice, 
such that planners gained an important status within the 
Rural Settlement Department and even beyond, extending to 
"Fellowship 2000", the ministry of Economics and Planning, 
and to the municipality of Karmiel. Unfortunately, at the 
present time, the outlook for this planning practice is more 
gloomy, but it still deserves attention. Indeed, it is 
precisely because of this change that this particular 
experience may contribute to planning performance by 
indicating how it may be improved. Indeed, the choice of 
this particular case study was strengthened by virtue of the 
changing environment which influenced the evolution of the 
methodological framework that will presently be proposed.
Accordingly, chapter 5 briefly describes Western Galil 
region, emphasising those characteristics most important for 
the understanding of the planning process, and chapter 6, 
then, presents the planning initiatives themselves. 
Following that, chapter 7 focus on the institutional 
conditions within which planners operated, and chapter 8 
presents an analysis of the actual impact of the planning 
process - the changes in Western Galil that can be 
associated with the planning process, and the way planners 
operated.
To conclude, chapter 9 emphasises the important 
principles planners should integrate into their practice, 
the areas where planning practice, evaluation studies and 
planning education should be modified in the anticipation 
for improved performance on the part of planners. Finally,
18
we raise several areas where further research is required 
and desired.
It goes without saying that the availability of 
information, including documentation of the planning process 
while it was underway, contributed to the possibility of 
analysing the planning process not merely from the point of 
view of its actual impact, but also from point of view of 
the process of formulating the planning products. As a 
former employee of the Rural Settlement Department, I 
enjoyed free access to the Department's archives, working 
files of its Planning Unit of the North Region office, data 
bases, the private files of Prof. Katzir, and the documents 
of several government ministries. The official government 
data-base also was fairly accessible; given the fact that 
Western Galil falls within the administrative definition of 
"natural areas", and the fact that the statistical data-base 
of the Central Bureau of Statistics is fairly comprehensive, 
the usefulness of this data-base is obvious.
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to define 
several terms that will appear frequently in the course of 
this dissertation:
* "Planning" is basically composed of three elements: the
planner, the partner, and the planning product. The
interaction between these elements creates the planning 
process, which takes place within a given context of 
time and socio-economic environment.
* The planning process incorporates three dimensions:
production, marketing, and implementation, all
19
occurring within a specific time-issue-space context. 
Planners, through their interactions with a concrete 
decision-making system, attempt to establish their 
"niche" in the decision-making processes related to a 
concrete regional (in our case) system. It is 
distinguished by reference to concrete "issues". be 
they a certain process, a certain feature of the 
socio-economic system, or a concrete set of components 
of the planning object identified by planners as 
deserving their concern or utilised to attract 
attention of others (political decision-makers in 
particular, but others as well). The process of 
creating "issues" as a means of encouraging or 
discouraging attention is by no means "planning"- 
specific. Planners may therefore refer to "issues" 
created outside their control, as most often is the 
case. Among the wide range of variables that form a 
certain issue, planners should limit themselves to 
those variables that are relevant to their tasks. The 
concrete combination of variables chosen for concern is 
often referred to as the planners' area of concern, 
expressed, for example, in terms of physical, spatial 
boundaries, or the level of an organisation's 
administrative hierarchy.
A Planning function comprises the entire structure of 
the features performed by planners. These may consist 
of any of the dimensions of the planning process - 
activities such as analysis of a certain socio-economic 
condition, actions associated with the distribution of 
a planning product, or relationships with decision­
makers. Such functions may be officially established 
within a certain organisation, creating specific 
operational codes and accompanied by concrete 
authority, or they may reflect planning practice 
regardless of the planners' official status.
A planning product is the output of planning functions 
and processes, and is a major instrument by which the 
dynamics described above is stimulated, directed, and 
controlled, while simultaneously it is affected by 
these dynamics. It should be amenable to constant 
change in its particulars without altering its essence. 
The planning product is an output of planners' skills 
and perceptions of the planning object (e.g., region), 
as well as the decision-making environment. 
Distribution of the planning product forms the 
cornerstone of planners' communication with decision­
makers, and is basic to its implementation. Plans 
(i.e., a written document, a map) are the most 
conventional type of planning product. Yet the final 
product may not necessarily include all the elements 
and assumptions that may have been crucial to the 
planning perspective, such as a statement of 
intentions, delineation of relations between social 
groups or confluence of interests. In fact, actual 
articulation of the product prior to action is not 
always necessary. Other written documents (e.g., 
operating schemes), proposed legislation, and organised 
lobby groups may be different types of planning 
products. In this sense, the planning product is an 
attribute of the planning process rather than vice-
versa (planning attribute of plans).
The planner’s goal is to initiate change in the subject 
matter (e.g., the region) through the activation of the 
planning product, and the use of planning techniques 
and resources.
The "partners" are those decision-makers who are 
expected to contribute to the materialisation of the 
planning product. The key to understanding the nature 
of the planner's influence (or the nature of planning 
process) is to understand the relationship between the 
planner and the potential partner of the planning 
product.
Implementation is the actual use of the planning 
product in decision-making regarding the subject 
matter.
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Chapter 2: THE REGIONAL SYSTEM
The "Region" Defined
A region is a complicated, dynamic system, involving a 
great variety of components that function simultaneously on 
diverse levels of socio-economic organisation, at different 
scales, intensities and time limitations.
Generally speaking, regions tend to be defined 
primarily in spatial terms, by criteria such as physical 
structure or administrative jurisdiction boundaries. These 
set the parameters of the region and define the limits of 
concern with different processes. The analysis of various 
regional systems, however, proves that such an approach may 
lead to a delineation of regions in a way that is totally 
inconsistent with various regional processes: boundaries are 
set that fail to correspond to those warranted for different 
activities related to a given region. Consequently, regional 
analyses and policies come to be based on a partial picture 
of processes at work within the region. Since this may be 
inappropriate, it seems that a "content definition" of the 
region, i.e., one based on the region's diverse 
characteristics and the aims of concerns with it, may be of 
greater relevance than one rooted in geography. This is not 
to argue that the definition should be stripped of all 
spatial reference, for space is an integral part of the 
regional system and one of the elements that structure the 
region (e.g., some activities become topics of concern only 
because they operate within a given physical area). The 
spatial element, however, should be perceived as only one
23
aspect of the content-oriented definition.
In the present context, the "region" is viewed as a 
spatial system in which a specific combination of socio­
economic and organisational activities takes place. By 
implication, regions are not distinct in terms of the basic 
types of activities that also take place elsewhere. The 
concept of "combination" refers to a pattern of linkages 
between such activities that forms a basis for the 
performance of specific regional systems, or the specific 
region's composition. It follows that the regional system is 
characterised by diverse elements, such as physical 
attributes (e.g., location, size, morphology), social 
structure (e.g., demographic trends, ethnic composition), or 
political features (e.g., a role in the national political 
Party institutions).
The region is structured along the contours of three 
major types of social activities: economic, social and 
organisational (Saunders, 1979; Dunleavy, 1982). All of 
these are carried out within a given space and determine the 
specific nature of the region (the specific region's 
composition). The essence of these activities is the 
determination of access to resources, defined as the ability 
to make use of resources according to one's own criteria. 
This feature is specified below, as it applies to each of 
the above types of activities and the regional system as a 
whole.
Economic activities tend to concern themselves with the 
mobilisation of resources1 and the generation of capital. 
There are several types of resources: financial-material 
(including capital and assets), human resources (skills,
24
knowledge), and socio-political assets. Economic activities 
can be further differentiated along lines of production, 
i.e., the creation of goods and services, and consumption, 
i.e., the appropriation thereof.
Social activities are those pertaining to the human 
relations that create the need for resources, and result in 
the formation of social groups. These groups may be composed 
of individuals, firms or other entities. They are partly 
differentiated by their need for and expectations of access 
to resources, and by the means available to them for the 
realisation of their access interest. These groups also can 
be influenced by ideologies, norms, and other not 
necessarily economic considerations (although the results of 
such influences can, in most cases, be measured by economic 
criteria).
Political administrative activities relate to the 
management of social relations by determining the economic 
activities that establish social groups' and organisations' 
access to resources. They include political and 
administrative activities as well as other institutional 
decision-making processes, all of which are basically 
concerned with resource allocation - the distribution of 
resources among social groups. These activities are also 
referred to here as institutional activities.
Taken as a whole, these activities form a dynamic 
system in which access to resources constantly changes due 
to interactions among the various social groups, each with 
its own interest in improved access. This system is 
discussed further in Chapter 3. Since these activities have
25
spatial implications, as stated above, it is important to- 
emphasise that the spatial element is one of their integral 
aspects (their existence), though the activities may take on 
different forms within different spatial boundaries. In 
fact, it is suggested that these activities function within 
the social system in such a way that specific interactions 
between them are related to an “effective space", defined as 
the spatial area to which they are directly linked and 
within which access to resources may materialise. In this 
regard, it should be further emphasised that the region does 
not necessarily represent an “effective space" for all of 
the activities of which it is composed. For example, the 
“effective space" for decision-making in the transition of 
labour from service to production activities may be the 
entire country, whereas labour training schemes may be 
relevant only at the regional (i.e., sub-national) level. 
Furthermore, the consumption patterns of certain goods may 
be explained with reference to specific locations, whereas 
those of other goods may be meaningful only with reference 
to totally different areas associated with a different 
socio-economic structure.
To recapitulate, then, the major characteristics of the 
"region" and its boundaries, as determined by the above 
social activities, are the following:
* The region is part of a larger system, since it does not 
embrace all processes and activities. This larger system 
may be a country, the world, or any other scale of 
activities chosen for specific theoretical and practical 
purposes. In the present case, the region is perceived as
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part of the national system.
* Because the linkages among regional components result in 
an integration of processes that occurs on various levels 
and in different contexts of the socio-economic system, 
the regional system is an "open" entity, in the sense 
that its content is definable only in relation to other 
systems and its structure is established through 
interaction with other systems.
* The regional system is dynamic in the sense of being 
structured by the interactions of socio-economic and 
political activities.
* The regional system is complicated, as it is composed of 
various types of activities that function simultaneously 
on different levels of intensity, on different scales, 
and in different locations.
* Since these patterns change with the passage of time and 
context of consideration, regional boundaries are fairly 
flexible. They lend themselves to modification in view of 
the types of linkages between activities that are chosen 
for specific purposes, and change in accordance with the 
paradigm of interaction among these activities.
Therefore, the "region" is defined as a sub-national 
functional system, its function being that of the typology 
of the combination of activities that structure it. It is 
distinguished by its position vis-a-vis other sub-national 
systems and the national system as a whole, in which its 
boundaries are subject to specific contexts of 
consideration.
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The assumption is being made that the socio-spatial. 
system is organised in a hierarchical fashion, i.e., that 
the "region" is intermediate to the nation on the one hand 
and the locality (with the latter defined as segments of the 
region) on the other . Since each level of the above system 
is distinguished by a different combination of activities, 
the "region" then becomes an area composed of segments of 
nationally occurring activities. This definition of the 
regional system, based on the substance of its activities, 
has the major practical advantage of addressing to the 
content of specific activities and issues on the levels 
relevant to them, rather than forcing the analysis to 
conform with artificial or irrelevant boundaries.
Admittedly, this definition may pose fundamental 
methodological difficulties in research, with respect to the 
selection of relevant criteria and scale of concern, 
especially in view of the need to deal with numerous 
"effective spaces" that may barely coincide or even overlap. 
One way to overcome this difficulty may be to a search for 
specific types of activities that belong to the specific 
regional system being studied, which can then serve as the 
major criteria for the definition of its boundaries. Such an 
attempt, however, may prove impracticable, since most types 
of social activities may be equally represented within the 
region and elsewhere. As an alternative, it has been 
suggested that the regional system be defined not merely in 
terms of specific activities and processes, but rather with 
reference to the composition of elements of these activities 
or the activity profile that lends the regional system its 
structure. A simplified illustration will clarify this
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point. Different regions may reflect some of the following 
characteristics: a high rate of out-migration, a production 
system based on low-skill labour, locational disadvantages 
relative to major national business areas, poor physical 
infrastructure, and a high concentration of minority social 
groups. It is unlikely, however, that all regions will 
possess all of these characteristics. Furthermore, the more 
detailed the description (e.g., out-migration identified by 
age of migrants, ethnic origin, or migration motives) and 
the more precisely the qualitative values are adjusted to 
the above characteristics, the greater the possibility that 
regions will be distinct from each other. By implication, 
regional boundaries are meaningful only if construed within 
the context of concern with the region, and the definition 
of a region contains an intrinsically comparative element. 
In the case of a region with a specific demographic 
structure, for example, a description of its qualities will 
not lead us far, while a comparative analysis may indeed 
provide a suitable vehicle for understanding "what is going 
on". In other words, comparison is a prerequisite for 
dealing with the regional system.
The importance of this approach toward the topic of 
regional boundaries becomes apparent in its implications:
a. A region is defined only with direct reference to other 
regions; the performance of one region is directly 
linked to that of other systems. Thus, the condition of 
a region should always be stated in relative, rather 
than absolute, terms. In other words, any reference to 
a specific region implies direct or indirect reference
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to other regions.
b. Since regions are dynamic systems, constantly subject 
to change, any reference to a specific "relative 
condition" is relevant only with regard to clearly 
defined time limits. Thus, the notion of "relative 
condition" further implies a strong linkage with the 
temporal dimension.
c. It follows, in view of the relativeness and the 
dynamics of the regional system, that the "relative 
condition" of a region is constantly subject to change. 
Furthermore, since the region is part of a larger 
system, any change in a given region is likely to 
affect the relative condition of other regional 
systems.
Finally, one should be aware of the practical 
implications of the notion of the "relative condition" of a 
region. The above assertions assume that the mechanism of 
regional performance is basically a matter of interactions, 
or "interactive activities", between the various forces or 
elements participating in regional processes. Thus we 
concluded that our major concern should be with those 
interactions, for they are the parameters by which we may 
determine the relativeness of the regional system. These 
interactions may occur on different levels of the social 
system hierarchy, on different scales, and within different 
time frames. They may also pertain to systems of similar or 
different typologies. For example, they may occur on the 
level of public political debate or on the level of actual 
movement of economic entities within space. They may
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manifest themselves in the exchange of information,, 
bargaining over land development projects, or other 
proceedings concerning issues such as regional public 
services. Whatever form they may take, the bottom line of 
all of these activities is concern over the allocation of 
resources, either to the region or within its boundaries. 
Assuming that regional systems function under conditions of 
constant scarcity of resources (as is usually the case), the 
interactive activities are likely to take the form of 
competition, in which regions vie with one another for the 
largest piece of the resource "pie" available; in our case, 
this takes place mostly in the national market. Thus, in 
practice, regional systems become competitors, with the 
relative condition of each one strongly depending on its 
degree of competitive success.
Numerous factors, discussed at further stages in this 
dissertation, affect the nature of competition. At the 
present stage, two conditions should be borne in mind: 
first, regions are potentially always competing each other. 
Second, any reference to a region's relative condition or 
advantage in the competition is in fact a reference to the 
competitive advantage of that system. Because competition is 
by definition a dynamic process, determined in the course of 
interactions between regional components, a competitive 
advantage cannot be a permanent situation for a regional 
system. Moreover, since the nature of that advantage is 
intrinsically affected by the decisions taken on the basis 
of these interactions, it necessarily becomes a position 
generated through the interactive processes. Therefore, it 
may be susceptible to planning initiatives aimed at
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affecting its nature.
In sum, the essence of the proposed approach toward the 
definition of a regional system lies in the concepts of the 
"specifity of context" within which the regional content and 
boundaries are defined, and the "relativeness" of the 
regional system, the condition of which is determined in 
relation to other systems. It follows that our area of 
interest should be the linkages between the social 
activities that determine the region's relative condition.
Some scholars may object to such an approach toward the 
definition of the regional system, arguing that it is 
subject to variable criteria, needs, or interests, rather 
than absolute or "objective" yardsticks. It is argued, 
however, that as long as the criteria are clearly specified, 
there is no justification for rejecting the view that 
similar processes may be associated with different regions, 
or that a single location may be considered part of a 
different region or regions as warranted by the 
circumstances. This having been said, the practical problems 
that this definition imposes on any inquiry into regional 
systems cannot be underestimated. Specifically, one's 
awareness of the dynamics and "openness" of regions may 
cause great confusion when one attempts to isolate 
activities that actually lend a specific regional system its 
character. As a potential aggravation of this confusion, 
several activities of ostensible importance may form 
different "effective spaces", possibly resulting in a 
situation in which reference is made to boundaries too wide 
for effective analysis and practice. By the same token, 
attempts to avoid this problem may run the risk of dealing
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only partially with important activities. This difficulty is 
not insurmountable, its solution lies in the realisation 
that the determination of boundaries of concern should not 
be viewed as a single act that, once executed, is 
irreversible. Indeed, where previously set boundaries prove 
to be inappropriate, their redefinition is crucial and can 
be carried out at any stage of the planning practice, even 
if this entails the modification of important aspects of 
research and implementation.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that "competitive 
advantage" is linked to the term "regional inequalities", 
which refers to the actual expression of a certain region’s 
competitive advantage vis-a-vis other regions (in terms of 
such elements as income generated within it, socio-political 
composition, and many others). Thus, the idea of encouraging 
competitive advantage may imply encouraging regional 
inequalities. Although a thorough discussion of the question 
of whether regional inequalities should be eliminated (as 
many regional plans vie), or not, is beyond the scope of 
this study, it was in fact argued that "regional 
inequalities" are inherent in the nature of "regional 
phenomenon". Accordingly, a realistic attitude toward a 
region and the forces stimulating regional processes should 
not turn away from this fact. This dissertation rests on the 
premise that planners are capable, and should be provided 
with the freedom to determine their own attitudes toward 
normative aspects such as those related to regional 
inequalities.
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Regional Analysis
The idea of regional relativeness, and its implications 
with regard to the importance of specifity of the context 
within which this relativeness is determined, present a 
major problem regarding the justification, the need, and the 
ability to set up the principles for determining, and the 
criteria for evaluating, the relative condition of regions. 
This is a conceptual and methodological problem, which may 
be phrased thus: to what extent may predetermined principles 
help establish relativeness without disregarding specific 
elements of the region that exist within particular 
contexts?
The imposition of predetermined principles on specific 
cases, while problematic, nevertheless cannot be 
categorically rejected. That would imply disregard of 
experience, underestimation of the analytical and conceptual 
tools provided by various theories, and more importantly, an 
inability to establish tools for the comparison of different 
regional systems or chronological stages within one region. 
Further, the rejection of any conceptual and methodological 
framework in coping with the issue of relativity strikes at 
the underlying rationale of this work, which, by necessity, 
requires the placement of some guideposts and seeks for some 
areas where generalisations may be defined. Therefore, 
beyond the specificity that may characterise any type of 
analysis, a general analytical framework for regions' the 
relative condition is evidently both required and desired.
Analysis of theoretical approaches and studies of the 
accumulated experience in regional processes provides an
important starting point for regional analysis in terms of 
general analytical tools and methodologies; it also offers 
different perspectives on the nature of regional processes. 
These studies, based in different disciplines of the social 
sciences, tend to focus on the functional and spatial 
disparities within and between regions, regardless of the 
way "regions" are defined. Geographers, for example, 
traditionally emphasise observable spatial inequalities and 
the way these may be measured. Economists examine the 
interactions of market forces and public intervention, or 
the viability of regions in terms of their relative 
attractiveness to productive investments, housing 
construction or business relocation. Studies linked to 
public administration and political sciences may highlight 
the spatial expression of political-economic power 
distribution and conflict within modern societies.
Taken together, several major contributions seem then 
to stand out. The first is the principle of selective 
concern with regional components. Since any regional system 
is distinguished by some components that are more important 
than the others, analysis does not require us to deal with 
all equally. Rather, it should allow concentration on those 
likely to elicit greater understanding of the processes. 
This principle is of great importance, as it permits the 
focus of attention on components of strategic importance.
However, another major question remains: how should 
specific components that seem to be of relative importance 
be determined? Different approaches highlight different 
components, be they social, spatial or institutional, as 
defined by the innate scope of the specific area of
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interest, and thus focus on different types of activities 
as major determinants and explanatory factors of regional 
processes. At the two extremes, it is possible to identify 
approaches emphasising economic behaviour of firms and 
individuals as explanatory of regional spatial inequalities; 
other approaches concentrate on non-spatial processes of 
capital restructuring as determining, for example, the 
spatial distribution of particular production activities. 
Some studies are confined to the descriptive level of 
research, attempting to characterise regional systems and 
classify patterns of development. Still others attempt to 
predict future development potential by analysing prevailing 
social and economic processes. Thus clearly, there is a 
rather large variety of components that can be classified as 
important. But, important for what?
By implication, an additional contribution of previous 
studies should be evident: the purpose of analysis or area 
of concern with the regional system governs the selection of 
issues for examination. This "purpose" may be merely 
theoretical interest in regional processes or it may have 
practical aspects. The scholar's aim or interest, as well as 
the identity of the person or agency concerned with the 
region, may influence the choice of points to be considered. 
Accordingly, analysis may be conducted for the enrichment of 
theoretical debate, or for the recommendation of actions.
Indeed, in the context of regional planning our concern 
is primarily with the activities which fundamentally compose 
and define the regional system. This focus is supported by 
various studies stressing the importance of non-spatial and
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not necessarily “surface-level" components of socio-economic 
and political processes in creating an understanding of 
regional systems (Stilwell, 1981; Massey, 1984). 
Specifically, the intent here is to identify the regional 
components that are most crucial in establishing the 
region's relative condition. Furthermore, our concern with 
the region is linked to practical rather than merely 
theoretical considerations (which may imbue feasibility 
aspects with an added importance). Thus stated, this intent 
requires clarification.
For the purpose of this discussion, "regional 
components" are defined as the specific elements (such as 
employment opportunities or demographic trends) of socio­
economic and organisational activities that characterise the 
region. "Crucial" refers to the role of components in the 
interactive activities, where it is assumed that components 
can be structured into a set of actions that will amplify 
the regional advantage vis-a-vis other systems.
On the practical level, our concern is directly 
connected with the issue of "change", also referred to in 
the literature as "development". Change is an intrinsic part 
of any reference to the region. Indeed, various studies seek 
to understand its different aspects in terms of volume, 
timing, location, and means to initiate change and affect 
its nature. Within the broad theoretical discussion of 
"change", the literature emphasises the direct connection 
between the type of change and the socio-economic system 
within which it takes place. This leads to a focus on the 
likelihood of certain changes being "marshaled" by given 
socio-economic organisations (e.g., elected institutions
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compared with urban protest movements), and to the 
determination of desirable and feasible changes in modern 
societies. Planning studies tend to add the actual- 
observable manifestations of political processes in order to 
link categories of changes with given spatial contexts 
("housing", for example, is rarely discussed within 
"regional" studies, whereas migration trends are selectively 
discussed in association with "urban" processes). In other 
words, specific types of changes are generally presumed to 
be associated with different spatial contexts of the social 
organisation.
Planning studies also share a common interest in 
"development", a term used to represent change of a 
"positive" nature of change desired by scholars and 
practitioners. Unexpectedly, although disparate theoretical 
attitudes of how the social system operates and how regions 
are integrated into such a system, most regional studies and 
plans express some egalitarian ideology in their concern 
with development and the desirable changes in regions. 
This is expressed in the continuous search for ways to 
offset regional inequalities (or the spatial manifestation 
of socio-economic imbalances).
This dissertation postulates that it basically is 
possible to initiate change within the regional system and 
in addition, influence events in the direction of "desired" 
change, with "desired" change being defined as improvement 
in the region's relative condition. This premise contradicts 
various approaches (such as that of the neo-Marxist school), 
which insist that the desired long-term change entails
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actions beyond planners' capabilities. These approaches deny 
the very possibility of planners contributing to the 
exercise of fundamental change in the regional system, 
because they assume them to be part of the "state apparatus" 
whose raison d'etre is to maintain the status quo.
It is further argued here that concentration on 
specific regional components can have a material effect on 
the nature of the larger change being envisioned. This 
assumes that the initiation of change in some areas of 
activity can create an effect much greater than that of the 
initial action. This, in turn, presumes the existence of an 
accumulative effect in regional processes (e.g., Myrdal's 
"trickling" effect, 1957), whereby any action may provoke 
processes that develop in either positive or negative 
directions ("positive" and "negative" being subjective 
evaluations). Thus, those (planners, in particular) who are 
deemed to have a limited area of influence may discover that 
their initiatives can be put into practice through directing 
their efforts to specific sets of activities. In other 
words, planners' ability to impact on events and stimulate 
changes cannot be dismissed.
In fact, regional analysis and planning is chiefly a 
matter of dealing with the issue of "change". Because 
"change" lies at the root of regional processes, the 
selection of critical components should satisfy a major 
criterion: namely, they should be those with the potential 
to have crucial effects on regional change.
Since our concern is with the stimulation of regional 
change, the criterion can be further specified as the 
vulnerability of components to change, that is, the
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likelihood that a given regional component may bring forth, 
and take the lead in changes within the entire regional 
system. In other words, it is proposed that the regional 
components relevant to our purpose are those most likely to 
be affected by planning practice, and which will at the same 
time "pull" other components in a similar direction, thus 
initiating the desired change as defined above (i.e., 
improving the relative condition of the regional system).
To sum up, it is argued here that regional analysis is 
concerned with the determination of patterns of interactions 
between social activities, and with the components 
determining the nature of these interactions. Although 
different theoretical perspectives regarding the nature of 
regional systems may be employed, nevertheless, the actual 
choice of perspective must be linked to practical 
considerations regarding its role within regional processes, 
rather than to mere analytical purposes.
Still to be resolved is the question of the 
determination and selection of regional components for 
planning use. The following section proposes a 
methodological framework for the selection of crucial 
components.
40
The Determinants of Regional Structure
In view of the nature of regional systems (e.g., complexity, 
constant change), it is both irrelevant and impractical to 
attempt to determine invariable, universally applicable 
crucial components of regional processes. This is due to the 
simple fact that different nations and their regions may 
operate differently. For example, the decline of subsistence 
family farming in Israel, as throughout the Western world, 
is part of certain social-economic processes that have 
resulted in the reorganisation of the national political- 
economic system. However, unlike in Britain, for example, 
the farming production processes in Israel serves three 
different roles in the national political economy, and, 
depending on the specific sub-national area, may be 
identified with different importance: the Kibbutz system 
which can be associated with a distinct segment of 
capitalist control of the means of production, the Workers' 
Moshav system that is simply part of the national 
consumption processes, and particular political minority 
groups that are excluded from major state organisations, 
and, in Castells' (1977) terms, from labour reproduction 
processes. These parts of the farming system have rather 
clear functional and spatial manifestations, and thus must 
be considered separately in the regional analysis of the 
Israeli system. Therefore, in our attempt to establish a 
general framework for regional analysis, to go so far as to 
suggest that the family farming process is necessarily a 
relevant or irrelevant element of the regional processes may 
be misleading.
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As an alternative to the "fixed rule approach"/ it is 
proposed here that the major categories of activities 
within the regional system, those most important to regional 
processes and the determination of a region's relative 
condition, should be identified as a basic framework; within 
this framework, the components that are crucial within 
specific contexts will come to light. These categories 
should facilitate the determination of crucial components, 
which their further reduction to specific elements of the 
regional system provides a basis for an understanding of 
concrete cases and for action.
An analysis of regional processes in light of available 
theoretical approaches and studies of planning experience 
suggests that among the broad categories of activities 
mentioned above that structure the region (i.e., economic, 
social, and institutional), the ones most crucial for 
strategic purposes are production and institutional 
activities. "Production" refers to the structure of both the 
direct productive process itself, as characterised by the 
area of production, and the way the process operates (e.g., 
type and size of the firm, its headquarters-branch 
structure, status of ownership, labour composition, etc.), 
as well as the productive environment: support services 
(financial, offices, etc.), educational system, and 
technological infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications). 
"Institutional processes" pertain to the political and 
administrative decision-making by which resource allocation 
is managed. This emphasis on production is supported by 
Castells (1977) and the trend of thought developed on the 
structuralist argumentation (e.g., Stilwell, 1980; Massey,
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1984)), which holds that the organisation of means of 
production and unequal development of productive forces form 
the essence of "the regional question". Political- 
administrative activities are .important in that they 
demarcate the functional decision-making milieu of 
production activities by affecting the scale of the impact 
of production processes on the regional system.
From a more pragmatic point of view, production processes 
can be more easily influenced by individuals, and thus are 
more "comfortable" targets for planning operation. Political 
adminstrative activities determine the planning operational 
environment. Simply expressed, production processes have a 
potential direct affect on major characteristics of the 
regional system, such as social structure and social 
relations, demographic trends, or patterns of private 
investment; political-administrative processes, in turn, 
represent the decision-making arena within which the 
potential impact of production processes is determined.
The essential aspect of these categories of components 
is that they usually determine the vast majority of regional 
characteristics with which they are directly and indirectly 
associated. For example, the potential impact of both 
categories with respect to linkages to various 
characteristics of the regional system, as illustrated 
below, shows that both categories of activities may be 
linked to most regional processes. The role of the 
production system may manifest itself in its impact on the 
social structure, in terms of effects on population 
migration trends and socio-economic composition, as
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determined by job opportunities. It may impact the region's, 
economic structure by measures that affect income levels, 
and, therefore, demand for services. Both of these may 
affect and be affected by the physical and technological 
infrastructure, which also helps determine the nature of 
production processes. The role of the political- 
administrative system may manifest itself in its impact on 
investments and entrepreneurial conditions, by means of 
fiscal policies, its impact on demographic trends, social 
structure, and economic processes, by determining the 
availability of services such as housing and communications, 
as well as its impact on production activities, by 
determining the availability of services such as education.
The major implications of this emphasis on the above 
categories of activities, as determinants of the regional 
relative condition, are consistent with the principles 
expounded in this paper:
a. The "openness" of the regional system, a conseguence of 
the fact that the stated activities operate on 
different organisational levels of the social system.
b. The intrinsic flexibility of regional boundaries 
demonstrated in the analysis, this being subject to 
various aspects of the above dynamic activities.
Both of these aspects require an analysis not confined to 
the "regional" level alone.
c. Elimination of issues of lesser concern: production and 
institutional activities are regarded as primary forces
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behind regional processes,
d. Regional systems are distinct not in types of activity, 
but rather in specific attributes of activities such as 
scale, intensity, and specific roles within larger 
systems. In other words, the crucial focus of analysis 
is the composition of components within a specific 
context.
The practical implication of this determination of 
crucial activities is fairly clear: the scholar or planner 
may thereby place planning initiatives within predefined 
conceptual boundaries, avoiding an inefficient division of 
efforts. Furthermore, since these activities occur on 
different levels of social system organisation (i.e., 
different "effective spaces"), any reference to them 
requires a multidimensional analysis, in which linkages 
within the regional system and between it and other systems 
come to light.
Thus far, the first stage in determining the structure 
of a region, and hence its relative condition, consists of 
the identification of the nature of production and 
political-administrative activities insofar as they 
establish regional components crucial to the region's 
processes. The way to proceed, then, is by identifying the 
specific elements of the above activities that play crucial 
roles in stimulating the relative condition of a concrete 
region. Indeed, this premise is an essential aspect of the 
theoretical perspective taken here on regional processes, as 
suggested above in the argument favouring selective concern
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with regional components.
This dissertation asserts that specific crucial 
regional components and elements may be distinguished only 
with reference to individual cases; however, it is still 
necessary to construct a methodology that will facilitate 
the implementation of this principle. In other words, a 
methodology is needed to guide the uncovering of the
specific factors within the above categories of activities
affecting the region's relative condition, and those 
particularly relevant to pursuit its competitive advantage. 
It is therefore suggested that the method best suited to 
this task is one based on the identification of key factors 
of development. "Key factors" are defined as those regional 
components that are most crucial within the regional 
functional system and, therefore, the most relevant for 
practical purposes. As argued above, they are likely to fall 
within production and political-administrative activities.
The proposed method involves a procedure reminiscent of 
systems analysis, reducing the regional system to components 
that are reintegrated on the basis of their role in (or type 
of impact on) regional processes. Thus defined, the issue of 
"key factors" becomes controversial, not merely because of 
the technical difficulty of the selection procedure, but 
rather because of the conceptual implications of the
rationale behind the attempt to conduct an analysis of this
type. This conceptual problem arises within the mainstream 
of theoretical planning debate, which clearly indicates a 
trend toward rejection of those approaches that seek to deal 
with planning issues in a rational, systematic manner, as 
with "systems analysis" or "rational comprehensive" theory.
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These approaches and their modifications are rejected as 
impractical, misleading (based on the policies they 
produced), or irrelevant as planning tools. Furthermore, 
they are alleged to underestimate crucial socio-structural 
processes, to be unable to deal with intangible aspects of 
processes, and to reduce the planning process into a mere 
technical exercise, remote from reality. Indeed, there seems 
instead to be a general shift toward the casting of regional 
processes into prestructured conceptual frameworks, which 
present clear criteria for choosing issues of analytical 
relevance. This is a trend that emphasises the conceptual 
rather than practical aspects of analysis.
My practical experience and that of other fellow 
planners, however, shows that regional systems analysis and 
the setting of regional policies entails a combination of 
both approaches: an attempt to utilise the methodological 
means of rational/systematic analysis while integrating it 
into a coherent conceptual framework as an explanatory base. 
In so doing, one rejects conceptual pretensions of total 
objectivity in analysis and the fiction of a completely 
exhaustive consideration of all possible components.
The question remains as to how key factors are selected 
and how the specific selection is explained in analytical 
terms, since this undoubtedly affects the content of policy. 
The approach advocated in this dissertation treats the 
practical and theoretical dimensions of planning as equally 
important. It assumes that the theoretical underpinnings of 
a given planning initiative do not rule out the need for 
systematic analysis, and that the latter does not 
necessarily imply an attempt to achieve comprehensiveness
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and absolute objectivity in either analysis or action. 
Indeed, as argued above, the conceptual perspective on 
regional processes taken here assumes that two categories of 
social activities (i.e, production and political- 
organisational) are the most important for regional 
processes. Thus, they are presumed to constitute the area in 
which crucial regional components or development factors 
should be identified.
With this in view, the proposed methodological framework is 
presented below.
Key Factors of Development (KFD)
As previously stated, the appropriate method for 
tackling this type of investigation is based on the 
identification of "key factors of development" (KFD), and is 
grounded in an understanding of strategic business 
principles (as these were presented to me by a director of 
"Intel-Israel Ltd.").2 The KFD method is basically a process 
of restructuring regional components in accordance with 
their role within a specific "process-tree" or "cluster- 
analysis" (Baki, 1965). This, in turn, is structured on the 
basis of a thoroughgoing analysis of the regional system, in 
the course of which major characteristics are identified and 
their interrelations revealed. The advantage of this method 
is that it permits one to perceive the regional system as 
relative to other systems, and to concentrate on actions or 
processes that may alter regional strength.
48
The method proposed for the determination of KFD is composed.
of the following four stages:
a. Specification of regional characteristics, supported by 
comparative analysis for the adjustment of qualitative 
criteria (including general indices, such as high/low 
performance). At this stage, it is possible to list all 
types of characteristics or to present them within 
their functional group.
b. Discovery of possible problematic aspects and 
interrelations among components. This stage is based on 
analysis of both a concrete system and other relevant 
systems, and may be presented in a simple "issue 
diagram". It is a crucial stage for determining one's 
interest in a given region.
The presentation of solution-oriented questions may be 
an efficient way of determining problematics and 
linkages between components. "Solution oriented" 
questions^ are those so phrased as to point in the 
direction of a solution, as distinguished from 
questions that lead to a "dead end" (Intel-Israel, 
1983). For example, a process of high out-migration 
rate may be approached in different ways: "What can be 
done to lower the rate?", "Can the region maintain 
these migrants?", "Can the region absorb in-migrants?" 
The latter two questions clearly permit further 
analysis; the former fails to indicate a direction for 
further work, and to permit the penetration of ideas 
that do not necessarily fall within conventional 
approaches to the stimulation of regional changes. This 
attitude is also useful for limiting the areas
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potentially subject to change to those where relatively 
higher impact can be generated.
c. Identification of aspects that are critical with 
respect to their location in the previously identified 
linkages. Once again, this stage is based on the above- 
mentioned identified linkages. It also rests on a 
conceptual perspective as to the structure of the 
region and its major functional processes. In our 
example, such aspects may be the housing market or job 
supply.
d. Determination of development-conductive components
within the critical aspects previously identified. 
These components, identified in the course of the 
analytical process, are the crux of the entire method, 
since they provide the grounds for the actual 
determination of development strategy. In other words, 
they are the elements on which the relative advantage 
of the regional system may be promoted. Such components 
may be telecommunication infrastructure, rental housing 
supply or education facilities.
It is suggested that the procedure be applied with 
special reference to the major regional activities, that is, 
production and political-administrative, though not 
necessarily.
In sum, the identification of key factors within the 
regional system is argued to be a prerequisite for the 
attempt to affect a region's relative condition. This method 
should not be perceived as merely a technical procedure, for 
only by means of imagination thinking is it possible to
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scrutinize processes and accentuate their major components, 
which may not necessarily be visible at first glance. 
Neither should this method be viewed as an "objective" way 
of coping with problems, since it is by necessity affected 
by the analyst's value judgment.
Finally, this method seems most appropriate for 
strategic purposes, because it permits the analyst or 
planner to focus rather than diffuse his or her efforts.
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CONCLUSIONS
The regional system and its major characteristics, as 
defined in this chapter, present a great challenge to those 
who intend to deal with them. This is because the "region" 
is so defined as to permit a wide variety of elements and 
criteria to determine its concrete content and parameters, 
depending upon the specific purpose of concern.
This definition entails a great disadvantage, connected 
with the "freedom" it grants to those interested in 
regional systems. It may also obviate the possibility of 
inter-regional comparison. In this regard, however, it is 
argued that as long as the criteria are clearly specified, 
there is no justification for the rejection of any type of 
regional definition merely because it is different from 
others. This is especially important in view of the 
particular advantage of this approach: its ability to deal 
with regional activities in the context best suited to the 
specific purposes.
Notes
(1) To mobilise resources implies, to affect their distribution and composition.
(2) This method was presented by M r.D.Duchan, 1986.
(3) Ibid.
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Chapter 3:
SEEKING LONG TERM CHANGE - THE 
DECISION MAKING ARENA
Introduction
As argued in the previous chapter, the relative 
condition of a region is established through a process of 
competition over available resources. Since the nature and 
consequences of the competition are determined by the 
resource allocation process, which provides a means for 
increasing the region's competitive advantage, it is 
essential to deal with the mechanism of allocation (i.e., 
management). This chapter therefore is concerned with the 
management of resource allocation processes, and with the 
decision-makers who are viewed as the potential managers of 
this process.
Stating such a broad interest immediately draws 
attention to a complex of issues related to political and 
economic decision-making processes that have been 
investigated from a wide range of theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. However, in view of this dissertation's task 
to set up a methodological framework for planning function 
exercised in a socio-economic context, we shall address 
ourselves to a very limited selection of aspects, and mainly 
to the way in which they should be conceived by planners. 
This might be viewed as committing an injustice against 
prevailing theories and studies, both in not discussing them
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thoroughly and in mixing them together. It is in this 
context, however, that a contribution can be made in 
structuring the major trends of thought in a way most useful 
for planning practice.
What do planners need? They need to be able to 
understand the political-administrative decision-making 
arena, because, simply stated, planning function operates 
within this system. Friend (1976), for example, suggests 
that planners need to acquire two types of skills: the 
technical ability to analyse the complex issues of urban and 
regional processes, and the ability "to work within an 
intricate decision-making context of interacting agencies, 
professions and political forces" (p. 25). Furthermore, not 
only are the traditional analytical tools often insufficient 
(Friend, 1976 ), they also should deal with a greater 
complexity of interorganisational arrangements (Friend, 
1980; Baer, 1977). Indeed, since planners are not in direct 
control of resources, and since they are equipped with a 
wide body of knowledge that sometimes confuses the 
profession's practical codes, there is a need to seek a 
framework within which their knowledge can be fit and 
utilised. In this chapter, therefore, we try to clarify a 
useful way in which the decision-making system should be 
perceived, and the expectations planners may have with 
regard to the responses of decision-makers to their 
initiatives.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part 
sets up the decision-making determinants that can assist 
planners with identifying in which dimensions of the
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decision-making processes they may function. The second part 
attempts to reveal the usefulness of the decision-making 
determinants that were classified in the first part, and the 
types of responses on the part of decision-makers toward 
which planners may aim.
3.1 Resource Allocation Processes
As previously argued, the distribution of resources is 
the essence of a region's competitive condition, and this is 
governed by different social-economic forces. Generally, 
three broadly defined categories of resources can be 
identified: financial-material (capital, other tangibles); 
human (skills, knowledge, and other human capabilities); and 
socio-political (votes, organisational capabilities, 
personal contacts),^- all of which are closely interrelated 
(Saunders, 1979). The strong links between various types of 
resources may be illustrated as follows: decision-making 
control can be obtained by the expenditure of capital (e.g., 
the ability to "buy" votes) (Werner, 1983), or by the use of 
skills in order to persuade decision-makers to act in a way 
that suits one's interests and needs (Doron, 1986). 
Conversely, one's ability to affect decision-makers, 
originating in professional skills and personal contacts, 
may be used to increase privately owned capital (Werner, 
1983). The essential point is that the interrelations of 
different types of resources tends to lend these resources a 
cumulative effect (Saunders, 1979), by which access to one 
category facilitates access to others. For example, 
ownership of financial resources may provide opportunities 
for enriching skills (e.g., costly university degree) or
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enhance access to a political party campaign. This is not to 
imply that access to financial resources necessarily paves 
the way to political power,^ or the ability to control 
publicly owned resources, let alone leads to any actual 
attempt to (acquire and) exercise this potential. One kind 
of access merely leads to another, and this, in turn, 
provides footing for an attempt to gain access to other 
categories. "Access" to resources is, therefore, the 
potential ability to make use of resources according to 
one's own criteria. Further, it is associated with the 
notion of political power and power distribution, as 
suggested by Saunders (1979) and others: "those who control 
the scarce and crucial material resources in society are 
also often those who enjoy the closest and more effective 
contacts with government" (p. 23). Thus, "the possibilities 
for effective political action are unevenly distributed ..." 
(Saunders, op. cit., p. 23).
The concept of "resource allocation" (i.e., decision­
making or actions taken toward the distribution of 
resources) generally is viewed as the essence of any context 
of political decision-making. "Resource allocation" 
therefore is a public-political activity that deserves 
theoretical and practical attention. It is distinct from 
individualised spending and investments in volume of 
resources concerned, magnitude of impact, and, most 
importantly, in distributional implications and their 
association with social-economic externalities. According to 
this line of thought, certain activities even of individuals 
(such as the case of Edmond Hammer's contribution to Project
56
Renewal in Israel) are considered political.^ This 
distinction is associated with financial allocations that 
are channeled through the political system, and have 
widespread impact. Nonetheless, public "resource allocation" 
is an important element affecting distribution of private 
resources.
In the context of planning studies, the issue of 
resource allocation and its spatial implications is the 
subject of much concern, as this is a major element of 
public intervention as manifested in land uses. Clearly, 
patterns of resource allocation are an important expression 
of the framework within, and the way in which, planning 
function operates. Indeed, planning studies are interested 
in the way resources are mobilised in order to affect land 
use patterns, land values, and land development. 
Explanations of the planning function are now given mostly 
in terms of the planner's role vis-a-vis different interest 
groups and the scope of public intervention in specific 
socio-economic contexts.
In practice, the object of regional plans and of many 
public policies (the "region" and its specific components) 
tends to be analysed from two widely divergent perspectives: 
a structural view of the region as a spatial case of 
national/worldwide socio-economic processes, and an 
economic-behavioural view of the region as the functional 
system of individuals and firms; these latter are more often 
associated with their role as migrants or entrepreneurs, or 
with their relocation activities. The above components 
become integrated into discussions of political systems and 
political resource allocation processes when their links to
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the political system (e.g., as interest groups) can be 
identified.
An analysis of different planning experiences indicates 
that planners, too, are interested in this process, but from 
a different perspective: although planners probably have 
assumptions regarding the socio-economic and political 
context into which plans and their expected results should 
fit, these remain implicit in the planning product (e.g., a 
plan, a written document). It would be quite unlikely to 
find plans that deal with the question of why resources are 
allocated one way or another. Instead, plans specify where 
resources should be allocated, sometimes when and at what 
magnitude or proportions, and, most importantly, plans 
concentrate on the results of the recommended patterns of 
public resource allocation; these mostly are expressed at 
the level of individuals, firms, and concrete spatial- 
functional components such as roads.
In other words, planning studies (including analysis of 
planning experience) on the one hand, and planning 
activities on the other hand, often operate from within 
different spheres of interest with regard to the issue of 
resource allocation: the former is interested in explaining 
the impact of public intervention within a wide social 
context, whereas the latter is interested in the actual 
response of individuals, firms and local-specific forces to 
the intervention, and avoids concern with their "context". I 
daresay that planners tend to disregard their (even 
unconsciously) assumed political context.
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This disparity is understandable from the planners' 
point of view, given their concern with the manifest content 
of the planning product: unless specifically relevant (e.g., 
required), it is not within the planning product's scope to 
specify an assumed perspective regarding how the socio­
economic system operates. Its task is rather to facilitate 
communication on the basis of concrete issues and 
recommendations (as further discussed). Thus, a discussion 
of the "how" the system operates may prove irrelevant and 
exhausting for those interested in the practical 
implications of the planning product. This state of affairs, 
however, should be modified so as to allow the knowledge 
gained through various theoretical discussions and 
assessments of previous planning experiences to be 
integrated into planning practice. This knowledge should 
provide planners with greater understanding of their 
functional environment, thus improving their ability to 
estimate plans' feasibility and the appropriateness of tools 
to promote the integration of plans into decision-making 
processes. This still does not to imply that the planning 
product should present the planners' perspective regarding 
the "why" question; the way this knowledge should be 
integrated into the planning process is elaborated at an 
advanced stage of the dissertation. What is in fact argued 
here is that regardless of planners' assumed socio-economic 
and political planning environment, their perspective should 
be integrated into the planning practice. Implicitly, a 
change in the way planners perceive the planning process may 
(though not necessarily) lead to a different planning 
product and process.
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In view of the argument that answers to questions of 
when and how changes are to be established and resource 
allocation affected should be conceived of within the 
"context" of planning practice and with a clear perspective 
on the "why" questions, this chapter classifies decision­
making determinants in a way that enables planners to apply 
any assumed planning context; the elements of public 
intervention and non-public decision-making that should be 
considered by planners are set in a framework that may be 
particularly useful for planning practice. The application 
of this classification is discussed in the following 
chapters.
The process of resource allocation is assumed to be 
determined by initial availability of resources, access 
thereto, and the motivation (need and desire) to take 
advantage of potential access. The former determinants refer 
to the extent and nature of resources that may be mobilised 
according to one's own criteria. The latter refers to the 
motivation to put the mobilisation potential into practice. 
Saunders (1979) introduces several basic arguments about the 
nature of the decision-making processes that take place in 
this context:
* The availability of resources does not necessarily 
imply what will be done with the resources, or that any 
attempt will be made to change states of availability.
* The availability of resources does, however, facilitate 
the ability to influence the distribution of resources. 
Thus, resources are one source of power with which to 
influence the distribution of other resources.
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* The types and extent of available resources determine 
the potential ability to influence allocation.
* The motivation to influence the distribution of 
resources originates in access to resources, coupled 
with additional factors such as the prospective gain or 
loss of resources resulting from a particular decision, 
or the ability to estimate these gains or losses before 
decisions are made.
In practice, therefore, any attempt to affect resource 
allocation is concerned with the distribution of:
1. Elements permitting access to resources, as
representing the basic state of control over resources 
and its associated political power in a specific 
historical context.
2. Forces promoting the exercise of potential access,
representing the various elements formulating the case 
for involvement in decision-making.
The first category of decision-making determinants is 
important insofar as it reveals the given socio-economic 
relations that govern political and functional environment 
within which planners operate and attempt to promote the 
implementation of plans. The second category reflects the 
context-specific argument of most theoretical perspectives 
that allows local-specific exercise of power relations in 
accordance with or in opposition to the principle conceptual 
framework and its rules regarding the way decision-making 
operates. It is important for planning practice because it 
provides a basis for the integration of these forces into
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the planning process. This category shows how the planning 
process may be integrated into the decision-making system 
that controls resource allocations.
Finally, in the context of the broad theoretical and 
empirical concern with "decision-making", the literature 
convincingly argues for the case of viewing "non-decision­
makers" as integral elements in the decision-making 
processes (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Saunders, 1979). 
We will not refer to this measure of social relations as a 
separate issue. However, the argument that planners should 
focus on active and observable patterns of decision-making 
implies a reference to those voluntarily excluded from 
decision-making, rather than to those forced out of such 
processes. In practice, planners may choose to concentrate 
on the latter group, and offer their services to them. In 
such cases, they will also attempt to make non-decision- 
makers publicly stress their interests.
3.1.1 Elements Permitting Access to Resources
This category embraces the elementary characteristics 
of decision-makers that determine their basic state of 
control over resources, and the potential political power 
associated with it. Although these characteristics are 
essentially given to planners, awareness of them is crucial. 
According to available studies, to speak of elements 
permitting access to resources is, in fact, to address the 
question of who controls the decision-making processes by 
which resource are allocated.
An extensive concern with the question of "who governs
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our life" is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as is an 
intent to seek for the theoretical approach that may be 
particularly relevant to any given planning practice.^ 
Rather, our task to formulate a framework for planning 
practice suggests that we may limit our concern to one major 
question associated with the distribution of potential 
power: who are the "partners" of planners in the planning 
process? "Partners" are those decision-makers through which 
planners may wish to affect distribution of resources. In 
view of the status of planning functions, planners who wish 
to integrate the planning product into the decision-making 
process presumably will seek out those forces in the social 
system that have the potential to advance this task, 
implementation thereto. This argument is based on the 
premise that elements permitting access to resources are 
basically given to planners, and cannot be subject to change 
from direct planning initiatives.
The literature highlights three types of potential 
partners: the owners of material wealth, the elected system, 
and the extended non-elected state apparatus and 
individuals. Furthermore, the literature offers two measures 
for classifying potential decision-makers' power, relevant 
to planning, that arise from two types of access to 
resources: the potential power that originates from direct 
availability of resources, and the potential control that 
originates from decision-makers' roles in the socio-economic 
system that create access to resources. These categories are 
distinct in the sense that whereas the first group 
represents a power potential that is not necessarily 
directly activated, the second group represents those
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actually exercising power. The following section emphasises 
the importance of these measures of potential power 
distribution for planners' search for "partners".
a. Direct availability of resources.
This measure concerns the links between the 
availability of economic resources that can be transformed 
into capital, and patterns of resource allocation. "Direct 
availability" in this case refers to ownership of these 
resources. Such a position is taken as the extreme case of 
decision-makers' freedom in having the "last word" in 
decisions regarding owned capital, and in strongly affecting 
other decisions. This position may be shared, for example, 
by individuals, industrial firms, large private businesses 
and corporations, or the banking system. We shall refer to 
them in the aggregate as the "business sector". This sector 
may also include a political party that owns assets and in 
many cases functions according to the interests of the 
business, and in contradiction to the party's principles 
(for example, such conflicts often occur between the Labour 
Federation, which owns the Workers' Bank, and the Labour 
Party in Israel).
The pluralist perspective (Pahl, 1961) holds that the 
different elements structuring the "business sector" may not 
amount to more than a flexible group that is organised in 
specific cases of mutual interest, and will not maintain a 
permanent dominant role. However, most studies prove the 
opposite, such that this category may be clearly identified 
over a course of time and in concrete socio-political
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context. Over the last twenty years, Israel, for example, 
has experienced a constant growth of the "business sector", 
which consists of banks, several private entrepreneurs 
(industrialists and land developers), and a few 
international industrial firms (Hashimshoni, 1983). This 
sector is increasing its influence on state economic and 
land development policies, gradually replacing the 
"developer" role of the government associated with the first 
decades of the state. Recently, with the developers becoming 
more closely linked with the banking system and the state 
becoming "poorer", there are signs of private investments 
even in the peripheral regions, which until few years ago 
were completely dominated by the government system (e.g., 
construction or industrial development in the settlements 
are no longer strictly government affairs) (refer for 
example to Massey and Catalano, 1978, for an analysis of the 
British system).
Direct availability of resources generally is argued 
(by different theoretical approaches and for different 
reasons) to be advantageous for those enjoying this position 
(although not only for them). Saunders (1979), for example, 
argues that "material wealth constitutes one of a number of 
key potential political resources" (p. 23). Buying votes 
(Werner, 1983), is only one example of this potential
c
influence. Ownership of material resources may enable the 
owners to press their interests in the political system 
(e.g., the "property lobby" discussed by Colenutt, 1975, as 
quoted in Kirk, 1980, p. 61; or the attainment of 
development contracts discussed in Werner, 1983). Such 
interests may easily be advanced when structured within the
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government system (Bilski, 1980), as in the Israeli case of 
the representatives of the agricultural sector that serve in 
the Water Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
determine water quotas and prices. In fact, the 
structuralist point of view that political decision-making 
is relatively advantageous to capitalist interests (at least 
long-term interests) is clearly supported by the Israeli 
government's "shares regulation" of the late 1970s, which 
proved most profitable for Israeli Banks, rather than for 
the "public" that was supposed to enjoy the 
(unrealistically) high share values and a stable national 
economy. From a different perspective, the ownership of 
material wealth may also be useful in coping with the 
complex bureaucracy and the constraints it imposes on those 
it attempts to serve (Kirk, 1980; Werner, 1983). Finally, 
private capital may in theory be used to finance protest 
groups, although little evidence supports this possibility 
(Dunleavy, 1980b, Hasson, 1983).
In practice, however, different theoretical accounts 
strongly suggest that the initial advantage in political 
decision-making that stems from availability of resources 
and the possibility of promoting interests should not be 
taken as a necessary stimulus for active participation in 
such processes, planning thereto (either because such 
interests are not endangered [pluralist-elite], or because 
they are secured, by the state system, for example [neo- 
Marxist]). In fact, most theoretical perspectives consent 
that the vast majority of "business sector's" members are 
more likely not to be actively involved in actual political 
decision-making. This, however, is not to be confused with
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involuntary non-involvement (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; 
Saunders, 1979).
Further, the links direct availability - active 
involvement may be partly associated with the notion of 
"political awareness" (i.e., awareness of the potential 
power that exists in such a position) (Kirk, 1980; Colosi, 
1983). The case of the Israeli entrepreneur, Mr. Vertheim,^ 
indicates a great awareness on the part of the private owner 
of his ability to mobilise the interest of the Labour Party 
so as to secure his wealth. Indeed, his offer to buy the 
collapsing government industrial firm of Beit-Shemesh was 
viewed by Labour as a major contribution to maintain its 
electoral base in this town. Importantly, this experience 
indicates that even full awareness of individuals of their 
potential power does not necessarily imply their involvement 
in the system: the individuals actively attempting to affect 
public decisions will limit their efforts to specific issues 
where particular interests can be satisfied. Such a task- 
specific involvement may nonetheless result in the creation 
of distributional effects (e.g., the establishment of the 
Kefar Havradim settlement in Western Galil,7 and its impact 
on the nearby town of Ma'alot). In this regard, an economic 
rationale that views the business sector as more sensitive 
to the inherent risks of decision-making, and hence more 
likely to be deterred from mobilising resources around 
issues entailing a high degree of uncertainty, may prove 
useful to planners interested in ways to generate responses 
from individual entrepreneurs to public initiatives. This 
rather individualistic measure of participation in resource 
allocation processes should not be underestimated.
If we want to estimate the likelihood that elements 
from the business sector will anticipate planning 
perspectives and effectively promote implementation, we have 
to consider where planners function from. Bearing in mind 
that planners and planning functions are mostly associated 
with public sector activities, several scholars (e.g., 
Kirk, 1980; Colosi, 1983; Friend 1976) suggest that the 
business sector may refuse to cooperate with public sector 
planners, although there are situations in which some 
confrontation is inevitable due to the planner's official 
role (e.g., in a city's planning commission) (Schon, 1982). 
The Israeli case of the Region 2000 project in the 1980s, 
which incorporated private and public initiatives to develop 
Western Galil (discussed in the following part of this 
dissertation), shows the relevance of this argument. Some
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members of the public committee for this project refused 
to work with the planners, who were employees of a public 
organisation. They did, however, offer to hire planners 
themselves, and to manage the planning of Region 2000 from 
within the private sector.9 Indeed, most studies focus on 
the role of the planners as public employees. In particular, 
not much is offered on the possibility of regional plans 
being managed and initiated in the business sector, nor on 
planners' relations with "capitalists", as compared with the 
extensive discussions available on their interest in the 
poor, those politically obstructed from participation, and 
those financially unable to press their interests (e.g., 
discussions of planning advocacy, public participation), let 
alone the possibility of planners purposely serving capital 
interests through involvement in the public sector (as
opposed, for example, to their proposed role as state 
employees who supposedly unconsciously serve long-term 
capitalist interests). However, the possibility of 
cooperation between the business sector and planners, who 
may be either public or private employees, cannot be 
overruled merely because it is rarely discussed. In spite of 
the constraints the business sector imposes on the 
initiation and management of plans, it is not impossible for 
planners to wisely stimulate this sector to act, as will be 
discussed further on.
In all, the direct availability of resources as a measure of 
potential power in decision-making processes clarifies two 
aspects relevant to planning practice: first, it may be 
prudent to seek "partners" in the business sector, insofar 
as planners are concerned with mobilising privately owned 
capital. Second, the business sector, which confines to a 
strong element affecting political-economic decision-making 
and public resource allocation, is most unlikely to be 
actively involved in the political system in a systematic 
way, and if this is the case, involvement in the political- 
administrative system takes place within a very limited, 
specific task-oriented scope. Thus, planners who find such 
involvement relevant should carefully assess concrete cases 
in which private active involvement may be stimulated.
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b. Indirect availability of resources.
This category refers to the availability of resources 
that is linked to the role or status of organisations and 
individuals in the political-administrative system; these 
determine the type and magnitude of resources affected by 
the decision-making organisations and individuals with the 
potential power to affect resource mobilisation. The effect 
on decision-making discussed here is basically a result of 
purposeful intention. In some cases this category may 
overlap the previous category, mainly when those enjoying 
direct availability of resources form part of the political 
decision-making system.
Perhaps the most obvious "candidate" for political 
power in liberal democracies is the elected system. This is 
suggested by early pluralist approaches that viewed this 
system as capable of making decisions and managing resource 
allocation in a way that satisfied the majority of interests 
and wants prevailing in the social system (Dahl, 1961; 
Nicholls, 1975). Most theoretical discussions, however, seem 
to have come to terms with the idea that political power 
extends beyond the electoral representatives. This is 
explained, for example, by the inability of electoral 
institutions to adjust themselves to meet the growing 
complexity and volume of political issues that are 
officially the responsibility of, and should be handled by, 
the different tiers of the elected system (Kleinberg, 1973). 
Indeed, most of the literature seems to share a view of an 
increasingly weakened electoral politics, as compared with 
an increasingly powerful, extended, non-elected political- 
administrative system and different non-government interest
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groups (Dunleavy, 1980a). Even an attempt (Doron, 1986) to 
argue for the importance of the electoral system by 
suggesting that this system still bears official 
responsibility for the consequences of decisions does not 
contradict the common view that the exercise of political 
power is not a matter of "who signs the paper at the end of 
the day", but rather of who determines whether and when the 
papers will be signed.
The diffusion of the electoral system is viewed in 
several ways. An elite perspective might stress the strong 
impact of non-elected individuals, and, in opposition to 
pluralist democratic principles, will define the flexibility 
of elected decision-makers mainly in terms of the demands 
and interests of elite groups - this system will be far less 
responsive to non-elite members or to members of competing 
elite groups (Michels, 1959). These elite groups may be 
large private corporations (Pahl and Winkler, 1974), or 
socio-cultural groups that have maintained their initial 
historical advantage over other groups (e.g., advantage 
gained by virtue of being the first in the country - Israel 
[Mishal, 1971]). This perspective suggests that in order to 
affect, for example, resource allocations, it is not 
necessary to operate within the state apparatus. Rather, 
individuals and social groups are provided with the 
opportunity to make their interests sound through personal 
contacts and strong relations with political administrators. 
This possibility may be useful for the promotion of an idea 
or a plan (Friend, 1976). Another type of theoretical 
approach emphasises the strength of the bureaucracy in the 
political system. Be it part of a political interest group
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(Dunleavy, 1980b), or an autonomous entity interested in its. 
own survival (Appleby, 1949), the responsibility for forging 
policies into concrete practices, the diversity of issues 
managed by the public bureaucracy, and the magnitude of 
information stocked in this system, are held to be the main 
elements establishing the strength of this non-elected and 
supposedly "objective” system of civil servants (Landau, 
1969). The bureaucracy may also have the advantage over 
elected politicians insofar as its position is basically 
secured (Kramer, 1977). Nevertheless, protest groups may 
also provide an alternative for affecting political system 
(Castells, 1977), although examples such as the British 
(Dunleavy, 1982b) and Israeli experiences (Hasson, 1983) 
suggest that this potential power is not easily 
materialised.
In all, the extended state apparatus that enjoys access 
to resources regardless of (though not unrelated to) its 
ownership status, may provide planners with useful grounds 
for integrating their initiatives into political- 
administrative decision-making processes, especially, but 
not necessarily, if they operate within this system. As 
noted, however, most theories associate public decision­
making with an orientation toward some type of stability in 
socio-economic relations. Therefore, mostly planners who are 
in accord with this principal direction of decisions will 
find "partners" from the extended state system useful. Those 
planners working toward a result at odds with the prevailing 
governmental winds may find it difficult to identify 
potential partners. Thus, depending on their perspective on 
political power distribution, planners should carefully
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assess the system within which they wish to operate or on 
which they wish to exercise influence, be it a certain elite 
group, a protest group, or individuals within a political 
party.
To sum up, the above measures represent one aspect of 
the environment within which resource allocation is 
exercised, a basic framework within which one can identify 
potential responsiveness to decisions, and the types of 
resources most likely to be mobilised. Importantly, both 
elements permitting access to resources refer merely to a 
potential access (as previously defined), whereas the 
realisation of this potential might not necessarily occur. 
In fact, as various scholars argue, cases of active attempts 
to materialise potential access are fairly rare.
These measures are not presented in a way that deals 
with how potential access is created and activated, but 
rather in a way that emphasises the distribution of 
potential access, and that it is unequal (Saunders, 1979). 
Accepting this, and the assertion that potential power is 
not necessarily actively materialised, where planners can 
find "partners" is largely a function of their subjective 
definition of the objectives of a particular planning 
process, and of their accordance with a certain perspective 
regarding the state system. Both the "business sector" and 
the extended state apparatus were argued to be important 
forces, determining socio-economic processes by virtue of 
different modes of influence, as well as the elected system 
which its role cannot be neglected. Importantly, the task-
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oriented involvement (i.e., selective materialisation of. 
access potential) of the business and the overwhelming 
complexity of the public sector suggest that planners are 
likely to operate within a system that is largely outside 
their direct control. Accordingly, their search for 
"partners" and their attempts to promote specific 
initiatives may be difficult. Nevertheless, the essence of 
the measures presented here may assist planners to identify 
the socio-economic structure and the decision-making 
determinants that are given to them, into which they may or 
may not fit. The following category of determinants are more 
flexible elements of decision-making, thus relatively 
responsive to the content of the planning initiative.
3.1.2 Forces Promoting the Realisation of Potential 
Access to Resources
The exercise of potential political power (as defined 
above) is either a positive or a negative response to an 
existing situation or to an expected change in the existing 
access to resources. A "positive" response refers to the 
initiation of action(s) to change condition; a "negative" 
response arises in reaction to an unsatisfactory situation 
or process. As noted, an active response to processes that 
can affect access to resources is not always likely to 
occur. In fact, political decision-makers and individuals 
arguably are indifferent to some, if not nearly all, 
processes that may affect their basic terms of access. 
Furthermore, even when they are not indifferent to specific 
processes, the nature of their response will vary according
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to the type of expected change and the available means of 
responding.
In view of our main concern with efforts to establish 
planners’ operational base, three categories of decision­
making determinants are important because of their impact on 
specific patterns of response: the expected change 
introduced by a certain decision, the issue concerned, and 
the distribution of costs incurred by a certain decision. 
These measures are important for planning practice by virtue 
of their context-specific sensitivity, and their effect on 
the determination of concrete reactions of decision-makers 
to specific events. As such, these determinants may enable 
the planner to intervene to some degree in the concrete 
responses of decision-makers to socio-ecnomic processes, 
planning initiatives, etc., by means to be specified at a 
later stage. These measures deal with the "we don't respond 
if we don't have to" case, which is taken as a measure of 
motivation to take advantage of the theoretical (in the 
pragmatic pluralist approach) freedom to function in liberal 
democracies. We will not refer to the case of not responding 
because it is prevented (see Saunders, 1979, and Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1963 for a convincing discussion).^0 In fact, 
all planning initiatives embody a certain attitude toward 
these determinants. However, no evidence prevails of 
attempts to make use of them in the formulation of the 
planning product and a purposeful integration of their 
selective nature into planning functions. Therefore, along 
with the principles of this dissertation, we propose the 
following variable categories of decision-making 
determinants to be integrated into planning practice.
a. The effect of "changes" on decision-makers.
This aspect of decision-making focuses on the impact of 
the decision on certain terms of access; it is assumed to be 
a measure of the motivation that induces particular modes of 
involvement in socio-economic processes. The impact of a 
decision may be perceived as positive or negative, 
manifesting itself in the actual availability of capital, 
status on the job, place of residence, or position within 
the political system, all of which affect the potential 
access to resources and modify the need to take advantage of 
this potential. Nevertheless, it is generally argued that 
only a small selection of such possible changes provoke 
actual reactions to decisions. Most are left unnoticed or 
simply do not stimulate active attempts to affect the 
prospective change. Selective responses to change-induced 
decisions depend on the priorities of organisations and 
individuals (i.e., the relative importance assigned to each 
change, and the means available to affect decision-making). 
The expected response, although can only partially 
predicted, may be of great use to planners, assisting them 
in identifying possible responses to initiatives, and 
directing their actions toward those decision-makers who are 
expected to be relatively sensitive to specific planning 
ideas.11
The essence of planning initiatives is most often 
described by planners in terms of "change", expressed in 
objectives such as improving the region's economy, promoting 
industrial growth, and different individualised objectives 
(i.e., increasing individuals' income). Thus, in seeking 
ways to promote implementation, planners should identify
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those political decision-makers who are likely to be in 
accord with the prospective change, and possibly other 
decision-makers who can be expected to respond to the 
planning initiative. Planners must further consider the 
nature and feasibility of the proposed change. Most 
theoretical accounts view these questions as interconnected. 
The Patero optimum principle and the Kaldor-Hicks criteria 
(Mishan, 1976)) suggest that although any change is 
theoretically possible, an attainable change is conditioned 
by the ability to yield benefits that are equal to or 
greater than the expected loss generated by the change 
(although the benefits may be counted only theoretically to 
compensate for the loss). At the other extreme, neo-Marxist 
arguments regarding relations between the state apparatus 
and capital interests suggest a unidirectional and necessary 
link between these elements on the one hand, and the social 
segment within "change" is initiated (e.g., state apparatus, 
workers’ movements) on the other, and thus its desirability. 
They further distinguish between two types of changes, 
suggesting that when planning is part of state intervention, 
the change is likely to be such that will not fundamentally 
affect the prevailing social relations status quo. 
Accordingly, non-fundamental changes (i.e., those 
maintaining the status-quo), which are less desirable 
conceptually, are likely to be acceptable to the political 
system (Pickvance, 1976). Other approaches are less 
categorical about these necessary links, although not less 
inflexible about the type of change achievable in modern 
societies. Such approaches also suggest that this issue is 
linked to questions about the type of proposed change (and
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its distributional implications), and the question of who is. 
initiating and expected to execute the change. Accordingly, 
they argue that when the planning function is carried out 
within the public sector, it is likely to be involved with 
incremental changes; this implicitly is conceived to be the 
most feasible impact of planning. Olson (1965), for 
example, accords with the idea that changes introduced 
within the state system are likely to be incremental and 
non-drastic, suggesting that since public policy is a 
product of the status quo between competing social interest 
groups, it is likely to obstruct changes with a potential 
effect on the prevailing "political order". A political 
elite perspective (Bunce, 1976) further argues that 
conservative policy principles and moderate changes in the 
existing social status quo are essential for the prevention 
of overt social conflicts, and thus essential to the elite- 
desired maintenance of consensus regarding the social values 
that enables it to rule. In this line of thought, Mishal 
(1971) showed that the "melting pot" policy of the 1950s and 
1960s, meant to facilitate the absorption of the masses of 
migrants that arrived in Israel in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, was carefully designed to prevent a collision between 
these migrants, the existing population, and the ruling 
elite group. Accordingly, it is possible to perceive the 
planners (headed by Mr. Brutzkus), who enthusiastically 
supported the population dispersal policy and the 
establishment of New Towns, as a part of this "melting pot" 
principle that was given the potentially "dangerous" task of 
population absorption within an incremental, state-initiated 
framework for change. Although Etzioni (1967) pointed out
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synoptic-innovative decisions associated with professional 
influence that were taken within the state apparatus and had 
widespread impact, such as the decision to develop the 
atomic bomb, Etzioni himself accepts that the general 
tendency is to create incremental changes (which implicitly 
are desired). Indeed, even an event such as the 
establishment of the state of Israel, which is, according to 
Doron (1986), a good example of a synoptic decision 
"originating from dissatisfaction from incremental changes"
1 o
(p. 70), is a unique example, one of very few similar 
cases in world history.
Beyond the conclusion that incremental change is what 
is mainly achievable, the question of what is the desired 
change is still unsolved. Many studies harbor explicit and 
implicit assumptions that drastic changes, although they 
might be highly impractical to achieve through existing 
channels, are theoretically desirable. Instead, "grassroots" 
movements and similar social structures may create the 
potential grounds for establishing the "desired", 
"fundamental" change. Indeed, this concept of desirability 
is appealing to some planners, who may see the emphasis on 
"grassroots" as justifying their initiatives. In this 
context, however, we shall refrain from discussion of this 
aspect; we assume that planners should determine their 
subjective perception regarding the "desired" change. 
Planners must nonetheless be aware of the argued links 
between what is desired, by whom, and what is possible.
In all, this decision-making determinant may prove 
flexible to planning process. Planners may expect or desire 
different types of changes, and the expressed change may be
79
differently conceived by different decision-makers. In fact/ 
planners are faced with a wide range of opportunities with 
regard to the desired and the feasible change. The important 
element in determining these aspects of recommended change 
is to bear in mind and estimate the implications of changes 
for organisations and individuals (mainly/ those identified 
as potential "partners"). Such knowledge provides planners 
with an important tool for provoking response to, and 
promoting the implementation of, their planning product. For 
example, planners may suggest private housing construction 
be encouraged as a means to improve the competitiveness of 
housing prices. Two different consequences of such a 
recommendation might be the discharge of a public housing 
construction agency's role, and an increased burden on the 
institution providing building permits (the latter will have 
to deal with many individuals rather than one construction 
agency). Both organisations are therefore inclined to oppose 
the planning proposal, though on different grounds - the 
loss of income and jobs in the public housing construction 
agency, and increased congestion in the planning authority. 
In view of these consequences, planners should estimate the 
extent to which such opposition might jeopardise the 
execution of the recommendation, and determine their moves 
accordingly.
b. The issues
Decision-making essentially is a matter of responding 
to specific issues set within specific contexts (e.g., time, 
location), and to the way in which they are presented, both
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of which determine the content and impact of decisions. 
Significantly, this aspect of decision-making is never 
objective.
This aspect is considered by most scholars to be 
crucially important to an understanding of the decision­
making mechanism. There seems to be a general agreement on 
the principle that theoretically similar issues may be 
treated differently by specific decision-makers in specific 
socio-economic situations, and that they may be sensitive to 
different issues.
Planning practice necessarily is associated with this 
aspect. Among the questions with which planning studies deal 
and planners should deal are: which issues are being and 
should be treated by planners; how should planners deal with 
issues that are seen as important by the political system, 
vis-a-vis publicly neglected issues; and how should "issues" 
be raised by planners (triggering their integration into the 
public agenda is only one possibility)? In principle, the 
"flexible" nature of "issues" creates for planners an 
important base for promoting their ideas, by permitting them 
to affect the aspects that become issues and the attitudes 
toward them. But this is easier said than done.
How do planners come to deal with concrete issues? 
Although there is not much direct debate on this question 
within planning studies, different discussions suggest that 
the issues subject to planning initiatives basically are 
imposed on planners, either by the overall conditions with 
which they are concerned, or by the organisation in which 
they function (Schon, 1982; Blowers, 1982). Planners, then,
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are not free to determine the issues with which they are. 
concerned. My observation is that planners tend to deal with 
"problems"; this justifies their recommendations that in 
most cases entail some aspects of change. "Problems" are 
generally identified in accordance with the political- 
administrative environment in which the planners operate, so 
that problems subject to planning concerns are closely 
linked to issues identified as "important" within this 
environment. In this regard, Anderson (1979) argues that 
political decision-makers also tend to deal with "problems"; 
they will make a decision if they are convinced of the 
existence of a policy problem.
The existence or non-existence of "issues" and 
"problems" is an important aspect of planning practice. 
Available theoretical discussions and empirical studies 
offer fundamentally different explanations of the mechanisms 
by which "issues" become public concerns, appear on, or are 
excluded from, the public political agenda, the extent to 
which its appearance on the agenda indicates its importance, 
and other aspects related to the way in which control is 
exercised in liberal democracies. These arguments provide 
different guidelines for planners' search for "partners" and 
means to promote implementation. In fact, it is widely 
suggested that it may not be necessary and desirable to deal 
with publicly debated issues. Although a pluralist 
perspective might suggest that a concern with publicly 
debated and recognised problems will ensure that the 
appropriate, democratic decision will be taken, different 
studies convincingly suggest that debated issues are not 
more important than non-debated issues (to say the least).
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Bachrach and Baratz (1970), for example, argue that issues 
reaching the public agenda are mostly non-problematic in the 
sense of the ability of decision-makers to deal with them 
publicly. Thus, dealing with "key issues" - those that 
generate public controversy (Dahl, 1961), or those that 
originate in certain feelings of dissatisfaction or 
discrimination that were identified by public decision­
makers as problems requiring solutions (Anderson, 1979) may 
divert planners' concern away from other (the "real", 
according to the structuralist approach) issues and problems 
that prevail in specific situations. Bachrach and Baratz 
(1970) also propose the existence of a mechanism that 
excludes issues from the political agenda and prevents their 
being politicised. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) further 
suggest that since several issues may compete for the public 
agenda, not all of them will actually be discussed. Thus, 
even with an issue that gained some political interest, the 
difficulties in coping with it may result in its conversion 
to a different issue or its replacement by other issues. A 
good example of that is the case by which concern for the 
democratic rights of Arab-Israeli citizens is constantly 
being converted to the issue of land control by this 
minority group. Similarly, a wish to avoid the public agenda 
that rests on the above possible treatment of "issues" may 
also come from the "public" itself. As was expressed by a 
director of "Koor" in the Arab Sector-^: "if we could only 
avoid public debate, the establishment of new industrial 
plants in the Galil may be done in a few months, and both 
Jewish and Arab leaders will accept such development" (Mr. 
Tahun, December 1985).
Still, the importance of an "issue" appearing on the. 
public agenda or creating public debate should not be 
underestimated. The following example elucidates this point. 
A private entrepreneur may wish to invest in a certain land 
development project. The project's or the site's becoming a 
matter of public debate may change the initial investment 
conditions (e.g., postponed development permits, increased 
development costs and land prices), and thus affect the 
entrepreneur's propensity to invest in the project 
concerned. In this line of thought, planners who enjoy 
access to information, may mobilise it with the objective of 
affecting "issues"' status.
Another area of concern with the "issue" is the 
emphasis placed on the relative nature of issues and their 
relations with the subjective interests and backgrounds of 
those discussing them. Parkinson (1957, quoted in Doron, 
1986, p.95), in his observation of the way in which 
decisions are reached in a public committee, concludes that 
the more trivial and the more familiar the issue, the more 
attention is paid to it. Further, even assuming that we can 
objectively define the importance of an issue, this does not 
imply that it will receive the time and attention its 
importance demands. Thus, public debate may be problematic 
for practical attempts to promote implementation within a 
reasonable time period. Accordingly, planners should assess 
the implications of a process or action becoming a "problem" 
or a publicly debated issue, remaining aware of the fact 
that the presence or absence of public debate suggest 
nothing of the issue's relevance and importance in specific
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cases. They should also be aware of their opportunity for 
defining "problems" that are different from those accepted 
by the political system, and the possibility that one 
"issue" will gain public interest in different contexts of 
time and ways of articulation.
Like the political decision-makers, however, are 
planners even capable of turning an "issue" into a problem? 
The literature offers several ways to attain this goal. We 
shall note here only that the susceptible nature of the 
"issue" and its role in the decision-making process suggests 
that in the way planners treat an issue they may be able to 
affect its integration into decision-making processes (e.g., 
promote a public debate around it or attempt to prevent such 
debate); they may present "issues" in a way that will accord 
with prevailing debate (thus increasing the chances of the 
planning product being considered), or present an issue in 
such a way that will immediately generate opposition to it. 
Therefore, once the choice of the "issue" of the planners' 
concern is made, it is most important to consider the 
question of how planners may treat these issues. As noted, 
once planners determine their own attitude toward an issue, 
the likely attitude of different decision-makers to this 
issue, and its distributional implications, they may find 
themselves considering two aspects related to the ways in 
which issues are presented as vehicles to stimulate a 
desired reaction on the part of decision-makers: the extent 
to which an issue should be specifically and directly 
tackled, versus a more indirect approach; and its 
familiarity to the actors. We shall expand on this at a 
later stage.
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c. Distribution of costs
Generally speaking, any decision taken has a potential 
effect on the distribution of costs incurred. These costs 
may be direct or indirect, social or economic costs, 
measurable or non-measurable. In fact, costs imposed by the 
decision-making process are an inherent consequence of the 
process, and a manifestation of its economic efficiency and 
social viability.
The important aspect, however, seems to be that of 
distribution. Who creates the costs, and who bears them? 
Does the decision take account of the potential cost, its 
scale, and similar ramifications? These and other questions 
undoubtedly reflect the possible attitudes of decision­
makers toward socio-economic processes. Externalisation of 
costs^ may decrease sensitivity to the impact of the 
decision, whereas the inability to externalise costs may 
increase awareness of its implications. For example, 
consider an attempt of the Housing Ministry to construct a 
new housing complex. The prospect of having to bear the 
costs of road construction, sewage infrastructure 
installation, and housing maintenance, or alternatively of 
being able to transfer the responsibility for such costs to 
other institutions and individuals, probably would 
drastically affect the attractiveness of such a project to 
the initiating organisation and others who are to be 
incorporated within it.^ The higher the direct costs, the 
greater the potential for response; a decision's high 
internalised cost is positively correlated with the 
potential decision-making response. Therefore, the ability 
to estimate overall costs of a decision, and their
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distribution, may elucidate the impact of a decision and 
provide a fairly strong basis for its evaluation. Indeed, 
the determination of the nature of costs, or more important, 
the estimation and increased awareness of their potential 
distribution, may provide planners with a major practical 
avenue toward integration into decision-making processes.
On the whole, the category of "forces promoting the 
realisation of potential access to resources" refers to the 
nature of the environment in which the impact of decision­
making on a socio-economic system is determined, thereby 
affecting patterns of involvement in these processes (as 
manifested in response to specific decisions).
The determinants included in this category are rather 
flexible elements of decision-making, since their content 
depends largely on how they are built into socio-economic 
processes. Indeed, planners may affect decision-making by 
determining how issues are presented, by estimating the 
distribution of costs, and by assessing the expected effect 
of specific changes on decision-makers, thus predicting 
their potential patterns of involvement in socio-economic 
processes. Therefore, it is postulated that these 
determinants are crucial elements in the planning process, 
in the sense that awareness of them provides an important 
vehicle for integrating a planning initiative into a 
concrete decision-making process.
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To sum upf this part of the dissertation distinguished, 
between two categories of determinants that affect the 
decision-makers' involvement in socio-economic processes, 
and, thus, their possible response to planning initiatives. 
The category of "elements permitting access to resources" 
refers to the potential power of decision-makers within the 
socio-economic system, as this is directly affected by the 
processes that determine their conditions of access. This 
category reflects both the initial point of reference of 
decision-makers in their involvement in socio-economic 
processes (i.e., their basic interests and motives in 
attempting to improve or maintain a prevailing state of 
access in a specific time context), and their response to 
possible changes in their condition of access. "Forces 
promoting the realisation of potential access" refer to 
those determinants that affect decision-makers' patterns of 
involvement in specific situations. As the forces reflecting 
the derivatives behind concrete responses, they may also be 
viewed as the means by which potential access conditions 
(initially determined within the first category of 
determinants) are materialised. Accordingly, the former 
category reflects the decision-makers' principle direction 
of response to, for example, a planning process, which 
potentially can affect their initial terms of access. 
Similarly, the latter category consists of the more variable 
elements of decision-making, and embraces their aspects by 
which planners may wish to affect socio-economic processes, 
and thus are viewed as providing a promising ground for 
planning practice by permitting planners to affect the 
content of the decisions to be taken. Similarly, Finally,
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planning initiatives affect the former determinants in an 
indirect manner only; in the latter category, by contrast, 
the planner's role is relatively clear. The two classes, 
however, are strongly interconnected, and thus should be 
considered simultaneously.
The discussion was concerned mainly with the possible 
types of responses to the determinants of decision-making, 
arguing that these determinants are of paramount importance 
in analysing the decision-making processes, and thus 
relevant for planning. The discussion attempted neither to 
treat thoroughly all possible responses that may 
characterise different cases, nor to concentrate on 
practical examples. The aim was rather to suggest, in 
general terms, the linkages between classes of determinants 
and the possible impact of each on decision-makers, while 
emphasising the distinction between these determinants as 
major tools that planners may use in practicing their 
initiatives. This task reflects the principal approach of 
this dissertation, which attempts to establish a 
methodological framework for the exercise of planning 
initiatives. Thus, the focus is on restructuring these 
determinants, which are discussed extensively in the 
literature, in a way that seems most relevant to planning 
purposes.
In practice, in view of planners' need to make use of 
these determinants (i.e., analysis of decision-making 
processes and determination of ways to integrate the 
planning product into these processes), they may be invoked 
in an explanation of the resource allocation mechanism in 
two basic dimensions, both of which are applicable in the
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formal and informal, explicit and implicit aspects of the 
decision-making:
a. The structure of the system as the unit of reference -
assuming "fixed" or predetermined interests of actors 
within the social system (e.g., dominant capitalist 
interests, or the interests of ruling elite groups). 
Here, an attempt may be made to assess potential 
responses within the decision-making process, in 
accordance with the above determinants, in view of the 
dominant interests that decisions are likely to serve.
b. The individualised level of explanation - concentrating 
on behavioural elements of decision-making, leading to 
an analysis of the determinants as a function of the 
decision-makers' traits in specific cases.
Various theoretical approaches tend to provide 
explanations within a single dimension. Most of them (even 
those that are very convincing in the coherent framework 
they provide for the analysis of historical processes and 
events) are difficult to apply as they are presented to 
actual practice, since they do not provide unequivocal 
answers to such problems as how to rank determinants by 
importance within specific contexts, or how to distinguish 
between their relative degree of importance to different 
decision-makers. For example, the neo-Marxist school does 
not enable a distinction to be made at the present time 
between public decisions that are straightforwardly in 
accordance with capital interests, and those that are a 
concession to the immediate requirements of the "public". 
This is possible in a historical perspective. Since the
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latter type may pave the way for the promotion of important 
changes, the inability to identify it "on the spot" may 
prevent planners' from advancing their initiatives.
Each dimension, however, offers different tools for 
planning practice; these, when put together, may facilitate 
planners in synthesising relevant determinants and ranking 
their relative importance in specific cases. This is 
important, since the planning practice involves elements of 
the overall system's structure as much as elements whose 
such links are not immediately apparent. Therefore, this 
dissertation seeks to explain the decision-making processes 
in both dimensions, postulating that different contexts and 
issues necessitate different levels of explanation and 
action. Throughout, our major concern is with the means of 
affecting the resource allocation mechanism.
The distinction between categories of determinants is 
based on the assumption that those creating potential access 
to resources form the point of departure and a term of 
reference for an attempt to evaluate the actual or potential 
impact of a decision and the changes it triggers; whereas 
those promoting the establishment of the access potential 
represent the nature of the impact of a decision on elements 
that may trigger a particular pattern of response to a 
decision. It may then be argued that any attempt to affect 
the nature of decision-making should concentrate on the 
latter class of determinants. In practice, however, these 
determinants must be integrated into an explanatory 
framework, within which planners may analyse and apply them.
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3.2 Integrating Determinants Into Planning
Having defined two categories of decision-making 
determinants, differentiated in terms of their response to 
resource allocation, we now consider the usefulness of these 
categories for planning purposes. We may then raise the 
aspect of the decision-makers' response to the planning 
process as facilitating the latter's integration into 
decision-making, and the dilemma of the decision-makers' 
contribution to the planning process that originates from 
the attempt of planners to identify "partners".
An analysis of these categories suggests, first, that 
some of the decision-making determinants are of a special 
practical importance, since they are potentially vulnerable 
to planning initiatives. "Vulnerable" is defined as being 
susceptible to integration into the planning process, and 
flexible with regard to change, under prevailing conditions. 
Second, these determinants provide some indication of the 
decision-makers' involvement in the planning process or 
their interactions with planning initiatives. In this 
context, it is suggested that involvement is a function of a 
specific conceptual and practical context, and can thus be 
predicted, and, possibly, induced. Accordingly, this section 
consists of two parts:
1. The functional foundation of planning action as 
provided by the decision-making determinants that are 
vulnerable to planning practice, compared with 
determinants that are relatively predetermined for 
planners' operational purposes (that leave the planner
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with limited areas of function).
2. The decision-makers' attitude toward the planning 
process, construed in terms of their commitment to the 
planning product. This attitude is perceived as an 
indication of their ability and will to operate with 
reference to the planning process; "commitment" is a 
descriptive element referring to the observable 
response to the planning process.
The discussion assumes that reactions toward the 
planning product may be affected, decision-making patterns 
can be generated, and that attitudes toward planning 
initiatives may be mobilised, in a desired direction. Their 
practical application should therefore permit planners to 
"struggle their way through" the task of influencing 
decisions concerning, in our case, regional systems.
3.2.1 The Functional Foundation of Planning Practice
A planning initiative presumably aims to affect 
decision-making as prescribed by the planning perspective, 
and the nature of this impact presumably depends on both the 
content of the planning initiative and the characteristics 
of the particular regional system to which the planning 
initiative refers. In other words, the potential for impact 
(again presumably) originates largely in the manner in which 
the planning initiative is structured into existing 
processes. In view of the above proposal that some decision­
making determinants are relatively more vulnerable to the 
planning process, two questions arise: First, why might 
these aspects be vulnerable to the planning process? Second,
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how can one take advantage of this quality?
Several aspects were identified in this category of 
potential vulnerability: the issue at hand, the distribution 
of costs, and the effect of change on the decision-maker or 
on the socio-economic system.
The issue is important because the response to it 
depends largely on how it is expressed, the decision-makers 
to whom it is presented, and the timing of its presentation, 
rather than on its "objective" content alone. Undoubtedly, 
the importance of the content of "issues" should not be 
underestimated. Yet, the pattern of response to issues 
largely extends beyond, or is unrelated to, their basic 
content. "Issues" develop within specific contexts; thus, 
attitudes toward them are susceptible to control (or 
external effects). An elementary illustration of this is the 
alternative of viewing a glass as half-full or half-empty. 
In other words, issues may be presented either in a way that 
provides the decision-maker with "self-fulfillment" (e.g., 
addressed in some way to his interests, opinions, or needs), 
or in a way that will give him the immediate sense of being 
"attacked", thereby provoking his immediate opposition. The 
process of residential rent increase in New York city 
provides an example of this. This process is often (1990s) 
associated in the newspapers either with the exodus of the 
middle-upper income population, or with the "homeless" 
phenomenon; each provokes different "issues" (e.g., the 
issue of middle class emigration, as opposed to the issue of 
increased street violence), hence potentially different 
reactions, although both may be a consequence of the same 
process. Furthermore, having noted that acceptance or
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rejection of a planning initiative and its planning product 
(two extreme responses) depend partly on how the issue is 
presented, it is important to bear in mind that the gap 
between complete acceptance and categorical rejection, and 
between different patterns of response (e.g., active or 
passive) is fairly wide. It is this gap that is of crucial 
importance in the planning process. Remoteness from an issue 
or an inconclusive opinion about a certain proposal also may 
be, in certain cases, important in restricting the range of 
decision-makers involved in the process. In practice, a 
planner is faced with a wide variety of choices as to how, 
when, and to whom to present a topic; the planner's strength 
lies in his ability to determine the most relevant context 
and method of presentation. Specifically, the planner needs 
to take note of the availability of various ways of 
presenting a subject, such as reducing it into several 
components, presenting each one in different contexts, or 
selecting the specific decision-making forum into which 
concrete issues are to be presented. This important aspect 
of planning may prove crucial in attaining the desired 
impact; at the same time, however, it presents obstacles 
because of the inherent difficulty of controlling the 
development of the "issue" within the decision-making 
process. For example, planners are unlikely to affect the 
way in which an issue becomes a matter of public debate, 
although theoretically they have the opportunity to 
"recruit" the media for such a task.
A second determinant of decision-making that can 
provide planners with an important means of influencing the 
process was noted above in the context of distribution of
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costs. The nature of the costs created by a planning, 
initiative or through the planning process, and their 
distribution (insofar as this is directly measurable), 
depend on the nature of the planning process. As previously 
argued, planners' concern with the distribution of costs is 
the crux of the planning processes, and determining this 
distribution is a major objective of any planning 
initiative. Careful analysis of concrete proposals in light 
of prevailing conditions in the relevant system(s) provides 
planners with an essential practical method of affecting 
decision-making. This is achieved through their ability to 
predict the feasibility of a proposed change, determine the 
most relevant way to distribute its costs, and provide 
concrete measures for estimating the planning 
recommendations (such measures are important for 
establishing a basis for communicating with decision­
makers). The requisite planning initiative, therefore, is 
one that takes account of possible sources or areas of 
costs, as well as the sensitivity of different socio­
economic organisations to different types of costs.^ A 
simple example clarifies this point. Assuming that a given 
planning task is to enrich the industrial structure of 
region A. One may attempt to achieve the goal by encouraging 
a specific firm to move from location B to location A, 
causing an immediate loss of jobs and income in location B. 
An alternative plan providing incentives for the 
establishment of new plants in location A may prevent such 
immediate impact in location B, though possibly affecting 
its future conditions, by creating a competitive job market. 
Either plan may help enrich region A's industrial base, but
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the second alternative may achieve it with a smaller
immediate negative impact on region B. Furthermore, the two
alternatives are likely to create different reaction
patterns. The first plan may arouse opposition in location 
1 7B, which stands to suffer when the firm relocates; the 
second plan may avoid this type of opposition. In this 
example, planners would need to consider these types of 
responses in view of, for instance, the practical 
difficulties in starting a new plant as compared to the 
utilisation of the prevailing base for the plant in region 
A. This is related to the previous argument, i.e., the 
response to distributional issues is largely a function of 
how the issues are created; in the example, long-run 
consequences that are relatively difficult to measure and 
thus less concrete are less likely to provoke vigorous 
reactions that may disrupt the objective of enriching the 
industrial base of region A. In sum, costs and their 
distribution are also functions of the structure of the 
planning initiative.
A third aspect of planning practice relevant to our 
case is the effect a change has on the decision-makers. This 
effect represents the impact of a given planning initiative, 
which results largely from the way in which the initiative 
is structured into existing systems and processes. Most 
planning initiatives imply changes in the social system, its 
institutions and individuals. In fact, the essence of 
planning practice is the ability to determine the nature and 
scale of changes that a given plan can be expected to make 
within the socio-economic system. Because "changes" may 
affect social groups, organisations, or individuals in
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different ways (and be perceived differently), the expected, 
responses to change are likely to vary with the cost of 
change. Planners therefore should seek to determine the 
nature and direction of change, managing it in such a way 
that it will be absorbed into the social system. As before, 
the planner's strength lies in his ability to control the 
way in which a proposed change is structured and presented, 
in order to predict and affect the system's possible 
response to it. Bearing in mind the previous example of the 
choice between supporting the relocation of an industrial 
plant or establishing a new one, and in view of the 
distinction between individualised and non-individualised 
change, planners should seek support from those who are 
fairly distant from the particular case in question, or from 
those who are unlikely to bear the direct consequences of 
the proposed change. In other words, the criterion for 
choosing the appropriate alternative is attached to the 
nature of the socio-economic organisation involved.
In general, assuming that planners can and should 
influence decision-making, the vulnerability of the 
decision-making determinants provides the fundamental basis 
for determining the areas in which impact is possible. These 
determinants are important for the establishment of a 
"niche" for planning practice within the decision-making 
process, and for possible interactions with decision-makers. 
As noted, certain decision-making determinants (e.g., access 
to resources, and organisational location) are less 
vulnerable than others to the planning process. However, 
because some measure of access potential and organisational
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location is presumed to exist at the start of the planning 
process, these decision-making characteristics 
unquestionably are affected by planning initiatives. 
Planners should therefore attempt to analyse these aspects 
within the entire regional analysis that they integrate into 
the planning process. For example, the interest of certain 
decision-makers in increasing the material resources 
available for one business sector should be taken into 
account, but the way to integrate this interest into 
practice is by anticipating the possible implications of the 
planning initiative for this interest, and then presenting 
the planning product in such a way that proves that the 
interest could or could not be satisfied in the specific 
case.
Essentially, the concept of the vulnerability of 
decision-making determinants implies that planning is mainly 
a function of how planners choose to advance their 
initiatives, rather than merely a function of the 
"objectively right" content of their initiatives. Thus, 
awareness of the vulnerability of determinants provides 
planners with fertile ground for determining how they will 
exercise their perception. Given this argument, we still 
need to cope with the questions of how to identify cases in 
which vulnerability may be applied for generating support of 
the planning perspective, and how to identify those 
decision-makers whose support planners most need.
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3.2.2 Commitment Within the Planning Process
The literature on decision-making proposes the concepts 
of "interests" and "wants" as major explanatory elements. 
Whereas the latter refers to one's own perspective regarding 
his or her situation or needs, the former refers (Saunders, 
1979) to "the achievement of benefits and the avoidance of 
costs in any particular situation" (p. 45), regardless of 
one's own perception of reality. Thus, one's interests lend 
themselves to objective assessment, while individual wants 
are subjective functions that may or may not clash with 
objective interests. Various theoretical approaches discuss 
both concepts in depth, dealing with their interaction, and 
especially with attempts to identify the types of interests 
that dominate decision-making, their distribution, and their 
integration into socio-economic processes, thus measuring 
the extent to which different patterns of involvement in 
socio-economic and political processes coincide with major 
interests.
The assessment of decision-makers’ involvement in a 
planning process can be linked to the discussion of 
interests and wants. The actual involvement of decision­
makers in a planning process provides an indication of both 
their interests and wants; but how this knowledge should be 
applied in the planning process poses a major difficulty - 
should planners concentrate on the "interests" or "wants" of 
decision-makers when attempting to predict their response to 
a certain initiative and seeking for ways to promote 
implementation? This difficulty is linked to the basic 
nature of these concepts: interests are not necessarily
articulated or expressed in some identifiable manner. Even
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when interests are articulated, they may not reflect 
objectively identified interests. The fact that the 
decision-maker is not always aware of his interests implies 
that the decision will sometimes be in opposition to them, 
and the extent to which a decision was in accordance with 
objective interests can be assessed after it was taken. It 
further implies that planners often interact with decision­
makers on the basis of their wants or subjectively defined 
interests. For example, assume a politician who believes his 
interest is to prevent the penetration of Arab-Israelis into 
Jewish urban areas on the grounds of securing the well-being 
of Jews (minimising the possibilities for mutual hostility). 
This, however, may be different from his objective interest 
in maintaining the prevailing reproduction of the Arab 
labour force (by enabling them to improve their living 
conditions), which is essential to the Israeli state’s 
economy and the capital accumulated through the use of this 
labour. Assuming a planner who wishes to promote the 
development of a region and believes that encouraging 
Jewish-Arab spatial and functional assimilation is important 
for this task. Should he attempt to convince the above 
decision-maker that improved Arab living conditions will 
prevent future conflicts such as the 1976 Earth Day in the 
Galil? Should he downplay the assimilation potential, or 
should he emphasise areas in which hostility can be 
minimised (for example, in the area concerned, or in other 
areas, in the local industries)? This example shows that 
planners operate within both dimensions of decision-making 
determinants. It also shows that planners, while keeping in 
mind objective interests, can in most cases communicate with
decision-makers on the basis of the decision-makers' 
subjectively defined interests, or wants. There is therefore 
a need for a measure that facilitates dealing with 
situations in which decisions clash with interests, in which 
interests are vague, in which a given interest may be 
satisfied in different ways, or in which people make 
decisions not because they want or need to, but because that 
is their "job" or those are the "rules of the game" to which 
they belong.
This leads to the concept of "commitment", that is, the 
social obligation to function in a certain way, as 
determined by the decision-maker's role in the socio­
economic system. Voting in parliament according to the 
political party's discipline is a standard example. 
Importantly, commitment may reflect the way in which 
conflicts of interest, originating from decision-makers' 
roles and their different functions in the social system, 
are resolved practically. Commitment to political party 
discipline, for example, may lead Decision-makers to vote 
against their own beliefs, and, possibly, their own 
interests. The concept of "commitment" thus complements 
"interests" and "wants" by explaining situations in which 
decisions clash with interests or wants. It also allows 
elements such as personal contacts and political pressures 
to affect commitment.
Unlike wants, which are wholly subjective, and 
interests, of which one may not be aware even though they 
basically are given within specific contexts, commitment 
consists of both subjective and objective elements. It 
represents the choice actually made by the decision-maker as
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to the functional and behavioural codes inherent in his role 
within the socio-economic system - a choice possibly made 
regardless of his objective interests (and possibly 
subjective wants). In this context, "functional and 
behavioural codes" consist of a given and identifiable 
system of rules specifying how socio-economic organisations 
should function. In fact, commitment differs from interests 
in that whereas in most cases one should be concerned with 
generating awareness of interests (assuming "objective 
interests" indeed exist), awareness is the very essence of 
commitment; generating it may be construed as generating 
commitment. In other words, commitment differs from 
interests in that it can be perceived independently of 
interests, and thus may be used to foresee decisions in 
specific contexts.
Like the other concepts, commitment is susceptible to 
change; since the functional bases of organisations change, 
the set of rules that determine the content of commitment 
also changes. Finally, as with the other concepts, patterns 
of commitment are context-specific, even though theoretical 
generalisation is possible. Changing social relations and 
concrete events that generate conflicts between the 
different functions of decision-makers (even if they are 
temporary) are among the important aspects enhancing 
commitments. In fact, commitment is largely a set of rules 
imposed on individuals by the specific social organisations 
in which they function; the realisation of commitment is the 
result of subjective decision-making only insofar as this 
does not neglect the essence of the organisation's 
functional basis. Therefore, the acceptance of commitment is
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an integral element of decision-making, resulting from 
interactions within the organisation, but still permitting 
socialisation (i.e., accommodation to rules) and 
legitimisation processes (such as lobbying, personal 
contacts, or political pressures) to affect one's attitude 
toward the commitment.
Defined in this way as a manifestation of decision­
making within a given socio-economic system, commitment can 
be perceived as a constraint on decision-making flexibility. 
Indeed, commitment does impose restrictions on decision­
making flexibility to the extent that it precludes the 
likelihood of being completely free to step away from any 
framework at any time for no predictable reason, but it 
should not be equated with the extreme case of unconditional 
connection with an issue, situation, or belief. In fact, as 
argued, making a commitment does not rule out the 
possibility of modifying the content or action resulting 
from this commitment. Thus, a commitment should be viewed as 
one of several socio-economic parameters that define the 
decision-making environment. It represents a responsibility 
toward a given framework, within which one may and can 
introduce flexibilities or initiate changes. The importance 
of commitment therefore stems from the fact that 
subjectivity is bounded within a given framework of rules. 
It may be useful for practical purposes, because the 
framework of rules constraining subjectivity can be 
identified in practice.
However, the concept of commitment also is seriously 
problematic: as a descriptive measure of decision-making, it 
does not form a firm explanatory element of socio-economic
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processes. Can we provide rules as to types of commitment 
and their relative importance? Is an assessment at all 
possible, as in the case of objective interests, or is 
commitment basically a matter of subjective determination, 
as in the case of wants? Analysis of decision-making 
processes in view of available theoretical approaches 
indicates that one may identify major types of commitments 
that characterise different organisations within a specific 
context of time, area of interest, and location. For 
example, a member of parliament elected as a representative 
of the agricultural sector may be committed both to this 
sector's interests in increasing farm profits and to his 
party's policy. Yet, neither their relative importance, nor 
the extent to which any type of commitment dominates the 
others, can be determined. Insofar as the two coincide, the 
M.P. is unlikely to encounter any difficulty. When party 
policy clearly clashes with agricultural interests, however, 
there is no way to predict accurately which of the 
commitments the M.P. will respect. This is a major drawback 
in the concept of commitment, since the identification of 
general principles regarding the potential impact of 
different types of commitments on decision-makers is 
rendered problematic. As one parameter of decision-making, 
commitment may nonetheless be linked to available 
theoretical approaches and their analytical tools, 
permitting us to conceptualise a basic framework of rules, 
and, thus, plausible patterns of commitment. The assessment 
of commitment must therefore be linked to available 
theoretical approaches and explanatory elements. Strong 
links to theoretical approaches are also advantageous in
that they provide planners with a framework for initiating 
commitment: as commitment is part of decision-making, and is 
affected by the determinants specified above, the planner 
may thus be able to induce specific commitments by the 
application of the knowledge gained through theoretical 
perspectives.
Importantly, the fact that commitment is, to some 
extent, a function of subjective determination lends it an 
advantage that should be treated seriously, as it implies 
that decision-makers are receptive to influences generated 
in socio-economic processes. This invests planners with the 
potential to affect decision-making priorities by 
intervening in socio-economic processes. In other words, the 
attributes of commitment are themselves important aspects of 
decision-making that can be influenced by the planning 
practice.
Beyond its contribution to a planner’s ability to make 
predictions (i.e., because the framework of rules 
constraining subjectivity can be identified in practice), 
once a commitment is made, its consequential conditions may 
be crucially important for planning purposes. A commitment 
may be abstract (e.g., to improve the quality of life) or 
concrete (e.g., to increase per capita income by 2%). 
Furthermore, it may take the form of a declaration (the 
level of commitment with the lowest liability) or of action, 
as manifested, for example, by resource allocation, 
perpetration of physical change, or a legislative 
initiative. Different manifestations apply to different 
situations. In our context, commitment to a planning issue,
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planning product, or the planning process in general is in 
fact a commitment to an attempt to decrease the level of 
uncertainty attached to the future environment in which the 
planning process operates. Since uncertainty is inherent in 
any planning initiative, the decision-maker’s commitment to 
the conceptual and practical planning framework can 
potentially further the process in two complementary 
respects. First, it permits a certain level of certainty 
with regard to the decision-maker's pattern of response to 
the planning initiative. For example, a firm's commitment to 
relocate its production department gives an indication of 
its attitude toward various regional processes and 
prevailing public policies. Second, in view of the 
cumulative effect of regional components characterising 
regional processes (see Chapter 2), a commitment represents 
a major means of affecting regional processes. In the above 
example, the existence of (and ability to generate) such 
commitment provides the basis for advocacy of other 
decisions on the residential environment for labour, changes 
in the educational system, or investments in complementary 
industrial plants.
The potential impact of "commitment" on the content of 
decision-making in general and planning processes in 
particular can be measured by several criteria:
a. Timing - the stage of the planning process at which the 
commitment is made. This criterion is linked to the 
question of "who is first to commit?"
b. Manifestation - action as compared to mere declaration.
c. Explicitness - the extent to which the commitment is 
explicit (and clearly specified). A vague or abstract
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commitment fails to provide a clear indication of its 
content, and hence of its impact.
d. Scale - the commitment's distributional implications.
e. Awareness - the dissemination of information on the 
existence of the commitment.
f. Competency - adequacy of a commitment as it results 
from the principle power of the person or the 
organisation committing themselves to a certain issue 
(e.g., the level of organisational hierarchy at which 
commitment is expressed).
Each of these helps determine the level of uncertainty 
in the decision-making milieu (to which the commitment 
refers). They are important (for planning purposes) because 
of the existence of the previously mentioned "cumulative 
effect" created by the linkages between the numerous 
elements and components of the regional and decision-making 
process.
Specifically, the timing of the commitment may 
determine the initiation of other decisions and actions that 
may follow, in view of an enhanced ability to predict 
consequences and measure possible gains. Thus, the timing of 
a commitment clearly affects cost distribution and risks 
assumed by those making a commitment. For planning purposes, 
the ability to encourage one type of commitment may 
facilitate the triggering of other decisions. In an economic 
enterprise, for instance, timing may be measured in terms of 
profitability. A commitment to relocate a plant to an 
underdeveloped region at a fairly early stage of the 
planning process will generate costs that arise from the
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fact that its functional environment is not yet "ripe"
(e.g., basic services are not yet available), but may still
have utility in qualifying for tax relief or generating a
capital gain by the use of abundant cheap labour. The same
commitment made at a later stage (e.g., once the economic
environment has consolidated) is far less risky (although
not necessarily less costly). Such commitment does not imply
that relocation will immediately take place, but rather
contributes to setting up the "scene" for the relocation.
For example, the commitment of a certain firm to relocate
1 ftits research group to the Galil, ° which was made public in 
the mid-1980s, forced the construction of an industrial zone 
that until then only could be found marked on master land 
use plans. Such development was aimed at satisfying the 
relocation prerequisites expressed by the firm. By the time 
the particular firm backed down on its commitment, the 
industrial zone was legally established, and the budget for 
initial construction was available, and thus development 
started, encouraging, in turn, other firms to consider 
relocation.
Awareness of commitment is virtually tantamount to the 
existence of commitment, whereas a lack of information about 
the commitment may completely nullify its impact. In our 
example, awareness of Firm A's relocation commitment may 
encourage investments in complementary services, whereas 
unawareness is unlikely to yield consequential changes. This 
does not rule out the impact of relocation, once truly 
materialised.
Another determinant of the potential impact of 
commitment is its distributional implications; commitment to
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the development of an entire business sector is different,, 
and probably limited in its distributional effects, from a 
commitment to the profit base of one business.
A vague, irrelevant, or incompetent commitment on the 
part of a decision-maker who does not have the authority to 
make such a decision may have no effect on the level of 
uncertainty or any overall impact, even if there is full 
awareness of the commitment, and the initiative is timed 
correctly.
Finally, experience shows that the more concrete or 
assertive a commitment is, the greater its ability to 
mitigate uncertainty. A commitment of the Minister of 
Housing (rather than of an employee of this office) to 
improve the roads network in the Galil (rather than to 
improve access conditions to other areas), which has been 
expressed for many years, is now generally taken as election 
campaign rhetoric. The same commitment, if accompanied by 
instructions to further the statutory status of the new 
roads, might be seen as more "serious", even though no 
suggestion of actual road construction has been made.
On the whole, these criteria represent the extent to 
which decision-makers are willing and able to bear the risks 
attached to a commitment. In fact, they determine the nature 
of the commitment and establish the grounds for determining 
the means needed to generate it. Bearing this in mind, it is 
useful to combine these criteria with the previous 
classification of decision-making determinants, permitting 
us to assess the role of commitment in decision-making.
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An attempt to deal with commitment in view of the 
decision-making determinants identified above leads to the 
following conclusions: 
a. Initiating commitment with significant distributional
effects at an increasing scale, measured in terms of 
level of risk, may be positively correlated with access 
to resources (greater freedom to choose), remoteness 
from costs (assuming that decision-makers will commit 
themselves more readily when they are not likely to 
have to bear the costs themselves), and impersonalised 
change (in which undesirable change does not directly 
affect the decision-maker).
Similarly, it is probably negatively correlated with 
private ownership of resources (individualised risk), 
internalised costs, and personalised change.
The explicitness of the issue (assuming that 
concreteness permits greater accuracy in estimating the 
impact of the commitment) probably affects both,
b. A demand for a commitment that increases future
certainty may be especially important for the group 
characterised by lower ability to bear risk (i.e., 
individualised risk and costs).
The following diagram illustrates these interrelations:
111
Diagram no.1: Commitment Under Risk Conditions
RISK
Low ability High ability 
to bear risk to bear risk
COMMITMENT
INITIATIVE
* High ability to bear risk: access to resources and level of authority, remoteness from costs, impersonalised 
change, explicitness of the issue.
• R elative low ability to bear risk: private ownership of resources, internalised costs, personalised change, 
explicitness of the issue.
These risk-commitment relations imply an assumed 
distinction between two basic groups of decision-makers: 
those capable of bearing high risks, and those more 
vulnerable to high and personalised risks. This distinction 
can, to some extent, be applied to the same decision-maker 
when he functions in different situations. It is also 
possible to apply this distinction to the structure of the 
social system as analysed by available theoretical 
approaches. Depending on the specific theoretical 
perspective adopted by planners, the "risk" may be measured, 
for example, in terms of the instability of social 
relations, or an individual's deteriorating profit. 
Accordingly, the ability to bear risk can be linked, for 
example, to the potential for long-run contribution to 
capital accumulation in the business sector, as in a state 
system that may bear the costs of a highly expensive housing
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project for the poor population, or an individual 
entrepreneur attempting to increase his share in the stock 
market.
Finally, this distinction suggests that a position of 
low probability of bearing risk may lead to dependence on 
the group(s) largely able to bear the risk in a particular 
case; this provides the latter with an advantage over the 
former group in the sense of the latter's relatively high 
impact on the nature of socio-economic processes (assuming 
the first to take an active step will affect its succeeding 
actions). In other words, a major aspect of commitment is 
the existence of a gap between the ability to initiate 
commitment and the demand for it. Experience shows that this 
disparity may be construed in terms of conflicting motives 
(functioning interests of groups of decision-makers). The 
first step in coping with this disparity is the 
identification of these motives.
This gap is acute for planning purposes: the ability to 
pinpoint the position of decision-makers on the risk- 
commitment axes permits us to predict, to some extent, which 
of them might be the planners' ''partners", and the 
initiatives to which they are likely to respond. Moreover, 
in view of the assumed status of planners in decision-making 
(i.e., they neither control resource allocation processes, 
nor are directly responsible for plans' implementation), a 
commitment to a planning product may create a normative base 
for different decisions, which would clarify the principle 
direction of the process and the potential role of 
decision-makers in this process. Such a normative base may 
be especially appropriate for regional planning in tackling
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a complicated system. Acknowledging the argument that. a. 
commitment to a planning product is a liability to the 
future decision-making environment, and the nature of 
regional systems, we attempt below to deal with the question 
of potential "partners" in the planning process, considered 
in the long-run and over a large, complex scale.
3.2.3 The Case of Long-Run Decision-Making
Regional planning attempts to generate commitments on 
the part of decision-makers requires that decision-makers 
will be associated with a long time-span and a large-scale, 
complicated system. Thus, in theory, the identification of 
potential partners can be based on decision-makers' presumed 
attitudes toward these aspects. In practice, however, such 
attitudes of different decision-makers are highly 
interrelated, to the extent that the identification of 
potential partners becomes quite tricky, a matter of 
permanent concern to planners, and an aspect of planning 
practice that creates a difficulty that can never be 
completely solved, as elucidated below.
An important assumption, implicit throughout this 
discussion, is that there exist categories of decision­
makers: the business sector, the state apparatus (elected 
and non-elected systems), and individuals, that share 
similar characteristics in terms of sensitivity to risk, 
and, hence, in terms of their attitude toward planning 
initiatives in general, and their ability to commit to its 
content in particular. This distinction is based on the
114
assumption that socio-economic processes are basically 
driven by two, broadly defined, types of interests: economic 
interests, which seek to measure all activities and 
decisions in terms of profits, and which are aimed at their 
maximisation; and non-economic interests, which permit 
various social considerations (such as ideologies or norms) 
to affect decisions; although, in most cases, these have 
economic implications. Accordingly, the business sector, as 
a whole, represents decisions measured primarily in economic 
terms, whereas the public sector represents a readiness to 
give precedence to predominantly indirect economic 
considerations. Individuals fall between the two extremes, 
as the case may be. These groups manifest different types of 
attitudes toward commitment; private enterprise is 
relatively sensitive to economic risks, whereas the public 
sector (elected and non-elected bodies), which may be 
economically more flexible, is fairly sensitive to the 
organisational changes in the administrative system that 
planning initiatives may present.
Concentrating on the possible different features of 
these categories of decision-makers, and the way these 
features may be applied to the planning practice, may lead 
one to conclude that once the decision-makers' role in the 
social system is identified and the determinants relevant 
for concrete actions and decisions are recognised, the 
choice of "partners" is straightforward. In practice, 
however, the guestion of which decision-makers are likely to 
contribute to the planning practice is far more complicated.
Commitment to a specific planning product is important. 
Insofar as regional planning is concerned, three major
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prerequisites will determine the importance and relevance of. 
a commitment: First, the scope of activities of the
organisation or the individual should be such as to permit 
operation under constraints of high risk. Second, it is 
necessary that the organisation or individual be able to 
cope with the complexity of a region and the great 
variability of its components, as determined by the 
organisation's or individual's operational mechanism and 
access to resources. Third, the role of the organisation or 
the individual in the socio-economic system must provide the 
organisation or individual with the ability and preparation 
to cope with externalities.
The first two features tends to be viewed as 
characterising the state apparatus and large businesses. The 
ability to internalise externalities, however, is viewed as 
representing the scope of the public sector; this also is 
used to justify public intervention. In this logic, the 
basic risk-commitment relations may imply that the public 
sector's tendency to emphasise the non-economic components 
of a decision enables it to establish initial conditions for 
business sector commitment by decreasing the level of 
uncertainty within which the latter would preferably 
function. The wider the scope of intervention (and hence the 
scale) of public sector activities, the larger the area in 
which the public sector's commitment will be relevant to 
other sectors and activities. By implication, since most 
planning initiatives come with important economic 
implications for resource allocation, decision-makers 
located in the public sector may be viewed as "natural" 
partners for the planning process; the generation of their
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commitment to a specific regional planning product may .be 
regarded as the task of planning practice. In reality, 
regional planning function is indeed mostly practiced in the 
public-governmental sector. Nevertheless, the planning 
experience in general, with its many cases of failed 
implementation, suggests that this conclusion is not as 
straightforward as it seems. The public sector, while 
possibly able to bear economic risk, strives mainly to 
maintain the existing socio-economic functional status-quo. 
Thus, the expectation that it will support planning 
initiatives that, almost by definition, attempt to effect 
changes in the socio-economic system, will probably be 
problematic. By the same token, the business sector, cannot 
be considered an optimal partner, since it may also be 
unreceptive to such structural changes and less capable of 
taking the economic risks involved in the introduction of 
structural changes.
Nevertheless, since the two sectors are sensitive to 
different aspects of planning initiatives, their potential 
contributions are inseparable. This line of argument is 
supported by observation of historical regional processes, 
which indicate that the sectors play complementary roles 
within the socio-economic system: the business sector is 
presumed to be a major agent securing continuous changes or 
development (e.g., the provision of jobs, housing 
construction). The public sector creates the general 
conditions in which the business sector performs. For 
example, investment in roads, an external, organisational 
concern most often handled directly or indirectly by the 
public sector, has a critical impact on the business sector
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by increasing accessibility to investment opportunities, as.
measured in terms of higher quality of life, lower
transportation expenses to be factored into product prices,
greater investment opportunities in more accessible areas,
and the like. In other words, both sectors continue to play
a role in implementing the planning product and each sector
tends to contribute to the process at a different stage or
with respect to different components. These complementary
roles are important for planning practice: planners may
devise a strategic perspective that allows the integration
of partners from each sector at a different stage or place
of the regional process, thus encouraging the integration of
each sector's potential contribution to the regional system
1 Qas a whole. This may require to abandon the desire17 to 
determine one single "partner", concentrating instead on the 
distribution of different segment of such strategy to 
different potential partners and recruiting their 
involvement as the case requires. We shall expand this 
argument in the next chapter. At this point, however, it 
should be emphasised that the relationship between the roles 
of the public and business sectors in regional processes 
remains problematic, because each sector tends to interpret 
commitment differently. Conflicts are likely to arise 
especially in contexts of long-run and possibly large-scale 
commitment, which establish levels of risk, as illustrated 
by the following discussion of the two sectors' different 
attitudes toward those aspects, and the problems of 
integrating them into planning process.
The public sector's long-run commitment is especially 
important in areas external to private enterprise, since it
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is assumed that the business sector will make such 
commitments only in cases crucial to its functioning 
mechanism. In this sense, the role of the public sector is 
to create a more favourable environment for business 
enterprise. The concept of "long-run", however, is subject 
to different definitions. The state system tends to define 
it in terms of electoral processes, according to which 
"long" may mean the period between elections, or according 
to a specific decision-maker's tenure in a particular 
position. The business sector, by contrast, may measure it 
in terms of a product's life-span or production cycle. 
Finally, individuals may regard long and short terms as 
functions of individual characteristics. This could lead to 
a situation in which the "long-run" commitment desired by 
the business sector to clarify its probable situation (i.e., 
a decreased level of economic risk) is beyond the scope of 
the public sector. Even if the public sector makes such a 
commitment, it hardly justifies the risk taken by the 
business sector, because guarantees in cases of structural 
changes within the government apparatus are hard to provide. 
A simple example clarifies this point. The business sector 
regards investment in telecommunication infrastructure as an 
externality, even though such investment is essential for 
its sound performance, and even though improvements in this 
area may generate a direct profit. Assuming a case in which 
investments are needed for the next 20 years, and that the 
public sector will start investing and even commit to 
finishing the project, the business sector theoretically is 
provided with the security to invest in activities requiring 
such an infrastructure. Even so, is there any way of
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securing that this infrastructure work will be carried, 
through to the end? Not entirely. Yet, we may argue that 
such securities might not be required. The previously 
mentioned case of the industrial zone in the Galil shows 
that although the enterprise's commitment was called off, 
the investment stimulated by this commitment continued, thus 
possibly promoting the future functioning of this industrial 
zone.
"Long-run" commitment by the business sector also is 
problematic, since it tends to relate only to internal 
issues under maximum control. Thus, issues that have 
indirect impact and involve externalities over which private 
control is minimal are likely to be outside this sector's 
interest, since the considerations of others are beyond its 
scope. One should bear in mind that commitment patterns 
within the business sector can never be fully revealed, and 
hence their impact only can be-measured once they are 
effectuated. Thus it may be difficult or even impossible to 
integrate other components of the system into future 
actions. In the example of the commitment to relocate a 
plant, there is no guarantee that the plant will relocate 
until it has actually relocated. Consequently, plans 
concerning such components as vocational training may prove 
either irrelevant or of limited utility in terms of their 
integration into the newly established production element. 
Therefore, a situation can develop in which the business 
sector attempts to externalise the costs of commitment as a 
way of maximising the protection of its interests, assigning 
the public sector costs that it may not be able to absorb.
120
An additional aspect of importance in this context is 
the scale of the system to which the commitment refers, 
along with the level of risk within which the system 
functions. This, again, is differently defined in the 
private and public sectors, and is determined by each 
sector's scope and scale of activity and specific area of 
concern. The business sector differs from the public sector 
in the limited range of issues preoccupying its individual 
entities (firms, enterprises, etc.), and their scale. Thus, 
with respect to the scale of issues, a public sector 
commitment is needed to clarify the future functional 
environment of the specific business sector units that are 
most likely to fall under some degree of public sector 
control. For the business sector, "large-scale" is chiefly a 
function of the types of activities in question. Experience 
shows (to make a crude generalisation) that this scale tends 
to be smaller in the private than in the public sector. As 
such, this issue is directly related to the distinction 
between internalities and externalities, in the sense that, 
for the public sector, "large-scale" may be construed as a 
set of linkages among different types of (external) systems 
and activities, whereas for the business sector it refers 
mainly to internal components.
In general, as in the previous case, the concept of the 
"large-scale" is a function of the nature of the activities 
dealt with by each of the sectors in specific cases. It 
should be emphasised that the potential ability to initiate 
commitment at a higher level and larger scale does not 
necessarily imply a demand for such a pattern of commitment.
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In other words, different sectors may commit themselves .to. 
different aspects of the planning product (or at different 
stages of the process). Although the public sector basically 
acts to maintain existing structures, it may be geared 
toward facilitating a business sector breakthrough in a 
given situation.
So, the dilemma remains: planners aim for a complex 
system, and hence require the cooperation of either or both 
the public and business sectors, but we cannot suggest that 
the cooperation of any one sector is particularly 
advantageous. What we will suggest, however, at a later 
stage of this dissertation, is that by presenting a general 
strategic perspective and generating commitment to it, 
planners may find it possible (although perhaps not easy) to 
coordinate the different sectors' responses to the planning 
initiative, and combine the possible limits of commitment of 
each sector.
Conclusions
This chapter identified those aspects of decision­
making that are of central importance to the planning 
process. It was argued that decision-making manifests itself 
in the allocation of resources, and that resource allocation 
determines the nature of competition, which, in turn, shapes 
the nature of regional systems. This being the case, it was 
emphasised that the foregoing aspects of decision-making 
permit planners to conduct practical analyses of regional 
processes. Because the essence of specific decision-making
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components depends on the specific context in which the 
components occur, this chapter places its major emphasis on 
those determinants likely to be most relevant in dealing 
with specific cases. Rather than presenting a detailed 
discussion of the numerous possible impacts that the 
determinants of decision-making can create, we have 
concentrated on the type of impact each aspect may have, 
presenting the framework in which important aspects of 
decision-making may be revealed, by classifying them either 
as forces promoting access to resources or as elements 
permitting access to resources.
The integration of the determinants' vulnerability into 
the concept of commitment is the very essence of planning 
practice. Vulnerability refers to those aspects of 
decision-making that planners may influence; the concept of 
commitment permits planners to identify types of responses 
to specific planning initiatives, and the optimal subjects 
for any attempt to influence decision-making. To utilise 
these devices, planners must systematically analyse the 
decision-making arena in which they operate, investing 
sophisticated and creative thought in determining how the 
potential decision-makers can be manipulated in the desired 
direction. This process should provide planners with clear- 
cut criteria for the selection of target decision-makers for 
the implementation of planning initiatives, including the 
points at which they may be mobilised for the planning 
process.
It was then postulated that once one has in hand the 
criteria for choosing relevant “partners" (i.e., decision­
makers who may be geared toward commitment to the planning
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initiative) and making decisions on how to approach them, 
through the activation of vulnerable determinants, one then 
has the basic tools to exercise the initiative. This 
approach rests on the premise that planning depends largely 
on the professional qualities of the planners, along with 
the specific conditions prevailing at the time an attempt to 
exercise a given planning initiative is made. There is 
therefore no valid reason to prescribe specific actions to 
take in each case.
The important element to provide is a methodological 
framework within which the planner’s qualities may be 
exercised, one that points out the aspects worthy of 
treatment and the avenues by which they may be identified 
and implemented. The identification of the major decision­
making elements relevant to regional processes may be left 
to the planner, who should be able to determine the specific 
analytical tools. Nevertheless, since we are concerned with 
regional development processes and ways of improving them, 
we must still discuss the nature of the planning strategy 
within which the above aspects are integrated.
Notes
(1) Information, considered an outstandingly important resource, may be classified in 
each of the three categories.
(2) Pow er - the ab il i ty  of d ec is ion -m akers  to impose the ir  cons ide ra t ions  (e.g., 
priorities, interests) on other members of the social-economic system.
(3) Other investments, such as H am m er’s investments in a new private plane, will 
most probably not be considered "political".
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(4) As previously argued, the determination of appropriate theoretical approach for 
concrete cases is, and should be, left to planners and analysts.
(5) A good example is the case of one Am erican Jewish religious community (the 
L ubav ich )  tha t  used its m ateria l  wealth  to p rom ote  changes in the Israeli 
p a r l ia m e n t’s p a r t  coalition  and in the re la tions  be tw een  relig ious and n o n ­
religious institutions. This wealth enabled the religious parties to gain a political 
power that exceeds their actual electoral base.
(6) Mr. Vertheim owns a large industrial complex. He is famous for the initiation of 
a private settlement in the Galil region and the recent acquisition of a small 
settlement in the Galil.
(7) The establishment of Kefar Haveradim was made possible by the allocation of 
state-owned land, for the first time since Israel’s founding, to private settlers led 
by the above entrepreneur.
(8) In particular, the director of two large industrial enterprises, Mr. S. Vertheim 
and Mr. U. Galil.
(9) From an interview with Ms. H. Aflallo (April 1990), a form er Jewish Agency 
planner who is presently employed by the Region 2000 company.
(10) It is indirectly argued here that "no response" scenario pose immense difficulties 
on the planner’s involvement. A response of any type is almost a prerequisite for 
planners’ search for "partners", since they do not and cannot operate alone.
(11) As a genera lisa tion , over sensitiv ity  of d ec is io n -m ak ers  to a ce rta in  idea is 
assumed to be undesirable.
(12) This decision fundam entaly changed the entire  state system and the political 
power distribution (both between the Jews and the Arabs and within each group) 
that prevailed during the pre-state period.
(13) A a large quasi-governmental corporation.
(14) "E x te rn a l i se d  costs" is cost no t b o rn e  d i re c t ly  by the  in d iv id u a l  or the  
organisation acting to effect it.
(15) R egard less  of o th e rs ’ awareness of the p roposed  p ro je c t ,  which is a totaly 
different question, as previously discussed.
(16) Thus, one is calling for a planning initiative that can take into account possible 
sources or areas of costs as well as the sensitivity of d iffe ren t socio-economic 
organisations to different types of costs.
(17) Assuming an awareness of the planning proposal.
(18) The firm: Fibronics LTD, based in Haifa; the industrial zone: Teradion, located 
in Segev area.
(19) A ssum ing it is p re fe rab le  to opera te  with one "partner" ra the r  than m any, 
e sp ec ia l ly  s ince  the  "one" may be an o rg a n is a t io n  th a t  cons is ts  o f  m any  
individuals.
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Chapter 4:
TURNING VISION INTO PRACTICE - REGIONAL STRATEGY
Introduction
The following are the major conclusions of the 
foregoing sections:
a. Political-administrative decision-making processes (as 
manifested in resource allocation patterns) are an 
important aspect of regional development processes 
because of their impact on the region's competitive 
advantage.
b. The essence of the planning initiative lies in its 
integration into existing economic and socio- 
organisational processes.
c. The ability to stimulate desired or expected patterns 
of response to planning initiatives within political- 
administrative organisations is measured by the ability 
to generate commitment on the part of decision-makers, 
by taking advantage of decision-making determinants 
that are potentially vulnerable to planning 
initiatives.
These conclusions bring major questions to the fore. 
What sort of impact does a planner seek in a particular 
region, and how may he achieve this impact, in view of the 
nature of the regional system and the practical 
qualifications he should have in order to affect resource 
allocation processes?
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As for the desired nature of the impact, no absolute 
rule can be proposed (even the traditional objective of 
improving the region's relative condition is meaningful only 
with regard to other criteria). The means by which a planner 
can achieve the desired impact, however, is another matter 
altogether. This chapter argues that a strategic approach is 
most appropriate for affecting regional processes and 
facilitating continuous regional development. It, therefore, 
deals with three major themes:
1. Regional strategy in general - coping with the inherent 
problems of operating a strategy in a given region.
2. The functional environment of planners - the scope of 
planning practice.
3. Regional strategy in practice - a methodological 
framework for the exercise of regional development 
strategy.
4.1 Regional Strategy Defined
The concept of "strategy" is rooted in military 
studies, in which it is defined as "the art of projecting 
and directing the large military movements ..." (Oxford 
Dictionary, Third Edition, 1956). This notion has since been 
recognised to apply to other areas of research, especially 
management and business. Prevailing definitions of 
"strategy" vary with the specific subject matter. Generally 
speaking, there seems to be a consensus as to its basic 
task: the determination of the scope and future direction of 
a given entity (a company, an army etc.). Scholars agree,
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too, on the principle attitude that characterises strategic, 
thinking: a broad consideration of the issues of strategic 
concern, often coupled with a focus on large-scale 
activities.
Within the context of regional planning, regional 
strategy is the art of stimulating decision-making processes 
in the direction of altering the region's strength relative 
to other systems. This definition of regional strategy is 
structured on the following basic elements of strategy, and 
is coupled with the notion of competition previously 
(chapter 2). As simple as this definition may sound, its 
implications are rather complex, especially with regard to 
the complex of aspects related to regional systems, and the 
task of regional planning that assigns planners to deal with 
this complicated system under conditions of no direct 
control over resource allocation and political- 
administrative decision-making processes.
The following major aspects of this definition of 
regional strategy, some of which are discussed thoroughly in 
the literature, require clarification:
1. To what extent can and should a strategy be a basis for 
action? From a pragmatic point of view, this question 
is irrelevant, since strategy ordinarily is structured 
for the precise purpose of guiding action. However, by 
rephrasing the question as "For what do we need a 
strategy?", we may deal with the essence of strategy.
2. How can the difficulty in determining the precise 
parameters of a strategy (or its boundaries) be 
overcome?
3. What is the organisational context of regional
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strategy? It is this context, after all, that gives 
planners their functional grounds for action.
In addition to these questions, which establish the 
basic rationale for our concern with regional strategy, 
other questions directly linked to the nature of the 
proposed strategy require clarification:
4. Can a strategist influence decision-makers; or, how 
likely is it that a decision-maker (a potential 
partner) will follow a particular strategy? Favourable 
answers to these questions lie at the essence of the 
proposed strategic approach, which concerns itself with 
methods of applying strategies, and assumes that 
planners can recruit decision-makers into them.
5. How do strategies, policies, programmes, and procedures 
interrelate? This is largely a matter of finding 
practical pathways along which interactions should 
function; by definition, it falls within the task of 
strategy.
6. The aspect of the modification of a region's relative 
strength. This concerns competition, and requires 
extensive discussion since, although in business 
studies it seems obvious that companies function within 
a competitive environment, regional studies tend to 
underestimate the competitive environment of the 
regional system, although they do treat different 
aspects of competition, such as the scarcity of 
resources. This aspect is discussed in Chapter 2.
These questions are discussed in the following 
sections:
4.2 The Case for a Regional Strategy
General approaches toward strategy, especially within 
the business world, tend to assume that strategy is a 
crucial, commonly exercised element of policy-making. These 
approaches presuppose a basic readiness of the system to 
function in accordance with strategy, but nevertheless 
acknowledge that the more innovative or drastic the strategy 
is in terms of the change recommended, the more difficult it 
will be to impose it on the system. By implication, strategy 
always lends itself to manipulation, and poses practical 
difficulties.
It is generally assumed that any organisation of any 
scale and structure will have some sort of long-run 
strategy. Some organisations take strategy as the main 
source of operational guidance; others allow day-to-day 
events to supersede overarching policy. As a whole, when 
dealing with an organisation's strategy, it is generally 
argued (Aharoni, 1982) that an effective strategy is a major 
determinant of the organisation's improved performance. Such 
a strategy therefore is considered both desirable and 
needed. Accordingly, studies focus on alternative strategies 
(varying in time-span, breadth of issues addressed, 
resources required, etc.) and their relevance in specific 
cases. Beyond the existence or absence of a strategy, the 
issue of its effectiveness, by contrast, evokes entirely 
different questions and discussions about the organisation's 
internal structure and capabilities (such a discussion at 
this point is beyond our scope).
However, when we deal with regional systems, we cannot
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assume that a long-term regional development strategy is 
essential to the individual system. Unlike private firms, 
which may either cease to exist or lose capital in the 
absence of a strategy, regional systems do not cease to 
operate in the absence of a long-term development strategy. 
Moreover, experience proves (e.g., Friedmann and Weaver, 
1979; Manners, 1980; Goldsmith, 1980) that even when a 
regional strategy is applied, it does not guarantee more 
efficient performance on the part of the regional system. 
Indeed, the relationship between regional systems and 
regional strategy is problematic. This difficulty is 
directly linked to the nature of the regional system, which, 
as was previously suggested, is a complicated system forming 
part of a larger system, and a dynamic one undergoing 
constant change as a result of interactions between regional 
components. In fact, these interactions instigate the 
process through which the nature of the regional system is 
established. In short, if no attempt is made to intervene, 
"regions" will not disappear; at most, they may operate 
differently. In this case, if attempts at region-wide change 
are made, they most likely will be realised only insofar as 
they meet the individual organisation's needs or interests. 
It is most likely that an overall strategic perspective of 
the regional system will be obtained only to the extent that 
it satisfies the needs of the individual organisation.
A simple example illustrates how a region can be 
influenced by a strategic perspective. Assuming an 
industrial plant located in region A decides to establish 
training schemes for its employees. It may either operate 
such schemes by itself, or contract with an existing
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education system capable of providing the required service.. 
The choice of one of these alternatives, based on evaluation 
of the practical implications of each for the plant 
(including factors such as costs, duration of the process, 
trainers' professional qualifications, etc.) will inevitably 
stimulate market dynamics for such a service. The dynamics 
may be manifest in the form of competition between existing 
educational institutions, modifications within a particular 
institution to accommodate itself to the demand, or in other 
ways. In any case, the choice of an appropriate scheme is 
unlikely to be influenced by a consideration of its 
contribution to the regional system; rather, the major 
criterion will be the utility of the selection to the 
organisation.
These processes are important, because they are among 
the different types of interactions that determine the 
nature of the region. In our example, the dynamics following 
the actual choice, although an organisation's internal 
affair, may result in a service that is new to the region or 
in an improvement of the existing educational system, both 
of which could be offered to other plants. Similarly, it may 
increase employee competence, and hence production, both in 
the specific plant and in others. On the other hand, the 
impact may be negative, as in the event of the above process 
occurring outside region A, thus denying the region its 
possible utility. One way or another, the result of this 
process probably will satisfy the plant's requirements, 
although not necessarily those of the regional system, which 
either can gain or lose from the resulting educational and 
production changes. Furthermore, the process will be
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coordinated with other organisations in a given region only 
insofar as they are connected to it.* It can therefore be 
concluded that, first, the need for a regional strategy 
transcends the straightforward, internal concerns of 
individual organisations, and requires an ability to 
perceive the region as a coherent system. There is, however, 
a possibility that strategy's contribution to regional 
organisations may be fairly straightforward, since 
individual organisations operate under conditions of 
uncertainty with regard to other forces' decisions and 
expected changes in their functional environment. Second, an 
attempt to influence processes within the overall regional 
system must focus above all on the interactions between 
various organisations operating in relation with the 
regional system. In practice, therefore, the attempt to 
influence regional processes requires that interacting 
organisations operate on the basis of similar objectives and 
expectations from the socio-economic system. Since 
interactions occur between socio-economic organisations that 
differ in terms of location, scale, or other such variables, 
and since changes do not take place immediately and 
interactions are rarely generated on the spot, the great 
extent of uncertainty involved in such interactions should 
be mitigated. Thus strategy, and those who shape it, should 
act directly by guiding the organisations toward common 
goals. Implicitly, then, attempts should be made to 
convince all concerned that a shared goal can decrease 
uncertainty.
Briefly stated, regional strategy confers the following 
advantages:
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a. It facilitates guiding the effects of day-to-day. 
events;
b. It decreases uncertainty, thus permitting organisations 
to determine how well their integration into the 
process would coincide with their own interests;
c. It may amplify comparative regional advantage by 
treating the region as one socio-economic system 
(though an "open" one; see Chap. 2);
d. It facilitates the assessment of the impact of various 
activities on the regional system.
In the example of the search for training schemes, the 
firm's choice undoubtedly will be affected if the 
local/regional educational system can guarantee the long-run 
(or as long as is reguired) availability of such services. 
If it can, the investments made by the educational system in 
"importing" needed trainers would in turn be worthwhile only 
if the region could guarantee appropriate housing, schools 
for their children, and so on. In other words, the 
strategist must concern himself with the cumulative effect 
that probably will, and should, be generated through a 
strategic perspective on the region.
Some may point to a potential disadvantage of such a 
perspective: namely, the risk of preventing or neglecting 
initiatives by those who deviate from the overall principles 
of the system, although they may be contributing to the 
region. This being the case, it nonetheless depends on the 
nature and practice of a given strategy, not on its 
existence per se.
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To sum up, regional strategy is perceived as providing 
a framework for the management of regional processes. As 
such, strategy is essential for the promotion of major 
changes in the regional system by streamlining its operating 
mechanism. The need for strategy does not mean that it is 
possible to manage by strategy all the diverse forces 
operating within the region. Regional systems, as argued, 
are "open" entities, susceptible to numerous internal and 
external forces. However, we must deal with the interactions 
as a whole if we wish to steer the system toward a common 
goal. For example, an educational system and a housing 
market may seem only loosely connected, since they 
ostensibly deal with entirely different aspects of regional 
processes. Experience (Manners, 1980; Sewer and Tabb, 1984) 
proves, however, that different regional components are not 
only highly interconnected in many cases (e.g., they affect 
migration trends), but are also directly linked to other 
components of the regional system, such as the labour 
market. Increasing the competitiveness of the educational 
system, as well as raising housing standards, may attract 
highly skilled labour, thereby leading to an influx of 
high-technology plants, thus stimulating the demand for 
highly skilled labour and possibly affecting the 
population's socio-economic conditions. All of these trends 
manifest themselves through improvement of the region's 
overall competitive advantage. Therefore, the only way to 
cope with these interactive activities is by integrating 
them into a single, coherent strategic perspective. 
Nevertheless, the actual need for a strategy does not mean 
that the entire strategic approach necessarily will be
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presented by planners. It may be used by planners for 
different tasks (such as guiding their search for "partners" 
and their interactions with other decision-makers), while 
only concrete aspects of the approach may be presented. By 
implication, a strategy is useful for improving the 
planner's performance.
4.3 Boundaries of Concern
The parameters (or boundaries) of regional strategy 
are, by definition, a function of the nature of regional 
systems. A strategy's limits of concern may therefore be 
determined with reference to two measures: the physical (the 
spatial area to which the strategy applies), and the 
functional (the set of activities and processes with which 
it deals).
It may be very appealing to emphasise the spatial 
criteria, thus concentrating on the region-specific 
functional system given within a specific spatial area. This 
attitude, however, is both impossible and undesirable. 
First, the "openness" of the regional system implies that it 
is difficult to apply a narrowly region-limited perspective. 
Second, as argued in Chapter 2, since the physical aspect of 
a regional system is merely the result of socio-economic 
activities, the emphasis should be placed on the nature of 
the activities of which specific regional systems are 
composed.
Admittedly, reference to a set of activities with which 
regional strategy should deal causes a serious problem. This 
problem is directly connected with the major characteristics
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of the regional system: “openness", complexity, and dynamic,, 
which permit any type of activity to be integrated into the 
strategy. Since it is impractical to deal with the entire 
range of socio-economic processes that structure the 
regional system, there is a need to limit the boundaries of 
strategic concern. The questions therefore become: what are 
the boundaries of a strategy, and how may we limit these 
boundaries?
The literature recognises the problem presented by the 
potential broadness of strategic parameters. Whereas they 
permit great abstraction on the part of strategy, scholars 
(e.g., Ansoff, 1965) tend to concentrate on the question of 
where strategy ends. Military studies, for example, tend to 
distinguish between "strategy" and "tactics" - the latter 
belonging only to the mechanical movements of bodies set in 
motion by the former ..." (Oxford Dictionary, Third Edition, 
1956). This rationale assumes a hierarchy of treatment of 
policy-making issues: strategy theoretically is expected to 
confine itself to a broad view of processes or issues. 
Increased specificity or technical concern with processes is 
the domain of tactics, programs, and procedures. However, 
while accepting the principle of hierarchy of treatment with 
issues, and the argued need to determine the limits of this 
treatment, our concern in the case of regional strategy 
requires clarification in two aspects:
a. These studies assume that the subject of strategy is
clearly demarcated, or that it is a distinct entity,
such as the armed forces or a business firm.
Accordingly, the problem of defining the "upper" limits
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of strategy is viewed as irrelevant. That is not,, 
however, the case with the region, which, as noted, may 
theoretically permit any type issue to be treated in a 
regional strategy.
The upper limits of regional strategy, in terms of the 
scale and complexity of the activities with which it 
deals, is largely a function of the region's 
relationship with the larger system (the nation, for 
instance). Thus, the strategy's limits should be 
delimited by the issues that arise in each case. For 
example, a planner's interest in the educational system 
may in theory be limited to intra-regional educational 
institutions and activities. In some cases, however, a 
broader perspective is required, as with extra-regional 
institutions that serve the region (e.g., 
universities). Therefore, the regional strategy should 
not confine itself to the physical boundaries of a 
given region. In fact, as suggested in Chapter 2, it 
should transcend local (internal-regional) processes, 
and deal with those processes that affect the nature of 
regional processes. At the same time, however, we 
should not assume the automatic relevance of non-local 
issues, as is shown in the following example. Assume we 
are interested in the links between industrial 
development and the educational system in a particular 
region. This may require, for example, to dealing with 
higher-education institutions located outside the 
region, which their isolation from industrial 
activities is assumed to be partly linked to a nation­
wide attitude toward applied research. It may also
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require some reference to the national government 
educational system and policies. Yet, in our extensive 
concern with such aspects, we may end up providing a 
national strategy for the encouragement of industrial 
R&D activities. But is this an appropriate strategy for 
the regional context? Probably not. Alternatively, a 
strategy also based on knowledge of national processes 
that proposes that certain incentives be provided 
locally (within the region) for the integration of 
outside educational institutions in the industrial 
system, probably will be more appropriate.
So, the concerns of regional strategy are not 
limitless, either spatially and functionally. Planners, 
however, are limited only by their understanding and 
imagination: the question of parameters is important 
only insofar as it emphasises that regional processes 
should be addressed within a perspective that aims to 
create a framework for operating with respect to 
regional systems.
b. In view of this "freedom", planners may face a problem 
related to the practical determination of strategic 
limits. The question of determining "where the strategy 
ends and the tactics start" is subject to extensive 
discussion. Business studies provide interesting and 
important insights in this regard. Ansoff (1985), for 
instance, suggests that the problem be solved by 
distinguishing between strategy, policy, programme, and 
operating procedures, which he ranks in order of their 
"increasing level of ignorance: standing operating 
procedures and programmes under condition of certainty
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or partial risk, policies under condition of risk and. 
uncertainty, and strategies under condition of partial 
ignorance" (p. 107). Nevertheless, the problem of
isolating clear criteria for the distinction between 
strategy, policy, programmes, and procedures remains 
unsolved at the level of theoretical discussion. 
Indeed, a strategy may deal with any issue on any 
level, but only as long as it serves its requirements 
and permits it to cope with regional processes 
efficiently. What "counts", then, is the set of 
activities and issues selected for strategic purposes. 
The contents of this set are determined solely by the 
way in which the strategist perceives the region and 
defines his goals. This being the case, however, the 
precise limits can only be determined only empirically.
In practice, beyond these difficulties, two principles 
of strategy are of particular importance in the regional 
case:
a. The administrative level of concern with strategy. 
Available studies that are interested in questions such 
as who is responsible for a strategy or whose needs it 
serves, tend to associate the scale and complexity of 
treatment with the administrative hierarchy of 
organisations. Strategy is confined to upper-level 
administrative functions. Increased specificity or 
technical concern with processes takes place at lower 
levels of the administrative hierarchy. This implies 
that the content of strategy cannot be separated from 
the organisation's structure and power distribution,
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i.e., in order to promote decision-maker commitment to 
a strategy, certain functions in the organisation's 
system are relatively more relevant than others. This 
principle, however, is directly related to the 
planner's problematic role in socio-economic 
organisations, as will be further discussed,
b. A second important feature of strategy, presumed to be 
obvious in all studies, is its specification. Studies 
emphasise its necessary links to tactics, programmes, 
and procedures. This suggests that a strategy cannot 
stand by itself, and the pathway to its implementation 
lies in its concretisation. Although planning 
experiences shows that "strategic" planners 
underestimate the importance of a strategy's 
specification as a vehicle to promote certain changes 
in regional systems, this aspect is crucially important 
for planning practice. Planners view this process as 
technical (or procedural), and often disregard the 
implications of such an approach (for example, 
specification of strategy may result in formulating a 
strategy that is different from the one initially 
sought).
On the whole, these questions emphasise the problem of 
the choice of activities to be included within a strategy, 
or, more accurately, the type of concern with various 
activities and extent of emphasis that each deserves. In 
practice, no clear-cut definition of such activities is 
available. However, the arguments presented in this 
dissertation elucidate several categories of activities that 
are prime candidates for strategic interest, and
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importantly, establish criteria by which relevant activities 
may be determined. Specifically, since production and 
organisational processes are crucial components of the 
regional development process, the nature of these processes 
is likely to affect the determination of regional boundaries 
and the parameters of regional strategy. Further, in view of 
the previously discussed concepts of regional competitive 
advantage, commitment to planning initiatives, and the 
vulnerability of decision-making determinants to the 
planning process, it is rather clear that the criteria for 
determining the boundaries of a regional strategy are 
directly connected with the issues that satisfy planners' 
efforts to modify regional systems their particular context. 
Finally, while seeking to eliminate certain areas of 
activity, and ensuring that others will be examined and 
modified throughout the process, if this is required 
regional strategy lends itself an essential aspect: 
flexibility. This may become disadvantageous, as an 
excessive proliferation of activities ranked on similar 
levels of importance within the strategy may lead to chaos. 
Yet, this possible disadvantage can be turned to advantage 
by the planner's ability to deal with various components of 
the regional system at their most relevant levels.
To sum up, the issue of "boundaries of concern" is a 
crude example of the planning approach presented in this 
dissertation, which leaves the planner with a maximum degree 
of freedom to determine the aspects he should treat, and 
assumes that such a selection arises from the professional 
qualities that are necessary for engagement in regional 
strategy.
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4.4 The Organisational Context of Regional Strategy
A central aspect of any regional strategy, and a 
crucial element in determining its impact, is the functional 
context of the strategy, or the way the regional strategy is 
integrated into the regional decision-making system. The 
task of making an impact on regional organisations and 
decision-makers (who are expected to function within a 
unitary, long-run strategic framework) is argued here to be 
both feasible and desirable. Feasible - assuming that the 
planner's professional and personal capabilities make the 
essential contribution toward the establishment of change. 
Desirable - as opposed to some theoretical approaches that 
rule out the possibility of effective planning, by arguing 
that too often the planning function by necessity serves the 
dominant interests of capital accumulation, and, therefore, 
cannot initiate requisite structural change.
This task, however, is not without problems. 
Difficulties arise in the following complementary aspects:
* The nature of the organisations within which regional 
strategy is initiated; and the kind of organisation that 
may initiate and manage one in view of, or as an 
indication of, the possible scope of a strategy, and the 
available resources to assert it regarding issues that 
are beyond the concern of the specific organisation. The 
problem that arises in this regard concerns the 
organisational characteristics that may lend these 
organisations an advantage in their treatment of the 
regional system as a whole (Friend, 1980).
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* The internal-organisational context in which a regional 
strategy is initiated. This aspect concerns the 
establishment of planners' potential role and their 
ability to create conditions under which the organisation 
will adopt the strategy. The major questions that arise 
in this context have to do with the planner's position 
within the organisation, his actual involvement in the 
decision-making process, and his ability to have an 
impact transcending his specific organisation (i.e., the 
organisation employing the planner).
The following discussion further elaborates these 
aspects.
4.4.1 The Initiation and Management of Regional Strategy
Beyond the theoretical need for a regional strategy, 
actual problems arise with respect to the readiness and 
ability of socio-economic organisations involved in regional 
processes to initiate or manage a regional strategy, 
especially in view of the nature of regional systems. 
Chapter 3 discussed the question of power distribution and 
organisations' commitment to long-term and large-scale 
processes, as well as the interrelations between public and 
business sector attitudes toward commitment to such 
processes. This section, therefore, links these arguments to 
the case of regional strategy, and highlights the aspects 
particularly relevant to such strategy.
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As stated, a region is a non-unitary system structured 
of different interests geared toward different policies. 
Since the interactions between the various forces forms the 
essence of its performance mechanism, these interactions 
should be the major concern of regional strategy (Friend, 
1980). Thus, the integration of the diverse economic and 
non-economic regional components (e.g., firms, individuals, 
local institutions) into one strategic framework is, almost 
by definition, an extra-organisational matter, in the sense 
of generally being concerned with the system as a whole, 
rather than meeting a prereguisite for the existence of any 
individual organisation. Examples of such extra- 
organisational issues of intrinsic importance in regional 
strategy are the available roads or transportation 
infrastructure in and leading to the region, public 
services, and telecommunications, to name only three. They 
do much to shape the organisation's attitude toward the 
regional system. A direct concern with such issues and a 
purposeful attempt to deal with them as a whole within a 
strategy is uncommon in the actual attitudes public and 
private organisations take toward their functional 
environment. In most case, any organisation, when 
determining its actions or policy, will consider such 
"extra" issues as the integral components of their 
environment's (regional) structure, but will not necessarily 
attempt to modify this structure if they are displeased with 
it. The individual organisation will either accommodate its 
system to the given conditions, or relocate to a more 
satisfactory environment. Rarely will an individual 
organisation attempt to initiate changes that are beyond its
specific scope. Indeed, the very notion of "extra- 
organisational issues" alludes to attempts to deal with 
various aspects of regional systems in a way that tends to 
transcend the interests of the individual organisation. In 
view of the potential contribution of a regional strategy to 
specific organisations and economic entities, the regional 
strategy is a type of "socio-economic externality", that is, 
an activity pertaining to public goods, which, by 
definition, no individual economic entity would produce if 
it were forced to bear the costs alone (Mishan, 1973).
Attempts to intervene with such components tend to 
occur only when a potential direct benefit is perceived; 
even then, involvement is generally limited to the (direct) 
functional environment of the organisation concerned. 
Indeed, in the case of a regional strategy, as opposed to 
other types of strategies (e.g., firm A will not benefit 
from a successful marketing strategy of firm B targeted to 
the same product's market), individual components of the 
regional system may directly benefit from a strategic 
success without suffering commensurately from strategic 
failure or the lack of strategic initiative.
By implication, first, not all organisations involved in' 
regional processes necessarily need*6 a regional strategy. 
Second, although a regional development strategy may have 
direct economic consequences, its initiation and management 
cannot be a matter of merely economic considerations. Third, 
although a wide range of organisations may desire an 
efficient regional strategy, few will find it worthwhile to 
initiate or manage it. Alternatively stated, the initiation 
and management of a strategy is a function of the
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organisation's ability to cope with extra-organisational 
issues. Moreover, linking this aspect to the risk-commitment 
relationship implies that the ability and desire to deal 
with external issues depends on the organisation's ability 
and will to bear the high economic risks involved in dealing 
with external issues (regarding which the reaction of other 
socio-economic organisations cannot always be predicted).
It is in this sense that involvement with regional 
strategy is directly linked to the exercise of political 
power; the ability and the desire to impose a certain 
strategic perspective on a wide range of social 
institutions, individuals, and businesses requires that the 
organisation practicing the strategy have some advantage 
over the above regional components. Such an advantage may be 
a particular economic strength or official authority, both 
of which become political power when used to facilitate the 
strategy's materialisation (as specified in Chapter 3). The 
ability to affect different socio-economic activities that 
is associated with this practice is likely to be 
accelerated; it may generate dependence of different 
regional units on the organisation controlling the strategy, 
or increase the magnitude of economic resources available to 
the strategising organisation.
The practice of this power, i.e., the coordination of 
the regional components toward common goals, is difficult. 
This practice could be eased by an inclusive a priori 
agreement on a strategy, which, although desirable, is 
totally unrealistic to expect (Friend, 1980). In reality, a 
strategic initiative need not be based on a general
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consensus among all organisations that are expected to have, 
some role within it. In fact, the essence of a strategy lies 
in its possibility of inducing some organisations to follow 
the strategic initiative, or in its ability to attract 
diverse forces to the desired process (Dyckman, 1976, in 
Baer, 1977). The following example illustrates how the power 
potential can be practiced through indirect measures. 
Consider the ability to improve the road network in a given 
region, or the ability to modernise a region's 
telecommunication infrastructure. Both actions, 
externalities by definition, can be taken without widespread 
agreement, assuming the financial capacity for such 
investment exists. Provided these actions are integrated 
into a strategic perspective that determines their location 
and timing, the response of the region's "market" for these 
commodities will be directed in accordance with the 
strategy, and different organisations initially not aware of 
the existence of the strategy will modify their activities 
according to it. A "wise" strategy, however, will attempt to 
integrate the diverse regional components into a relatively 
homogeneous functional framework, while providing these 
components with sufficient "space" to function within it. In 
our case, a strategy should not deal with the 
telecommunication infrastructure of, for instance, an 
industrial park; the management of this park should in 
theory make the choice of being connected or not to the 
region's infrastructure. Nevertheless, the estimated 
regional demand for such infrastructure should include this 
industrial park. In other words, a regional strategy should 
attempt not to replace the internal development policies of
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specific regional units (firms, services, etc.), but rather 
to provide a framework within which these units may exist 
and even improve their performance. Thus, an important 
practical condition for the initiation and management of a 
regional strategy is the ability to deal with interactions 
among regional elements that do not fall under the direct 
responsibility of an individual firm or similar regional 
component. A successful player would also be able to cope 
with the externality costs generated by these interacting 
processes.
The power potential associated with the ability to 
practice regional strategy, providing an "umbrella" for 
various forces and guiding their activities, further depends 
on the scope of the initiating organisation's activities; a 
broader scope is considered potentially advantageous 
(Friend, 1976). Thus, an organisation that controls a broad 
range of regional production services, such as automotive 
and equipment repair, would potentially be better able to 
practice a regional strategy than another organisation that 
controls few such services. A large volume of services 
controlled is not necessarily a prerequisite for effective 
strategy; the nature of the components under control should 
be considered as more important. Indeed, control of land 
development and building permits, for example, may prove 
much more valuable in luring other organisations into a 
strategy-driven process than the above-mentioned control of 
services. Thus, the concept "crucial" modifies the role of 
components within regional processes. The conclusion is that 
the nature of the activities under direct control is an 
important determinant of the ability to impose a strategy on
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various regional organisations. It is difficult to determine 
either the nature of the "crucial" components that can 
amplify the impact of a strategy, or the specific type of 
organisation that is likely to have the available means to 
generate a regional development strategy within a specific 
time and location context. Nevertheless, having suggested 
that a strategy initiative is largely a function of the 
ability to cope with externalised issues, we may further 
suggest that the issue of "crucial" components in this 
context is directly linked to the non-economic activities of 
the regional system and the externalised costs generated by 
regional processes.
An additional and important concern in the initiation 
and management of regional strategy is the organisation's 
practical ability to carry out these tasks. This is 
generally a function of the organisation's internal 
structure, and is manifested in two ways. First, it is 
necessary to have the internal synergy and functional 
efficiency that may facilitate the management of a regional 
strategy, which is, after all, a complicated mission. The 
availability of staff and professional skills may also be 
required in this case. Second, the organisation must to a 
certain extent be geared toward long-run thought. This 
element is argued to distinguish the state apparatus from 
the business sector, for example. Indeed, one should note 
the Japanese industrial firms, which are famous for the 
relative importance they place on strategic planning, and 
their integration of strategic functions into the overall 
functional mechanism of the firm.
Finally, it is important to seek organisations that are
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either strongly inured to previously mentioned externalities, 
or well equipped to bear their costs. The concept of 
commitment (Chap. 3) may further elucidate this problem of 
determining the type of organisation that is likely to be 
prepared to manage a regional strategy, that is, a socio­
economic entity capable of bearing the risk of managing the 
processes that generate these externalities. This further 
implies that regional planning should base itself on the 
ability to distinguish between different types of 
externalities, and the different levels of sensitivity 
displayed toward them by different organisations.
These arguments lead to the almost inevitable 
conclusion that the organisations best suited for this 
purpose are public organisations. Some scholars might 
support this conclusion rather straightforwardly, asserting 
that such activity represents the essence of state 
intervention. Indeed, reality clearly indicates that the 
vast majority of regional strategies are under the direct 
responsibility of public institutions. Other theoretical 
perspectives, such as the political economy approaches, may 
similarly regard these functions as inherently connected 
with the role of the state apparatus in liberal democracies, 
manifested by their contribution to the maintenance of the 
social relations status quo, while permitting the ongoing 
accumulation of capital. However, the foregoing conclusion, 
based on these theoretical and deterministic approaches, 
cannot be ratified unquestionably. First, an acceptance of 
the political economy perspective implicitly admits that any 
regional development strategy is bound to be ineffective in 
the creation of structural changes. Indeed, even though we
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do not attempt to argue that structural changes in the 
social system and capital relations are necessary 
prerequisites of an effective strategy, it is difficult to 
accept fully an approach that rejects the possibility of 
such impact a priori. Second, the fact that most regional 
strategies actually are under the responsibility of 
government ministries and agencies does not provide ipso 
facto justification for the continuation of this state of 
affairs. In fact, such a conclusion is shown to be 
problematic because of the nature of the state apparatus, 
which imposes fundamental constraints on any attempt to 
achieve long-run commitment (a prerequisite for regional 
strategy, as previously argued), and clashes with prevailing 
experience regarding the state apparatus' role in regional 
development policies.
The expression "state apparatus or public sector" 
evokes an immediate association with large, highly 
fragmented organisations, in which decision-making tends to 
be inefficient, polluted by irrelevant considerations, and 
unable to exercise long-term commitment. The "private or 
business sector", by contrast, tends to be associated with 
small organisations noted for highly efficient economic 
performance. These are fallacies; private organisations may 
have similar or other characteristics that preclude 
efficient treatment of regional strategy. Public 
organisations may be small, deterministic, and efficient 
bodies. Yet, the major difference between the two does seem 
to be the primacy of economic considerations in private 
sector decision-making. Still, this is not to say, as is 
conventionally presumed, that state agencies completely
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disregard economic considerations in determining their 
policies. Neither does this difference between the two 
sectors indicate that one or the other is necessarily more 
"relevant". Therefore, since both sectors have potentially 
complementary roles to play in the socio-economic system, 
the problem is how to implement a strategy that integrates 
the potential contributions from both sectors. In practice, 
then, the relevant questions to ask are concerned more with 
the ways in which a given strategy is initiated and the 
nature of its content, rather than with who (i.e., which 
organisation) bears responsibility for it. Additional 
questions that should be posed when one actually attempts to 
determine the organisational context of a regional strategy 
are:
* Is the initiating sector capable of carrying out the task 
it has assumed?
* Does the initiation and management of a strategy by a 
certain sector impose a priori constraints on the 
participants and their mode of involvement?
* How effective can a strategy be in view of the 
constraints intrinsically imposed by the sector 
responsible for it?
The answers to these questions in view of strategic 
objectives may enable planners to choose the appropriate 
organisational system by which strategy can to be managed. 
These answers, however, warrant preliminary comments. First, 
any organisation may encounter intrinsic difficulties in the 
practical task of coping with a regional strategy. Second,
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any organisation involved in a strategy will undoubtedly, 
affect the scope of the strategy and determine other 
organisations' patterns of involvement in the regional 
system.
In sum, one cannot a priori reject any type of socio­
economic entity as irrelevant to the management of a 
regional strategy. The public sector's flexibility in 
dealing with extra-organisationl issues may lend it 
advantages in the management of a regional strategy. At the 
same time, the objective cannot be attained without the 
integration of private forces, which are needed for the 
handling of aspects of development that transcend the grasp 
of the state apparatus. This assumes, as argued in Chapter 
3, that the public sector cannot effectively engage the 
issue of long-run productive entrepreneurship, a crucial 
type of activity in regional development.
154
4.4.2 The Role of Planning Function
As stated, the attitude of organisations toward a 
strategic perspective is an important aspect of the 
organisation's ability to initiate and manage one. A related 
aspect that deserves our attention is the role of the 
strategist in this organisation; its importance to planning 
practice is well attested to in the literature (e.g., 
Friend, 1976; Baum, 1980; Forester, 1981), although 
sometimes it is underestimated by planners themselves 
(Forester, 1989). It may be associated with the above 
theoretical links between the strategy and the 
administrative hierarchy of organisations.
Traditional business studies assume that strategic 
planning is an intrinsic part of a firm's business 
management activity, and that strategic function is integral 
to its performance mechanism (Aharoni, 1982). Accordingly, 
it tends to be argued that the authority of a strategic 
planning unit may vary according to elements such as the 
nature of the specific organisation, issues being subjected 
to the strategy, or the professional competence of the 
strategist, depending on the specific case. Further, there 
seems to be a general acceptance that the desired situation 
consists of the planning unit working close to upper-level 
management of a given institution or firm, and in direct 
relation with the overall decision-making system that is 
supposed to take its recommendations into account and 
attempt to implement them. Again, however, this paradigm 
arguably is invalid in the case of the status of strategic 
planners in regional planning, which is far more 
problematic, especially in view of the previous discussion
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emphasising the intrinsic difficulties arising in the 
implementation of a regional strategy. Indeed, the 
literature is well aware of the "fragility" of the planner’s 
role in decision-making systems, as argued by Baer (1977) 
"Planning is too important to be left to the planners" (pp. 
675-676). This is a result of the planner's basic dependence 
on those social forces with the potential power to implement 
planning products (Baum, 1980), and the possible disparity 
between the planner's expectations as regards his role, as 
well as the way land use planning function is perceived by 
non-planners (Baer, 1977). In this regard, is strategic 
regional planning function distinct from other (land use) 
planning functions?
As noted, the planners' status is always problematic. 
This also applies to planners who operate in the business 
sector, in spite of the tendency to idealise the role of 
business-marketing strategies and strategists (Aharoni, 
1986). However, unlike in the case of business strategies, 
whose existence in a given firm reflects the firm's basic 
acceptance of the strategic function, the fact that land use 
planners operate in a given organisation does not 
necessarily imply that strategic planning is an acceptable 
function. Further, since a regional strategy is not a 
prerequisite for the organisation's existence, the planner's 
position is unlikely to be more advantageous than any other 
position in land use planning, to say the least, because the 
planner's attempt to stimulate the organisation's 
involvement in a high-risk regional development process may 
be particularly undesirable, or at odds with the 
organisation's standard operating patterns and interests
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(Baum, 1980).
It follows from the above that different regional 
strategic planning initiatives may differ in the content of 
the planning product, in the magnitude of the issues 
concerned, or in planners' expectations. However, they are 
unlikely to differ fundamentally in the principal role of 
planners in their organisational environment. In practice, 
therefore, what is likely to be planners' role in their 
organisational environment? Where are planners' potential 
strengths in influencing decision-making? Which principle 
function can be suggested to be most appropriate for the 
practice of regional planning?
The planning literature and the associated contribution 
of different theories and empirical studies from other 
social science disciplines thoroughly discuss the question 
of the planners' role in different social systems, the 
actual planning practice as compared with the practice 
desired by planners, changes in planning ideologies, and 
more recently, the question of what planning is, and the 
disparities between planning as an academic and as a 
practical domain. This dissertation itself is a 
manifestation of a specific perspective on what planning is 
all about. In practice, however, among the different 
"planning" issues and challenging theoretical discussions, 
we shall limit our concern to a very small selection of 
aspects with a particular relevance to this section, and 
emphasise their implications for planning practice, rather 
than, for instance, their implications for planning theory 
(insofar as these two can be separated).
157
In general terms, most theories imply that the 
planner's basic functional framework is given by the system 
in which he operates. The planner's specific role depends on 
the theoretical perspective of the structure of, and the 
power distribution in, modern democracies. Most planning 
theories, however, provide planners and individuals with 
some freedom of choice within their basic functional 
framework. This freedom, again, depends on the theoretical 
perspective through which the planner's role is analysed. 
Three major types of planner roles are postulated: The 
planner-bureaucrat, the planner as a consultant or advocate 
(the latter refers to consultation that is coupled with 
"humanistic" aspirations), the planner as a negotiator.
Wherein do their potential strengths lie?
The bureaucrat. This function refers to a situation 
whereby the planner has a clear official status in the 
system. This may explain why the concern with this function 
is confined mainly to official planning systems (that tend 
to be regulatory). Indeed, the literature generally views 
planner-practitioners as belonging to the category of 
government officers or civil servants. Such planners may 
concern themselves with executing given policies and 
regulations, some probably established by their fellow 
planners, although the literature in general rarely 
discusses this aspect. On the other hand, planners may 
exercise their potential strength so far as to serve their 
individual "existence" interest in the organisation or 
alliance with their professional interest group. In both
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cases, the literature does not see potential conflicts 
between their official and actual roles as interfering with 
their functioning. In this role, the planners' power to 
influence decision-making is associated with their official 
status, which facilitates the determination of issues on the 
public agenda and the accessibility of non-planners (and 
non-professionals) to material (e.g., information, 
documentation of evidence) (Jowell, 1977; Forester, 1989). 
This status, when coupled with planners' professional 
skills, their knowledge accumulated during long periods of 
service in specific organisations, and the masses of 
information stocked in planning departments, may be utilized 
to manipulate elected politicians and individuals. Finally, 
a planner's potential strength is associated with official 
status: the chief planning officer is viewed as "stronger" 
than the ordinary planner serving in the same department.
This power, however, is largely negative. Opponents of 
the exercise of such power emphasise the elitism-paternalism 
and relative pettiness of planners who believe they are 
superior. Accordingly, the planner-bureaucrat's potential 
power as recommended by scholars such as Rex and Moor (1967) 
and Pahl (1975) is strongly questioned by insights into 
planning systems and the distinction of planners from other 
civil servants; Mellor (1977) and Broadbant (1977) make the 
point that many issues are beyond planners' authority and 
their ability to exert influence, due to their lack of 
control over budgets and implementation. Baum (1980), 
however, associates this attitude toward planners' power 
with planners' unrealistic expectations. Indeed, the 
literature does not provide examples of important public
159
policies that were affected by such bureaucrat-planners. At 
the most, examples show that interpretations of prevailing 
policies may differ according to local-specific 
characteristics of the planners administrative set-up. The 
common example of the way bureaucratic power is exercised is 
taken from the city or local planning commission (Mellor, 
1977, quoted in Kirk, 1980, p. 36).
The following example from the Israeli system shows the 
limited potential for influence that may be associated with 
such a planning function. The settlement site of Ginat, 
located in the northern West Bank, was not converted during 
the mid 1980s from a military camp to a civilian settlement 
(as opposed to most other military camps in this area). This 
was partly due to the planners of the WZO Settlement Section 
in the Haifa region office, who erased this site from the 
maps used by the political director of this organisation 
(Mr. Drobles) during this period of mass construction of new 
settlements in the West Bank. Indeed, and the planners 
credited themselves for this,^ the site "disappeared" from 
official statistics and rarely enjoyed visits from 
officials. However, the conversion or non-conversion of 
Ginat did not affect the major trend of populating Jews in 
West Bank, nor did it change the fact that the military camp 
remained, and would probably require consideration of its 
future scope at a later stage of the settlement process. 
Further, in my personal view, planners could not have acted 
in the same way in connection with other sites that were 
politically more important, and they did not attempt such 
acts. Also, these planners in fact served the interests of 
their director, whose complicity with a fellow party member
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(Mr. Sharon, who was the political referee of Ginat) made it. 
possible not to allocate resources to Ginat.
This planner-bureaucrat type of function is echoed in 
many aspects by the mainstream structuralist perspectives of 
planners within the state employee system or as state 
agents, who are merely technicians following orders with a 
very limited freedom to have their professional and personal 
inputs (Poulantzas, 1969). Nevertheless, planners facing 
conflicts between their given function and their personal 
beliefs may act as "bureaucratic guerrillas" (an Altshuler 
term, 1965) who may utilise their potential strengths, 
including an advantageous position with respect to 
information, greater understanding of information, and a 
somewhat "protected" status (as opposed to politicians who 
may or may not be reelected [Doron, 1986]), to assist those 
believed by the planners to be discriminated against by a 
given organisation or deprived of important information. 
Although this type of function is not reported as a common 
planning practice, it reflects some concession planners must 
make to their own beliefs. It also extends planners' freedom 
far beyond the traditional view of planners as professionals 
"following orders". This, however, is argued to hold true 
for only a short time, since it challenges the official 
status of planners. Still, its importance is in emphasising 
the difficult situations planners may find themselves in as 
a result of their fundamental dependence on the execution 
machinery and budget.
The consultant. The consultant's strength lies 
primarily in his professional skills or expertise (Davidoff,
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1965; Maziotti, 1974). He may be hired as a specialist by a 
given institution, while his status being clearly determined 
with regard to a concrete task. His involvement with other 
issues may confuse the system and be practically difficult. 
In general, his views are likely to influence decision­
makers who expect the consultant to guide their actions in 
specific issues. Alternatively, there is the possibility of 
the consultant-specialist who is hired by a public agency on 
behalf of others (the "public" in many cases). In this case, 
his status may not be established due to a lack of clarity 
with regard to the identity of his "clients" (the "public", 
an agency) (Gans, 1968) and their relations with official 
organisations. The Israeli Project Renewal experience, in 
which planners were hired by the government on behalf of 
specific urban communities, proves this argument. Planners' 
dual loyalties and dual sources of status (i.e., the 
government and the local communities) obstructed their 
ability to operate beyond the production of written 
documents. The government viewed these experts as 
representatives of the communities, and thus felt no 
obligation to involve them in most decisions. The 
communities, on the other hand, viewed these experts as 
government-biased agents, an thus limited their cooperation 
with these agents. Planners were able to generate 
cooperation and increase their involvement in local 
political decision-making only when they were hired by the 
local communities.^
Planners may prefer to call this function "advocacy", 
assisting the politically needy either through direct 
involvement with such "clients" (Davidoff, 1965), or at some
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distance from them (Albrow, 1970). Such aspirations, at 
best, do not seem to affect planners' status in 
organisations. In many cases, however, they may only 
punctuate the problems of unclear status and conflicting 
loyalties planners often face.
The planner-neaotiator. The planner-negotiator likewise 
faces a problem of dual loyalties that is a direct result of 
his status (Jowell, 1977). In this function, however, 
planners tend to face conflicts between private developers 
or those economically advantaged, whose initiatives may be 
needed by the public agency, and the public agency, which 
will attempt to stress its "control". In working with either 
party, planners are expected to obtain agreements that will 
satisfy both sides (Schon, 1982). Professional skills count 
here, but the personal characteristics that permit the 
management of the negotiation are equally important (Kirk, 
1980).
Planning studies tend to place the bargaining advantage 
in the private sector; this is linked to the specific 
perspective of power and influence in social systems, rather 
than to the nature of planning function. This function is 
most common in discussions of land-use planning and during 
the process of granting development permits (Schon, 1982; 
Kirk, 1980; Healey, 1992).
On the whole, studies focus on the planner's role 
within his immediate organisational environment, assuming 
this to be a public planning agency (this is probably the 
easiest environment for assessing planning practice, since
163
here planners function within a fairly visible set of 
rules). Studies also tend to associate greater "limited 
freedom" with higher official status. This argument can be 
empirically assessed. Concurrently, planners’ relations with 
other organisations are poorly discussed, presumably because 
these relations are assumed to be remote from most planning 
functions (except, maybe, that of the negotiator). 
Discussions of such relations do exist, but with respect to 
different public services in which scholars attempt to 
reveal the patterns of influence between the public and 
private sectors that are the result of professional 
mediation (Bilski, 1980; Dunleavy, 1980a). In general terms, 
we may suggest that a planner's ability to influence other 
organisations depends on the socio-political role of the 
organisation employing the planner - its scope of activities 
and political power, as previously discussed.
The different planning functions, each challenging in 
its own way, lend themselves to several important 
implications for our case:
* Personal contacts and the input of personal 
characteristics are allowed by theories, in one way or 
another, to affect concrete planning practices.
* Each planning function may be appealing in different 
aspects, but the limited power of the planner to exercise 
influence "cries out", and is evident in all discussions.
* Consequently, measures such as those suggested in the 
previous chapter may improve the performance potential of 
planners, i.e., their ability to integrate initiatives 
into political-administrative decision-making systems.
* We cannot suggest that any specific function is
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particularly appropriate for the practice of regional 
development strategy, each may be useful in different 
contexts.
* Empirical studies do suggest the relevance of active 
attempts to promote ideas and plans rather than merely 
following instructions - a strength that stems from 
planners' attitude toward planning practice and, at 
times, from some sort of deviation from prevailing norms 
and rules.
* Studies emphasise the complex of organisations planners 
operate within, their complicated relations to planners, 
and the importance of these issues to the understanding 
of planning practice.
What are, then, the determinants of planners' access to 
decision-making processes and their role within them?
The specific status a planner must enjoy in order to 
participate actively in the decision-making process depends 
largely on the nature of the organisation involved. In some 
cases, this status is conferred by planning laws or 
regulations that take planners' proposals into account. In 
other cases, planners serve as consultants to top decision­
makers, thus affecting the latter by virtue of their 
dependence on these consultants and the reliability of their 
advice. However, the planners' official status is important 
only insofar as they can exploit it to present proposals in 
a fashion that commands attention and response. They may, 
nevertheless, face a major problem, that is, the need to 
conform with the organisation's goals or functional scope
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(Friend, 1980; Schon, 1983). Planners' proposals are 
expected both to further the performance of their 
organisations and to benefit the entire regional system. 
Yet, this task may necessitate a change in the prevailing 
attitudes of decision-makers, which may further imply 
drastic change in the functional basis of the organisation, 
and may affect the personal status of specific decision­
makers within the organisation, who, needless to say, may be 
disinclined to accept the proposed change. Therefore, 
assuming that the planning proposals are relevant and 
professionally sound, two opposed patterns of behaviour may 
be used in their presentation. Planners may avoid opposition 
by refraining from presenting non-conformist proposals or by 
modifying the proposals in order to satisfy expectations 
(Baum, 1980). Alternatively, they may present their proposal 
and act to promote it, in spite of the risk of rejection. 
These alternatives should reflect a combination of the 
nature of the organisation (in view of its ability to absorb 
planning initiatives with the changes they inherently augur) 
and the professional and personal characteristics of the 
planner (Friend, 1980). In this context, I argue that 
planners may compromise with expectations only insofar as 
this does not implicitly denigrate the professional 
competence of their proposals, although this is sometimes 
difficult to achieve in practice. Indeed, this dissertation 
rests on the assumption that planners can and should 
mobilise decision-makers to follow their proposals, and that 
they may invoke various ways of achieving this only if their 
goals are strictly defined.
Generally speaking, these aspects of planning practice
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are important because it is assumed here that, first, the. 
planner depends on decision-makers for execution, and 
second, that the strategic function is an essential part of 
the regional development process. Indeed, an analysis of the 
role of planners in decision-making processes, with respect 
to their ability to integrate strategy into these processes 
and affect its implementation, leads us to distinguish among 
three categories of elements facilitating planning practice:
* Structural-functional:
This category encompasses the relationship between the 
organisation's scope and the regional strategy, expressed 
in terms of the former's ability to absorb the strategy, 
including the changes and scale of investments it 
requires. These relations are affected by the extent of 
the required commitment to a proposal, attendant costs, 
scale of investments, conformity with the organisation's 
policy and attitude toward the region, as well as the 
planner's location (official and unofficial) within the 
organisation. Problems arise because of the nature of 
regional strategy, which almost inevitably prescribes 
change. Therefore, the major question is how planners 
should cope with them.
* The professional attributes of the strategy (and the 
planner):
This refers to competence of the strategy - how well it 
provides conceptual and practical means with which to 
cope with regional processes and future development. 
Among them, the most important is timing, both of its 
presentation and its recommended implementation (as
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further discussed). In the context of acceptance, a major 
factor in affecting decision-makers' attitudes toward the 
strategy is information. Nor should the importance of the 
quality of the means of presentation be underestimated.
* The behavioural-personal characteristics of planners and 
"partners":
A subjective, and unpredictable determinant is the 
planner's ability to approach decision-makers and create 
personal contacts, through which he may penetrate the 
decision-makers' "world" and affect their attitude toward 
the proposed strategy. This determinant assumes that 
decision-making is strongly affected by personal, 
subjective contacts, thus may be crucial in the 
implementation of a strategy (Friend, 1976).
To conclude, this classification implies that the 
integration of a strategy into a regional system is strongly 
conditioned by planners' attributes and their ability to 
utilise their professional capabilities for formulating a 
strategy and promoting its implementation. These quantities 
are crucial for the establishment of a basis for a 
breakthrough with regard to the existing situation, since, 
as previously suggested (Chap. 2), the regional system is 
structured for development in inconsistent, sporadic 
changes, whereas the type of change that may be required is 
consistent with long-run objectives that restructure its 
components. Indeed, a strategic approach that incorporates 
several, previously discussed, principles should facilitate 
planners' work and permit them to steer strategy along
168
routes over which they may have considerable control:
* The availability of vulnerable decision-making 
determinants provides a point of departure for 
determining the issues to be tackled and the means to 
implement the strategy proposed.
* The decision-makers' commitment can be used as a measure 
of the potential efficacy of a planning initiative.
* The acceptance of the idea that a given planning product 
should not be regarded as the only one available in the 
market, nor treated as generating interest in itself, 
implies that planners should make active attempts to 
promote the integration of a certain planning product 
into a specific decision-making context. Indeed, planners 
should make use of various marketing, lobbying, and 
public-relations procedures, in order to reach the 
potential consumers for different parts of the project.
* The acceptance of the need to specify the strategy into 
working procedures, or "packages", may further be an 
effective way of coping with large-scale initiatives (see 
also the following section).
Nevertheless, the entire process is subject to 
fundamental constraints, which, in most cases, will thwart 
the continuous implementation of strategy. It should be made 
clear that there are no formulas guaranteeing a successful 
planning experience. In practice there is never any 
certainty that a strategy will be both sound and come to the 
attention of its target audience, even if it appears to meet 
all the requisite determinants.
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To sum up, this section of the chapter dealt with the 
organisational context of regional strategy, which is argued 
to be an important aspect of planning practice.
Having asserted that the nature of the organisation 
within which planners function has a major effect on the 
nature of the strategy, we went on to argue that it is the 
planners' task to take advantage of the organisation's 
characteristics to bring about the integration of the 
proposed strategy into the decision-making system.
Furthermore, because both the public and the private 
sectors may have a role to play in regional development 
processes, it was concluded that the type of organisation 
within which planners function is not as important as their 
ability to mobilise decision-makers in the service of the 
proposed strategy, and to impose their influence on the 
system as a whole.
Consequently, the remaining question refers to how 
planners may carry out this task, that is, what kind of 
strategy may permit the planner to carry out such a 
difficult task?
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4.5 Strategic Breakthrough
The aim of regional development strategy is to 
determine the timing, scale, and "actors" of an intervention 
that will provide this region with a sustainable edge over 
other regions (its competitors) in particular issues. The 
major aspects to which the strategy may refer and with which 
the strategist should deal are discussed above. The question 
of present concern is fairly straightforward: how may these 
be integrated into a strategic framework? Indeed, along with 
the principle approach expressed in the entire discussion of 
regional strategy and its related environment, the following 
proposal is expressed.5
Thus far the discussion focused on locating or 
identifying every issue deemed important for planning 
practice within a single coherent framework governing 
regional processes. Emphasis was placed on the rationale 
underlying a decision to stress certain aspects and their 
practical implications. This approach neither determined the 
aspects that deserve attention in specific cases nor 
discussed the specific means by which these aspects should 
be analysed and implemented. Rather, it attempted to point 
out the variety of aspects that may prove relevant for 
planning purposes, while indicating how each aspect is 
integrated into the regional process approach. Briefly 
stated, the discussion of regional systems emphasised the 
importance of competition and conflict-relations among the 
many components that form its structure, and are crucial in 
any attempt to effect changes. Because competition is 
generated over resources, the discussion then turned to the 
concept of commitment as the outcome of various decision­
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making determinants that affect resource allocation, and 
stressed its importance as an element planners should aim to 
affect. Having also argued that commitment is highly 
relevant to the resolution of the inherent uncertainty in 
the planning process, we further suggested that planners’ 
awareness of the vulnerability potential of certain 
decision-making determinants may permit them to enhance 
commitment to a certain planning product or planning 
initiative among decision-makers. Thus, we arrived at a 
''team” composed of three basic "players", whose interaction 
determines the nature of regional processes:
a. The region: the functional area of reference, with its 
processes representing the result of competition.
b. The "partners”: decision-makers involved in regional 
processes and motivated by the need or wish to improve 
their terms of access. Their pattern of involvement in 
the planning process is measured by the extent of their 
commitment to the planning product and to the regional 
development process.
c. Planners: who aim to initiate change in the regional 
system by activating a planning product (e.g., the 
strategy) and by utilising planning techniques and 
resources to promote integration of the planning 
product into a specific decision-making system.
By implication, the type of planning process envisioned 
fashions the regional system in a process of interactions 
between "partners" and planners, with the latter directly 
involved in socio-organisational activities. This being the 
case, it may seem insufficient to planners to reveal mainly
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the various functional opportunities they may face. It might 
be preferable, by this line of reasoning, to prescribe 
specific actions - what to do, when, and where. It might 
also be preferable to prescribe one theoretical approach to 
decision-making as most suited for any planning practice. 
This dissertation is distinguished by the fact that it gives 
the planner a broad latitude in the determination of his 
specific mode of function and the theoretical base of his 
initiative. My experience, indeed, as reflected in the 
perspective presented in this dissertation, has been that it 
is precisely this type of "freedom" that is most important 
in structuring a strategic approach by which the changes 
needed to sustain a regional development process may be 
initiated. But what is the type of framework within which 
planners may realise this freedom? What kind of strategy do 
we need?
Most prevailing regional planning approaches and 
regional strategies are constructed on a rigorous process of 
analysis, projection of trends, and estimation of 
constraints, all of which lead to a conceptual framework and 
specific recommendations that are often "comprehensive" in 
their concern with an extremely wide variety of regional 
components. This very tendency, however, may lead to 
stagnation, especially since it permits the inconsistent 
effect of day-to-day events to determine the region's 
nature. It thus is argued that only a conceptual (strategic) 
breakthrough, driven by creative and intuitive thought 
rather than purely rational processes, can lead to the 
desired change, even though it may clash with the existing 
"culture". This is not to dismiss the relevance of analysis.
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On the contrary: efficient analysis provides an
indispensable stimulus and a necessary tool for the 
examination of emerging ideas. A step-by-step methodology 
such as systems analysis, however, seems insufficient in a 
world unsuited to linear modeling. An alternative, non­
linear method, leaving room for the integration of 
"brainstorms" and flashes of ideas and imagination, would 
seem to be more relevant for an environment in which 
challenges arise. Furthermore, such an environment is 
accessible only when planners are not "locked" into a rigid 
methodology that dictates the stages and outcome of the 
planning process, and thus stifles innovation and 
creativity. In short, it is proposed that planners apply a 
"strategic thinking", that is, a mentality situated between 
systems analysis and pure intuition, which is marked by the 
ability to analyse regional processes (or make use of an 
analysis) coupled with an intellectual flexibility, by which 
the planner may come up with realistic responses to changing 
situations.
These arguments immediately bring two practical 
questions to the fore:
a. How, if at all, can a "strategic mind" be produced?
The "mind" in question is enriched by an imaginative 
and intuitive abilities to grasp the major aspects of 
situations or phenomena, both strengthened by 
intellectual capabilities. Some people have the 
confidence to follow their intuitions and allow their 
imagination to be integrated into their decision-
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making. Others may need a basic methodological, 
framework, such as that provided in this dissertation, 
with which they can structure their work in a way that 
elicits creative strategy. This assumes that by 
providing planners with a basic framework, within which 
they determine their specific way of operating and 
choose among the operational opportunities that emerge 
during their engagement with the complex of regional 
systems, the basic precondition for enhancing a 
creative strategy is met. Underlying this assumption is 
another assumption that the actual process of 
selecting, from among the components of regional 
systems and the decision-making determinants, those 
that are relevant for stimulating specific regional 
changes, requires a fundamental intellectual process 
that can elicit and initiate the imaginative attitude 
and creativity envisioned here. Obviously, these 
qualities are also a function of the personal-mental 
integrity of specific planners, including their self- 
confidence and articulation ability. However, most 
professionally qualified planners may be stimulated by 
the above process, and, thereby, may be able to fashion 
an appropriate regional strategy,
b. What constitutes the product of "strategic thought"? 
Alternatively, what input is needed to generate this 
"output"? Such a product may be at odds or clash with 
existing operating norms. If this is so, how may it be 
adopted, and why might it be implemented?
The answer should be sought in the combined effect of 
the nature of proposed strategy and the means adopted
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by planners to promote it by taking advantage of their, 
potential opportunities to operate within a specific 
institutional context. The principles of the proposed 
strategy are as follows:
* The strategy is distinct from other policies 
governing the promotion of regional development by 
virtue of the concept of competition, this being the 
basis for creating important change as opposed to 
operational improvements. Accepting that implies the 
need to question the very nature of the existing 
system and the validity of conventional solutions 
and policies, since a basic acceptance of existing 
parameters is bound to lead merely to improvements 
that maintain an existing structural-functional 
status quo. For example, assume the case a planner 
who operates in an organisation that is heavily 
involved in the establishment of new settlements as 
a vehicle to increase the population of a given 
region. This planner may find it "natural" to be 
concerned with questions of where and how additional 
settlements can be added to the region. We, however, 
suggest that this planner will come to question the 
validity of creating the new settlements as a tool 
to increase population. This kind of planning 
attitude takes nothing for granted that may create 
access to areas or components susceptible to change, 
and to decision-makers who are willing to be 
involved.
* Coping with the regional system from the point of 
view of competition also requires to distinguish
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between factors whose associated problems can be 
tolerated, as opposed to factors whose effect on the 
region's relative condition is likely to be 
significant. The latter cannot be left aside. Only 
in certain cases, a poor neighbourhood may be 
tolerated while insufficient physical access between 
an industrial plant operating in this area and other 
areas cannot be tolerated.
* In principle, most attempts to promote 
implementation require an "aggressive" planning 
approach that is based upon planners' active efforts 
to integrate a planning product into decision-making 
system, which utilises marketing procedures and 
exploits other regions' inferiority as major tools 
for stimulating decisions and directing regional 
processes. A strategy that is not accompanied by an 
awareness of this is a useless one. By "marketing", 
we refer to the various ways to "sell" the planning 
product. Such means are thoroughly discussed in the 
business literature, and thus we need not specify 
the available tools.
* Once decision-makers have been made familiar with 
the essence of the planning product, the next stage 
is to secure their commitment to this product, in 
full or in part. Thus, by use of the methods 
described above, the implementation of the strategy 
may be advanced. As noted, however, further 
specification of the strategy is equally important 
for this purpose.
* Since the world is undergoing constant change, the
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planning product should be amenable to change of two. 
kinds: that of internal components, and that of the 
issues and decision-makers subject to it. A third 
kind of change, touching on the essence of the 
strategy, is unquestioned. This flexibility, 
however, is not limitless. Within the parameters of 
our concern with accessibility to and within a 
region, we may shift from roads to 
telecommunication, or even to the transportation 
services. But we may not start dealing with the 
taxation system that encourages the use of certain 
type of cars.
Finally, it remains to generate the principle structure 
of the proposed strategy, as illustrated in Diagram 2 (in 
the following page).
An analysis of the regional condition is the starting 
point of any strategy. It is at this stage that one 
determines the major characteristics of the regional system 
and the very need for a strategy. The analysis should 
provide an overall perspective on the issues of concern, 
and, as argued throughout this dissertation, it should 
provide a comparative perspective of the regional system. 
Because the analytical techniques available for this are 
thoroughly discussed in the literature, there is no need to 
elaborate on them here. It is assumed that the planner 
should be able to determine those techniques that are most 
relevant to his case or tasks. The outcome of this 
comparative analysis should provide the following:
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Diagram 2: R E G I O N A L  STRATEGY
RELATIVE
C O N D IT I O N
V I S IO N PL ANN ING
PRODUCT
I D E N T I F Y  
POTENTIAL  PARTNERS
ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL  
C O N D I T I O N
RELAT IVE STRENGTH  
or
COM PETITIVNESS
IDENTIFY DEVELOPMENT 
DERIVING FACTORS 
(K F D)
"WORKING PACKAGES" PUBLIC
COMMITMENT
I I  I I  MARKETING,  LOBBY,
T I M I N G ,  CONTENT PUBLIC RELATIONS
"MISSION GROUPS"  
(TASK GROUPS)
PROGRAMMES
E VA L U A TI O N
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* An initial insight into the current and potential 
relative strength of a specific regional system.
* A basis for identifying potential "partners" (decision­
makers who are likely to involve themselves directly in 
the planning process).
* A basis for determining the key factors of development 
(mentioned in Chapter 2).
All of these should be ascertained concurrently, 
insofar as this is possible, because they are strongly 
interrelated. The choice of "partners" should be connected 
with their role in major regional processes; their role, in 
turn, affects the choice of the key factors of development.
The "vision”, the planner's ideas about the future of 
the region and his insights into components that are both 
malleable and capable of creating some cumulative effect, 
coalesces into the planning product, in which ideas are 
clearly articulated and the means to achieve them spelled 
out (at least in part). Because this planning product aims 
to be a source of reference for decision-making processes 
affecting the region, and is the major tool by which 
planners may disseminate their ideas, it should be 
structured so as to be accessible to all interested players 
(in the way its contents are articulated and in any other 
meaningful aspect). It should also be reducible to specific 
parts for presentation to different decision-makers and 
further execution. As previously argued, however, this 
planning product should not necessarily be presented in full 
to decision-makers. At the same time, the content of the 
planning product is not rigid, in the sense that it is 
likely to change throughout the implementation process. In
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most cases, the "first edition" will probably be rather 
abstract (but not too abstract, because abstractions do not 
easily command basic commitment). As the planning process 
advances, arguments and recommendations can be specified.
This scheme presents one possible way to approach the 
task of imposing one's impact on the decision-making 
process. It is based on the author's experience, which 
suggests that a multi-dimensional procedure, one that 
permits simultaneous actions on various planes and ensures 
their integration, is best suited to the regional system 
paradigm. The specific device is the "working package", that 
is, a group of highly interconnected issues (e.g., 
employment and housing opportunities) that should be worked 
out together. "Working out" implies a greater level of 
detail in planning, from the initial "grand" vision to the 
level of specific policies, programmes, and procedures. In 
practice, this type of attitude toward specific elements of 
the strategy also permits the planner to bring in various 
specialists, thus increasing the likelihood of efficient 
treatment of problems and the creation of relevant 
solutions. It is argued thereby that strategists not only 
should not but also cannot cope with all the specific 
elements of a strategy. Rather, it is their task in this 
regard to reduce the issues into manageable "packages" and 
to link each one to the overarching strategic perspective.
While specific solutions to specific problems are 
worked out, strategists should concern themselves with the 
"partners" of the strategy - those decision-makers who can 
be attracted to the process of stimulating change in the
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regional system. My experience proves that this task calls 
for a "business" approach, entailing marketing, public 
relations, and lobbying. The choice of the relevant 
procedure depends on the nature and quantity of the task. An 
attempt to reach a wide variety of population groups will 
probably require a public relations campaign. Lobbying 
procedures may be most appropriate when one needs to bring 
public pressure to bear on political decision-makers. 
Attempts to "sell" a private entrepreneur may be realised by 
a "door-to-door" technique.
Once again, choosing the best method by which to approach 
decision-makers, and the selection of the decision-makers 
themselves, are subject to the specific context within which 
these selections are made, and depend on the planner’s 
implementation abilities. Moreover, these decisions can be 
made only with direct reference to other aspects of the 
strategy and current changes in the region concerned. To be 
sure, planners should not allow every change to modify their 
strategy. Indeed, the strategy should safeguard the 
integrity of the overview (e.g., of processes, activities, 
issues) so as to determine the relative importance of each 
dimension.
Summing up, this diagram is presented as a one-way, 
"top-down" procedure. It should be emphasised, however, that 
the essence of the strategic approach lies in its ability to 
provide a framework for multi-dimensional, task-oriented 
concern with regional processes.
As such, the scheme may seem to prescribe a rather 
"standard" type of strategy, especially since it reflects
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something of the "systems approach" - a pyramid structure in 
which analysis serves as the basis for determining specific 
recommendations and actions. The structure of the strategy 
should be presented consequentially, so that the viewer may 
understand its principal elements. This, however, does not 
necessitate a one-way, single-direction attitude. Rather, 
work should proceed as the planner deems relevant, even if 
the basic structure is somewhat abrogated thereby. This is 
permissible as long as the basic requisites of strategy are 
satisfied (e.g., that the ideas are accompanied by a 
profound understanding of the issues under consideration).
Finally, the important point is the content of the 
proposed strategy, that sets a given strategy apart from all 
others, as expressed by the following principles:
* Emphasis on the relative advantages of a region, implying 
a selective concern for its components and the 
stimulation of performance in key factors of the regional 
system.
* Commitment of decision-makers to the strategic approach 
(all or parts of it) as the route to implementation.
* An "aggressive" planning approach - the marketing of 
ideas and projects, aimed at taking advantage of other 
regions' inferiorities.
* The ability to integrate short-term changes into the 
overarching perspective.
* The flexibility of specific elements within the 
overarching perspective.
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Conclusions
Having established (in the previous chapters) the 
framework for planning practice's operational environment, 
that is, the region, the decision-making environment, and 
planners’ potential strengths in it, the essence of this 
chapter lies in the presentation of the proposed approach 
that may assist planners to promote the processes they 
desire or deem necessary. Indeed, in view of the complexity 
of the region and decision-making system on the one hand, 
and the need to direct various forces toward a common goal 
under conditions in which planners have only indirect 
control over resources and operate under complicated 
institutional condition on the other hand, the strategic 
attitude presented here seem most relevant.
The discussion was developed from the basic perspective 
of a strategic function as an important element of attempts 
to influence regional processes. This perspective is not 
necessarily shared by the various forces that operate in the 
regional system. Planners are therefore faced with a 
difficult task in generating commitment on the part of 
certain decision-makers to the planning product and 
directing decision-making processes along strategic 
principles. In confronting this task, planners should be 
aware of the importance of the limits of the strategy and 
the continuous specification of its components, as well as 
of the capacity of specific decision-makers ("partners") to 
follow the strategic perspective or its specific segments 
presented to them. Indeed, the discussion emphasised the
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complicated and context-specific nature of the above aspects 
of planning practice, thus providing planners with great 
freedom to determine their attitudes in concrete areas. 
These areas include the theoretical approach adopted for the 
analysis of decision-making and the determination of leading 
regional components, as well as the personal characteristics 
to be applied during the planning process and in the 
establishment of planners' relations with the given 
institutional context.
In practice, several important guidelines for a 
strategic approach were highlighted. Among them are the 
importance of the interactions between region, partners, and 
planners; the need to integrate imaginative and intuitive 
insights into a structured analysis; the integration of 
decision-makers' commitment to a planning product as the 
route toward implementation; and expressing the different 
time-spans relevant to different levels of specification of 
the strategic perspective. Finally, with regard to the 
postulate that there is no one "good" or appropriate 
planning product (i.e., the product's effectiveness depends 
on the concrete context within which it is operationalised), 
a principle structure of strategy was proposed. This 
structure, although meaningless by itself, should assist 
planners in determining their specific direction and 
structure with which to direct regional processes. It should 
also be emphasised that a regional strategy is not the only 
planning product of the strategic perspective; the outcome 
of this approach may provide a base for devising several 
additional products.
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The proposed strategic approach is argued to establish 
fertile grounds for planning practice. This is attained 
through a process of stimulating changes within key regional 
components, while working simultaneously in various 
dimensions that have the potential of establishing a 
positive cumulative effect, or encouraging development in 
the desired direction. Practicing this type of strategy is 
by no means an easy task, especially since it requires that 
planners constantly be alert to emerging changes, and 
demonstrate outstanding integrity, as expressed by their 
professional qualifications, their creative mind, and 
sensitivity, to establish their role in the relevant 
decision-making system. Indeed, problems are likely to arise 
in every step planners may take. Thus, it is the way in 
which they cope with these problems and constraints that is 
of immense importance for the content of the implemented 
planning initiative. Importantly, planners' actual attempts 
to promote the integration of a certain planning product 
into the political-administrative system is crucial, the 
planning product is most likely not be executed without such 
active role.
Following these arguments, the next part of this 
dissertation consists of the presentation and analysis of a 
specific case of actual struggle on the part of planners to 
make their planning initiative a sound one, and see to its 
implementation. It is a study of planners' role in regional 
processes, which analyses the planning experience in view of 
the major strategic perspective presented in this thesis. 
Specifically, reference will be made to the actual choice of
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regional components and decision-makers as the cornerstone 
of the strategy, to the way in which the planners practiced 
their choice, as well as their way of interpreting actual 
working principles and procedures from their initial vision. 
This analysis aims to prove that implementation of a 
strategy depends to a large extent on the combined effect of 
planners' production capabilities and their active attempts 
to promote implementation through their skills in gaining 
access to major decision-makers. Put differently, lack of 
the above qualities is likely to have a negative impact on 
implementation, even if the strategy's professional 
competence is unquestioned.
Notes
(1) Later in this chapter, we shall suggest that a regional strategy for region A can 
encourage the plant to undertake the training scheme in region A, if this is 
considered desired for the region.
(2) "Need" as a guide for activities, as opposed to need as a "cover to distinguish 
between choices made on quite d ifferen t basis" (Baur, 1977, p.671).
(3) A note from a discussion between planners employed in the WZO Planning 
Section, H aifa region office, dated October 1984.
(4) This observation is based on my work, as a member of the planning team of 
Project Renewal in Yeruham (a new -tow n located in the south of Israel) during 
the years 1978-80.
(5) This proposal was initially stim ulated through my acquaintance with a form er 
director of Intel Israel, Ltd. and the way this company inspires innovations, as 
compared with the public company by which I was employed.
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Chapter 5: THE WESTERN GALIL
Introduction
The Galil is a hilly area in the north of Israel, noted 
for its spectacular scenery. At 1,660 square kilometers, it 
accounts for 8% of Israel's territory. Within this area, 610 
square kilometers (3% of the country) are defined as Western 
Galil.1 Map 1 illustrates its location.
Any study of the Galil as a whole, and Western Galil in 
particular, is a study of a sub-national physical area 
composed of different and independent socio-economic 
functional units, for many of which physical proximity is 
the major, if not the only, shared element. "Galil" is 
neither an administrative region, nor a unified functional 
system composed of closely interrelated socio-economic and 
political entities. The study of "Western Galil" is not a 
study of the type commonly seen in the literature, i.e., 
that of one regional system being affected by a major trend 
such as the rise and fall of a dominant industrial sector, 
with its consequent chain reaction of effects in the entire 
regional functional system. Rather, it is a study of a 
potentially emerging "region", of structural changes within 
different and separate functional units that through their 
combined effects planted roots for the establishment of a 
distinct "regional" entity in a specific part of the Galil 
(i.e., Western Galil).
Nevertheless, Western Galil shares in some of the major 
historical processes that characterise the entire Galil.
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Among them are the Jewish settlement process,, 
infrastructure development, and local political 
institutionalisation. All are strongly linked to the socio­
economic and political processes that structure the Israeli 
system. They manifest themselves within a national spatial 
system that displays (and has displayed for some time) a 
clear tendency to centralise the vast majority of its 
activities and population in a small part of the country, 
leaving the rest (mainly the northern and southern regions) 
relatively unpopulated and heavily dependent on processes 
carried out in the country's core areas. Table 1 in the 
appendix illustrates this spatial distribution. In 1987, for 
instance, some 70% of the population occupied about 14% of 
the land, leaving 29% of the population with 86% of the 
national land reserves.
This issue of the spatial structure of the country is 
widely discussed in the literature. Scholars and politicians 
tend to agree that this kind of uneven distribution is 
undesirable. Their rationale rooted in the alleged 
structural inefficiencies that this state of affairs 
produces in the national socio-economic system (i.e., large 
congested urban areas vs. underdeveloped peripheries), and, 
in Israel's case, is further supported by arguments about 
the need to populate border areas. Yet, at 200 kilometers 
from the centre of the country,^ Galil is indeed rather 
remote from Israel's major national centres of population, 
political affairs, and socio-economic activity; and it has 
been so for the past 40 years at least. Thus Galil, and 
Western Galil, have never attracted masses of people from 
the congested central areas, despite local advantages such
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as low land prices. Neither has the region served as a last 
resort for land-intensive production processes/ nor as an 
active national leisure area exploiting the beautiful/ 
relatively untouched landscape. On the contrary/ the 
situation in the Galil is such that physical and functional 
distance are directly related. This condition prevails even 
though the Galil is generally regarded as an area in socio­
economic stress and with a strategic-defence importance 
(Hill, 1980), which has encouraged the initiation of 
different public waifare-economic policies and induced 
planners over the past 40 years to issue a wide variety of 
plans (national and Galil-specific) aimed at offsetting the 
spatial-functional centralisation trend and promoting social 
and economic development.
This begs the question connected with the nature of 
national public policies (i.e., expressed and salient 
objectives, coupled with the means adopted to implement 
them). Indeed, studies lead to the conclusion that even in 
the pre-state British Mandate period, the Jewish political 
system purposely fostered spatial and functional 
centralisation (Reichman, 1979). As to the Israeli political 
system, scholars (Horowitz and Lisak, 1977; Weiss, 1977) 
suggest that the underdevelopment of peripheral areas is 
explicable in terms of the central government's attempts to 
maintain its dominant role by limiting the power of local 
political institutions. Consequently, no thoroughgoing 
attempts have been made to develop areas such as the Galil. 
Other scholars suggest that the lack of an immediate need to 
deal with the Galil has precluded the political system 
becoming seriously concerned with its development; Sofer
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(1985), for example, implies that although Western Galil has 
an Arab majority, the absence of basic signs of socio­
political unrest among the Arabs has thwarted most 
controversy concerning, and, thus, political attention to, 
the question of the affiliation of this province with 
sovereign Israel.
The efforts of the government to maintain central control 
seem, on the whole, to provide the best explanation of the 
historical processes that established the functional 
peripheral role of areas such as Western Galil within the 
national system. Among the means invoked in pursuit of this 
control, scholars stress the fragmentation of local 
functional units and the delegation of only minor authority 
to regional institutions (Turgovnic, 1986). Since a 
thoroughgoing analysis of Israel's national political and 
socio-economic system is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, we merely note that the situation of Western 
Galil as described in this chapter is intimately related to 
national-level political and socio-economic activities.
This chapter establishes the basis for the case study 
of a specific planning initiative and strives to reflect 
the major characteristics of Western Galil as identified 
during this planning process. Thus, general background 
information is provided on Western Galil and, when relevant, 
on Galil as a whole, describing the major areas of reference 
in the planning initiatives, and spelling out the issues 
with which planners concerned themselves. This being the 
goal, this chapter is mostly descriptive. It refrains from 
offering an in-depth analysis of processes and their future
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implications, as this would exceed the scope of the 
dissertation.
5.1 Delineation of Boundaries
Having emphasised (Chap. 2) the importance of defining 
regional boundaries in a manner that facilitates the 
discussion of issues relevant to the most pertinent aspects 
of the intrinsically complex nature of any regional system, 
this dissertation now addresses itself to a specific 
planning process that proposed clearly articulated 
objectives as to the nature of expected change within a 
concretely defined section of the Galil, namely "Western 
Galil".
Although these areas are composed of several clearly 
identifiable geographic units, the terms "Galil" and 
"Western Galil" are variously applied to different areas. 
The vast majority of routine references to Galil (i.e., in 
newspapers, by politicians) tends to disregard these 
differences, although the term is used as a synonymous with 
the northern reaches of the country. Scholars are inclined 
to set boundaries in accordance with prevailing national 
administrative jurisdictions, which divide the country into 
districts, sub-districts, and natural areas. These divisions 
present an important advantage for data collection 
requirements. Indeed, the availability of a large official 
data base on the country as a whole and its specific 
administrative regions (maintained by the Central Bureau of
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Statistics) is highly attractive for research purposes,, 
especially since "regions" are not politically and 
economically established entities.
As previously argued, however, such boundaries may 
prove problematic if they force the analyst to treat an area 
that does not coincide with the processes being analysed. 
Nevertheless, since the spatial boundaries of Western Galil 
are well defined within the planning work discussed her, our 
task is easy, although one practical difficulty arise: the 
area of concern gradually expanded during the planning 
process, starting from the Segev Block in the south and 
middle of Western Galil, to a larger area embracing the 
northwest of the region.
As we wish to deal with one region only, we shall define 
Western Galil in accordance with the extended frame of 
reference used in the most recent planning initiative. This 
is further warranted because the area is rather small and 
well defined within the Galil; it possesses numerous 
similarities in terms of the socio-economic processes 
affecting it in the past few years. This decision leads to 
an important practical advantage: the extended area 
corresponds (with the exception of two small settlements) to 
the prevailing official administrative demarcation of 
"natural areas". Thus, it permits us to make use of the most 
solid and comprehensive national source of information, that 
compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics; it also 
eliminates confusion regarding the areas included within 
"Western Galil", and facilitates historical comparison.
In practice, the "natural areas" defined as Western 
Galil under this rubric consist of numbers 14 and 15. Since
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we shall compare Western Galil with the entire GalLl, 
reference will be made to the "Galil" within its 
indisputable boundaries, embracing "natural areas" numbers 
4, 7, and 13 through 16. All of these areas fall within the 
North District (see Map 1). They are confined to one 
morphological system - the mountainous part of Galil 
(excluding the Hula-Jordan and Yzreel Valleys), and create a 
sufficient basis for providing a general background on the 
Galil.
Map no.2 illustrates the major aspects of the spatial 
structure of Western Galil.
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5.2 Physical Structure^
Western Galil consists of several physical units that 
coincide with the basic structure of the Galil and its two 
major physical sections: Lower and Upper Galil (Upper Galil 
extends to the northern border of Israel). These sections 
differ in elevation, climate, landscape, fauna and flora, 
and settlement history. The major physical sections of 
Western Galil are:
a. The Segev and Zalmon^ blocs, located at the south east 
extremity of Galil.
b. The Tefen Bloc and a small area to its west, located in 
the south of Upper Galil and to the north of Segev 
Bloc.
c. These sections are separated by the Beith-Hakerem 
Valley. The town of Karmiel, located in the centre of 
this valley, represents the physical core of Western 
Galil.
The topography of this region exerts a major effect on 
its socio-economic activities, as is inevitable in such 
mountainous zones. This terrain prevents convenient and 
direct connections between various parts of the region, 
fails to provide large flat spaces suitable for space­
intensive activities, and, most importantly, increases the 
expense of any type of construction. These aspects aside, 
the region has a typical, comfortable Mediterranean climate 
and is noted for its marvelous landscape, both of which are 
thoroughly described and discussed in the literature.
Roads Infrastructure: The road network of Galil is 
characterised by its attachment to historical routes, which
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were determined by the area's physical features. During the 
1950s-1960s, when the major national road network was 
planned and constructed, planners' perceptions^ supported 
the establishment of a main national road axis along the 
coastal plain, thus emphasising the peripherality of the 
Galil, and encouraging the integrity of the functional 
separation between the large urban areas and the 
peripheries.
Several major thoroughfares cross this region and 
connect it with other parts of the country, as illustrated 
in Map 2. The map gives the impression of a well endowed 
transportation grid linking all parts of Western Galil, and 
the entire region, with outside areas by a diverse system of 
roads. In fact, the system provides rather poor access both 
within the region and between it and other parts of the 
country, because of two major features (Katz, Menuhin, 
Ludmer, 1982): first, the existing roads are fairly narrow, 
poorly paved, and unsafe; they are also unsuited to the 
actual volume of transportation; second, Galil has no major, 
high-quality traffic route. Consequently, the system is 
detrimental to regional integrity, as it provides poor 
internal access and renders external access problematic; The 
substandard regional network constricts the development 
potential of the region, limits the availability of various 
activities for different customers, and reduces the extent 
to which local demand for services and goods may contribute 
to regional development. This, in turn, fosters the area's 
sense of being peripheral and remote from major national 
urban centres.
Communications: The existing regional communications
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infrastructure, based mainly on the telephone system, is 
fairly poor, fails to meet the current regional qualitative 
and quantitative demand, and thwarts the utilisation of 
alternative means of communications (Kela, 1985 and 1990).
Admittedly, the problem of communications 
underdevelopment is shared by the entire country. However, 
its impact on present and future development in Western 
Galil is especially acute. The absence of a satisfactory 
system affects the development of production activities of 
all kinds, for which communication facilities are crucial. 
Unfortunately, communications in the Galil does not 
compensate for the region's distance from major national 
urban areas and its poor physical accessibility. With the 
communications infrastructure in its present state, the 
region cannot take full advantage of the major product of 
modern life: information. Although the future negative 
impact of this drawback in the regional system is far beyond 
our ability to estimate, it will surely be crucial.
To sum up, the physical structure of Western Galil is 
such that convenient access cannot be taken for granted, 
although it offers several inherent advantages (such as 
opportunities to avoid congestion and create spatial 
separation between different activities).
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5.3 Demography^
The population of Western Galil (1987) constitutes 
about 45% of the Galil's and 4.4% of the total population of 
Israel. This population is composed of two major socio­
religious groups: Jews and non-Jews (referred to in this 
dissertation as "Arabs"). The vast majority (83%) of the 
population of Western Galil is non-Jewish, of whom 53% are 
Moslems, 27% Christians, and 20% Druze and Bedouins. Western 
Galil's Jewish population comprises 1% of the total Jewish 
population in Israel and about 30% of the Jews in Galil. 
Arabs in Western Galil, by contrast, account for 20% of the 
total Israeli-Arabs in the country, and more than 50% of the 
Arabs in the Galil. Table 2 (appendix) summarises these 
figures.
This socio-religious disparity and, in particular, the 
majority of Arabs within the territory of Western Galil, is 
often referred to as "the demographic problem of the Galil", 
which "cries" for public intervention aimed at offsetting 
this "negative Jewish balance" (Sofer, 1985). In fact, the 
issue of the absolute and proportional volume of the Jewish 
population had always been an essential aspect of any 
concern (planners' included) with the development of the 
Galil; its Jewish population growth has been regarded as an 
indication of the region's overall economic growth and 
social stability. These disparities are the result of 
several crucial differences between the Arab and Jewish 
population groups (commonly referred to as "sectors"). 
Indeed, each displays distinct socio-demographic, economic, 
and political characteristics (although differences within
200
specific social groups of each sector are also relatively 
acute), which are briefly discussed below.
In general, the population of Western Galil has been 
growing steadily over the years, both in absolute numbers 
and in terms of its proportion of the national and North 
District population, as shown in Table 3 (appendix). An 
analysis of this trend indicates several characteristics:
a. Relatively high rates of population growth (between the 
years 1972-1987), especially in comparison with the 
national and North District rates.
7
b. Deceleration of growth rates between 1972 and 1978.
c. Two salient inter-sector distribution attributes are: 
An increase in the proportion of Jews in the region's
p
population and higher annual growth rates in the 
Jewish sector,^ although in absolute numbers, Arab 
growth is much greater.
The major reasons for these disparate growth patterns 
are basically related to the sources of population growth. 
The growth in the Arab sector is fueled by "natural 
increase",10 which is higher than in Jewish sector, coupled 
with negligible emigration. The Jewish sector, in contrast, 
displays a negative migration balance (mainly in New Towns) 
and a lower rate of "natural increase".
In conclusion, assuming that natural growth rates are 
maintained, the only way to increase the size of the Jewish 
population of Western Galil is to stimulate Jewish in- 
migration.
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5.4 The Settlement System
The settlement system of Western Galil is a product of 
historical processes that determined the spatial 
distribution and functional structure of settlements. These 
processes, affecting Western Galil as much as the entire 
Galil (and other regions), created a diverse system that is 
steadily developing a set of similar socio-economic 
features, although maintaining a clear segregation between 
Jewish and Arab settlement sub-systems.
a. Historical Background
The Galil has been settled continuously since the 
Bronze Age, with each period characterised by distinct and 
exceedingly diverse events and population groups (Yitzhaki, 
1978). The present spatial system is based on the historical 
processes whereby settlements’ location was determined 
largely by the region's physical structure (the preferred 
locations have always been near the existing east-west 
transportation routes and close to valleys' arable land).
The pre-statehood national processes (during the 
British Mandate), as noted, "planted the initial roots" of 
Galil's peripheral role within what was to become the 
Israeli national system. Galil did not fall under the major 
criteria for the Jewish land acquisition p r ocess^ 
(Reichman, 1979). Thus, Galil was relatively neglected, 
leaving its Arab majority and traditional spatial system 
largely undisturbed.
The establishment of the State of Israel inaugurated a
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new era in Western Galil (as in Galil and the country as a. 
whole), in which the most salient change in the past 40 
years has occurred in the settlement system. This change 
reflects the dominant political-instrumental perspective, by 
which the massive construction of new settlements is the 
major way to attain regional development objectives and 
pursue territorial control. Planning initiatives, too, have 
constantly been concerned with the issue of establishing 
settlements. In fact, most of the fundamental changes in the 
functional mechanisms of Israel's peripheral areas that have 
taken place since the foundation of the state have been 
directly or indirectly caused by the large-scale 
establishment of new Jewish settlements. In the Galil, this 
unique process, in which almost 100 new Jewish settlements 
were established, triggered a series of changes in 
infrastructure and housing development, service expansion, 
and structural changes in the Arab sector (urbanisation and 
physical expansion of built areas).
Jewish new settlements were established in three major 
"waves":^
* An initial spurt in the first post-independence years
(1948-1955), in which one New Town and 33 small
13settlements were newly established in the Galil Six of 
the small settlements were located in Western Galil.
* An extension of the initial building boom (1956-1969), 
with the establishment of another three New Towns and 12 
small settlements in Galil^ Two New Towns and four 
settlements were located in Western Galil.
* A third wave of massive construction (1975-1985) of 47
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settlements in the G a l i l , o f  which 31 settlements .in 
Western Galil.
This process, in which Jewish settlements were located 
within the Galil "heartland" (i.e., mostly Western Galil and 
other areas until then scarcely populated by Jews), resulted 
from a national policy meant to settle the country, while 
decentralising the population and absorbing immigrants 
flowing into Israel from post-World War II Europe, Africa, 
and Asia (Brutzkus, 1964).
The mid-1970s stage deserves special emphasis. It began 
(as will be further discussed in Chapter 6) with the rapid 
construction of approximately 30 mitzpim (singular: mitzpe, 
a "watchtower settlement", in Hebrew), most of them located 
on the sites of permanent future settlements, for which 
Jewish-owned land was available for immediate needs. The 
"mitzpe" concept, first applied to a settlement process in 
the northern Negev (Israel's southern region) in the 1940s, 
refers to settlements that are a result of a process in 
which only the rudimentary facilities (temporary housing and 
basic infrastructure) are constructed before the permanent 
nature of the settlement is determined. The mitzpim process 
in Galil, therefore, enabled the establishment of 
settlements that varied in their basic characteristics 
(e.g., organisational structures, level of cooperation, and 
the local economic base), while still sharing several common 
features, such as the socio-economic complexion of the 
inhabitants, hilltop location (i.e., areas not populated by 
local Arabs), and, in most cases, physical proximity.
As a whole, this attitude toward the settlement 
construction process and the importance assigned to
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settlements in the regional development process (that of 
Galil in this case) is thoroughly discussed in the 
literature; some scholars (e.g., Hill, 1980; Dror, 1964) 
view it as a distinct, and, in a sense, relatively 
"positive" element of Israeli public policy. They suggest 
that its advantages lies in that it enables state 
construction to take place under unusually difficult 
conditions (i.e., constant hostility from Arab nations, 
massive immigration flows, and a newly emerging state's 
administration). Others, however (e.g., Sofer and Finkel, 
1988), stress the intrinsic disadvantages of the rapid, if 
not frantic, construction of new settlements, which ignored 
fundamental aspects of social economic infrastructure. In 
the context of Western Galil, any practical attempt to 
evaluate this process must take account of two facts: the 
actual regional role in the national system has not changed 
drastically over the years; nor has the relative size of 
Jewish population fundamentally changed, as contrasted to 
steady Arab demographic growth.
The development process within the Arab settlement 
system has been rather different from that of the Jewish 
sector. These differences manifest themselves in expansion 
of built-up areas and rapid population growth, reflecting 
the impact of the modernisation and urbanisation processes 
to which the entire Galil has been subject. Indeed, the Arab 
communities, unlike Jewish settlements, have undergone a 
"classic" urbanisation process within existing 
settlements.1** Historical analysis suggests that whereas 
modernisation and urbanisation had been at work in the Arab
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sector for many years, their scale and intensity may be 
linked to the Jewish settlement process in Galil, especially 
during the 1970s and 1980s. These changes affected the 
expansion of the built-up areas along major transportation 
routes, the development of mountaintop settlements, growing 
awareness of the importance of land ownership, and increased 
participation in the labour force (including increased 
propensity of women to work outside the home).
b. Structure of the Settlement System
The Israeli settlement system is often confusingly 
described, especially in relation to the notion of "rural 
settlements", commonly applied to various types of small 
Jewish localities that presumably exhibit socio-economic 
features distinct from large cities and metropolitan areas. 
Traditionally, this notion referred to all, mostly small, 
production-based (mainly agriculture) Jewish localities or 
communities with a certain degree of cooperativeness built 
into their organisational structure, such as Kibbutz,
1 7Cooperative Moshav, and Workers' Moshav. Most of them are 
located in peripheral areas or spatially defined areas in 
the centre of the country. In this case, therefore, "rural" 
is synonymous with an agricultural economic base, 
cooperative organisation, and small size, thus 
distinguishing such settlements from other Jewish and all 
non-Jewish settlements. Some also refer to these settlements 
as the "working settlement system", still others utilise the 
term "rural settlement" in an unsystematic way, referring 
either to all small Jewish peripheral settlements, or to
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part of them (for example, to those constructed by the 
Jewish Agency
This distinction, however, is no longer valid, for two 
reasons: First, some Arab settlements are still engaged in 
traditional, non-cooperative, family-based farming 
production processes, distinguished by specific socio­
cultural features and spatial segregation from Jewish 
settlements. Second, Jewish "rural" settlements undergo, 
especially since the 1970s, an important change: existing 
settlements present a shift towards non-production-oriented 
communities), and non-cooperative and non-production- 
oriented settlements (i.e., those in which the internal 
production process is not an integral component of the 
settlement's functional system) are emerging. All create a 
"rural" settlement system that no longer performs any 
specific socio-economic roles distinct from cities and towns 
(as is the case in most modern capitalist societies) 
(Dunleavy, 1980a).
Alternatively, the national official approach 
(determined by the Ministry of the Interior), which defines 
"urban" as a settlement with population of 2,000 or more, 
smaller settlements as "rural", may be useful. This 
"urban-rural" dichotomy is advantageous in creating one 
basis for defining all types of Jewish and non-Jewish 
settlements all over the country, overruling attempts to 
associate "urban" or "rural" phenomena with spatially 
distinct socio-cultural systems and economic activities. 
This definition, however, disregards the existence of major 
difference between Arab and Jewish settlements; whether 
defined as "urban" or "rural", they have specific socio­
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economic and political characteristics that differentiate 
between them. This dissertation, therefore, will refrain 
from making an "urban-rural" distinction, referring instead 
to several types of settlements (whereby a "settlement" is 
taken as a broad notion, referring to any type of locality, 
regardless of its location, size, organisational and ethnic 
structure):
Metropolitan areas, or "large urban centres" - the chain of 
large cities located along the Mediterranean coastal plain 
and in the centre of the country. The major metropolitan 
areas are Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa.
New Towns - Jewish settlements established during the 1950s 
(with two exceptions in 1960s) in peripheral areas.
Various types of collective settlements - all Jewish, mostly 
small communities that structured on the basis of different 
levels of cooperation (i.e., from communal ownership and 
management of means of production, consumption, and most 
social facilities, to partial cooperation with regard to 
basic public services).
Arab settlements - mostly featuring an economic system based 
to some degree on agriculture, and forming socio-cultural 
and political communities distinct from the Jewish system.
On the whole, all settlements feature (following 
Dunleavy, 1982a, for example) social activities that can be 
defined as "urban". The differences between them express 
types of linkages to national political-economic 
institutions and specific local variants.
The major characteristics of the settlement system in 
Western Galil follow:
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The Jewish sub-system is composed of New Towns and
O ft
different types of collective settlements. Although its 
population is a minority in the region, it is distributed 
across a much larger number of settlements than the Arabs, 
most of which are fairly small (an average of 200 
inhabitants per settlement in most cases). The majority of 
the population, however, dwells in the New Towns, Karmiel 
and Ma'alot. With Karmiel in the centre and Ma'alot in the 
north of the Western Galil region, the spatial distribution 
of the collective settlements is rather systematic; they are 
located mainly on hilltops and mountain peaks, most of which 
previously were unpopulated. These settlements tend to be 
organised in clusters, although the physical proximity of 
the settlements' built-up areas is low due to large land 
reserves designated for future development. Nevertheless, 
settlements do not function as an integrated system, but 
rather as individual entities that cooperate either on the 
municipal level of organisation (within regional councils) 
or in national sectoral institutions (e.g., National Kibbutz 
Organization, The Moshavim Movement).
The Arab sub-system is distributed among a relatively 
small number of large (average population per settlement: 
5,600) and rapidly growing settlements. Most settlements are 
situated along major regional roads, forming several large 
and densely populated spatial clusters. The Druze 
settlements tend to be congregated in upper Western Galil, 
the Bedouin townships mainly in the Zalmon area, and Muslim 
and Christian settlements in lower Western Galil. The 
built-up areas of these settlements are rather large and 
dense, since land reserves are not growing in accordance
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with increasing demand (this is an important source of 
social unrest); internal infrastructure (roads, sewage 
systems) is very poor, especially in comparison to the 
nearby new Jewish settlements. Settlements are organised as 
individual economic and social entities, although 
cooperation between settlements is increasing, mainly for 
purposes of supplying public services such as education. 
They are composed of several ethnic groups, and are marked 
by a high degree of socio-political fragmentation 
(differences are to a large extent a function of the role of 
each ethnic group within the national system).
Summing up, for many years, the actual existence of 
settlements, their spatial distribution, and their internal 
land uses, seem to have formed the major point of interest 
for political decision-makers, administrators, and 
professionals (planners not excepted). Intrinsic to their 
existence, settlements were implicitly assumed to have 
growth power and a self-generating economic system. Over the 
years, however, it became evident that important economic 
and social measures should be introduced in order to promote 
development of the masses of newly constructed settlements. 
Table 4 in the appendix lists the major characteristics of 
settlements in Western Galil. Map 2 illustrates their 
spatial distribution.
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5.5 The Economic System
The nature of the regional economy is a combined effect
of its role in the national system and the extent to which
local economic forces may devise a "regional" sub-system. 
Processes identified in the past ten years, however, suggest 
that a distinct economic system is being established in 
Western Galil (distinct in relation to the entire Galil). 
This evolving "regional" economy is endowed with the 
following major attributes:
a. A relative importance to previously mentioned 
locational characteristics which put major constraints 
on economic activities. Certain types of economic 
activities (e.g., traditional land-consuming 
agriculture and industries highly sensitive to physical 
distance) cannot take place in the area, and 
accessibility between the different parts of the 
regional system and outside is difficult.
b. Dominance of the national political system in local-
regional affairs: its impact, by means of direct
financial allocations, indirect financial incentives
(e.g., tax relief), and other policies does much to 
determine regional economic processes. Western Galil 
has no particular advantage over other peripheral areas 
in the case of incentives determined by locational 
criteria (e.g., assistance to "development areas"), * 
or over the country as a whole with respect to 
incentives allocated according to functional criteria, 
such as to export-oriented production firms, and 
housing liabilities (Ministry of Industry and Trade,
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1989). These relations are further expressed in the. 
high degree of dependence of the regional socio­
economic components on public services, which are 
allocated and administered predominantly in accordance 
with criteria determined by national political 
institutions. This is an outgrowth of the fundamentals 
of Israeli public policy, which combines traditional 
welfare principles (grounded in socialist ideology).
c. Production activities of two extreme structures: small, 
mostly inefficient economic units in agriculture and 
industry are found in conjunction with large, private, 
and mostly sophisticated industrial and agriculture 
enterprises. The former are outgrowths of the 
traditional system; most of the latter developed in the 
past decade. This structure reflects changes in the 
national economy: the crisis in the cooperative 
production system and structural changes in production 
processes, which led to the ascendancy of privately 
owned, "high-tech" industries and the incursion of 
multinationals, the decreased potency of the Labour 
Union and its investment in peripheral areas, and 
structural changes in the labour force (i.e., increased 
participation of Arabs and women). Importantly, no 
major changes have occurred in the cost of labour, 
which remains rather expensive due to government and 
Labour Union control over this market (justified by the 
socialist ideology that has dominated State 
institutions) (Pat, 1990).
d. The industrial system Western Galil has some 
characteristics that suggest the existence of an
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industrial development trend distinct from that of the.
Galil at large.23 The major characteristics of the
Jewish regional industrial production system are as
follows: A great diversity of enterprises, functioning
in different areas of production and vary in number of
employees;2  ^Most industrial plants are private,25 with
the exception of five plants owned by Rafael (the
Authority for Combat Means Development) and the Labour
Company;25'27 47% of the industries are "advanced"
(according to Bergman's (1986) distinction between
"advanced" and "traditional" industries), employing 67%
7 8of the labour in industry, ° and devoting about 20% of
their employees to R&D activities. Finally, 50% of the
7 Q"advanced" industries*^ were established m  the area 
during the 1980s3® (from 1978 to 1980 there was a 360% 
growth in number of plants, and a 500% growth in 
employees). It should be noted that available data 
indicate that the Arab sector has made almost no 
private investments in large, "advanced" industrial 
plants.
By comparison, fundamental changes in agriculture are
relegating this major traditional source of livelihood
to a minor role in regional production activities. Its
function today is largely its contribution to
31maintaining territorial control,
e. Minimal cooperation on a regional basis among groups of 
similar settlements (moshavim or kibbutzim) or among 
nearby settlements, with the exception of small-scale 
activities in area of municipal services. This applies 
to both the Arab and the Jewish sectors. This
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functional fragmentation is aggravated by the umbilical- 
connections between local-regional individual economic 
units and their national organisations. Examples are 
the United Kibbutz Organisation and The Moshav Movement 
(affecting local socio-economic processes), or 
organisations such as Agresko, Ltd., a national 
exporter of agricultural products (and the sole option 
available in this field, for the most part).
f. The attributes of the regional labour force approximate
o o
the national averages. * The civilian labour force 
constitutes 88.5% of total employment, of which 45.8% 
are Jews and 54.2% Arabs (although the latter make up 
83% of the total regional population).
g. An in-depth analysis of the regional labour market 
reveals that the availability of abundant unskilled 
labour, mainly in the Arab sector and the New Towns, 
seems to meet the high prevailing regional supply of 
unskilled jobs (Jubran, 1983), especially in industrial 
plants. However, the total regional shortage of job 
opportunities leads to dependence on jobs in 
metropolitan Haifa, located within reasonable commuting 
distance (especially with respect to the Arab sector, 
within which the supply of jobs is less than 6% of 
demand; Jubran, 1983).
h. The major function of the Arab sector in the regional 
economy is that of a consumer of services and jobs. 
Capital within this sector is rarely reinvested in 
non-individual, non-family-based small enterprises.
j . Whereas agricultural activities are distributed among 
the entire region, the spatial distribution of the
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industrial enterprises is rather clear: the New Towns- 
(Karmiel and Ma'alot) host 61.7% of the region's 
industrial plants and 67.4% of industrial labour (about 
50% of plants and 60% of employees are classified as 
belonging to "advanced" industries; 77% of these plants 
and 63% of their employees are in Karmiel); The new 
settlements (except Kfar-Havradim) are associated with 
28% of the region's industrial plants and only 4.6% of 
its industrial labour. "Advanced" industries are in the 
majority, comprising 33% of the above plants and 44% of 
employees. Yet, although they account for 19.5% of the 
region's "advanced" plants, they employ only 3% of the 
region-wide labour in this category;^ Tefen industrial 
park (in the north) and Leshem complex (in Segev Bloc) 
account for 10.3% of the area's industrial plants and 
28% of its labour. Several (26%) are large industrial 
complexes, of which 80% are classified as "advanced", 
employing 78% of the workers in these areas. These 
plants tend to be privately owned; 30% function as 
branches of an external parent company, and 45% perform 
R&D functions. Arab sector industry is located mostly 
in the larger towns. Available data indicated that all 
industrial plants are "traditional", only 10% of plants 
employ more than 10 workers; only one (Kadmani Metal 
Industries, Ltd. of Yarka) employs more than 400 
employees. An additional observation is the tendency of 
plants to be located in Druze settlements. This is 
probably a consequence of the privileged socio­
political status of the Druze among the non-Jewish 
population.
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Summing up, the major areas of economic development .in. 
Western Galil are largely a result of private initiatives 
rather than a purposeful public intervention. This is 
especially true with regard to industry. Agriculture, as a 
traditional source of subsistence and the economic base of 
settlements, was indeed subject to more intensive 
interventions, although along nation-wide principles.
5.6 The Institutional Structure
The institutional system is composed of elected and 
non-elected government bodies, an well as national and local 
non-governmental bodies. These organisations have separate 
administrative machineries to execute their policies. 
Importantly, most of them are nationally oriented in their 
policies (and structured in accordance with the national 
political Party system). Even the local authorities, which 
represent the major potential for non-national control, are 
vulnerable to the massive impact of the central government 
system. The great diversity of organisations connected with 
regional processes, the lack of coordination between them, 
and their strong links to the national political system, 
leave local organisations open to the massive influence of 
national policies, and thwart the emergence of a unified 
regional system of any kind.
This fragmented institutional structure was the subject 
of only a residual concern in planning practice. The latter 
tends to be exercised within public organisations, and to 
avoid questioning the given functional environment. This
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system, however, is the subject of a growing academic, 
concern that emphasises the links between the present 
characteristics of Western Galil (and Galil as a whole) and 
the public political-administative machinery, its impact on 
the region's processes, and the need to initiate changes in 
this machinery as a precondition for the promotion of 
Western Galil's development.
The major categories of organisations are briefly 
described below. It should be noted that throughout the 
dissertation we refer to two additional notions: "central
government" and "local government" institutions. These 
represent the different public bodies that operate at the 
national level of decision-making, and predominantly non­
national (regional or local) decision-making institutions, 
respectively. Both may consist of elected and non-elected 
bodies.
Local and Regional Authorities
These are elected bodies, which are discharge two major 
functions (Hoffman & Marcus, 1986):
a. Provision of local democratic representation within the 
national political system. Elections are distinct from 
those for the central government, although affiliations 
between local representatives and national parties are 
strong and direct (Lisak, 1977).
b. Delivery to the local community of three basic types of 
public services: nationally provided services (funded 
by central government and provided according to its
O C
guidelines), local compulsory services, and local
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voluntary services (as determined by the specific local. 
authority).36 In principle, local authorities are 
heavily dependent on direct and indirect government 
finance, although other sources of finance are 
available.
A wide variety of issues is subject to local public 
intervention, including land use planning (e.g., the 
provision of Building Permits, the initiation of local land
o 7
use plans). Differences between local authorities exist 
mainly in the quality of compulsory services and the variety
OO
and quality of complementary services.
The local authorities in Western Galil fall into 
several categories:
a. Municipalities - towns with over 20,000 inhabitants, 
such as Karmiel.
b. Local councils - in settlements with 2,000 to 20,000 
inhabitants, such as Ma'alot-Tarshiha and the Arab 
settlements.
c. Regional councils - incorporating several small 
settlements, as in Misgav.
d. Local Committees - within Jewish cooperative
o g
settlements (except for the Kibbutzim).
On the whole, the local authority system is 
distinguished by high fragmentation (Turgovnic, 1986) and 
fairly inefficient spatial distribution (Kipnis, 1982). 
Each authority functions as an individual entity, rarely 
integrating into a "regional" system, and at times, they 
compete with one another, to the detriment of regional
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integrity. These kinds of relations make the Galil as. a 
whole, and, at times, specific authorities, rather 
vulnerable to the impact of the central government system, 
which is highly dominant in any case.
Government Administration
The government system dominates Western Galil, with an 
actual and potential impact identifiable in almost every 
aspect of the regional system. Examples include prevailing 
patterns of physical development (the issuance of "building 
permits" through the Ministry of Interior, for example), the 
quality of the local road infrastructure and housing system 
(Ministry of Housing), and the diversity, quality, and 
spatial distribution of public services and economic 
development (the impact of ministries such as Health, 
Education, Industry and Trade, and Transportation, to name 
only a few).
This apparatus operates either through regional offices 
of specific ministries (i.e., Galil or North District) or 
directly through the head offices. The regional offices are 
by definition nationally oriented in their policies. Even 
when regional offices have some latitude in determining 
content of activities and their adaptation to regional 
requirements (Turgovnic, 1986), the nature of intervention 
is determined by the head offices.
Policies affecting regional processes fall into two 
major categories:
a. A territorially based policy that sets the extent of
intervention and the nature of assistance in accordance
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with the locational characteristics of regional systems, 
or specific settlements (for example, border areas and 
the settlements located in them). This policy is based 
on the "positive discrimination" doctrine, by which the 
extent of public intervention is a function of assumed 
direct relations between physical location and the 
region's relative need for assistance. Indeed, it 
provides an "umbrella" for the determination and 
application of various socio-economic public incentives 
such as "encouragement of capital investment in 
industry" law, prices of industrial land and space, and 
road-building. In accordance with this doctrine, the 
country is divided into "development areas" ranked in 
descending order,41 whereby intervention is determined 
largely by the status of each "development area".43 
Historically, this policy was meant to leverage 
development, mainly within the Galil and Negev 
peripheries.43 In practice, however, the awarding of 
"development area" status has become largely a function 
of political considerations. The prevailing 
distribution of high-priority "development areas" 
indicates a clear decrease in the importance of the 
Galil (most of which, including Western Galil, is not 
given highest priority), and greater importance 
accorded to areas beyond the "green line".44'45
b. Non-territorial criteria, often applied in the policies 
of specific ministries that reflect national welfare 
policy perspectives. Two examples are the educational 
system and eligibility for housing mortgages, in which 
the determining criterion is the population's socio­
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economic condition. In this regard, generally speaking,. 
Western Galil as a regional system has no advantage 
vis-a-vis other parts of the country. Rather, the 
relevant unit of reference is the individual family, 
the individual settlement, or a specific sector of the 
settlement. Yet, because Western Galil tends to be 
included within reference to the Galil as a "region in 
distress", some of its economic units are eligible for 
most types of programs aimed at strengthening specific 
components of the regional system.
Beyond the above characteristics affecting the content 
of policies, it should be emphasised that Israel’s central 
government administration is ramified and voluminous.^  A 
major practical problem arising from this is the lack of 
continuous and comprehensive coordination between ministries 
(Hill, 1980). Since numerous regional processes and programs 
do require the involvement of several ministries, 
conflicting interests or mere inability to coordinate may 
make the actual result of intervention irrelevant or 
ineffective. This may create, for example, a possible 
situation in which the Ministry of Education wishes to 
expand services but cannot because the Ministry of Housing 
cannot, or does not wish to, provide required building 
facilities. Functional fragmentation is exacerbated by the 
distribution of political party influence within ministries, 
since each ministry's attitude toward the Galil (and 
different parts of it) is determined largely by its 
political stance and party affiliation (Bilski, 1980). This 
aspect has become more relevant since 1977 due to the 
growing government's preference for the development of areas
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over the "green line" at the expense of peripheries such as 
the Galil.
Finally, the spatial distribution of regional offices 
(for those ministries that have such offices) is sometimes 
inefficient. Jurisdictions do not always coincide (Kipnis, 
1982), causing, for example, two settlements under one 
regional council to fall under the authority of different 
offices of one ministry.
To sum up, government intervention in regional 
processes is clearly the most important public force 
affecting the relative condition of Western Galil and its 
development. Although welfare policies may treat the Galil 
as a "region in distress", entitling it to various kinds of 
assistance, territorially based policies emphasising 
production processes place the Galil and Western Galil at a 
clear disadvantage vis-a-vis areas over the "green line".
Non-Governmental Organisations
The non-governmental organisations of Western Galil are 
distinguished by several features (Menuhin, 1980, Meshorer, 
1985):
a. The vast majority are quasi-governmental; only few are 
privately and publicly (non-governmental) owned 
entities.
b. Not only are most local organisations subject to 
central political control, they also tend to be 
branches of national organisations.
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c. The organisations that operate in the region tend not 
to coordinate their activities.
d. They tend to fail to bring a regional perspective to 
their work, viewing the region rather from the point of 
view of national needs, interests, and priorities.
The important public organisations within the regional 
system of Western Galil are the following (Menuhin, 1985):
a. The Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI).
b. Settlement institutions - the Moshav Movement, the 
United Kibbutz, the Herut-Beitar Movement, etc.
c. Quasi-governmental companies - Tahal and Mekorot Ltd. 
(water engineering and supply), the Israel Electric 
Company, the Egged transportation cooperative, the 
Ha'Mashbir wholesaling cooperative.
d. Women's organisations - Na'amat child-and-mother care 
and WIZO.
e. Regional marketing cooperatives (mostly operating 
before 1985).
There are, then, many organisations that function 
within the Western Galil or in direct reference to it. All 
of them form a system often referred to as "non-executant 
central government" (Dunleavy, 1980a), which reflects the 
distribution and extent of central control of the Israeli 
state system. Since a far-reaching extended discussion of 
their impact on the regional system is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, only one category is discussed below: the 
JAFI, by virtue of its relevance to this study and the fact 
that its existence and function in the Israeli institutional 
system is an experience not a commonly shared by other
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countries. The contribution of bodies such as the Settlement 
Movements and sectoral public cooperatives should not, 
however, be underestimated.
The Jewish Agency for Israel
The Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) is an international 
organisation founded in 1929 by the 16th Zionist Congress. 
The British government recognised the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine (subsequently the Jewish Agency for Israel) as the 
representative of the Jewish people in any issue concerning 
Palestine (The Hebrew Encyclopedia, pp.494-495). Thus, 
importantly, the JAFI, with its financial resources and 
administration, created a foundation for what became the 
Israeli Government. In 1947, with the adoption of the United 
Nations resolution for the establishment of the State of 
Israel, JAFI had discharged its initial task. However, it 
was not abolished and the vast majority of its institutions 
were maintained.47 Since then, JAFI has consolidated its 
interest in various aspects of the state's functional system 
(such as education, Jewish youth, and rural settlement 
processes) and its administrative system swelled. 
Nevertheless, it is a predominantly non-Israeli controlled 
organisation, and, by implication, only indirectly linked to 
the Israeli electoral system.
This extensive functional existence of JAFI within the 
state apparatus was facilitated by JAFI's financial 
resources (originating in its ability to marshall funds from 
world Jewry), which the governmental system has always eyed
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jealously as a potential additional source of revenue. This 
anomalous situation was further encouraged by the historical 
processes establishing the new state administration, which 
gave JAFI full legitimacy to develop its connections with 
the Israeli government. Consequently, the latter has allowed 
JAFI to function as a complementary authority, often 
unofficially including JAFI resources among those with which 
it may execute its plans. This abnormality, which is 
encouraged by the fragmentation of the Israeli government 
system, transcends that of a unique but questionable case of 
coexistence between state and pre-state governing bodies 
within a shared socio-economic and political system. In the 
paradigm at hand, a predominantly non-Israeli body is 
allowed to play an active role in the internal affairs of 
the state of Israel, functioning as a partner in national 
processes, even though the government of Israel is 
proscribed from intervening in any of its internal 
affairs.48
The Israeli section of JAFI is essentially controlled 
by its international apparatus, with its fragmented 
institutional and political structure. The Israeli system 
consists of several departments under an Executive, as 
illustrated in Diagram 2 (in the appendix). These 
departments, the major executive vehicles for the 
implementation of policies formulated by the Assembly and 
the Board of Governors, are divided by areas of 
responsibility and operate through regional offices. The 
system is therefore highly centralised and policies in 
Israel are directed by international bodies (e.g., the Board
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of Governors and the Assembly). However, it is also subject, 
to processes within Israel's national political system, 
because the basis of the political structure of JAFI and the 
Zionist congress is affiliated with the political party 
structure represented in the Knesset (the Israeli 
parliament). Thus, the management of JAFI functions under a 
dual set of interests - the Israeli system on the one hand, 
and the non-Israeli system on the other hand; these are not 
necessarily similar or coordinated.
As noted, when the Agency operates in areas under the 
overall authority of the government, its activities either 
supplant or augment traditional governmental activities.^  
Examples to the distribution of authorities include the 
following: Permanent housing - Ministry of Housing,
temporary infrastructure of new settlements - JAFI; Primary 
schools (construction of building, teachers' wages, 
curriculum content - Ministry of Education, Teaching 
accessories, library and recreation facilities - JAFI.
The role of JAFI within the national system is notably 
problematic. Difficulties arise when government and JAFI 
operations overlap, and when the two agencies intervene in 
different ways. Indeed, it is often hard distinguish between 
the specific areas of JAFI and government competence. Other 
problems associated with JAFI intervention are byproducts of 
its great fragmentation. These problems arise when specific 
JAFI departments fail to coordinate their operations, 
compete each other, or disregard other departments' possible 
contributions. The absence of coordination has a crucial 
impact on regional systems, which fall under several
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departments' areas of competence.
In all, then, JAFI is a very complicated mechanism, one 
prone to the influence of different, and, at times, 
conflicting interests of the Israeli system, the 
international bodies, and the various political parties of 
which both apparatuses are composed. Not only is the system 
beset by cumbersome administration, but the boundaries of 
its functional arena are not always clear. Thus, its 
activities lend themselves to confusion and misunderstanding 
within JAFI, in government circles, and among the population 
groups at which JAFI intervention is targeted.
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CONCLUSIONS
Among the different characteristics of Western Galil, 
some discussed briefly and others at more length, several 
should be emphasised:
1. Industry as a basis for development.
The industrial production system is subject to the 
dominant role of large private firms, most of which can 
be classified as "high-tech". This is the major source 
of regional job opportunities, and of attraction of 
various complementary services. Although the "parent 
firm-branch" structure of many industrial enterprises 
creates a situation in which capital is not necessarily 
reinvested in Western G a l i l , t h e i r  contribution is 
manifested in its potential attractiveness for 
additional entrepreneurial and complementary services 
(which can take advantage of the economies of scale and 
proximity slowly being created in Western Galil), and 
the attraction of potential immigrants (through jobs 
availability).
The gradual expansion of industrial production 
activities that characterises Western Galil over the 
last 10 years distinguishes this area from other 
peripheral regions (especially those located far away 
from the coastal plain, such as East Galil, south of 
Beer-Sheva), and its effect extends over the entire 
regional social system.
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2. A dual socio-economic system.
Western Galil is marked by social, economic, and 
institutional fragmentation. This applies to both 
Jewish-Arab relations and the different social groups 
of each sector. The vast majority (83%) of the 
population is Arab. This is different from the nation 
as a whole, in which Arabs form 4.5% of the total 
Israeli population.51 However, the Arabs' specific 
quantitative advantage in Western Galil has no 
expression either in public policy concerning Western 
Galil or in their role within regional socio-political
c o
and economic processes. * In fact, the Jewish and Arab 
populations form two different functional systems, 
separate in their economic activities, socio-political 
institutions, and spatial distribution of built-areas. 
Very few points of collision, however, do exist, 
especially in the local labour market and the 
industrial demand for low-skilled labour.
The result of this situation is a highly fragmented and 
inefficient regional system. Fragmentation is further
c o
aggravated by the social structure of each sector. 
This polarised socio-economic structure has a clear 
spatial expression, and is an important potential 
source of social unrest, which, although it has never 
fundamentally surfaced, undoubtedly thwarts regional 
social integrity.
3. Local labour force.
There is abundant low-skill labour concentrated in the 
Arab sectors and Jewish New Towns. In a country were
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wages are to a great extent nationally controlled, and. 
work costs are high, the ability to employ Arab labour, 
which is less protected by the Labour Union, results in 
decreased overall expenses. Thus, although Arabs are 
excluded from some jobs (those with defense security 
limitations), they form an attractive labour stock for 
industries requiring low-skill and relatively low-paid 
labour.
4. Western Galil from the perspective of political 
consensus.
The socio-economic structure of Western Galil is often 
referred to as "the demographic problem of Western 
Galil". This reflects discontent with the quantitative 
size of the Arab population - a socio-political 
minority group that is competing with the Israeli state 
for possession of territory.
In this regard, one can clearly identify an ideological 
consensus between the two large political parties, 
expressed in terms of "national interest" to offset 
this situation and secure a Jewish majority within the 
state's undisputed boundaries. This attitude, however, 
never actually led to public policies that favored 
Western Galil vis-a-vis other peripheries, and aimed to 
cope with the region's unique condition. An explanation 
of the actual attitude is linked to the following:
a. The "demographic problem" is treated by political 
decision-makers (and scholars) as an integral part 
of the the Israeli-Arab conflict. Consequently,
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this issue is externalised from its immediate 
context in Western Galil, and thus justifies no 
particular long-run political initiatives to cope 
with this issue (one exceptional public response 
of the Jewish Agency will be discussed in 
following chapters).
Western Galil is generally a stable system that 
does not attract specific political concern. The 
"Earth Day" of 1986 (as specified in Chapter 6) 
was the only major case of an actual outburst of 
the fundamental historic social conflict between 
the local Arab population and the Jewish state 
institution. It, indeed, should have emphasised 
the need to deal specifically with the 
"demographic problem". However, the fact that this 
violent expression of discrimination feelings in 
the Arab sector lasted only few weeks, and did not 
spread into a county-wide protest movement, 
enabled the Israeli political system to avoid a 
direct confrontation with the problem, and refrain 
from a long-term commitment to the "issue".
Aside from the fact that the "demographic problem" 
gave rise to only one actual expression of social 
unrest, the distance of Western Galil from the 
northern international political borders (Lebanon 
and Syria) contributed to the lack of urgency in 
coping with its extremely inefficient socio­
economic structure.
In practice, Western Galil is separated from Upper 
Galil. Located along the hostile Lebanese border,
the latter is generally considered more crucial to 
"defense" issues. Western Galil is also less 
attractive to public policy in relation to areas 
beyond the "green line".
d. Western Galil may be expected to receive special 
public concern based on its (or parts of the 
region's) status as a "distressed area". However, 
public concern with Jewish "distressed areas" in 
New Towns and "veteran" Moshavs is confined to the 
national level, externalising the specific 
locational context of socio-economic problems.
As for other characteristics of Western Galil, they are 
basically similar to those in other parts of the country. 
The agricultural system is subject to a structural crisis in 
its production units, administrative fragmentation, and a 
high degree of local economic and socio-political dependence 
on the national political and institutional system. All of 
them lead to a situation in which the "regional" level of 
activities hardly exists.
The social structure of Western Galil, together with 
its role in the national political system, has enabled this 
area to be "penetrated" by private productive 
entrepreneurship. On the one hand, the possibility now 
exists for businesses to take advantage of standard 
governmental incentives and abundant low-skill labour, while 
being able to attain large blocks of low-priced land for 
large-scale production plants. And on the other hand, the
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combined effect of new industrial plants and new settlements 
seems to create a process through which some distinct system 
"Western Galil" is being formulated.
As a whole, an analysis of the major characteristics of 
the regional system enables us to state the following
conclusions:
a. Western Galil is competing with Upper Galil and areas 
beyond the "green line"; both the latter are more 
politically "sensitive" with regard to the above- 
mentioned "defense" fallacy. Further, in terms of 
actual allocation of resources, industrial zones beyond 
the "green line" have the advantage (Center of 
Investments, 1989).
b. This area is also competing with the central 
metropolitan areas, the latter being the "heart" of the 
national business and administrative system.
c. The Southern periphery is subject to similar public 
incentives.
This competition takes place under conditions of:
a. National economic uncertainty and fluctuation in public 
policy.
b. Severe accessibility constraints.
c. Fragmentation of the public institutional system.
d. "Polarised" social structure.
e. A labour market that depends heavily on the Haifa 
metropolitan area.
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The results of the above conditions are further 
discussed in Chapter 8, which attempts to describe the major
changes of the past 10 years.
Notes
(1) Source: The Statis tical A bs trac t  of Israel, 1988 (no .39), C en tra l  Bureau  of 
Statistics, Jerusalem.
(2) A bout 200km separate between the centre point of the Galil and that of the 
coun try .  "Centre" - m erely  in physical te rm s, regard less of d is t r ib u t io n  of 
population and such elements.
(3) Yitzhaki, 1988; See bibliography.
(4) Zalmon Bloc is a very small area located east of Segev Bloc.
(5) A perception represented by Mr. Brutzkus and Mr. Sharon.
(6) Source of data: Central Bureau of Statistics, publications for the relevant years 
(see methodological appendix).
(7) From 5.7% per year on average in 1972-1978 to 4.1% in 1984-1987.
(8) Jewish growth - from 9.2% in 1972 to 17.4% in 1987.
(9) Between 1972 and 1987, the Jewish growth rate was 16.4%, but only 4.8% in the
Arab sector.
(10) "Natural increase" - births minus newborn deaths.
(11) Not buying land in the Galil had not been a m atter merely of a shortage of
financial resources, which in any case forced selective acquisition.
(12) A fter  1985, the construction of new settlements in Western Galil drastically 
slowed down, although not totally.
(13) Accounting for 40% of North District and 9% of all new construction country­
wide.
(14) Accounting for 45% of North District and 25% of all new construction country-
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wide.
(15) Accounting for 72% of North District and 21% of country-wide construction.
(16) New settlements were not built up, with few exceptions of Beduin tem porary 
encampments that were turned into perm anent settlements (mainly in Zalmon 
Bloc). This was a result of national relocation policy.
(17) These  se t t le m e n ts  are  s t r u c tu r e d  u p o n  e i th e r  f a m i ly - b a s e  (M oshav)  or 
com m un ity -base  (K ibbu tz )  p roduc tion  units ,  and form  ra th e r  close so c io ­
economic communities.
(18) This approach appear, for example, in publications of the Centre of Settlement 
Research, Rehovot.
(19) According to this defin ition , the vast m ajority  of Israel’s population dwells in 
"urban" localities.
(20) K ib b u tz ,  C o o p e ra t iv e  M oshav , W o rk e rs ’ M oshav  (M oshav  O v d im ) ,  and 
Community Settlement.
(21) Discussion of this complicated aspect, which requires to analyse the entire Israeli 
functional system, is beyond our scope.
(22) Refer to section 5.6 (particularly to the description of government policies).
(23) Sources: refer to the methodological appendix.
(24) The Western Galil industrial system is s tructured around two extremes: a large 
proportion of small plants (an average of 40 employees per plant, with 41% of 
plants employing 10 or fewer than 10 workers) and several (11.9%) relatively 
large firms, employing over 100 workers, of which 27% employ over 400 workers 
ap ie c e ,  and  to g e th e r  a c c o u n t  fo r  68.8% of the  to ta l  r eg io n a l  in d u s t r ia l  
employmen.
(25) "Private" - not owned by either the government or by the Labour Company.
(26) The la t te r ,  owned by the N ational L abour U n ion , had been  a m ajo r  force 
investing in industries located in peripheral areas.
(27) As a generalisation, the small plants tend to be locally owned and managed; 30% 
of the larger plants (over 100 employees) are subsidiaries of parent companies 
located outside the region.
(28) This d iffers  from the Galil as a whole, in which 42% of industries and 40% of 
total employees are "advanced" (Chemanski, 1990, p. 195).
(29) "Advanced" industries includes the following categories of production determined 
by the C.B.S: e lec tron ics  and e lec tr ic i ty ;  chem istry  and  fuel; t ran spo rta tion ;  
m ach inery  and m etal. "Traditional"  consists of: m in ing; food and tobacco 
processing; textile, clothing and leather; carpentry and non-metal minerals; paper 
and printing; plastics.
(30) These account for 60% of the total plants established in this period.
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(31) This does not apply to sophisticated and R&D agriculture discussed above.
(32) Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Publication no.848.
(33) Labour is distinguished as fu ll- t im e  (72%) and pa rt- t im e  (21.5%) workers, and 
the unemployed (6.5%). Although 27.5% of the total employees are women, they 
account for 52% of the pa rt- t im e  employees and only 20.5% of fu ll- t im e  ones. 
Finally, Jewish women have a greater propensity  to work than Arab women: 
Jewish women account for 40% of total Jewish labour and 20.7% of pa rt- tim e  
workers; Arab women account for 17.3% of Arab labour and 4.2% of part-time 
workers.
(34) 73% of the plants in new settlements are small (with 10 or fewer workers); about 
45% of them perform R&D functions.
(35) Local services are allocated according to the M unicipalities Ordinance (1964) and
Local Council Ordinance (1950) - the legal basis of their functioning.
(36) Voluntary services can be provided either to augment the o ther categories of
services, or to widen the range of services locally provided. In practice, they 
serve as an index of the local authority’s affluence and efficiency.
(37) Other areas of in tervention are sanitation, land-use planning and engineering 
supervision, firefighting and security, education recreation and welfare services.
(38) These are a function of local demand for services, and the local tax base (i.e., 
residents’ ability to pay in order to satisfy demand), the caliber of the local 
leadership, and political affiliation of the authority.
(39) T he ir  ex is tence  is ques tionned  in view of the recen t  soc io -econom ic  crisis 
(Gibton, 1986).
(40) Local authority jurisdictions vary according to number of inhabitants, the type of 
cooperative institutions they integrate, and size. The latter is nationally defined, 
and  s t ip u la te d  in m as te r  p lans .  D iscuss ion  o f  the  i n e f f ic ie n c ie s  of  these  
ju r isd ic t io n s  is beyond  the scope of this d isse r ta t ion  (e.g., K ipn is ,  1982). It 
should be noted, however, that there is a m ajor d ifference  between the Jewish 
and A rab  authorities. While the jurisd ic tion  of the latter is largely confined to 
existing bu il t -u p  areas, mostly under private ownership, the Jewish authorities 
are provided with large land reserves for future development.
(41) A++ - highest level of eligibility.
(42) Ostensibly, then, the designation of a region or any other area as a "development 
area" should provide an indication of its state of development relative to other 
parts of the country, and its eligibility for various public incentives.
(43) This was grounded in national goals concerning the spatial development of the 
country (i.e., the decentralisation policy previously mentioned), and was used as a 
means to implement the national priorities stemming from these goals.
(44) The term "green line" applies to the pre-1967 international borders between Israel 
and the Arab nations. Areas beyond the "green line" include the West Bank, Gaza 
Stip and Golan Heights, all captured by Israel during the 1967 Six Days War.
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(45) A ccording to information provided by the Investment Centre, the M inistry of 
Industry and Commerce (May 1990).
(46) Almost every Ministry and public institution is represented by offices and sub­
o ff ices  dealing with d i f fe re n t  issues, ra re ly  coopera ting  w ith  each o ther  or 
sharing nearby locations.
(47) Only a few departments were shut down, their competence transferred  to the 
Government of Israel.
(48) A thorough discussion of the dispute regarding the justifica tion  for JAFI is 
beyond our scope.
(49) Three major factors determine the role of JAFI within the Israeli national socio­
economic and political system: a. The World Zionist Organisation and the Jewish 
Agency For Israel Status Law (1952, amended in 1975) and the Covenant between 
these bodies and the government of Israel. These documents determine the type 
of activities with which JAFI should be concerned, and the nature of cooperation 
and coord ina tion  betw een JA FI and the governm en t. The p r io r i t ie s  and 
political principles of world Jewry, (e.g., restriction of allocations to areas within 
the "green line"), its legal im pera tives  (e.g., tax regu la tions  in the ir  home 
coun tr ies) ,  and o rganisa tional concerns  in those coun tr ies  (some resources 
marshaled on Israel’s behalf are allocated to local Jewish communities). These 
p r inc ip les  are linked  to the po lit ica l  s t ru c tu re  of the  Jew ish  o rganisa tions  
represented in the JAFI, and their at times different interpretations c  ^ Relations 
between the international system and the Israeli section of JAFIspecifically, the 
extent of the latitude given the Israeli sections and Departments.
(50) Available data do not enable us to estimate patterns of capital investments. This 
argument is based on information provided by Mr. A. Eitan, the Treasury.
(51) This rate is relevant for 1987 - the pre-Russian migration.
(52) In fac t ,  as a na tiona l m inority  group  with h ighly  p rob lem atic  po lit ica l  and 
economic roles (linked to the Israeli-Arab conflict in the Middle East), the Arab 
sector is excluded from major social, political, and economic processes, which are 
predominantly geared toward satisfaction of the Jewish sector’s interests, needs, 
and ideologies.
With this in mind, it should be noted that the specific ethnic groups within the 
Arab sector often exclude themselves from the "mainstream" Jewish state, in their 
attempt to maintain their socio-cultural and political identity.
(53) Although not different from other parts of the country.
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Chapter 6:
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Introduction
Since the establishment of Israel, Galil has been, as 
noted, the object of various public initiatives aimed at 
increasing its Jewish population (both in absolute terms and 
as a proportion of the national population), expanding its 
settlement system, and developing its economy (with an 
emphasis on production activities). Marked changes have 
indeed occurred in the spatial-functional structure of Galil 
and Western Galil (especially in settlements' direct 
functional environment). Some of these changes can be 
connected with various planning initiatives that were 
designed to meet the above objectives and other goals 
discussed below.
Generally speaking, the planning process in the Galil 
was stimulated largely by the search for ways to attain a 
Jewish majority and distribute Jewish settlements' 
functional units (e.g., industrial parks) among the entire 
area. This official conceptual attitude toward desired 
changes in Galil and the national redistribution of social 
and economic components was basically accorded by planners 
and scholars. Thus, planning initiatives, mostly carried out 
by public bodies that play an active role in Galil's 
processes (e.g., the Ministry of Interior), are consistently 
guided by similar objectives and proposals for their 
attainment.1 The important plans reflecting the planning
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thought of the 1970s are:
a. National Master Plan for the Distribution of Israeli 
Population of 7 Million. By: Ministry of Interior; 
Published in 1985; Target year: 2010. Boundaries of 
plan: North District.
b. Accelerated Urban Development in the Galil. By:
Ministry of Housing; Published in 197 6; Target year: 
1992. Boundaries of plan: North District, excluding 
areas south of Yzreel Valley.
c. The Galil - A Proposed Planning Framework. By: Israel 
Land Authority; Published in 1976; Target year: 1992. 
Boundaries of plan: Central Galil and the northern 
coastal plain.
d. Industrial Distribution Plan for the Galil. By:
Industrial Building Company Ltd.; Published in 1976; 
Target year: 1992. Boundaries of plan: North District.
An analysis of the plans suggests that they are based 
largely on similar principles:
a. They are initiated under the "umbrella" of the national
policy for decentralising population toward the
peripheral areas. This implies acceptance of the 
ideology regarding the undesirability of the prevailing 
national population distribution, and the perception 
that attraction of population to the Galil (in our 
case) should be done on account of the central regions.
b. All the plans have clear physical expressions. In fact, 
there is a tendency to emphasise physical solutions 
(i.e., land use structure) when recommendations are
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operationally expressed.
c. The plans deal with issues exceeding the authority of 
the specific organisation initiating the plan, though 
in some cases it is stated by the planners that 
policies of other ministries had been integrated into 
the specific plan. This tendency on the part of 
planners to extend interest to issues that are not 
under their direct responsibility represents an attempt 
to gain some sort of "holistic" (or "comprehensive") 
perspective on the regional processes. Nevertheless, 
the applicability of this perspective is problematic, 
especially in light of the actual minimal coordination 
between ministries or their specific functional units, 
such as their planning sections (refer to chapter 5).
d. Expected regional population growth is geared toward 
urban centres, several of which, though this varies 
between the different plans, are identified for 
intensive growth. In most cases Jewish migrants serve 
as the major means of attaining the plan's target 
population growth, a lthough the sources of migration 
are not discussed.
e. Major emphasis is placed on the development of non­
local industrial activities (i.e., those not attached 
to specific settlements, either in their location or 
ownership and management conditions). These are seen as 
an alternative to the traditional agricultural base of 
settlements or to the small-scale industries in New 
Towns and small settlements. Indeed, all plans are 
concerned with the designation of regional industrial 
parks.
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f. An important characteristic of these plans is their-
disregard of economic issues and policies; national
monetary policies are not directly integrated into 
plans, and the financial implications of plans are 
largely ignored.
g. As for Jewish-Arab relations, all the plans aim
predominantly at the Jewish sector. None of the plans
are structured with the Arab sector as their central 
concern. Yet, there is a general agreement that 
cooperation between sectors should be encouraged in 
areas of land use distribution, employment, and some 
public services. In other issues, such as housing 
opportunities, the prevailing spatial and functional 
separation between sectors is maintained in all the 
plans. Moreover, the plans are distinguished by a lack 
of direct and clear references to the Arab sector, 
resulting in a situation in which the potential impact 
of changes in the Jewish sector on the Arab system is 
at most only implicitly raised, if at all.
These plans and others are widely discussed in the 
literature. Some studies (e.g., Vildavski, Law-Yone, and 
Meir-Brodnitz, 1988) conduct a comparative analysis among 
plans, examining their specific objectives, the extent to 
which they affected the regional system, and the nature of 
their impact at the point of occurrence. Other studies adopt 
a "goal-achievement" approach, comparing individual plans 
with actual and measurable changes in the planning areas 
(Sofer and Finkel, 1988). In all, although the various plans 
emphasise different physical planning areas and vary in 
their selection of issues and their concrete
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recommendations, it is interesting to note that most of 
their goals and regional development perspectives have much 
in common. As for implementation of the plans and their 
effectiveness, some were partially implemented (with one 
exception, an Industrial Distribution Plan sketched after 
most industrial parks had been officially designated and 
some even constructed), whereas others never progressed past 
the document stage.
Among the public bodies at work in this area, the 
experience of the Jewish Agency Rural Settlement Department 
(Henceforth: RSD) is especially relevant to our concern with 
the role of planning in various regional processes. The 
choice to analyse the issue of regional planning with regard 
to the experience of the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) was 
motivated by several considerations spelled out above 
(Chapter 1). The most important of them are:
a. An identifiable trend of thought that developed over 
several years of actual involvement by planners in some 
actions taken by public organisations with reference to 
the Galil in general and Western Galil in particular. 
Several of these actions can be credited to planning 
initiatives.
b. Unlike most other plans, which concerned themselves 
with only one point in time (with the exception of the 
Ministry of Interior's population redistribution 
plans), the combined effect of JAFI's plans and actions 
point at a long-term and, therefore, research-worthy 
concern with the Galil and its development process.
It will be argued that this combined effect gave JAFI a
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leading role in the determination of structural processes in 
the Galil, and in the shaping of intervention throughout the 
entire governmental system. Thus, the present chapter 
describes the RSD's planning perspective regarding the 
nature of regional development processes, and its evolution 
over time. Issues related to the application of this 
perspective are discussed in subsequent chapters.
The Development of Planning Thought at JAFI
JAFI planning doctrine between the early 1970s and the 
mid-1980s evolved from a perception of a regional system 
that is a fairly homogeneous functional unit, composed of 
small groups of rural-agricultural settlements, to a 
perspective of a region as much more diverse, complicated, 
and larger-scale system. Previously, individual settlements 
had been treated as fairly independent and self-sufficient 
systems, the specific components of which (i.e., the 
settlement apparatus and its settlers) had been the center 
of concern. The revised perception was addressed to a wider 
range of functional units, the interrelations of which form 
the essence of the regional functional system. For example, 
this shift manifested itself saliently in the Segev area (in 
Western Galil), which previously had been regarded as 
structured of clusters of "industrial villages", but in 
recent years came to be seen within the context of the 
Region 2000 idea. Importantly, this change in planning 
perception evolved amidst the actual implementation of 
several planning initiatives and attempts to modify them in
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accordance with changing circumstances in Western Galil, as 
discussed in detail below.
The revised planning perception originated in the 
search for "a different settlement structure" (RSD, 1974) 
that might offer an appropriate vehicle for Galil settlement 
under conditions of scarce agricultural means of production 
and harsh physical terrain. This initiative sought to 
provide an alternative to existing settlements in peripheral 
areas, which were traditionally based solely on agricultural 
production factors. It became a matter of concern in view of 
the stagnation of Jewish population growth in the early 
1970s (especially in comparison with the rapid development 
of the Arab settlement system of Galil). This RSD 
initiative, taken with the cooperation of other public 
agencies, led to the "industrial village" proposal. The 
industrial village was defined as "a small rural settlement 
whose settlers work in an economic system not dependent on 
agriculture, live within closely knit communities, and 
belong to production and consumption cooperatives" (RSD, 
1974). In fact, the "industrial village" concept suggests 
the abandonment of the hitherto obvious "rural = 
agriculture" equation traditionally applied in Israel and 
accepted as the very essence of "settlement" in Zionist 
ideology (Cohen, 1980; Hill, 1981). For the first time since 
the establishment of the state, JAFI was about to deal with 
settlements in which agricultural means of production would 
not constitute the sole source of livelihood, and "industry" 
would not be considered inappropriate for small peripheral 
settlements. Consequently, although the other elements in 
the traditional picture were not changed, the new interest
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stimulated far more important changes in the RSD perspective 
of regions: The new settlements, like the old, would be 
organised as cooperatives, contain their own sources of 
livelihood, and their establishment would entail securing 
their economic base. Nevertheless, since it was necessary to 
cope with the problems arising from the diversification of 
the economic base of these small settlements ("the nature of 
the industrial production system requires larger scales of 
labour and services" [RSD, 1974, p.2]), planners concluded 
that the new settlements should be clustered in order to 
permit economies of scale and proximity.
From an historical perspective, the "industrial 
village" concept offered new possibilities of Jewish 
settlement in areas previously thought to be "off-limits" 
because of the lack of agricultural development 
opportunities. In Western Galil, this proscription had led 
to the concentration of the sparse Jewish population in a 
handful of New Towns and small collective settlements, 
leaving most of the region devoid of Jews. As noted by 
planners, "industrial villages permit the settlement of 
areas... where the veteran settlements failed" (RSD, 1974, 
p.l). Importantly, however, "the role of the industrial 
village does not replace that of the New Towns" (Op.Cit., p. 
1) because the latter, small, urban settlements, would offer 
various types of jobs not necessarily available in the new 
settlements. In other words, the condition for abandoming 
the traditional individual oriented perspective had been 
established, and a shift of interest toward the extended 
regional-functional environment of settlements gradually 
evolved.
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6.1 Segev Development Plans
Once the basic idea of the "industrial village" had 
matured, planners began to apply it to the regional system 
of Galil. The 1974 proposal for the development of the 
"Mountainous Galil" suggested that most population growth 
should concentrate in the New Towns. The "industrial 
villages" would contribute to the general effort by 
maximising the spatial distribution of the Jewish population 
in Galil. This task was to be accomplished by locating 
"industrial villages" in the unpopulated (by Jews) parts of 
the Galil. With these goals in mind, the 1976 Segev plan was 
an initial attempt to apply these principles within a 
regional context. Its major objective plan was "to provide a 
solution for the settling of areas with sparse (Jewish) 
population, through the application of the industrial 
village idea" (RSD, 1980). A secondary objective had to do 
with contributing to the national goal of population 
dispersion and peripheral development. Finally, the plan 
specified the number of settlements and the expected 
population of each.
The Segev plan is part of a wider Galil perspective 
that sets aside three areas for "intensive Jewish 
settlements": the Segev, Tefen, and Zalmon blocs (see map 2) 
(RSD, 1976). Within each of the new clusters, 15 sites 
suitable for settlements of the "industrial village" type 
are pinpointed, with their planned development based on the 
following four principles:^
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a. Size of clusters: A threshold of 1,000 families in each 
block is determined to be a prerequisite for the 
provision of high-quality community services.
b. Spatial structure of clusters: Each bloc is to have one
industrial zone and one service centre, both located
outside settlements. The resulting efficiency in 
utilisation of space, coupled with economies of 
proximity potential, will spur industrial development.
c. Functional structure of clusters: The plans encourage
the concentration of most expected industrial
activities in the central zone (rather than in the 
individual settlements). This is meant to force the 
small settlements to cooperate, provide sufficient job 
opportunities for persons with different occupations 
and skills, and establish an efficient functional 
system by creating conditions conducive to economies of 
scale.
d. Structure of individual units: Settlements should be 
organised along the basic principles of the cooperative 
"industrial village".
Specifically, the Segev plan is composed of two
elements:
a. Specification of required changes in terms of:
* Population and labour force projection (based on a 
total of about 8,000 inhabitants by 1985).
* Recommended types of services to be made available 
in the bloc's service centre.
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* Distribution of land uses in the intra-settlement 
industrial zone, and determination of criteria for 
the selection of types of industrial plants to be 
located in this zone.
* Electricity, water, and telephone demand 
projections, including spatial distribution of 
facilities (e.g., a local telephone exchange units).
* Distribution of land use in recreation areas.
* Designation and general outlining of roads to be 
built.
* Preparation of specifications for architectural 
plans (e.g., size of houses).
b. Stages of development:
* Short term - construction of three settlements (50 
dwelling units) and initial selection of settler 
candidates.
* Long term - implementation of the rest of the plan.
The 1976 plan was initiated by the Planning Section of 
the RSD North Region office. The timing of its publication 
lent it an immediate relevance; it came out during a period 
of socio-political unrest, manifested by a drastic change in 
the Galil Arab population's political awareness of its role 
in the national political system and its status in the 
functional system of this region. The watershed in Arab- 
Jewish relations was crossed on what later became to be 
known as the “Earth Day" (March 30th, 1976),^ when the Arab 
sector in the north of the country declared a general strike
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following the expropriation of privately owned land .in. 
Beit-Hakerem Valley (near Karmiel) and near Nazareth for 
reallocation to Jewish towns. The concrete event initiating 
the strike had been the destruction of illegal housing 
construction along the Akko-Karmiel road. The strike, and 
the rioting that erupted in its wake, brought three issues 
to the fore: the spatial distribution of land ownership in 
the Galil, the relative size of Arab population (i.e., the 
"demographic problem"), and anti-Arab discrimination. Only 
the first two issues were subject to public debate).
The official government response was rather moderate: 
it acted to contain the riots and declared a moratorium on 
land expropriation. The RSD took a different attitude 
altogether, construing the riots as "an impetus for the 
implementation of the 1976 plans as a way to demonstrate the 
presence of Jews in the Galil".4 In practice, however, 
implementation of these plans required copious preparations, 
most of which entailed the reduction of the prevailing land 
use plan into practical increments (such as engineering 
planning of infrastructure, and architectural housing 
plans). The first problem to resolve in the course of this 
activity was that of land ownership. Since the land of Galil 
is a mosaic of Arab privately and Jewish publicly owned 
plots and parcels, and since the construction of settlements 
required the accumulation of land reserves in public hands,^ 
the authorities (led by the RSD) had to purchase land from 
Arab owners, or compensate them with plots in other 
locations, before they could take any other action regarding 
the new settlements. Although settlement sites were
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initially determined in areas where fairly large blocks .of. 
public land were available, most of these sites were riven 
by privately Arab-owned plots. Land transactions, therefore, 
commanded major attention for more than a year. The process 
was exceedingly complicated and time-consuming; land 
registration documents and procedures from the pre-state 
periods had to be tracked and owners had to be found. Some 
of the latter, it transpired, had either died or left the 
country. As a result of this process, the RSD was able to 
map most of the land of Western Galil by its ownership 
status, thus providing an estimate of the area's potential 
to absorb new settlements.
In the course of this work, however, a major conceptual 
change in settlement doctrine had taken place. Instead of 
stressing new Jewish settlements' functional structures 
(i.e., "industrial village" vs. traditional cooperatives), 
their spatial distribution was now viewed as the issue of 
greatest importance. The new Jewish settlements were now 
regarded as means not only to populate areas with limited 
agricultural potential, but also "to populate areas with 
political strategic importance"(Sofer and Finkel, 1988). 
This new conceptual approach, coupled with the newly 
acquired information about the distribution of land 
ownership, manifested itself in a "Proposal for Regional 
Comprehensive Development in Western Galil" (1978), 
formulated by the Planning Section of the RSD North Region 
office in Haifa on the basis of the development perspective 
of the 1976 plan.
The 1978 plan aimed to bolster the Jewish presence in
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Galil by means of establishing new small settlements (not. 
agriculturally based), strictly segregated from Arab 
settlements. In deference to the latter principle, for 
example, one physically suitable site was rejected because 
of its proximity to Sachnin.^ In view of these aims, the 
essence of the 1978 plan is a detailed mapping of existing 
and proposed land uses in Western Galil (e.g., settlements, 
recreation sites, inter- and intra-settlement industrial 
zones, and nature reserves), coupled with detailed mapping 
and quantification of existing infrastructure (roads, 
telephone exchange units, water systems, and electricity 
lines) and an estimate of their potential capacity. The plan 
includes the actions needed for implementation, ranked in 
order of timing:
a. Obtaining the Department's (i.e., RSD) approval of the 
plan.
b. Securing Jewish presence in the land not immediatly 
utilised for settlements by means such as fencing and 
afforestation.
c. Determination of the settlement structure suited to 
this area.
d. Water and sewage planning.
e. Completion of the development plan.
f. Preparation of detailed plans.
Once the existing distribution of land uses was mapped 
and the areas sorted by ownership status, the immediate 
consequence was a decision by the head of the RSD (Mr. R. 
Weitz) to initiate the "Mitzpim project", which called for 
the rapid construction of some 30 "mitzpim" (see Chap. 5).
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As previously suggested, the essence of the "mitzpim" 
concept is the safeguarding of future opportunities to 
establish settlements on the foundation of the "mitzpim". 
The ideology underlying this practice is firmly rooted in 
Israeli history, which treats the "creation of facts" as a 
prerequisite for the handling of territorial issues (Akzin 
and Dror, 1966; Hill, 1980). The "mitzpim" project was based 
on one major component of the 1976 and 1978 plans: widening 
the spatial distribution of Jewish settlements and 
penetrating unpopulated areas. In this context, settlements 
were regarded as a means of consolidating the Jewish 
presence in Galil and attaining state control of nearly all 
its land.
The project was executed on the basis of several maps 
marked with the potential sites for new settlements. These 
maps rely on information provided in the 1976 and 1978 plans 
and include additional sites identified during the 
preparation of the latter plan (most of which were rejected 
by planners as inadequate for settlements). Never, however, 
was there one plan, a single coherent set of principles, or 
a unified list of the settlements to be incorporated into 
the project. Similarly, the project's objectives were never 
officially articulated in the form of a cohesive list. 
Rather, they were phrased and revealed by different 
political decision-makers and planners only on request 
(i.e., for research purposes, government resolutions, 
newspapers). These objectives, apart from the dispersion of 
Jewish population throughout the Galil, may be expressed as 
follows (Sofer and Finkel, 1988):
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a. To secure state control of national land in areas, 
sparsely populated by Jews.
b. To rearrange the government's priorities - drawing 
attention to the Galil and creating alternative 
settlement opportunities to those over the "green 
line".
c. To attract Jews to Galil and encourage young members of
o
existing settlements to stay in Galil.
d. To create opportunities for the consolidation of new 
settlement structures.
In practice, the settlement process spurred by the 
"mitzpim" project took place in 1979-1982, during which time 
over 30 new sites were equipped with the basic accessories 
for permanent settlements. Of these, 27 sites were located 
in Western Galil, and were added to the area's four existing 
Jewish settlements (one was dismantled after a short time), 
as specified in Table 4 (appendix). Although some of the 
above sites had been planned previously (especially in 1976 
and 1978 plans), they may be identified as one bloc because 
all were similar with respect to structure and course of 
action. Importantly, the decision to establish the "mitzpim" 
inaugurated an exceptional experience. The Jewish Agency RSD 
set the stage for a new settlement process in the Galil, to 
which the entire governmental system was attracted at 
subseguent stages. While JAFI established the actual 
existence of new settlements (by means previously 
specified), the governmental system was called on to take 
responsibility for these settlements and to further their 
development, although it had neither planned nor intended to
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start such a process (as discussed below). For example,, 
while temporary housing was provided by JAFI, assistance in 
the construction of permanent housing was provided by the 
Ministry of Housing in accordance with its standard policy 
in "development areas" (see Chap. 5). Nevertheless, some 
government agencies were incorporated into the process from 
the start; examples are the Ministries of Interior, 
Communication, and Education. This is discussed further in 
Chapter 8.
In all, the "mitzpim" project may be viewed as a 
partial accomplishment of the 1976 and 1978 development 
plans, satisfying the objective of securing state ownership 
of land and respecting their proposed spatial distribution 
of settlements and economic activities, though disregarding 
many other aspects of regional development. Indeed, in the 
first years of the project (1979-1981), the RSD had to 
pledge most of its human and capital resources to the mass 
construction of settlements. Once the settlements' existence 
was no longer in doubt, however, the planners shifted their 
concern to the issue of the settlements' future development 
(economic base, social structure, community services, etc.). 
The major question at this stage had to do with the 
settlements' ability to function as independent socio­
economic entities, and hence to grow. This question had 
important implications in every aspect of community life. 
For example, the settlements were struggling to consolidate 
their productive systems, seeking industries suited to 
conditions of resource scarcity, limited labour potential, 
as well as the intrinsic difficulties caused by their
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location (i.e., distance from major national business, 
areas), and lack of an adequate communication and highway 
infrastructure. The attraction of new settlers, too, was 
constrained by the settlements' strong dependence on JAFI, 
which practiced a selective candidate-acceptance policy.
As time passed, planners were increasingly preoccupied 
with the modification of plans in view of changes that 
occurred as the settlements developed. These modifications 
found their expression in the Segev Regional Development 
Plan 1983-1992 (Buzi, 1983), which reflected the following 
changes:
a. A shift from the "industrial village" as the dominant 
settlement form to a diversity of forms (Kibbutz, 
Cooperative Moshav, Community Settlement).
b. A shift from the idea of functional settlement clusters 
to the establishment of a regional council (e.g., 
Misgav) as the functional organisation embracing new 
and existing settlements (i.e., cooperation in 
municipal and other public services between a larger 
number of settlements than in the "clusters" idea).
c. Concentration on means of production within settlements 
rather than in the regional industrial zone (even 
though the latter paradigm is not abandoned).
d. Acknowledgment of the inability of the local economic 
system to provide sufficient job opportunities. 
Accordingly, the principle of economic self-sufficiency 
of each settlement was abandoned; commuting to jobs 
outside the area was permitted.
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The 1983 plan is the most coherent document expressing, 
these modifications. However, it continued to view the 
individual settler and the individual settlement as the 
basic objects of concern, refraining from any attempt to 
regard them as components of a wider functional environment 
within which solutions to prevailing problems might be 
found. As such, it is merely a detailed land use plan that, 
while articulating the spatial aspects of conditions in the 
new settlement area, undermines these settlements' future 
prospects and interlinkages. In fact, problems related to 
the future development of settlements had been accumulating 
for some time, and the need for a change in planning 
perspective regarding the settlements' development (i.e., a 
reconsideration of the conventional JAFI emphasis on the 
individual settler) was perceived. It was at this stage, 
then, that the introduction of the "Region 2000" idea to RSD 
planers seemed to provide some "light at the end of the 
tunnel".
6.2 Region 2000 Development Strategy
Q
The history of Region 2000 goes back to 1978, when the 
Minister of Industry and Trade (Mr. Y. Horovitz) appointed a 
committee "to promote the establishment of a science-based 
industrial town in the Galil",1  ^ its major task defined as 
"the exploration of opportunities for the development of 
such a town as a means to increase the Jewish population of 
Galil".11
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This professional committee, chaired by Prof. Efraim 
Katzir, the fourth President of Israel (henceforth: the 
Katzir Committee), initially concerned itself with the 
development of Karmiel as a way of stimulating development 
in the Galil. However, aware of the specific characteristics 
of this region, especially its peripheral role within the 
national economic-political system, the committee sought to 
treat the functional hinterland of Karmiel as the 
appropriate environment for attaining this goal. 
Accordingly, the committee's task was redefined: "to develop 
a region in which man will draw upon the limitless 
possibilities generated by post industrial technology in 
order to shape a better world ... in Galil and Israel" 
(Katzir Committee, undated, p. 2). The essence of the idea 
was "the integration of advanced technology and a society 
shaped by the highest ethical and moral values of Jewish 
heritage" (op. cit., p. 2). Indeed, the Region 2000 idea, 
credited to Prof. Efraim Katzir, initially focused on the 
content of socio-economic activities, whose aggregate 
performance would express the "best" qualities of modern 
life or those characteristics thought of as most desirable 
in the 21st century. This performance, in the context of one 
specific regional system, comprises the Region 2000 idea. 
Accordingly, its cardinal principle is the combination of 
certain types of activities, whereby the physical context of 
these activities is perceived as a framework within which 
the combined activities may be developed and managed.
The expectations for the desired socio-economic system 
were construed in terms of the following changes:
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The development of science-based industry supported by 
R&D activities and the application of modern 
technologies. These types of production activities were 
deemed desirable because of their potential impact on 
the regional system, namely, their attractiveness to 
professionally skilled immigrants and their potential 
liaison function vis-^-vis institutions of higher 
education and research. This kind of development was 
also regarded as an important potential contributor to 
the national export base and an important source of 
highly qualified job opportunities. In other words, it 
seems the committee had in mind a "Silicon Valley" type
of regional development.^
The attainment of a high quality of life, in which the 
integration of modern technologies manifests itself in 
reforms such as broader individual opportunities to 
choose working and study patterns (e.g., work at home); 
greater leisure time and the ability to take advantage 
of it; and an intensification of social and community 
life. These reforms were especially sought as an 
alternative to the social alienation processes that 
characterise modern industrial communities. 
Encouragement of private sector investments in the 
various components of the regional system productive 
activities (industry and complementary services), 
housing, and socio-cultural services. Prof. Katzir's 
use of the term "private sector" clearly refers to both 
Israeli and non-Israeli entrepreneurs, thus investing 
Region 2000 with an element of "international" 
interest. Importantly, emphasis on the important role
of the private sector in the development process sets 
Region 2000 apart from most previous initiatives to 
develop Galil.
As described thus far, the Region 2000 concept is 
applicable to any regional context. Once applied to the 
specific regional context of the Galil (specifically, 
Western Galil), the idea was associated with this region 
above all others, because the development process of Western 
Galil had been the major concern of the Katzir Committee and 
the official reason for its appointment. Over the time, 
however, the concept of "Region 2000" became a synonym for 
an idealisation of regional processes, especially regional 
development. Accordingly, some politicians (and 
administrators) applied the term not only to Galil but also 
to the Negev region. Both of these areas, to be sure, are 
physical and functional peripheries that seemed to justify 
public intervention.
The Katzir Committee discharged its official duty in 
1982 by presenting the Minister of Industry and Trade with 
its conclusions and recommendations. Simultaneously, 
however, it took two major initiatives aimed at ensuring the 
fulfillment of Region 2000 and the recommendations. This 
was, in a sense, a way to ensure the committee's involvement 
in future Region 2000 processes:
a. The establishment of "Fellowship 2000" (1983), a non­
profit company to which most members of the Katzir 
Committee belonged. Its tasks were defined as taking
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"action for the establishment of Region 2000"15 and 
"leadership of Region 2000M.1^
b. Appointment of a planning group, which "should be able 
to tell us what do we want to do in the designated 
region".15 The fellowship was supposed to provide a 
basis for the management of the planning processes.
Seeking support for these initiatives, the Katzir 
Committee and Fellowship 2000 approached JAFI for a 
financial allocation. In 1982-1983, the chairman of the 
JAFI Executive indeed proffered this assistance.16 At that 
time, however, JAFI evinced no further concern in the 
project. It was not until the planning function was 
established (i.e., a contract with the Lichfield and IDC 
planning group - L&IDC),17 and some output of the planning 
work was available, that an interest in Region 2000 evolved 
in the JAFI. Specifically, it was the first draft of the 
Region 2000 development strategy that motivated the vice 
director of the RSD Planning Authority, along with the 
corporation of the Planning Section of the North Region 
Office, to propose an alternative development strategy for 
Region 2000, as discussed below.
The RSD was motivated to take part in the Region 2000
planning process in view of its perceived implications for
the development of Western Galil, which became relevant
during the period of RSD planners' increased concern with
the above-mentioned stagnation in new settlement
development, as well as on the basis of the strategy's
i ftcriticised content. ° As noted, the Region 2000 concept
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marked a new trend of thought in the attempts to develop the 
settlement system in Western Galil. It offered the RSD 
planners a more relevant framework of concern with Western 
Galil, and provided a new conceptual basis for promoting the 
development of productive activities. Therefore, once the 
initial draft of a proposed regional development strategy 
had been presented by the L&IDC group, its content, and the 
criticism it attracted, legitimised the formulation of an 
alternative strategy by RSD. Notably, the timing of the 
presentation of the proposed strategy was important. The 
intensive process of constructing and populating new 
settlements was over; this was the right time for the RSD 
planners to consider settlements’ future development.
On the whole, the Region 2000 concept presented the 
development of Western Galil with an immediate challenge; 
the criticism surrounding the initial Region 2000 strategy 
provided RSD with legitimate reasons for active 
participation in the project, although initially it was not 
assigned by the Katzir Committee with any planning role. 
Indeed, two agencies, L&IDC and the RSD planning groups, 
presented Fellowship 2000 with two strategic proposals in 
March 1985.*^ Consequently, the Fellowship asked JAFI that 
"the planning section of the RSD's North Region Office 
(Haifa) ... will begin formulating the more detailed plan of 
Region 2000".^°
Specifically, the RSD development strategy contained 
the following objectives (Gilat and Duchan, 1985, p. 4):
a. The Katzir Committee objectives:
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* To attract 100,000 Jews to the area by the year 
2000.
* To promote industrial development that would 
generate exports in excess of $1 billion by the year 
2000.
b. Operational objectives:
* To provide the planning group with the legitimacy it 
needed to function within the project.
* To establish an initial conceptual framework 
regarding the improvement of the relative status of 
Region 2000 in the national political system, and 
create irreversible facts.
The essence of this strategic perspective was an 
attempt to establish a breakthrough from the conventional 
Israeli regional development approach (including that of 
JAFI), in which attempts to achieve comprehensiveness 
frustrated the implementation of regional strategies (as 
further discussed below). Indeed, the RSD strategy was based 
on the principle of selectivity. Only a few elements of the 
regional system were chosen as the objects of intervention, 
while assuming that such interventions would give rise to 
many other changes, possibly in the desired direction. An 
additional principle underlying the strategy was related to 
its execution: In view of the "mitzpim" experience and the 
development processes that followed it, the RSD planning 
team considered repeating the initial investments approach, 
in which RSD activities would "leverage" the involvement of 
the entire governmental system in the project.
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This strategy was regarded as a necessary continuation 
of the regional processes undertaken since the mid-1970s, 
which had not yielded the desired scale of change. However, 
unlike previous attempts to treat separately the different 
functional subunits of Western Galil (i.e., the "collective 
settlements", New Towns, and the Arab sector), the Region 
2000 development strategy assumes that the essence of any 
attempt to initiate changes lies in the integration of the 
various functional subunits. This was indeed a difficult 
task, since the "region" at hand did not exist as a 
functional system. Moreover, Israel's entire state system 
lacks this intermediate functional level (i.e., that between 
local functional units and the central government). In 
fashioning this potential system, then, the strategy 
stressed the relationship of Region 2000 with other regions 
and placed special emphasis on the role of Region 2000 in 
the national system. The latter role, in fact, was treated 
as crucial in view of the country's centralised political, 
economic, and administrative processes. Accordingly, any 
recommendation was judged by its impact on the role of the 
regional system within the national functional system.
Finally, the strategy concurred with the Katzir 
Committee in assigning the private sector a crucial role in 
the development process. In view of experience with private 
entrepreneurs in the Galil, a restructuring of the 
prevailing relationship between the public and private 
sectors was proposed. The public sector was to invest in 
components of the regional system that were not likely to 
attract private investments; in so doing, it was to create
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suitable conditions for the attraction of private 
investments to other regional activities. Public sector 
investment in roadbuilding, for example, was proposed as a 
means of improving regional access, and thereby furthering 
the economic viability and "investability" of ventures 
dependent on physical connections with other parts of the 
country.
In sum, public intervention would be channeled into 
four key components of the regional system, defined as "key 
factors of development" (Gilat and Duchan, 1984): the 
industrial system, infrastructure, education, and regional 
administration. This choice was guided by the following 
criteria:
* Concern with processes identified as important mainly for 
their potential "chain reaction impact" on other 
components.
* "Public goods" - regional components in which individual 
functional units (i.e., entrepreneurs, local authorities) 
were not likely to invest, but whose improvement would 
benefit the entire system.
* Areas in which there was no need to reform the entire 
state system, thus permitting existing units to continue 
functioning.
* Aspects of the regional system in which reform might 
prove attractive to the private sector.
In addition to these principles, the strategy
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emphasised several major characteristics of the regional.
development process:
* A perception of Region 2000 as the hinterland of the 
country's major coastal metropolitan areas (mainly Tel- 
Aviv). This explains the cardinal importance of 
establishing linkages with these areas.
* Initial emphasis on development in the centre of the 
region, along the "north-south axis", leaving the rest of 
the region to be affected as the development processes 
become consolidated.
* A strong regional administrative system, developed in 
several stages and embracing all Jewish authorities, is 
viewed as essential for securing long-term future 
changes. The strategy espoused no particular doctrine 
with respect to the Arab sector.
* Because of the prevailing fragmented regional political- 
administrative system and its role in the national 
political system, JAFI is designated as the major vehicle 
for the allocation of initial investments, thus forcing 
the government to enter the project at a later stage. In 
practice, the RSD was expected to function as a 
"development authority".
* Consolidation of long-term changes should integrate 
proposed projects for short-term implementation.
* Political decision-making processes are suggested as the 
grounds for implementation of the strategy.
After defining the four key regional components of
development and the principles guiding the future nature of
"Region 2000", most of the planning work focused on further
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elaboration of the strategy and its specific details. The 
important task was to identify concrete elements within 
these fairly broad components of the regional system, which 
were assumed to create a basis for the initiation of change 
(e.g., the telephone-based network, the Segev-Haifa highway, 
and high schools), and formulate detailed plans for 
implementing the strategic perspective. At this stage it 
became necessary to subcontract with specialists in 
communication networks, industrial development, education, 
and public administration. Thus, the planners devoted their 
time to a search for competent professionals and
articulating the demands to be presented to them. Because 
these professionals had to be paid from the RSD's budget, 
however, it was necessary to modify the strategy in three 
respects:
a. Additional attention to processes within JAFI-sponsored
O 1
settlements. This contradicts the principle planning 
attempt to promote the "regional'' entity and
concentrate only on the key regional components.
b. Abandonment of the idea to permit the expansion of 
JAFI-sponsored settlements beyond the size initially 
planned by the RSD (i.e., to enable some settlements to 
reach the size of 1,000 families rather than their 
planned 200 families, on average). This had been 
considered as a way to generate immediate absorption 
potential (which is theoretically possible in these 
settlements) without massive investments in 
infrastructure.
c. Abandonment of the idea to promote several short-term
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projects as a way to bring about an initial 
consolidation of the project's functional system and 
enhance awareness of Region 2000 among local 
authorities and inhabitants.
These modifications were forced on planners by the 
director of the RSD North Region office who controlled 
available funds for Region 2000; the director justified the 
changes as "being in accordance with RSD intervention 
principles". The incorporation of these modifications, 
however, inaugurated a process in which every Region 2000 
action that required official RSD approval imposed various 
constraints on the planning function and the project as a 
whole, as discussed in the following sections of this 
dissertation.
In all, the strategic principles were expressed in the 
development strategy document presented to Fellowship 2000, 
a document that was regarded as the initial output of the 
planning work. Once it was approved by the Fellowship, 
further actions were initiated, as discussed in the 
following chapter.
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Conclusions
This chapter presented two basic "blocs" of planning 
thought, as manifested in several plans:
a. The "settlement plans".
Several attempts were made to establish a "new" socio­
economic subsystem in an "empty" part of Western Galil. 
This system was designed to be relatively self- 
sufficient; collective and small settlements were 
chosen to make up the proposed subsystem in a manner 
best suited to the conditions prevailing in Western 
Galil.
Over time, attempts to implement this "grand idea" led 
to growing concern with the minutiae of the 
settlements' internal structures and an increasing 
disregard of their regional hinterland. These changes 
were expressed in the various Segev development plans 
formulated from 1976 to 1983.
b. "Region 2000" development strategy.
This is an attempt to recast the system of individual 
settlements into the contexts of the wider regional 
hinterland and the national political and economic 
system. It articulates broad principles on the proposed 
nature of Western Galil and the means to attain it.
In contrast to the emphasis on detail evinced in the 
"settlement plans", this strategy document ended at 
precisely the stage at which the details were supposed 
to be formulated (although few attempts in this 
direction were made).
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The "settlement plans" represent a process of "trial, 
and error", in which the plans were designed to accommodate 
themselves to changing conditions created in the course of 
implementation. As such, they were notable for a rather 
short-term concern with the specific issues associated with 
planners' involvement in regional processes, as will be 
discussed further.
Once the basic elements of a new settlement array were 
founded, the planners realised that the initial principles 
governing the structure of the system had been abandoned. It 
also became apparent that the existing system suffered from 
fundamental deficiencies intrinsic to its small dimensions 
and its location in Western Galil. In other words, they 
realised that no self-sustaining growth process in this area 
had been secured. This led to the conclusion that a new 
perspective was needed. In this sense, the Region 2000 
strategy was an outgrowth of the earlier planning process, 
reflecting an accommodation of the previous basic planning 
perspective to prevailing conditions in the region and to 
the evaluated impact of previous planning initiatives. 
Therefore, unlike modifications of the previous set of plans 
that concerned themselves with the specific structure of 
individual settlements, the essence of the shift to the 
conceptual approach articulated in the "Region 2000 
Development Strategy" was the need to place these 
settlements in a wider regional context and to deal with 
somewhat different issues.
This change originated in a different perspective on 
"regional" systems. The "Segev" plans assumed that 
development (i.e., increase in number of settlements, the
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Jewish population, and the scale of economic activities) was 
an immediate and necessary consequence of the establishment 
of new settlements and the attraction of small groups of 
settlers. Region 2000 holds this condition to be 
insufficient, as demonstrated chiefly in the Segev 
experience. The New Town experience further supports this 
premise, demonstrating that a self-sustaining development 
process requires more than housing and population. It 
requires a certain combination of elements, such as ability 
and desire of the local population to participate in the 
labour force, basic infrastructure for public services and 
business activities, as well as favourable institutional 
conditions that facilitate the absorption and initiation of 
productive activities.
Both sets of plans attempt to modify the relative role 
of Western Galil in the national political and economic 
system. However, whereas the "settlement plans" chose means 
that basically accorded with the prevailing nature of public 
intervention, the Region 2000 strategy sought to effect 
structural changes within this governmental system. 
Implicitly, then, the latter assumed that in the existing 
intervention paradigm, Western Galil had no chance of 
undergoing the drastic changes that would improve its 
position within the national system. Specifically, the first 
set of plans reflected the traditional central government 
way of coping with territorial issues, which measures 
"control" in terms of the volume of land (acreage) occupied 
by settlements (Israeli history is replete with such 
examples). Region 2000, by contrast, emphasises the quality
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of activities within a given space. It may be argued that, 
the shift in planning perspective became possible only after 
the previous perspective had been applied, creating 
conditions that permitted a reevaluation of the region's 
development potential. This issue, and the important 
implications of the differences between the planning 
doctrines in terms of their integration into regional 
processes, is discussed at greater length in the following 
chapters. The following comparison table summarises the 
differences between these schools of thought.
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Criterion
Initiation 
of planning 
function
Declared need 
for planning 
function
Objectives
Regional role 
within the 
national 
system
Regional
perspective
Segev Plans
Established within 
the RSD system.
Inherent part of the 
planners' job.
* Disperse Jewish 
population.
* Establish a new 
settlement system,
Planning initiative as 
a response to local 
processes and enhanced 
by national processes.
Planning output 
avoids reference 
to national processes.
* Concentration on 
Jewish "rural" sett­
lement clusters.
* Disregard of 
immediate functional 
hinterland.
* Emphasis on connec­
tions within settle­
ment clusters.
* Connections with 
outside metropolitan 
are out of actual 
concern.
Region 2000
Katzir Comm.: 
"Planning is a 
necessary part 
of regional 
development".1
"Tell us what to 
do2 ... and make 
sure the work 
will begin soon".
Increase Jewish 
population.
Develop the
region's industrial
base.
Initiation of Region 
2000 as a distinct 
part of the country. 
Planning output is 
based on an attempt 
to place the area on 
the national 
decision-making map.
* The region as 
consisting of all 
prevailing socio­
economic units.
* Purposeful avoid 
concern with Arabs
* Linkages with 
central parts of 
the country are 
deemed crucial.
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Criterion
Boundaries 
of concern
Identified 
"key factors 
of
development"
Issues of 
concern
Strategic
Perspective
Segev Plans
Local public institu­
tions and government 
regional offices 
directly and actively 
associated with 
processes within Segev 
spatial boundaries.
Boundaries evolving 
through implementation
* Land use patterns.
* Direct "settlement 
components", e.g., 
housing, infrastruc­
ture in settlements.
* Organisational struc­
ture of settlements.
* employment base.
* Settlement location
* Physical structure 
of settlements.
* Settlement 
organisation.
* Community services.
* Production base in 
settlements.
* A "step-by-step" 
approach - once one 
change is consolida­
ted (e.g., construc­
tion) further changes 
are considered.
* Concrete and 
measurable changes.
Region 2000
Region 2000 embodied 
within a perspective 
of national politi­
cal institutions.
Boundaries defined 
at an initial stage 
of strategy 
formulation.
* Regional physical 
infrastructure.
* Organisational 
structure of the 
region.
* Industrial produc­
tion processes.
* Educational system,
* Quality of tele­
communications .
* Regional 
organisational 
opportunities.
* Ways of attracting 
industrial 
enterprises.
* Principle of selec­
tivity, coupled 
with a "holistic" 
perception of each 
selected component
* Inability to inter­
pret most issues 
into measurable 
changes.
1. M inutes of Katzir Committee meeting, dated 24.2.1982.
2. Ibid.
3. Op. cit., 25.2.1982.
4. Some of the aspects concerning national ownership of 
land had been adopted in the "Mitzpim" project.
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Considering the major characteristics of the 
"settlement plans" and the Region 2000 strategy together, 
one may question the extent to which they provide planners 
with a firm basis for promoting the implementation of these 
plans. To answer this question, we must analyse the 
political and administrative system within which the 
planners functioned and which formed the "final test" of the 
applicability of the specific planning initiatives. Although 
a more substantial discussion is presented in the following 
chapters, several aspects should be raised at this stage.
As suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, the notion of 
vulnerability of decision-making determinants may be useful 
for planning practice, in enabling planners to explore their 
operational environment and determine appropriate strategy 
and means to promote implementation. A ccordingly, several 
elements within plans may be used to assess their 
application potential and possible constraints. These are 
related to the extent to which planners were able to utilise 
plans to promote their implementation, and the extent to 
which they were aware of such qualities. Here we present 
those elements of the plans that planners could or could not 
have used. The following chapters further discuss these 
aspects.
a. Attitude toward "change"
The "settlement plans" envisage changes confined 
chiefly to land uses in Western Galil - from agricultural 
uses to "urban" type of uses (i.e., housing, services, 
public facilities, and industrial zones). A byproduct of 
this kind of change is the redistribution of land possession
274
along population group lines, that is, the creation of 
segregated Jewish and Arab blocs of land. Region 2000 
proposes a functional change within existing land uses. For 
example, industrial activities are concentrated only in 3 of 
many designated zones, encouraging inter-regional linkages 
with the urban centre of Karmiel, which constitutes a core 
area for activities such as business, personal services, and 
regional organisational functions. Thus, whereas the 
"settlement plans" attempted to establish a rather closely 
knit functional subsystem that could be added to other such 
subsystems in Western Galil, Region 2000 strives for 
coordination among the area's sub-functional units.
Further, the "settlement plans" were rather vague with 
regard to the future nature of the proposed subsystem; their 
long-run perspective was confined largely to the mere 
existence of new settlements and their population sizes. 
Region 2000, by comparison, presents a fairly clear 
perspective on the future nature of the area, but it does 
not clearly specify short-run changes and processes.
Finally, as stated, the "settlement plans" permit 
public organisations (i.e., JAFI and government ministries) 
to practice intervention along prevailing lines. Region 
2000, by contrast, demands changes in the basic nature of 
public institutional intervention (e.g., in resource 
allocation and in the region's organisational structure).
b. Issues of concern
Most of the "settlement plans" (i.e., those pursuant 
to the 1976 plan) were the outputs of actual implementation 
processes, which implies a high degree of flexibility on
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the part of planners to deal with issues as they arise 
during "everyday" operations. Despite this potential 
flexibility, however, these plans were concerned above all 
with specific issues related to the direct establishment of 
new settlements, such as housing construction and 
absorption of new settlers, while avoiding concern with 
such "non-immediate" local issues. Region 2000 takes the 
opposite approach, dealing with issues related to regional 
organisation within the national political system, and the 
nature of public incentives required to make the area more 
attractive. Thus the plan rejects planner involvement in 
tenanting procedures, and purposely avoids concern with 
settlements' internal affairs, which are left to local 
control.
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the 
preoccupation of the "settlement plans" with issues 
traditionally connected with standard paradigms of public 
intervention (especially that of JAFI) helped further a 
process in which Western Galil was gradually (after the 
Earth Day incidents) distanced from public debate and 
consciousness as a problematic area in which Arabs had been 
deprived of their land. This enabled the planning-execution 
process to continue. Region 2000, by contrast, addressed 
itself to an important issue that has become quite 
politically sensitive of late: modification of the local- 
regional political organisational system and election 
procedures.
Further, the "settlement plans" were noted for their 
highly detailed articulation of specific recommended changes 
and means to implement them. Region 2000 strategy tends to
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the opposite extreme: a high level of abstraction and 
reliance on the reader's (e.g., politician, scholar) 
imagination.
c. Distribution of costs
The "settlement plans" were only implicitly concerned 
with the costs of implementation, as expressed in terms of 
the direct construction of a new settlement area. They 
seemed to assume that such direct costs would be covered by 
public institutions, chiefly JAFI. Reality demonstrated the 
truth of these assumptions. Region 2000 makes reference to 
two types of costs: those incurred in the course of
implementing plans (e.g., roadbuilding) and those accruing 
to any economic activity in the area, in compensation for 
the region's distance from major national business areas. 
Whereas the public sector is asked to cover the former 
costs, the latter are considered potential savings, to be 
effected once the structural changes in the regional system 
are consolidated.
d. Timing of presentation
The 1976 Segev Development Plan was presented during a 
period of heightened political awareness of "the demographic 
problem of Galil" and a declared public need to bolster the 
area's Jewish population. In this sense, its publication 
provided an immediate framework within which JAFI could 
pursue its attempts to cope with the problem. Region 2000 
strategy had no similar advantage. It was published during a 
period of national political disregard for the social and
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economic issues related to Western Galil (or other . 
peripheries located in the “green line").
In view of these perspectives on plan-making, each with 
its advantages and disadvantages, expectations, and 
constraints, the following chapter discusses the environment 
within which they were put into practice.
Notes
(1) For an extended discussion of the development of Israeli planning thought, its 
operationalisation and other relevant issues (such as the interactions between the 
planning system and the political apparatus) refer, for example to Bilski, 1980; 
Brutzkus, 1964; Cohen, 1970; Vildavsky, Law-Yone, and M eir-Brodnitz, 1988, 
to m ention only the few studies that are referred to in this dissertation.
(2) As most coherently spelled out in the Segev Plan, 1976.
(3) In Israel, the notion "Earth Day" is d iffe ren t than in many w estern countries,
where it is associated with the natural environm ent and human actions devoted to
its flourishing.
(4) M r. Y. Freidm an, interview , Tel-A viv, September 1990.
(5) To "accum ulate land" - to create continuity  of s ta te-ow ned  land which will 
provide sufficient space to construct new settlements.
(6) Op. cit., note no.2. to check
(7) D iffe ren t docum ents refe r to d iffe ren t num ber of planned "mitzpim"; some 
include sites designated in 1976 plan, others also count the sites identified and 
tenanted during the execution of the "mitzpim" project, although they were not 
mentioned in the initial documents. Our reference is to all settlements established 
during the period of mass construction of settlements that was stimulated by the 
"mitzpim" project.
(8) New Towns and Moshavim were especially subject to conyiuous out-m igartion of 
young and socio-economically stable population.
(9) Similar timing of the "mitzpim".
(10) The Committee’s terms of reference. Source: the private files of Prof. Katzir.
(11) Ibid.
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(12) While disregarding problem atic and, at times, inaccepted aspects of such regional 
processes.
(13) M inutes of Katzir Committee meeting, dated 5.2.1982.
(14) "fellowship 2000 Constotution" (1982). Source: Vix Archives.
(15) Op. cit., note 13, dated 24.2.1982.
(16) 1 /3  of the com m ittee and the fellow ship budget. Source: A ccounting R eport 
1982-1984, private files of Prof. Katzir.
(17) Nethaniel Lichfield & Partners and Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.
(18) An internal correspondence in the Planning Section (RSD North region office), 
marked "after meeting with Iyur & Einav, November 1984". Source: working files 
of the Planning Section, the RSD North region office, Haifa.
(19) a. L ichfield & IDC., 1984; b. G ilat and Duchan, 1985. See bibliography.
(20) A le tter from  Prof. K atzir and the M inister of Econom y and Planning (M r. 
Ya’akobi) to the JAFI, dated 25.12.1975.
(21) "JAFI-sponsored settlements" - those constructed during the "mitzpim" process 
and others heavily supported by the JA FI finance and adm inistrative apparatus.
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Chapter 7:
POTENTIAL ABILITY OF PLANNERS TO FUNCTION
Introduction
The planning philosophy behind Western Galil 
development, as it evolved during the 1970s and 1980s 
(described in Chap. 6), suggests the existence of some 
correlations between regional processes and planning 
practice. To further the understanding of these possible 
correlations, this chapter reveals the nature of the 
planning process in relation to the socio-political system 
in which the major planning products (i.e., the "settlement 
plans" and the Region 2000 development strategy) were 
expected to be applied. Several previously elaborated 
arguments are especially important for this analysis: 
Insofar as it is the result of interactions among the three 
components of a theoretical "region-planner-decision-makers" 
triangle, the planning process affects the regional system 
largely as a function of the way in which a planning 
initiative is structured into the socio-economic and 
political system that determines the decision-making 
processes concerning the region in question. Since planners 
are highly dependent on socio-political institutions in 
their quest to implement the planning product, it is the 
combination of both elements - the institutional context 
within which planners function, and the planning product 
itself, that determines the content of a planning process 
and the implementation of a planning product. In this
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regard, the notion of commitment of decision-makers to. a. 
planning initiative offers a measure of the extent to which 
the planning process is integrated in the political- 
administrative decision-making system and, hence, to some 
socio-economic processes that affect the region’s relative 
condition; the commitment of decision-makers to certain 
changes or actions proposed by plans implies a willingness 
to function within a known framework of activities and work 
toward a specific objective(s). This being the case, it was 
argued that planners should attempt to maximise the 
decision-makers' commitment to the planning product. In so 
doing, planners are expected to promote favourable 
operational conditions (i.e., mitigating the inherent risks 
of any action taken with regard to the region, such as a 
firm's decision to relocate and individual migration 
considerations). Finally, in order to generate the initial 
commitment that will promote the above conditions,, planners 
are given an opportunity to exploit several determinants of 
the decision-making processes that can be directly affected 
through the planning process, especially the determinants 
that can be defined as relatively "vulnerable" to the 
planning process.
In practice, therefore, the analysis of the planning 
process should concentrate on two major questions:
a. Under what conditions have the planners functioned?
The term "conditions" refers on the one hand to the 
basis, created by the planners, of their communication 
with decision-makers (i.e., a basis structured within 
the planning product) and, on the other hand, to the 
nature of the political-administrative system with
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which they had (and were expected) to cope, and toward 
which their planning product was addressed,
b. How have the planners actually performed?
This question examines the means invoked to promote the 
integration of the principle planning perspective into 
the prevailing system of decision-making.
This chapter address itself to the first question, and 
uncovers the potential basis for planning actions. Chapter 8 
considers the second question, exploring the ways in which 
the theoretical ability to perform was manifested in actual 
planning experience during the years covered by our research 
(1975-1986).
The potential ability of planners to function (i.e., to 
promote the implementation of the planning product) is, as 
stated, partially connected with the nature of the planning 
product. The planning product, in turn, expresses the 
planners’ understanding of the social, economic, and 
political system that concerns them, and their estimation of 
the types of required and feasible changes. Specifically, we 
contend that this connection of planning product and 
implementation is affected by the way in which planners 
treat the issues subject to their concern: the articulation 
of the recommended change and its practical implications, 
timing of the presentation of plans, targeting of decision­
makers, and the clarity of the perspective from which 
planners view future regional processes. All of these 
aspects can equip planners with important tools in their 
attempts to structure the planning product in a way that
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will help marshall decision-maker commitment toward the. 
planning initiative and thus contribute to its 
implementation. The attention drawn to these aspects of the 
planning process suggests that were planners able to 
structure the "right" type of planning product, and if there 
were a "right" product at all, political decision-makers and 
socio-economic units would adopt and apply the product 
almost automatically. The present discussion, however, shows 
that the task of creating a planning product that will 
stimulate and lure public intervention in regional systems 
is a far from simple matter. First, different features of 
the planning product may contradict each other. For example, 
the planners' wish to be specific about the nature of 
proposed change, although important, may force them to focus 
immediately on issues that they would prefer to postpone to 
a more advanced stage of the planning process, since they 
are regarded as hard to promote at so early a stage. In our 
planning process, had planners been specific about the 
nature of the Region 2000 elected council, an important 
aspect of the area's development, this might have caused the 
immediate rejection of the entire strategy. In this case the 
dilemma was whether or not to be specific about the proposed 
change. The planners chose to stay with an abstract 
description of this issue, but this resulted in certain 
drawbacks. Second, whether planners like it or not, many 
processes are neither predictable nor controllable, as will 
be seen, for example, in the case of planners' 
"unproductive" choice of "partners" for implementation, and 
their inability to control the timing of the presentation of 
plans to the political-administrative system. The extent to
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which it was possible to maintain an overall future 
perspective on regional processes under conditions of 
constant variability and complexity, the ability to make the 
"right" choices and promote the implementation of the 
planning product - these indeed constitute the essence of 
planning function. It is therefore in our interest to 
analyse the way in which planners have treated these 
matters.
Beyond that, however, assuming a hypothetical case in 
which all the above features of the planning product are 
structured in a way that makes this product highly 
accessible (i.e., easily understood and acceptable) to 
decision-makers, the actual factors governing the making of 
decisions, and hence the planners' ability to function, 
remain less than completely vulnerable to planning 
initiatives. The second part of this chapter indeed proves 
that decision-makers may take an attitude toward the 
planning initiative that has nothing to do with its content. 
The response of decision-makers to the planning product in 
the case considered below was often based on the roles of 
specific decision-makers in their functional system (e.g., 
political party) rather than on the content of the planning 
product itself.
The issue of the potential ability of planners to 
function is discussed in light of Rural Settlement 
Department (RSD) plans (presented in Chap. 6), and is 
explored from two complementary perspectives:
a. The nature of the planning product as a medium of
communication with certain decision-makers. Assuming
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that these have the power to execute plans, the aim is 
to create a product that will motivate them to 
intervene within regional systems and guide this 
intervention. In this fashion we deal with the way in 
which specific planning products treated the vulnerable 
determinants of decision-making.
b. Locational characteristics, that is, the institutional 
context in which the planners operated, as a framework 
for promoting the execution of their planning product. 
How capable are the regional and national institutional 
systems of absorbing the planning initiatives, both as 
presented by planners and regardless of the specific 
content of the planning product presented?
7.1 The Written Planning Product
As argued in Chapter 4, plans are written products of 
the planning process, reflecting the planners' state of mind 
regarding an issue or set of issues of concern to them at a 
specific juncture of the process. Plans do not necessarily 
articulate all elements of this state of mind; nor need they 
express the full range of considerations behind the planning 
perspective. Planners may choose not to specify the 
considerations that guided their work. They may also present 
different parts of plans to different decision-makers. As 
such, the essence of the planning product should be the 
provision of means to stimulate, direct, and, at times, even 
control the interactions between decision-makers and 
regional systems. However, it is the actual articulated
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product, rather than unarticulated thoughts, that forms the. 
basis for eliciting responses to planning initiatives.
Since planners do not function independently of the 
political and administrative decision-making system - they 
depend on the ability of this system to bring plans to 
fruition, implementation is largely a function of the 
planners' ability to produce a product addressed to those 
actors in the socio-economic system who have the potential 
to execute plans. These actors, whom we call the "partners" 
(see Chapter 3), may, for example, be economic entities 
expected to invest in specific enterprises, government 
ministers expected to affect allocation of financial 
resources for regional infrastructure, or various other 
decision-makers. Implementation also depends on the ability 
of planners to create a framework for actions in which the 
relationships between different regional processes are 
clarified. This is important for mitigating the inherent 
uncertainty in any type of economic and social activity. In 
regional plans, which concern themselves with a very complex 
system, it is crucial.
It follows that plans should be analysed in view of 
several major aspects:
a. The attitude toward "partners" - how clearly they are 
defined and how relevant are the means of addressing 
them.
b. Potential access to "partners" that stems from the 
nature of the plans themselves - the extent to which 
the "picture" is complete, specific, or abstract.
c. Timing of the presentation of plans. This may affect
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the decision-makers' initial attitude toward the plans..
d. Strategic perspective - the extent to which a clear
perspective on future changes affects the
"accessibility" of plans.
e. The personal characteristics of the planners and their
influence on the planning product's accessibility. To 
assess this aspect would require reference to socio- 
anthropological and behaviour observation studies, 
which could lead to issues transcending the scope of 
this dissertation. Therefore, although it is relevant, 
it is not thoroughly analysed here.
f. The issue of the planners' authority, and the nature of
"partners" with whom planners must deal, is the theme
of the second part of this chapter.
The present discussion, unless specifically stated 
otherwise, refers to plans that fall into two "blocs" - the 
"settlement plans" and the "Region 2000 strategy". These 
blocs of plans differ in their basic structure, as explained 
below.
7.1.1 The choice of "partners"
Generally speaking, the "settlement plans" are 
concerned with issues under the official responsibility of 
the Jewish Agency Rural Settlement Department (i.e., issues 
of constructing and establishing "rural settlements"). The 
planners, as employees of the RSD, sought RSD approval of 
their plans. Thus, by presenting the plans to the director
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of the RSD North Region office, who would presumably, 
transfer them "up the ladder" in the system's hierarchy, the 
planners had in fact chosen the RSD as their major 
"partner", expecting its administration to act in accordance 
with the plans when operating in Western Galil. Other public 
bodies were disregarded at this stage, their potential 
contribution in specific issues being identified in the 
midst of various actions. This process, however, received no 
special attention: planners merely followed prevailing 
procedures, whereas the "partnership" with the RSD 
administration was intrinsic to their role in this 
organisation.
In Region 2 0 0 0  strategy, by contrast, the process of 
determining "partners" was much more complicated, and the 
planners were conscious of the issue. The initial reference 
was to Fellowship 2 0 0 0 .  As the body most interested in 
promoting Region 2 0 0 0  and integrating the planning function 
into this project, Fellowship 2 0 0 0  was thought to be the 
most relevant "partner" for the implementation of the 
strategy. About six months after the strategy was 
publicised, however, the planners realised that apart from 
granting them the legitimacy to function within this 
project,1 Fellowship 2 0 0 0  lacked execution power (i.e., it 
had neither political authority nor financial resources). 
Consequently, planners sought a different "partner", 
approaching the senior executives of the RSD and attempting 
to convince them to assume responsibility for the project 
and the strategic recommendations. This shift came at a 
price; it exposed planners to fierce criticism from M. 
Drobles, a co-chairman of the RSD, who resented the
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planners' having "approached the RSD after the strategy had 
already been presented to other bodies"'6 (i.e., Fellowship 
2000, which had already circulated the strategy among 
government ministries). Moreover, this shift underscored 
differences between the articulated principles of strategy 
and the official policy of the "new partner". Indeed, after 
approving the Region 2000 development strategy, the RSD 
administration asked the planners to modify its content in 
several ways, so that the revised planning product would
o
"satisfy RSD objectives and interests". These changes were 
specified in Chapter 6.
Nevertheless, planners were still not consistent in 
their attitude toward the RSD. Although they regarded the 
RSD's contribution to Region 2000 as crucial in the initial 
stage of the project, difficulties in securing RSD 
commitment to the project led planners to ask members of 
Fellowship 2000 to help achieve this goal.
These experiences suggest two practical implications 
regarding the choice of partners:
a. The way the "partners" are chosen may affect their 
initial attitude toward the planning initiative. In the 
case of the "settlement plans", the planners' quest for 
"partners" was precisely the kind of action they had 
been expected to take. As planners employed by the RSD, 
they were supposed to "plan", and they did so before 
forwarding responsibility for implementation to the 
regional office and the national administration. Having 
approved these plans, the RSD administration's 
cooperation in their implementation was almost a
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foregone conclusion, in the sense of fulfilling its. 
role within the system.^ In the case of Region 2000, 
the planners were fairly aggressive in attempting to 
generate the RSD's involvement. By gaining the approval 
of Fellowship 2000, the planners, employees of the RSD, 
actually forced the RSD's hand; the RSD had little 
choice but to approve the strategy (at least 
officially). Yet in doing so, the planners overstepped 
their official brief, namely, to "plan" within the 
RSD's official areas of concern, rather than 
determining where the planning should take place. Thus 
they presented an initial discouragement to RSD 
cooperation.
b. The choice of "partners" may necessitate different 
layouts of the planning product. The "layout" of a plan 
refers both to the content of the planning perspective 
and the way it is articulated. Thus, it is possible 
that in structuring the planning product, planners may 
also affect the extent to which potential partners 
accept it. The original layout of the Region 2000 
strategy was highly appealing to Fellowship 2000 but 
inconsistent with the expectations of the new partner, 
the RSD, as is discussed below. By comparison, the 
application of the 1976 and 1978 plans during the 
"mitzpim" process indicates that both the planning 
recommendations and their articulation suited the RSD's 
expectations regarding the required changes in Western 
Galil.
In all, the "settlement plans" referred to the RSD were
congruent with the planners' official scope of activity.
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Thus the planners were spared the need to struggle at length 
to locate an executive partner and foster this partner's 
desire to cooperate. The question is whether an initial 
approach to the RSD for partnership in Region 2000 would 
have made the project more acceptable. It may have required 
a different layout for the initial proposal, especially in 
the proposal's articulation, but it may also have 
ameliorated the planners' muddling treatment of the 
partnership issue. For example, the strategy could have 
emphasised the positive consequences of the proposed changes 
for the development of new settlements, indicating where RSD 
influence should be maintained or initiated. This would have 
given the RSD an opportunity to estimate its role in the 
region's processes and determine its policy priorities.
Subsequent discussion will show that official approval 
of a planning product does not secure its implementation. 
The reasons for the RSD's rejection of the long-run 
commitment proposed by the Region 2000 strategy were much 
more profound than the strategy's specific layout. Thus, 
another question must be asked: should the planning
perspective be accommodated to suit the partner's interests 
and needs? Possible answers, and the implications of such 
accommodation for the planning process, are discussed in the 
conclusions to this dissertation.
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7.1.2 Relations with the partner's official policy and 
presumed interests
Both blocs of plans essentially are concerned with the 
issue of public intervention: where and how it should take 
place. Both were based on a political consensus on the need 
to develop the Galil.
The "settlement plans" were based on the RSD paradigm of 
settlements in the context of territorial issues (i.e., they 
accept the principal view of settlements, regardless of 
their size and functional characteristics, as a way to 
establish and demonstrate Jewish control). These plans also 
adopt the standard RSD model of settlement structure 
(especially the post-1976 plans, designed during the plans' 
implementation). Accordingly, these plans dealt with issues 
under the official responsibility of the RSD - the 
construction and consolidation of small collective 
settlements and their immediate functional environment. In 
particular, they dealt with questions such as the 
settlements' location, the number of families expected to 
populate them, and the allocation of basic means of 
production and public facilities. All of these were part of 
the existing RSD operational machinery, which set 
implementation procedures and financial allocation 
principles. Accordingly, planners did not concern 
themselves, for instance, with the suitability of RSD 
financial allocation quotas.
Region 2000 strategy, by contrast, addressed itself to a 
wide range of issues for which the RSD had established 
neither an operational apparatus nor an official policy. For
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example, even though the RSD officially has no concern with 
New Towns , ^  the strategy suggested that the New Town of 
Karmiel be viewed as the core area of Region 2000 and, thus, 
as the centre of RSD attention.^ The strategic proposal to 
promote the growth of new settlements to magnitudes (i.e., 
number of settlers) much higher than traditionally planned 
by the RSD represents another aspect in which the Region 
2000 strategy deviated from the "mainstream" policy of the 
RSD. An even greater departure was the planners' belief that 
the promotion of development in the Arab sector should be 
made an integral part of the Region 2000 project.7 Although 
this belief was never interpreted into specific 
recommendations, it was an issue totally out of JAFI's 
official scope. In fact, the strategy rejected the RSD's 
traditional short-run preoccupation with a set of 
predetermined increments within small, territorially defined 
functional systems. Instead, it suggested that the 
traditional RSD approach to "settlement" processes was no 
longer valid in the Western Galil of the 1980s. Indeed, as 
noted in Chapter 6, the Region 2000 strategic perspective 
provided planners with an alternative to the 1976 and 1978 
Segev plans, especially in view of the fact that the 
region's condition had not fundamentally changed as a 
consequence of their implementation. For the RSD (and other 
public organisations), however, this conceptual alternative 
was far too radical, as it challenged its role in Western 
Galil in three aspects:
a. The power base of the RSD.
The "settlement plans" implied an increase of the 
territories and volume of population dependent on the
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RSD (i.e., its financial resources, social- 
organisational facilities, and role in the national 
political system).
By contrast, Region 2000 proposed, for example, larger 
settlements with a smaller management role for the RSD, 
the development of larger intra-regional industrial 
zones at the expense of small industrial areas already 
existing in the new settlements, and the promotion of 
linkages between new settlements and Karmiel. All of 
these changes (e.g., minimisation of RSD involvement in 
local decision-making processes, its inability to 
determine migration guotas for collective settlements, 
and abandonment of the cooperative production structure 
of the settlements) created a potential for the 
elimination of the RSD power base. They also implied a 
potential overlap between RSD activities and those of 
other JAFI departments and government ministries,
b. The functional base of the RSD.
The "settlement plans" maintain prevailing patterns of 
public intervention in regional systems. They even 
imply that such intervention is highly desirable to 
secure the protection of national land and the 
development of new settlements in Western Galil.
The opposite attitude is taken by the Region 2000 
strategy, its essential recommendation being to 
restrict the role of different public agencies (chiefly 
the JAFI-RSD and government ministries) in the regional 
system, limiting their intervention to investments in 
physical infrastructure, thus leaving most regional 
processes to be determined by market forces. Therefore,
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not only does Region 2000 reject the traditional 
patterns of public intervention by suggesting the 
redistribution of public authority, it emphasises the 
case for eliminating the power of public agencies (such 
as the RSD) to affect regional processes. As expressed 
by N. Zvili (a co-director of the RSD) in the debate 
around Region 2000, "such changes will force the 
Department to re-define its justification to function, 
both in the national government system and in the 
entire JAFI system, thus we should consider whether we 
want it or not".® In terms of the government apparatus, 
Region 2000’s recommendations also imply a shift from 
the welfare attitude and direct public involvement with 
all aspects of regional processes, toward a much more 
limited scope of intervention.
Practical constraints on institutional reorganisation. 
The task of redistributing public intervention, 
proposed in the Region 2000 strategy, implies 
structural changes to which large public organisations 
like the RSD and government ministries would have 
difficulty in accommodating. As to these bodies, the 
strategy had similar practical implications: First, 
redistribution of the authority of different public 
bodies and the proposed regional elected body, would 
require a fundamental change in the national political 
and administrative structure, thus necessarily leading 
to a curtailment of the control presently exercised by 
national and local bodies, and thus is difficult to 
accept. Indeed, these proposals created a potential 
base for Fellowship 2000, the Ministry of Economics and
Planning, and possibly the Mayor of Karmiel to increase 
their control over Western Galil, as will be specified 
further. Second, changing the patterns of intervention 
in a way that will enable the private sector to have a 
stronger impact would require changing the basic 
perception of intervention held by the national 
political system. This also would be difficult to 
absorb. Third, as changing the intervention machinery 
is a matter of practical complication, there is the 
need for great dedication and a particular (negative or 
positive) political situation that will create the 
incentive to initiate such changes.
Therefore, it is contended that the fact that the 
"settlement plans" did not deviate from prevailing policy 
and fit the operational machinery of the RSD, contributed to 
their general appeal to the Department, in contrast with the 
difficulties encountered in approving the 1985 Region 2000 
strategy.
7.1.3 Concreteness of proposals
The "settlement plans" are basically a detailed 
description of the proposed changes and a specification of 
various actions to be taken in order to realise them. As 
such, they provide a firm basis for determining the required 
actions and their priorities. They also enabled planners to 
identify the roles of different public agencies in the
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process of realisation of the plans (e.g., the role of the. 
Israel Land Authority in allocating land reserves for 
different land uses, or the role of the Ministry of Housing 
in road construction).9 Evidence indicates that plans' 
implementation indeed followed the principal means specified 
by them.10
By comparison, the Region 2000 strategy is a relatively 
abstract framework for identifying the aspects of regional 
processes on which efforts to initiate changes in the 
regional system should concentrate, the organisational 
structures for the realisation of the proposed changes, the 
prospected public intervention, and the priorities between 
issues and activities. It is, indeed, a strategy, in the 
sense of providing the direction of recommended changes and 
the conceptual context into which specifically recommended 
actions should fit. Specification of this broad perception, 
however, was never accomplished by the planners. In 
practice, the strategy's abstraction initially proved to be 
an advantage - it satisfied the interests of different 
partners. The "other side of the coin", however, was that 
this abstraction created grounds for different 
interpretations that were not in accordance with its 
principal approach, and led to demands to change this 
approach (such as the case of the "settlement" issue, 
specified in Chapter 6). In the long run, the lack of 
further specification or concretisation of the strategy 
became a major obstacle to its application in practice.
With this in mind, it may be concluded that regardless 
of the content of the specific proposals, greater
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concreteness of a planning product provides planners with a 
more comfortable ground to communicate with decision-makers. 
Since concreteness implies greater ease on the part of 
decision-makers to estimate, for example, future actions and 
costs, it is likely to be positively correlated with the 
extent of implementation of plans. It should be emphasised, 
however, that the planners were aware of the need to specify 
the strategy. Although efforts in this direction were made, 
specification of the strategic principles was too limited 
and took place at an inappropriate stage of the planning 
process (as will be further discussed). This limited 
specification of the strategy into a set of concrete actions 
can be partially explained by the institutional context of 
the planning function (discussed in the following section), 
and the planners' difficulties in accepting the compromises 
required in making the shift from abstraction to 
concreteness. This lack of specification represents a major 
drawback of the strategic perspective, which bore very 
fragile links to actual reality.
7.1.4 Distribution of costs
None of the plans produced an analysis of the costs 
created by the recommended changes and the distribution of 
economic units which should, or are likely to, bear them.
By assuming the maintenance of prevailing public 
authority, "settlement plans" implied that the financial 
burden of establishing a new settlement area in Western 
Galil would initially be imposed on the RSD, and gradually
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be transferred to government ministries. Individual and. 
economic enterprises in new settlements were, presumably, to 
be subject to standard (i.e., heavy) financial public 
assistance. In this sense, these plans suggested actions 
whose direct and short-term costs could be estimated rather 
accurately by the existing public system (Reichman and Oren, 
1984). Nevertheless, the plans did not bother themselves 
with external costs such as the damaged natural environment 
caused by construction of new settlements and infrastructure 
(Sofer and Finkel, 1988), or their impact on the Arab 
population.
The Region 2000 strategy adopted a similar approach, 
but unlike the previous case in which the direct costs 
imposed on public agencies could be estimated, the 
recommended changes in Region 2000 (especially since they 
were insufficiently extrapolated to concrete actions) were 
difficult to estimate. The proposed changes in patterns of 
public intervention left the question of immediate costs 
open to speculation, since such costs did not fall within 
prevailing public allocation procedures. They also did not 
enable the estimation of the duration of investments. For 
example, although it was suggested that the RSD allocate 
initial investments to the development of regional 
infrastructure, no concrete proposal was put forward as to 
the volume of required investments and the RSD-government 
relations necessary to secure the continuity of 
allocations.** Further, by giving the private sector an 
important part of the task of investing in Region 2000 under 
the above conditions, the strategy imposed a theoretically 
crucial cost on this sector, stemming from their presumed
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interest to invest in an area where basic facilities are. 
insufficient and their development process is yet
1 o
undetermined.
7.1.5 Timing of presentation
As mentioned, the 1976 Segev development plan was 
published during a period of social unrest in the Galil, in 
which riots in the Arab sector over the issue of land 
ownership raised a political debate concerning the question 
of Jewish existence in the Galil. This debate did not last 
for more than few weeks, nor did it have a country-wide 
effect (e.g., demonstrations were mainly confined to the 
local Arab population, and took place in the Galil). 
Nevertheless, in this context of events, the presentation of 
the 1976 plan provided it with immediate relevance, 
especially for the director of the RSD of the Jewish Agency, 
who was provided with theoretical and practical guidance 
regarding the way to cope with the implications of these 
riots and the importance given to the Arab-Israeli 
territorial dispute. Thus, although this plan addressed 
itself to a problem that planners thought important before 
the "Earth day",13 the specific combination of events and 
the political perspective of the RSD director that gave this 
plan its immediate relevance was not and could not have been 
predicted. Accordingly, it is difficult to infer from this 
case any ability on the part of planners to create specific 
"favourable" conditions during the initial introduction of a 
plan. Moreover, one cannot even conclude that the existence
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of public debate is necessarily an advantage to the planning 
process, especially since the public debate provoked by the 
"Earth Day" was very short and limited in its scope. In this 
regard, some studies (Sofer and Finkel, 1988; Lifschitz, 
1990) imply that the fairly rapid decline in importance of 
the "demographic" issue in Western Galil was of major 
advantage for the RSD "mitzpim" project - had the public 
debate persisted longer, it would have been much more 
difficult to execute the project. In any case, from the 
planners' point of view, their involvement in any kind of 
public debate was irrelevant.1  ^ The case of Region 2000 
further emphasises this problematic aspect of the planning 
process: the strategy was published during a period in which 
the Galil and Western Galil were not on any particular 
public and political agenda. Although the publication of the 
strategy led to a few publicly articulated reactions from 
several politicians, these gradually dissipated, leaving 
open the questions of what "favourable" conditions are, and 
how long can they last.
In all, assuming that "favourable" public conditions 
are those enabling planners to promote integration of plans 
in the execution mechanism of forces related to regional 
processes, the above examples might suggest that such 
conditions are totally remote from the potential impact of 
the planning process. Yet, they do not rule out the idea, 
explored at a later stage of this dissertation, that 
planners may utilise different marketing procedures to 
create public awareness of plans, thus possibly creating 
"comfortable" conditions in which to function.
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7.1.6 Strategic perspective
The discussion in Chapter 4 suggested that a strategic 
perspective on long-run regional changes may provide a 
useful framework for guiding decision-making processes in 
political-administrative systems and economic and business 
forces.
In this regard, the initiation of the Region 2000 
strategy indicates the planners' dissatisfaction with the 
prevailing lack of a long-run perspective guiding the 
different public activities charged with the task "to 
develop Western Galil", and the "settlement plans", which 
gradually accommodated themselves to the ad hoc nature of 
the RSD's intervention. This strategy assumed that a 
strategic perspective would enable the identification of 
those aspects of regional systems most requiring attention, 
and which thus should be subject to planning efforts. As 
stated in the introductory comments to the strategy: "such a 
perspective should offset the planners' tendency to 
concentrate on day-to-day affairs that results in a total 
unsystematic concern with regional processes and inability 
to encourage important changes in the region's relative 
condition" (Gilat and Duchan, 1985). In practice, however, 
was this the case? Did the strategy guide planning function 
away from its traditional concern with ad hoc solutions to 
current problems and ongoing processes? Further, as an 
alternative approach to regional processes, did the strategy 
provide additional or different means to cope with planning 
tasks?
The answers to these questions are not simple, since,
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from a pragmatic point of view, the fact that the strategy, 
was not actually implemented might lead to a rejection of 
any other potential contribution of this strategy to 
planning practice in general. Nevertheless, putting aside 
the content of the strategy (which, it will be argued, posed 
an almost impossible challenge for the public execution 
system), the strategy offers several guidelines that may be 
useful for future planning practice: First, the strategic 
perspective redefined the scope of regional planning by 
limiting the areas and issues concerned, with these to be 
determined in connection with the potential "partner" in 
their execution (the latter affects the scope of change that 
may be attained). Indeed, in view of previous experience 
whereby the traditional issue-wide planning approach proved 
insufficient for pursuing the development of Western Galil, 
the task-oriented approach may well be relevant for 
improving this area's relative condition. Such an approach 
may prevent a "spreading out" on many issues that is almost 
necessarily done at the account of a thorough understanding 
of and intensive involvement in issues concerned. It may 
prove especially relevant under conditions of economic 
recession when public allocations must be restricted and 
their objects should be clearly identified. Further, given 
the problematic status of planners in political and 
administrative decision-making processes (discussed in 
section 7.2), it seems that the consideration of potential 
partners as an integral part of the production of a strategy 
(or other planning products) offers planners an opportunity 
to increase the initial accessibility of the planning 
product. Second, the strategy provided specific criteria for
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continuing the attempt to advance planning initiatives. In 
our case, the criteria were linked to actual changes in 
public intervention: since the prevailing patterns of public 
intervention seemed to prevent any attempt to establish 
important (as determined by the planners) changes in the 
region’s relative condition, the planners' inability to 
change these patterns was given as grounds for abandonment 
of the entire strategic perspective and efforts to advance 
it. In other words, a strategic perspective cannot stand by 
itself; it is context-specific and impermanent.
In all, Region 2000 initially enabled the planners to 
find their way through the muddle of specific issues of 
regional processes which, in their prevailing treatment, 
they believed led to a "dead end" in actual regional 
conditions. This turned planning practice into a task- 
oriented and conditional function, and thus worked against 
the common tendency on the part of planners to be content 
with mere involvement in regional processes regardless of 
their consequences.
Summary
This part of the chapter departed from the assumption 
that the planning product is an element of the planning 
process that highly depends on the planners' skills and 
sensitivity to shape it in a way that will promote its 
integration into the decision-making system. Analysis of the 
planning experience (of the two blocs of plans) shows that 
even if planners are provided with such a potentially wide
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base for determining the nature of the planning product, 
their actual ability to structure a suitable product (for 
their needs) is nonetheless challenging.
Presented as a tool for communication with decision­
makers, the discussion of the planning experiences 
highlighted the dilemmas planners face, areas where their 
influence is very moderate, and the principles they should 
respect; the major practical dilemmas surround the 
alternatives of concrete versus abstract articulation, and 
the choice of partners. Although any planning product should 
stem from the planners' clear and fairly concrete picture of 
the desired and expected future, the different experiences 
show that whereas great specificity may lead to a somewhat 
technical and narrow-minded treatment of regional issues, 
abstraction by itself is insufficient for operating. This is 
further linked to the choice of partners for execution - 
different target partners may reguire a different set-up of 
the planning product and possibly compromises on its 
content, some of which are difficult for planners to accept. 
These dilemmas are reinforced by the fact that planners have 
a limited influence on suitable timing of the presentation 
due to their inability to affect the course of events; thus, 
they can be solved only in practice, if at all.
In the course of the planning process, planners should 
therefore bear in mind the following principles: a clear 
perspective on the future is crucial for planning practice; 
an abstract strategic proposal must be followed by its 
concretisation; distribution of the estimation of costs 
cannot be disregarded; and distributional effects should be 
considered since they are among the expected consequences of
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planning practice.
In this regard, a question is raised as to why planners 
need to communicate. This dissertation assumes that the need 
to communicate is inherent in the planning function, or in 
the work of those planners who expect to be involved in the 
implementation of plans. Therefore, the guestion to be asked 
is: How is communication stimulated?. Such "communication" 
reguires that planners be clear about their thoughts and set 
up the planning product in a way most accessible to the 
chosen "partners". Further, even where a planning initiative 
is basically accepted, the actual process of communication 
requires planners to compromise on some issues and means so 
as to make proposals feasible in certain execution 
situations (this assumes that communication by definition 
implies compromise). Indeed, this section showed that in 
terms of clarity of ideas, the "settlement plans" where 
fairly accessible to decision-makers, in that they were 
clearly articulated and dealt with issues with which the 
"partners" were familiar. "Region 2000", by comparison, in 
its abstraction of issues and its concern with unfamiliar 
aspects of the regional system, was at times difficult for 
potential partners to grasp. Moreover, even though the 
strategy attempted to tackle the politically unquestioned 
"demographic problem" of Western Galil and its moderate 
economic development, the proposed means to tackle these 
problems made it less attractive to the political and 
administrative system. Nevertheless, while the above 
elements may facilitate communication, the most important 
issue is the content of the planning product, on the basis 
of which communication is developed.
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In practice, apart from the fact that the task of 
formulating an accessible product is by itself "tricky", the 
result of communication may or may not be its official 
approval. Still, approval and integration into actual 
activities may lie in quite different dimensions of response 
to the planning initiative, or reflect two different 
patterns of commitment: both products discussed in this 
chapter were approved by the RSD, although resulting in 
different patterns of RSD commitment to their content and 
practical recommendations. Were these reactions merely a 
function of the different characteristics of the planning 
products? Had this been the case, we might be arguing that 
the planning process depends totally on the planners' 
professional and personal characteristics,15 and that 
planners are capable of forming the "right" planning 
product. If so, then we might also suggest that the nature 
of the planning product could be "prescribed". For example, 
it would follow that since the "settlement plans" seem to 
have promoted execution, a planning product model developed 
on the basis of these plans should be applied in other 
cases. By implication, had the Region 2000 strategy 
contained features similar to the 1976 and 1978 Segev plans, 
it would have been executed by the RSD of the mid-to-late 
1980s. The following discussion, however, overrules these 
conclusions, suggesting instead that although we can offer 
several characteristics that planning products should 
contain in order to promote their execution, the 
implementation cannot be secured.
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7.2 Institutional Locational Characteristics
As noted, certain qualities of the planning product may 
enhance its becoming a source of reference for decision­
makers associated with, in our case, the specific region. 
The question of the potential for planners to function, 
however, extends beyond these qualities of the planning 
product. Planning, indeed, involves more than producing a 
written document. It is the process by which planners exert 
influence through their involvement in decision-making 
processes related to the region concerned; their opinion is 
considered, they are consulted about procedures, and they 
are required to assess actions. The question is, also, 
whether the political-administrative system permitted the 
planners to act in this interactive mode to implement the 
plans.
This role of planners is closely linked to the 
institutional context of planning function (or, the 
planners’ institutional location). By "institutional 
context" we refer to the combined effect of the 
organisations' characteristics within given stages of the 
planning process and specific regional processes on the role 
of planners in these institutions at any given time. By 
implication, the planning process is largely a function of 
its institutional context.
Indeed, the links between planning function and its 
institutional environment are thoroughly discussed in the 
literature, and are subject to much debate as to the 
specific elements that most affect planning practice and 
implementation. Beyond the general agreement on the
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importance of understanding the planning institutional, 
context in the sense of "know your partner or enemy", 
scholars emphasise several elements in these relations, each 
important in itself: the institutional complexity associated 
with the planning process, and the consequent inability to 
fully preconceive the nature of the institutional context; 
the possibility that decisions in areas unrelated to the 
planning product actually affect its implementation, along 
with the problematic status of planners. All necessitate 
that planners carefully determine their proposals and 
expectations (Baer, 1977; Baum, 1980; Forester, 1981; 
Friend, 1976 and 1980; McAuslan, 1979).
Although it is beyond our scope to present in full the 
different arguments of the scholars mentioned above (and 
many others), the following discussion shows their immediate 
relevance and demonstrates that the different institutional 
contexts of planning initiatives (e.g., the different 
characteristics of the organisations associated with Western 
Galil and the changing role of planners in these 
organisations) had crucial effects on the planners' ability 
to operate. This part of the chapter, therefore, addresses 
itself a major question: The extent to which the
institutional context of the planning processes in Western 
Galil during the relevant years permitted the adoption of 
planning initiatives and contributed to their execution. 
This requires, first, to discuss the basic characteristics 
of this context.
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A wide variety of organisations form the institutional 
context in our specific case: government ministries and 
governmental bodies, local authorities, the Jewish Agency 
for Israel (JAFI), and other public bodies such as 
Fellowship 2000 and the political "settlement movements". 
The discussion, for practical reasons, distinguishes between 
"direct" and "indirect" institutional contexts. The former 
is the system in which the planners' basic conditions of 
functioning are determined by virtue of their being employed 
by or contracted with it - the RSD in our case. The latter 
category refers to the various institutions that form part 
of the entire socio-political and administrative environment 
to which planners were related in course of the planning 
process. In the latter, interactions between planners and 
others do not involve formal "boss-employee" relations, but 
they are not necessarily any the less binding for planning 
function. Clearly, the institutions in this category are not 
equally relevant.
Differences in planning processes are expected to occur 
as a result of the planners' role in their direct 
institutional context and their relations with other 
institutions. Accordingly, the questions posed above are 
tackled in two stages: first, there is an attempt to analyse 
the major characteristics of the RSD and its structural 
changes that affected the status of planning function and 
the planners' ability to take part in regional processes. 
This is followed by a description of the relations between 
planners and other institutions related to the specific 
planning initiatives. This path of analysis permits us to 
concentrate on the areas in which planners were involved,
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and avoid a thorough discussion of the entire national, 
political and administrative processes during the years 
covered by this research.
7.2.1 The direct institutional context of planning
function: The Rural Settlement Department (RSD) of 
the Jewish Agency
The RSD is the organisation that employed the planners 
subject to our analysis during the years 1975-1986. Hence, 
we are concerned here with the extent to which the RSD's 
apparatus affected planners' ability to initiate plans and 
promote their implementation. Since this potential for 
operation changed over the years, the following discussion 
emphasises the historical processes in the RSD that 
determined the role of the planning function in the system's 
internal decision-making milieu.
The Rural Settlement Department, as noted in Chapter 5, 
is part of the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the latter 
being a unique quasi-governmental by virtue of its 
relatively high executive power and fair degree of 
independence from government policies and executive 
machinery, although it is authorised to function in areas 
under basic government responsibility.
The relations between JAFI and its specific departments 
are such that the basic principles of policies are 
determined by the JAFI Executive. The departments are 
authorised to interpret principles into specific policies 
and to execute them; thus, they can be fairly independent in
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that they, rather than the JAFI international institutions, 
can dictate policies in their areas of concern. Planning 
functions are mainly confined to the specific departments, 
with regional planning the domain of the RSD. Within the 
RSD, regional planning takes place in the regional 
offices.16 The fragmented JAFI system results in a situation 
whereby policies oriented to internal Israeli affairs are 
largely a result of the specific departments' initiatives 
and their actual application. Accordingly, the strength of 
the RSD stems from its substantial control over numerous 
collective settlements scattered all over the country. This 
also is linked to the traditional national political- 
ideological importance assigned to the "settlement 
processes" (Chapter 5).
In practice, the processes characterising the RSD 
during the years 1975-1986 had clear implications in terms 
of its ability and will to take advantage of its potential 
relative independence from JAFI, the coherence of its 
executed policies, and their impact on regional processes. 
These processes were expressed at all administrative levels 
of the RSD: from the national management, through its 
regional offices, to the individual professionals. They can 
also be associated with the planning function that is 
structured in this system. In fact, the year 1983 can be 
identified as the point in time at which the accumulated 
effect of the different processes characterising the RSD 
during the 1970s and 1980s made itself felt in the entire 
system, resulting in the creation of virtually a different 
RSD apparatus system, and a different environment for
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planning functions. This changing structure of the RSD can 
be further associated with the two "blocs" of planning 
initiatives discussed in Chapter 6 - the 1970s "settlement 
plans" and the 1985 Region 2000 development strategy, each 
belonging to a different RSD apparatus. Several 
institutional changes in the RSD were particularly important 
for the practice of the two blocs of planning initiatives. 
To discuss these processes, the information presented in 
Chapter 5 should be extended in one aspect, to note three 
trends in nation-wide processes that affected the socio­
economic system in which the RSD operated:
a. The 1977 general elections to the Israeli government 
that resulted in a Liberal-Revisionist alliance 
("right-wing" or Likud) government after 30 years of 
Labour-Zionist control. The immediate effect on the RSD 
came through the change in the political party 
coalition of the Zionist Congress, leading to the 
appointment of two directors to the RSD. This, however, 
was only one aspect of the different socio-economic 
system, previously governed by Labour party 
institutions, with which the RSD had to deal. Further 
effects included, for example, changes in public 
intervention priorities (i.e., "anti-socialist" 
policies and different territorial preferences), the 
jolting of traditional administrative procedures, and 
creation of expectations for minimized social 
discrimination.
b. From the mid-1970s, the country has been experiencing 
an increasing growth in the importance of industrial
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activities and a shift away from the traditional 
importance of agriculture, especially agriculture 
applying traditional technologies. Since agriculture 
was the economic base of most of the settlements under 
control of the RSD, and since "agriculture" created the 
ideological foundation of RSD intervention and its 
operational machinery, the introduction of industrial 
activities posed a difficult challenge for those aiming 
to promote the development of RSD-sponsored 
settlements, and forced different operational 
conditions on the RSD: first, the RSD lacked the
normative procedures and resources to deal with 
industrialisation of settlements. Second, some 
settlements lacked the skills and the incentive to 
acquire the know-how for either modernising 
agricultural production or integrating industrial 
activities into their economic base. Third, 
agriculturally based settlements formed the electoral 
base of N. Zvili (a co-director of the RSD) and the 
Labour party; structural changes in these settlements 
may have meant a loss of this power.
The mid-1980s are marked by a deepening economic and 
social crisis in the cooperative settlement system, 
seen in the disintegration of the family productive 
unit and the cooperative principle on which most 
collective settlements are structured. This structural 
crisis grew out of previous years of uncontrolled 
spending in consumption and minimal allocations for the 
productive base of settlements, especially during the 
post-1977 nation-wide economic euphoria (Ravid, 1986;
Gibton, 1986). Since the cooperative settlement system 
was the traditional environment of reference of the RSD 
(i.e., its source of legitimacy and official 
authority), the collapsing system raised questions 
regarding the contribution of the RSD to this socio­
economic system, thus forcing the RSD to take action 
with regard to the collapsing settlements, and allocate 
to them large parts of its budget.
In all, these trends, which had measurable expression 
from the mid 1980s, are undoubtedly rooted in pre-1980 
national socio-economic and political processes, as much as 
in the pre-1980 RSD management and policy determinations 
that failed to perceive the coming changes in the country 
and especially in the collective settlement system. Most 
important for our discussion is that these processes 
introduced to the RSD unfamiliar issues and problems to cope 
with, some even beyond its official scope of intervention. 
Accordingly, the issues and problems planners had to deal 
with were also affected, creating different challenges for 
pre-1980 and post-1980 planning initiatives: Pre-1980 
planners operated on the "safe" base (i.e., a stable role of 
the RSD in the collective settlement system, and a general 
satisfaction with their existence). Post-1980 planners, 
however, functioned during a period in which most of the 
principles of RSD intervention and the structure of 
collective settlements were being questioned.
Apart from these changing conditions, several 
additional changes in the administrative structure of the
316
RSD are particularly important for our attempt to understand
planners' functional conditions. These changes occurred in
the two major segments of the RSD's hierarchy (diagram 2,
appendix): The national apparatus, which consists of the
Director(s), General-Director and several vice-General
Directors (the latters are in charge mostly of the
professional divisions) (diagram 2),17 and the sub-national
system - regional offices. Five regional offices operated
(until 1990) (their distribution of authority is determined
by territorial criteria): Galil, North, Central, Jerusalem,
and Negev. The North Region office, the subject of this case
1 ftstudy, is composed of three professional sections:1 
Development Planning, Construction, and Water. Regional 
planning is confined to the "planning unit", classified 
within the Development Planning section. This unit operates 
under dual subordination: the regional office management and 
the professional control of the "planning authority" 
(mutually controlled by the RSD and the Ministry of 
Agriculture.)
The following changes in the RSD, all specifically 
relevant to the role of planners, are therefore specified 
according to the RSD's basic structure.
7.2.1.1. Changes in the RSD national management system
a. The Structure of Management:
Until 1977, the RSD was headed by one director, R. 
Weitz - a charismatic leader who was well appreciated in 
JAFI and maintained continuous contacts with its
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international bodies.
From 1977 to 1988 two political nominees of the two 
large political parties (i.e., Labour and Likud) served as 
the RSD's co-directors. During most of this period the 
management was shared by R. Weitz and M. Drobles, their 
coexistence facilitated by a clear distribution of 
authority, although Weitz was undoubtedly the dominant.
In 1983, with the appointment of N. Zvili (a member of
the Labour Party) as co-director with M. Drobles, RSD
management procedures became problematic; while both lacked
a dominant role over the department, cooperation was
prevented due to the importance given to political party
considerations in the directors' decision-making, and to the
resulting development of a dual execution apparatuses.
Consequently, the selection of settlements, issues, and
regional systems subject to the concern of either of the RSD
directors was consistent mainly with Party's considerations,
resulting, for example, in situations where two settlements
in close physical proximity were supported by two different
directors with their sometimes conflicting policy principles
and instructions. Since each director attempted to increase
control over settlements, competition between directors was
unavoidable, thus creating crucial inefficiencies in
managing the RSD activities, especially those affecting
regional systems, since they consist of many settlements,
1 9involve various issues, and require cooperation.
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b. Toward administrative disorder:
Up to 1983, the RSD functioned as a highly centralised 
system that maintained a clear administrative hierarchy. 
Overall policy determination, and the provision of 
assistance to regional offices (assistance mainly was given 
on the latter's request) was done at the national level of 
management. Regional offices were given a wide authority in 
executing the department's policy.
The 1983 change of directors created complete chaos in 
the hierarchy: these directors became involved in the small 
details of actual execution of policies, approaching 
different administrative and professional functions 
regardless of official role in the system, thus paralyzing 
the Director General's coordination of the RSD's activities, 
and confusing the regional offices with their conflicting 
instructions. Importantly, this situation increased the 
importance of informal relations between personnel, the 
directors, and other managers of the system - all involved 
in a "mismatch" of policy determination and internal 
management affairs.
c. Toward disintegration of departmental policy:
Until the early 1980s, the RSD had a clear view of its 
role in the national social-economy, and had solid policy 
principles. Indeed, over the years, its coherent resource 
allocation policies gave it a dominant role in areas where 
collective settlements existed. In administratively defined 
regions, RSD policy was oriented toward the expansion of the 
settlement system. High priority was given to peripheral 
areas within the "green line", although other areas were
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also subject to intervention.
The period from the early 1980s saw a growing confusion 
and inconsistency in policies. Conflicts arose around 
several issues: The extent to which the RSD should maintain 
its intensive intervention in collective settlement areas. 
This traditional role was questioned mainly by the JAFI 
international institutions; The extent to which the RSD 
should take over government responsibility for the economic 
consolidation of collective settlements. This debate arose 
in relation with the economic crisis of the 1980s in the
O  A
settlement system;The determination of areas that should 
be ranked with high priority for RSD intervention. 
Importantly, this period was marked by a growing emphasis on 
political considerations in RSD decision-making, and by 
attempts on the part of the directors to utilise 
professional units in justifying the different policies. 
Consequently, it became difficult to formulate long-term, 
department-wide policies and provide a solid base for future 
intervention.
d. Decreased independence of the RSD vis-a-vis JAFI
institutions:
The importance of "settlement" issues to the Israeli 
and the JAFI political systems is evident in view of the 
appointment of two directors to the RSD, each representing a 
different government political bloc. This, however, did not 
imply immediate support of RSD policies by these political 
systems. Under Weitz's directorship, the RSD was highly 
independent in determining its policies and activities, for 
which it enjoyed full JAFI backing while attracting a large
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portion of the total JAFI budget. By comparison, after 1983, 
the two-director structure seemed to justify the 
intervention of JAFI international institutions in RSD
O  1
policy-making and internal management As a result, the 
RSD's ability to determine its own policies independently of 
JAFI decreased drastically, as expressed, for example, in 
its growing difficulties in attaining approval of its 
requested budget, not to mention the difficulties inherent 
in making possible changes in policy orientation or taking 
over other departments' tasks, as implied by the Region 2000 
strategy.
e. The role of regional offices:
Weitz's pragmatic management approach and the wide 
authority he gave the regional offices implied his 
acceptance of changes in RSD policy resulting from policy 
execution. Regional offices were, indeed, relatively free to 
determine specific programs, and in many cases to establish 
the role of the RSD in regional systems. These offices also 
were fully backed by Weitz in the government and JAFI 
systems. By contrast, the administrative disorder prevailing 
since 1983 resulted in an unclear role of regional offices 
and a selective backing of their activities. Although these 
offices gained some freedom to determine their activities (a 
consequence of the lack of a departmental policy and minimal 
central control), this was not a result of a purposeful 
decentralised authority, and, in many cases, the offices 
were paralysed by conflicting instructions and inefficient 
management.
In both periods, the regional offices were viewed as a
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major professional segment of the RSD. Differences, however,, 
existed in the extent of the management's commitment to 
professional recommendations: such commitment was greater 
during the first period, whereas after 1983 there was a 
tendency to adopt those proposals that complied with the 
directors' political interests. In fact, the role of 
regional offices in RSD decision-making reflects the major 
characteristics of the department's apparatus system, 
especially since its actual intervention was activated 
through these regional offices. To conclude, one should note 
the example of the Avtalion settlement in Western Galil, 
whose establishment (in 1985) was directed by M. Drobles, in 
spite of strong opposition of the co-director N. Zvili and 
most of the North region planners. This case reflects the 
lack of RSD policy priorities and the total disjunction 
between the interests of the directors.
7.2.1.2. Processes in the RSD North region office
Apart from the above processes, several other elements
in the specific region office authorised to deal with
Western Galil determined planners' direct functional
environment. The director of the Haifa Region office Y.
Friedman (until April 1983), in accordance with the general
departmental attitude toward regional planning function,
assigned planners a crucial role in his decision-making:
"having realised that an efficient management of activities
and determination of 'a regional perspective' is a function
22of planners' integration in decision-making processes",
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planners were, indeed, incorporated into most of the. 
office's decision-making processes and were provided with a 
wider authority than that required by their official brief. 
Planners enjoyed the freedom to initiate projects and manage 
different activities, and to established their professional 
status in the RSD.
The appointments of E. Schmidt (April 1983 to April 
1984) and M. Cohen (April 1984-1988) were marked by these 
directors' efforts to eliminate the role of planners in the 
regional offices. This was expressed by conflicts between 
them and the head of the Planning Section (T. Duchan), in 
difficulties for planners to operate, and in their growing 
exclusion from the office's decision-making. This conflict 
was exacerbated by the administrative disorder in the RSD, 
which, at times, enabled planners to bypass the regional 
offices through the support of one of the co-directors of 
the department (mostly N. Zvili). Planners, indeed, 
attempted to take advantage of this administrative 
fragmentation, but without much success, as will be 
discussed further on. Their professional subordination to 
the Planning Authority (refer to diagram 2) further enabled 
them to initiate plans remotely from the North Region 
office. Indeed, this ability was encouraged by the vice­
director of the Planning Authority (the former director of 
the RSD North Region office, Y. Friedman), who controlled 
its planning functions. There is evidence, however, that 
although the North Region office's planners were embroiled 
in the above conflict, this conflict was not so much over 
the role of planners in the regional office, as was 
initially thought, and that planners were merely a "ball" in
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the game between the directors of this office. As noted by. 
Mr. M. Cohen: "since he (Y. Friedman, O.G.) expected,
through planners, to maintain control over the regional 
office, I was left with only the alternative of excluding 
planners from decision-making processes in the regional 
office. This proved to be a mistake, since after you 
(planners, O.G.) left the regional office, we did not know 
what to do in relation to numerous projects, especially 
Region 2000, which was most important". J Nevertheless, 
during most of the period from 1983 on, the ability of 
planners to function was constantly disrupted and their work 
jeopardized, as will be discussed below.
To sum up, the above processes in the RSD indicate that 
the planners' degree of operative freedom was positively 
correlated with RSD functional integrity: During the first 
period, planners were part of a stable decision-making 
system and an orderly operating mechanism, in which planning 
function had a clearly defined role. This period is also 
noted for the strong position of the RSD vis-A-vis the 
entire JAFI, resulting in a large budget for, and hence 
great executive power of the RSD. The "settlement plans" of 
the 1970s represent a situation in which planners were able 
to take full advantage of the authority to initiate plans 
and promote their implementation through the plans' 
integration into the department's decision-making system. 
Being backed by the RSD gave planning initiatives the 
credibility and access to resources required for 
implementation. This in turn created the ability to 
incorporate different non-JAFI institutions and individuals
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into the planning process, as will be discussed in the. 
following discussion.
The economic crisis of the 1980s in the settlement 
system heavily sponsored by the RSD and the disjointed RSD 
apparatus, created difficult conditions for planning 
practice. Under the dual-director structure, the unofficial 
relations that dominated the decision-making processes gave 
planners some potential for initiating plans with the 
backing of some of the RSD managers. The Region 2000 
strategy represents an attempt by planners to generate RSD 
patronage of the project, by taking advantage of these 
elements. Implementation of this strategy, however, proved 
almost impossible: having had to deal with different
personnel conflicts and indirectly to satisfy the political 
interests of the directors, the planning function found 
itself subject to the changing RSD commitments and 
inconsistency in its performance. This further damaged the 
planners' credibility, and did not contribute to the 
creation of any "risk-elimination" conditions.
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7.2.2 The indirect institutional context: non-JAFI 
organisations
The "indirect institutional context" of the "settlement 
plans" and Region 2000 consists of all non-JAFI 
organisations. All comprise this category for the sole 
reason that they did not employ the planners initiating the 
plans discussed here. The "indirect" status has two major 
implications: first, all bodies, with the exception of 
Fellowship 2000, were incorporated into the planning process 
after plans' initiation within the RSD. Their incorporation 
reflects the mechanism of the plans' implementation, through 
which the types of issues and the bodies affiliated with 
these issues are determined. Once the initial links of these 
bodies with the plans are determined, their role in the 
planning process is dictated mostly by their interest in 
different aspects of the plans and the target region. 
Second, the lack of boss-employee relations enables planners 
to avoid involvement in internal institutional affairs (such 
as the RSD personnel conflicts) that might divert their 
efforts to irrelevant issues. It should be emphasised that 
being classified in the "indirect" category does not suggest 
anything about the nature of these organisations ’ 
involvement in the regional (in our case) and the planning 
processes. In fact, the incorporation of non-JAFI 
organisations into the planning process is important, 
especially since the RSD does not operate in a vacuum, and 
the plans assume that overall public intervention principles 
will change in Western Galil (at least).
Our concern here is with the extent to which the
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indirect institutional context contributed to the potential, 
for planners to function, and the degree to which it 
affected their role in the plans' implementation. Since we 
are dealing with RSD planners and predominantly RSD 
activities (especially up to 1983), the questions are 
whether there was cooperation with RSD initiatives, and what 
was the planners' role in these relations. The first 
question will be assessed through the discussion of the role 
of public organisations in Western Galil: the potential case 
for establishing cooperation with RSD activities on the one 
hand, and the organisations' actual attitude toward issues 
connected with the planning initiative on the other hand. 
The second question is tackled in the following chapter.
7.2.2.1 The distribution of organisations' official 
authority
This section attempts to demonstrate a potential case 
for cooperation with RSD activities and its planners, as a 
function of the authority of the organisations constituting 
this “indirect" category in their operation in Western Galil 
during the relevant years. In principle, this context of the 
planning initiatives is notable for its fragmentation, 
minimal coordination, and basically nationally oriented 
policy-making regarding regional affairs (as specified in 
Chap. 5). The processes related to the "settlement plans" 
involved an extremely wide variety of public organisations, 
most of which were traditionally involved in Western Galil. 
The Region 2000 strategy, which was subject to very limited
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implementation attempts, necessarily generated the 
involvement of a limited selection of organisations. 
"Necessarily", since it is assumed that implementation is a 
major process generating involvement of different public and 
private agencies in the regional activities.
The following list of public organisations briefly 
presents those that, through their activities in Western 
Galil during the years 1975-1986, were linked to the RSD 
planning initiatives. Emphasis in on the organisations' 
official authority (Menuhin, 1980) and the areas of 
"collision" and convergence with RSD activities. The latter 
are important insofar as RSD activities can be associated 
with the planning initiatives. This information enables us 
to reveal the organisations' relations with planners and the 
general conditions under which they functioned.
a. Government ministries
* The Interior Ministry - this office is the national 
planning authority (e.g., it allocates Building Permits, 
determines national master plans, and approves regional 
master plans). Equally important are its other roles, mainly 
refereeing local authorities and regional councils, and 
controlling the population register. As the highest national 
planning authority, this ministry potentially serves as the 
overall coordinator of numerous public and private 
initiatives with some land-use expression. Its links to 
local authorities are a further source of power. Its lack of 
an execution budget (and machinery), however, is a major 
constraint to its potential coordinating power.
Interactions between this ministry and the RSD planning
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initiatives were supposed, by law, to be established at 
early stages of the plans' formulation, and before their 
implementation. In practice, however, the construction of 
new settlements ("mitzpim") was launched without the 
official approval of the North District Commission2  ^ (as 
further specified in Chap. 8). Nevertheless, at very early 
stages of the "mitzpim" project, the North District 
commissioner was approached by the director of RSD North 
Region office and its planners. This was meant to legalise
n c
the settlement. Once the project was introduced, the 
cooperation between the RSD and the commissioner was 
established with regard to all relevant RSD activities. The 
case of Region 2000 was different. The ministry was 
represented in Fellowship 2000 by Mr. Y. Golani, and the 
North District commissioner (Y. Kening) was also associated 
with it, but no contacts with the RSD were developed on the 
basis of this project. Mr. Golani, the chairman of the 
national planning commission, opposed the RSD planning 
initiative on the grounds of "undesired involvement of the 
RSD in a government project"2** (and probably also because of 
his involvement with the first planning group headed by 
Lichfield and Partners).
* Ministry of Agriculture - the national authority for 
managing agricultural activities. Among its tasks are the 
determination of production priorities, production quotas 
for nationally controlled agricultural products, and the 
allocation of nationally owned means of production (water, 
land).
Since RSD-sponsored settlements were traditionally based on 
agriculture, the relations RSD-Ministry of Agriculture were
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obvious; for years, clear working procedures and 
distribution of authority prevailed. Cooperation in planning 
was carried out by the Planning Authority (whose vice­
director general has the same status in the RSD). For 
example, settlements' programs prepared by RSD regional 
offices are approved by the Planning Authority.
The establishment of new settlements in the Galil took place 
in full cooperation with this ministry. Over the years, the 
shift away from agriculture decreased the need for such 
cooperation, although the Region 2000 strategy created a new 
area of cooperation. In fact, the Planning Authority had an 
important role in promoting the strategy's approval, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 8.
* Ministry of Housing - authorised to deal with two 
distinct issues: "public h o u s i n g " ^ 7 and road construction. 
Until 1978, most collective settlements were established by 
the Rural Building Administration (planning and execution) 
of this ministry. Assistance to housing is currently 
confined to the allocation of financial assistance to 
individuals (i.e., mortgages).
As noted, the "mitzpim" project changed the status quo in 
the relations between this ministry and the RSD: the RSD 
initiated the construction of new settlements, and only 
later applied for the Housing Ministry's assistance in the 
establishment of permanent housing and standard roads 
leading to these settlements (i.e., the temporary housing 
arrangement). This ministry was represented in Fellowship 
2000, and its Programming Unit (headed by Ms. Eldor) 
contributed to the formulation of the first strategic
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proposal (presented by the Lichfield and IDC group). Beyond 
that, this ministry did not participate in financing the 
Fellowship, nor did it show a particular interest.
* Ministry of Communication (and Bezek, Ltd.) - the 
national authority for telephone system development and 
maintenance. It also controls other means of communication 
(e.g., operating licenses for satellite stations), .pm .50"
This ministry was incorporated in the construction of 
new settlements, limiting its concern to the establishment 
of the required infrastructure according to national 
standards. The way it was initially incorporated is 
described in Chapter 8. A major role in the promotion of 
Region 2000 was given by Fellowship 2000 to the development 
of the telecommunications infrastructure. The chief 
scientist of this ministry (Mr. Y. Kela), a permanent member 
of Fellowship 2000 (until 1987), was particularly interested 
in Region 2000, which he thought to be "an appropriate 
opportunity to set up a different standard in the national 
communication infrastructure, and seek for solutions that 
will enable the country to accommodate its infrastructure to 
available modern technologies" (Kela, 1986). In his work 
with the RSD he guided planners' attempts to mold strategic 
principles into concrete actions. Several unsuccessful 
attempts were made to convince the minister (Mr. Rubinstein) 
to utilise Region 2000 as a model for country-wide 
improvements.
* Ministry of Industry and Trade - the major government 
authority in the area of industrial development (though not 
the only body affecting such activities). Unlike in most 
other areas of public intervention, direct construction of
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industries is rare. Rather, this ministry makes its impact, 
through the allocation of various incentives, mainly to 
means of production but also to productive activities. In 
some cases, this ministry manages (through the Industrial 
Building Company, Ltd.) the physical development of 
industrial parks and buildings.
The role of this ministry in the industrial development 
processes of Western Galil is fairly significant: promoting 
the relocation of large firms (especially export-oriented 
industries), enlargement of existing industries, financial 
contribution to R&D activities, and the development of two 
large industrial parks (in Tefen and Karmiel). Links between 
the new settlements of Western Galil developed mostly from 
the beginning of the 1980s, and occurred on an individual 
basis (i.e., between the ministry and individual firms or 
settler-entrepreneurs). Project Region 2000 was initiated in 
this ministry, and in a 1985 government resolution this 
ministry (under a different minister) was given official 
(though not sole) responsibility over the project. This, 
however, did not imply its continuous commitment to the 
committee's recommendations. Over the years, this ministry 
provided about 50% of the Katzir Committee's and Fellowship 
2000's budget. Further, the chief scientist and the 
minister's assistant were constantly associated with actions 
related to the Region 2000 project. However, due to the 
minister's (Mr. A. Sharon, since 1985) opinion that Region 
2000 should be integrated into the ministry's standard 
activities rather than designated as a "model area", the 
interest of this ministry was gradually limited to its 
theoretical development and not to its implementation.
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Moreover, since he thought this project should be controlled
by the ministry and not become subject to "cooperative
9 ftgovernment concern", ° any other body's independent 
involvement in the project was rejected, especially that of 
the ministry of Economics and Planning and the RSD.
* Ministry of Economics and Planning - created as a 
result of the coalition agreement between the two large 
political parties. Its authority lies in the area of macro 
planning of economic development. This ministry lacks an 
executive capability (i.e., no administration and budget for 
executing its plans), and execution of its proposals depend 
heavily on government resolutions and the Treasurer's 
policy. By definition, this ministry is not involved in the 
non-national levels of processes. Exceptionally, the 
minister (Mr. G. Ya'akobi) was allocated some authority by 
the government resolutions related to Region 2000 to 
coordinate government activities. Indeed, Region 2000, in 
which this ministry expressed high interest, provided him 
with the opportunity to extend the range of issues under the 
ministry's concern and inaugurate its association with 
regional-level economic activities. The minister's interest 
was particularly notable in his attempts (following 
Fellowship 2000) to establish a "coordinating government 
body" (chaired by this minister) and a private firm that
O Q
will carry out most developments m  Region 2000. * During 
the few years of its involvement in this project, some 
relations between this ministry and the RSD developed, as 
will be discussed further.
* Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Defense Forces - 
these bodies, as their names indicate, are concerned with
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defense issues. They are associated with Western Galil and 
its related planning initiatives in several aspects: first, 
the military is an important element in the distribution of 
land uses (i.e., large land reserves are designated as 
"closed military Fire Areas" excluded from any non-military 
use, and their distribution create a situation whereby most 
land-use projects require coordination with the Armed 
Forces). Second, The construction of new settlements is 
associated with close links between this ministry and the 
RSD: mutual needs, interests, and plans were coordinated on 
a regular basis by a specific staff member of each body. 
Third, the military and semi-military industries located in 
Western Galil (e.g., Rafael industrial plants in Karmiel and 
Segev) are an important element in the region's industrial 
development and the attraction of migrants to the area. 
Region 2000-associated activities were geared to the 
military industrial plants. Relations with them were 
confined to members of the Fellowship 2000 executive, and 
they were essentially for the purpose of sharing information 
rather than coordination of plans and development strategies 
(especially from the side of the military).
b. Regional councils and local authorities
This category refers to the existing system of local 
political institutions in Western Galil, as specified in 
Chapter 5. Among the different bodies, the Misgav regional 
council and the municipality of Karmiel developed particular 
relations with the RSD. The Misgav regional council
334
maintained close relations with most of the RSD system, the 
latter heavily affecting the settlements' social and 
economic structures. Planners, especially during the years 
1978-1983, worked with this council on an almost daily 
basis, sharing plans, needs, problems of any kind, and in 
fact almost any issue with which the council was dealing at 
the time. As this council's apparatus was established, links 
with the RSD were limited to the specific aspects over which 
the RSD had authority, thus moderating the personal 
relations that accompanied the first period.
Karmiel municipality had no official relations with the RSD. 
However, as an active member of the Katzir Committee and 
Fellowship 2000, the mayor of Karmiel (Mr. B. Vanger) 
encouraged relations with the RSD, whose importance was 
viewed in two complementary aspects: "as an important source 
of financial resources to the project, and a source of 
highly qualified professional assistance from the North
O A
Region office's planners". Moreover, as a member of the 
Labour Party and a political associate of Mr. Zvili (RSD 
co-director), Mr. Vanger made numerous attempts to promote 
RSD commitment to Region 2000.
c. Government companies
Government companies are numerous, dealing with a wide 
range of issues and political-economic activities. These 
companies basically are related to one specific ministry, 
and they are partially autonomous in determining their
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activities, especially since their management is nominated 
on a political basis. The importance of such companies 
varies according to their specific area of authority, the 
historical processes that affect the extent of their control 
over resources, and the extent of their affiliation with 
dominant political ministers. We shall specify only three 
such companies.
* Israeli Land Authority (ILA) - the national authority 
for the management of state-owned land reserves. Its major 
authority and strength lies in land allocation for different 
private and public purposes. By law, for example, the ILA's 
approval is a prerequisite of any building permit. It can 
substantially affect urban development (mainly in peripheral 
areas) by determining the extent of land to be made 
available for different uses.
Close relations of the ILA with the RSD characterised the 
"mitzpim" project and its subsequent land development 
activities; these were based on the ILA's and RSD's mutually 
shared interest to increase Jewish land control in Western 
Galil. The interest of the ILA in Region 2000 was provoked 
by Mr. Ya'akobi's idea to establish a private firm to manage 
the land development process. This created a "danger" for 
the ILA, in terms of losing control over its assets in 
Western Galil (and probably in other parts of the country 
later). Consequently, its Director General (Mr. Lipka), in 
coordination with the director of the RSD North Region 
office (Mr. Cohen), acted to scuttle the idea. This was 
justified on the grounds that "the state cannot afford to 
allocate large parts of its land reserves to one or several 
private developers, who will realise easy-to-come benefits
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and may later dictate to the state where and how to act".^* .
* TAHAL - the Israeli water planning authority. Any 
proposed regional plan with physical implications requires 
its approval, although execution normally takes place 
through Mekorot, Ltd. This is especially relevant in cases 
of large-scale plans (and is of no concern at the level of 
private housing). Accordingly, these companies played an 
important role during the construction of new settlements.
* Mivnei Ta'asi'a, Ltd. (Industrial Building) - 
specified under the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Although 
a fair degree of cooperation between the professional staff 
of this company and RSD planners prevailed during the entire 
period discussed, the tight control of the Minister of 
Industry prevented any cooperation in areas not directly 
confined to the company's concrete authority. Region 2000, 
for example, was completely out of its authority.
d. National non-governmental organisations
This category also comprises a wide variety of bodies, 
mostly nationally oriented in their policy determination and 
strongly linked to the political-governmental structure. A 
few are worthwhile to mention, especially for demonstrating 
the types of organisations RSD planners were dealing with.
* The Jewish National Fund (JNF) - an independent body 
within the WZO (see diagram 2). Its main relevance for our 
case stems from the work of two of its sections, Forestation 
and Land Development, through which most initial land 
development processes were executed by the RSD. For example, 
the actual construction of the "mitzpim" started with the
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request of the Department to the JNF "to start immediate 
execution of 7 Mitzpim" (Law-Yone, Lifchitz, 1990).
* Settlements Movements and the Ministerial Settlement 
Committee - the machinery through which the influence of the 
political parties in new collective settlements is 
exercised. Each settlement is affiliated to one "settlement 
movement" - a political body representing one of the large 
national interest groups. The Ministerial Settlement 
Committee approves establishment of settlements and their 
distribution to different settlement movements. These bodies 
were active during the construction of new settlements. 
Since competition between the movements characterises their 
principal relations, when coordination was required, it was 
carried out mainly by the RSD, and within it by directors of 
regional offices or of the RSD. Planners' relations with 
these movements were for the purpose of executing RSD's 
decisions. No relations were developed around Region 2000.
e. Katzir Committee and Fellowship 2000
The Katzir committee presented its conclusions and 
recommendations to the Minister of Industry and Trade in 
1982 and to the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs 
in March 1984, and by that was discharged of its official 
task. In practice, however, the committee assumed a major 
executive role in the implementation of its own 
recommendations, as attested by its working patterns and 
structures. Indeed, in 1983 it established Fellowship 2000 - 
a non-profit organisation, as the legal entity through which 
the implementation of the recommendations could be managed.
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This initiative was not approved (though it was not opposed) 
by the government, and thus, in fact, neither its official 
authority nor its budget were commensurate with its new 
task. The Katzir Committee in its new form as "Fellowship 
2000" remained a voluntary body whose mandate stemmed from 
the high status of its very well-known members from the 
public and the private sectors, especially Prof. Katzir, the 
fourth president of Israel.
The initial relations with the RSD were confined to the 
allocation of financial resources from the JAFI Executive to 
Fellowship 2000. the latter's approval of the RSD planning 
strategy for Region 2000 marked a change in its attitude 
toward the RSD, which gradually became to be seen as "the 
only body that can manage such a project".^ These relations 
were stimulated by RSD planners, who were granted with the 
initial official legitimisation to operate, while forcing 
the RSD's involvement in the project.
In 1987, after the Jewish Congress, during which it 
became clear that the RSD will not resume its expected role, 
Fellowship 2000 changed its entire approach toward the 
project.
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7.2.2.2 The operational basis of the planners' "indirect 
institutional context"
A limited selection of the wide variety of public 
organisations associated with Western Galil was presented 
above. The list, nonetheless, introduces the major bodies 
that had some links with the settlement process of the late 
1970s - early 1980s and the Region 2000 initiative.^  The 
distribution of authority between these public 
organisations, and their different official relations with 
the regional processes, suggest that as a potential base for 
practicing the RSD planning initiatives, the "indirect 
institutional context" did not provide favourable conditions 
for the management of regional processes. This stems from 
several major characteristics of this context:
a. Since different components of the regional system are 
under the official responsibility of different bodies, 
each component is likely to be treated from a fairly 
narrow, issue-specific perspective (for example, 
considerations of education programs and facilities 
disregard the regional industrial system). Accordingly, 
activities related to these regional components are 
budgeted according to the priorities determined by the 
specific organisation authorised for them, while these 
priorities are rarely coordinated on a regular base. 
Further, since most public institutions are nationally 
oriented in their policies (chapter 5), the above 
"issue-oriented" perspective and resource allocation 
criteria tend to be determined by non-regionally 
specific requirements.
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b. This distribution of authority suggests that those 
bodies with a limited executive budget are likely to be 
more vulnerable to actions of bodies with available 
resources and executive machinery. The experience of 
several ministries (e.g., Housing and Interior) during 
the years of mass settlement construction supports this 
conclusion (as further specified).
c. The institutional fragmentation suggests that 
coordination between these bodies and others is 
crucially important any attempt to affect resource 
allocation processes related to Western Galil. Yet, 
such a task of coordination can be practiced only at 
the level of the national government. No region- 
specific body is authorised to coordinate the numerous 
public bodies that operate at the regional level of 
activities.
d. The organisations had neither a commitment nor an 
official obligation to consider the RSD planning 
initiative. Needless to say, the RSD had no official 
authority to coordinate the different organisations' 
activities.
There is indeed ample evidence that the extent to which 
planners were able to cope with the fragmented institutional 
system and to operate in areas controlled by other 
organisations was a function of two elements: the role of 
"partners" (mainly the RSD) in the region-related decision­
making process on the one hand, and the content of the 
planning initiative on the other hand. These aspects are 
discussed below.
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The case of the RSD's integrity in pursuing the planning 
initiative, and promoting regional development in accordance 
with the principal planning perspective.
Clearly, the RSD played a dominant role in the Western 
Galil processes from 1976 to 1981, as manifested by its 
ability to mobilise the entire public intervention in a new 
direction (i.e., the impact of the construction of some 30 
new settlements on the functional system of Western Galil 
cannot be regarded as residual for the support systems that 
had to be established). In practice, although the plans to 
establish new settlements and the decision to implement them 
were initiated apart from the government system, and 
although implementation of these plans in cooperation with 
the entire government was considered (by both the RSD 
management and planners) essential for the successful 
establishment of new settlements, the actual force 
bulldozing the public system was the RSD, with its available 
resources and execution machinery. Nevertheless, other 
organisations were integrated as implementation advanced and 
their contribution was required. One should note the RSD 
attempted to avoid an aggressive "takeover" of other 
organisations' responsibilities; in the case of "temporary 
housing", for example, since the Ministry of Housing was 
unable to cope with the task of mass construction of new 
settlements, the Director General of the RSD (Mr. S. Ravid) 
introduced the idea of "temporary housing" to be built by 
the RSD as an immediate housing solution until the ministry 
could allocate assistance to permanent housing. In this way, 
the official role of the Housing Ministry was maintained,
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while the construction of new settlements, directed by the 
RSD, also was ensured. In other cases, the cooperation with 
RSD initiatives was established on the basis of the RSD's 
power (i.e., resources and executive machinery), which 
permitted it to make "tradeoffs" of its support for other 
ministries' policies in exchange for their support of the 
settlement process in Western Galil. For example, the 
approval of RSD plans by the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. A. 
Sharon) was obtained through the promise of Y. Friedman 
(director of the RSD North Region office) to promote the 
development of the Iron Valley settlement area. The latter 
area was important for the Minister of Agriculture.^ The 
same "method" was applied to the Ministry of Interior, with 
the result that the North District Commissioner became a 
full participant in the process of establishing the new 
settlements' legal status.
During the entire period of new settlement 
construction, since the RSD operated according to the 
guidelines set by the "settlement plans", these plans became 
the major source of reference for most public organisations 
associated with processes in Western Galil, with each 
organisation concerned about its "share" in the overall 
process. Over the years, as the role of the RSD was 
gradually adjusted to match its official proportion, 
enabling public organisations to take their standard role in 
the new settlements' affairs, the role of RSD planners was 
similarly restricted to RSD areas of intervention. This was, 
indeed, one of the tasks of the "settlement plans". Yet, the 
substantially modified role of the planners affected their
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future ability to promote other projects that penetrated 
other organisations' areas of authority, as the experience 
of Region 2000 indicates.
Region 2000 was initiated in an institutional system 
which, in its fragmentation and nationally oriented policy 
determination, was basically similar to that of earlier 
periods. Other aspects of the planning institutional context 
were different: this was a period in which several 
organisations (i.e., Fellowship 2000, the Ministry of 
Economics and Planning, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
and the municipality of Karmiel) were seeking to attain a 
dominant role in Region 2000 processes, but none actually 
had a significant advantage vis-a-vis the others. In view of 
the Fellowship 2000's unsuccessful attempts to enhance the 
RSD's interest in the project or provide an alternative 
backing system for the planners' initiatives, the basic 
"alertness" of other organisations to the previous 
experience (in which they were forced into a settlement 
process that without the RSD's role probably would never 
have occurred), created near-impossible conditions for 
planning practice and planners' attempts to function in 
their indirect institutional context and promote 
implementation of the Region 2000 strategy.
The practical implications of cooperation with the planning 
initiative in terms of its interference with the 
organisations' prevailing decision-making systems and 
functional mechanisms.
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As noted, the rapid construction of new settlements in. 
Western Galil (and other parts of Galil) was guided by the 
major planning objective of integrating this new system into 
the existing regional social economy. Although initiation of 
the process disregarded other organisations' opinions, 
policy priorities, and will to cooperate, the actual result 
not only did not eliminate the public system's role in the 
region but increased its areas of intervention. In this way, 
public control was maintained and the status quo in 
distribution of public authority respected.
Region 2000, by comparison, defined changing the above 
political status quo as its highest priority. In its 
proposals to create a "regional" system that does not exist 
in the current state system (i.e., the intermediate "tier" 
between local and national institutions does not exist), and 
to provide private capital with a major role in turning 
Western Galil into a large business center with massive 
capital inflow and Jewish immigration, Region 2000 
theoretically endangered the political system, which did not 
ease its access to the indirect institutional system. 
Indeed, evidences prove that the attitude of decision-makers 
to this planning initiative was predominantly a function of 
their reaction to the degree of "political power" inherent 
in this project, i.e., the ability to impose one's own 
principles and desires on others, stemming from the extent 
of one's control over material and political resources that 
may become available in Region 2000. Theoretically, one 
could argue that the changes endorsed by Region 2000 have 
the potential to yield massive resources, enabling those who 
are in control of these resources to increase their power
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related to the region, its specific segments and the nation. 
By this rational, the proposed changes should basically be 
acceptable to most decision-makers. Alternatively, these 
changes might be rejected, since creating a "regional" 
system implies a projection of authority from the national 
system to the "region". This is likely to result in a 
diminishment of the existing functional sub-regional units1 
and the national system's control over local systems. 
Further, turning Region 2000 into a large business center 
could yield financial resources (generated, for example, 
through taxation), enabling the "regional" decision-making 
system to function in relative freedom vis-&-vis the 
national political system. In other words, creating the 
"missing niche" in the political system implies 
decentralising the national political system.
In practice, an analysis of patterns of involvement of 
decision-makers in Region 2000 indicates that the "missing 
nisch" paradigm provoked those decision-makers who were 
actively involved in Region 2000. It explains attempts by 
the Minister of Economics and Planning to advance the 
project, by which means he expected to add the "executive 
function" to his office, and Mr. B. Vanger's (the Mayor of 
Karmiel) attempts to integrate the various local functional 
units into one large "regional entity". In the same way, it 
explains the opposition of the Minister of Industry and 
Trade and the Director General of the Israeli Land 
Authority, who attempted to prevent the relocation of parts 
of their power base to other ministries and the private 
sector. Therefore, the proposed redistribution could not
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have been acceptable to all political decision-makers, and. 
the attitude of those currently more powerful in terms of 
control over resources (e.g., the Minister of Trade and 
Industry) was the dominant one.
Finally, an analysis of the processes related to Region 
2000 indicates that the official attitude of public 
organisations also was a function of their attitude toward 
its major strategic proposal: leaving aside the
redistribution issue, the political system was unwilling to 
accept the proposal to distinguish Western Galil from other 
peripheral areas. This refusal to provide Western Galil with 
high priority was expressed at every possible occasion. The 
government resolutions on Region 2000 are good examples of 
that.
In all, several government and JAFI resolutions 
(approved from 1987 to 1985) related to the planning 
initiative, reflect the essential attitude of political 
decision-makers toward the planning initiative. These 
resolutions state a fairly general approval for the issues 
concerned: the ''mitzpim" project and Region 2000. However, 
they are distinct in several aspects: first, whereas the 
1979 government resolution specifically refers to the 
"mitzpim" in the Galil project, all other resolutions extend 
their reference to other regions, mainly the Negev (the 
southern periphery). This is a clear attempt to avoid 
distinguishing the Galil from other parts of the country. 
Indeed, this reflects the basic traditional political 
approach of the past 40 years, according to which the Galil 
does not have any special problems that justify its positive
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discrimination from other peripheries. In fact, it is 
precisely this non-discriminatory attitude that all the RSD 
planning initiatives attempted to change, but only the 
"mitzpim" project met with success in this: by not demanding 
any commitment other then general approval of plans, the RSD 
actually put it into practice. These resolutions further 
differ in the ways they determine distribution of official 
authority. Most resolutions (except those of 1984 and 1985) 
fully legitimise the RSD to function on behalf of the 
government and JAFI. By contrast, the 1984 and 1985 
resolutions concerning Region 2000 allocate responsibilities 
to three ministries: Treasury, Economics and Planning, and 
Industry and Trade. In other words, only the resolutions 
regarding Region 2000 gave such "shared" authority to 
government ministries, disregarding all other bodies 
(especially Fellowship 2000 and the RSD). This can be 
explained in terms of the nature of political control over 
the areas of concern that is implicit in these initiatives; 
the "mitzpim" project was executed by the RSD in accordance 
with its basic official authority (although there is a 
question regarding the extent to which the government fully 
appreciated the project's consequences and its required 
future contribution to the Galil). As opposed to that, not 
only had Region 2000 been initiated within the government, 
but control over this project could potentially change the 
prevailing distribution of authority between ministers, 
which otherwise could not be realized without considerable 
difficulty. Thus, to allow the RSD to control Region 2000 
was politically impossible.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter dealt with two categories of planning 
function determinants:
First, the nature of the planning product as an 
expression of the planners' "state of mind" and a function 
of their capacity to estimate the ability of the executive 
system to absorb it. Theoretically, the nature of the 
planning product depends totally on the planners' 
perception. However, the need to promote its acceptance 
within a given political-administrative system and its 
executive machinery, may affect the articulated perception, 
and hence the planning product. The question to be solved 
only in practice is how can planners find the proper balance 
between their "state of mind" and that of the system within 
which materialisation is expected to be carried out?
Second, the nature of the institutional context of the 
planning process, as establishing potential conditions of 
operation. In view of planners' lack of political and 
executive power, the institutional system within which 
planners operate becomes a significant determinant of their 
functioning potential. The associated questions are: Where 
did the institutional system permit planners to stress their 
perception, and do planners have the tools to cope with 
"institutional" processes, which may not necessarily be 
related to the content of the planning product? The 
discussion distinguished between two basically different 
planning products and two different features in the 
performance of the Rural Settlement Department (RSD) of the 
Jewish Agency for Israel as most important in determining
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the planners' base of action. The indirect institutional, 
context was important for planning functions only insofar as 
the RSD permitted connections with it.
On the whole, the potential for planners to operate in 
a way that promotes the implementation of the planning 
product is by now fairly clear. The simplicity and 
concreteness of the recommendations of the "settlement 
plans" that were provided in connection with one, clearly 
defined sub-system of Western Galil, and the conformity of 
planning principles to the prevailing RSD attitude toward 
the issues of "settlement process" and "regional 
development", paved the way for integrating these planning 
products into the RSD decision-making system. In practice, 
commitment of the entire RSD system to these planning 
products was generated by satisfying the immediate interest 
of the head of the RSD (Mr. Weitz) in the area, permitting 
him to authorise immediate actions and determine the scale 
and especially the speed of the plans' execution, in ways 
not foreseen by the planners.
By comparison, the abstract and "different" thoughts 
expressed in the Region 2000 strategy were very appealing to 
different decision-makers, both in the RSD and in other 
institutions, but only to the degree of generating official 
approval of the planning product, the lowest level of 
commitment. By not making the strategy more concrete, or 
reducing it to a set of operational programmes, planners 
failed to provide a basis for commitment to concrete issues 
and actions. Admittedly, Region 2000 may have been made more
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concrete over time, as planners indeed attempted to do.. 
This, however, was almost impossible under the fragmented 
conditions of the RSD system, and the political interests 
that the project created in the government and local 
political systems. This experience emphasises that in such 
cases a strategy that lacks programmes or any type of 
specificity is useless for the purpose of generating the 
commitment of "partners".
The next chapter attempts to shed light on the way in 
which planners coped with their potential for functioning 
that was imposed from outside, and the potential they 
created.
Notes
(1) Fellowship 2000, minutes from a meeting, dated 15.3.1985.
(2) M inutes from RSD Executive meeting dated: 26.7.1985.
(3) Ibid., and minutes of meeting between the director of RSD North region office
(Mr. M. Cohen) and the planners of this office dated 3.5.1985.
(4) This is not to suggest either that official approval of plans necessarily implies 
their im plem entation, or that plans that accord prevailing rules and operational 
norms are necessarily implemented. The following discussion shows that in the 
case of the "settlement plans" implementation was largely a function of particular 
RSD needs which they served, though their accordance with prevailing 
operational norms should not be underestimated.
(5) New Towns are subject to concern of another JA FI departm ent.
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(6) This principle accord the main perspective of "Katzir committee".
(7) This was expressed in the initial working draft, Gilat and D uchan, 1984, See 
bibliography.
(8) M inutes from RSD Executive meeting, 10.7.1985.
(9) A lthough planners’ ability to take advantage of this quality of the planning 
product developed only through implem entation, as will be showen later.
(10) This assertion is based on the analysis of the decision-m aking processes, as 
appear in the working files of the RSD North region office and RSD Archives, 
Jerusalem.
(11) The relationships between the JAFI and the governm ent are very complicated. 
R efer, for example, to the letters between the m inister of Economy and Planning 
(Mr.Y.M odai), the JAFI Treasurer (M r.A.Lvinski), from Septem ber to June 1986. 
We shall refrain from a thorough analysis of this aspect, as it is irrelevant to this 
study.
(12) Planners’ assumption that the private sector will be interested in Region 2000 was 
based on "Katzir committee"’s perspective, according to which the potential long- 
run benefits in operating within this area will exceed the sho rt-run , direct and 
indirect, costs. Essentially, benefits are expected to be created due to the unique 
status of Region 2000 in the national and international economy.
(13) The existence of large areas unpopulated by Jews.
(14) Freidm an, interview, Tel-A viv, September 1989.
(15) Aassuming these guide their work in creating the planning product.
(16) It is interesting to note, however, that in past years the D irector-G enerals were
regional planners by profession, and there were cases in which a regional planner
was appointed as an assistant to the D irector-G eneral and the D irector of the
departm ent.
(17) This categoty include also the direct subordinates of the above positions, i.e., 
those not employed by regional offices.
(18) This structure is a result of historical interpretation of RSD tasks and historical 
im portance of issues related to settlem ents’ functional base.
(19) These inefficiencies were recognised by JA FI, and in 1989 the one-director 
structure was reestablished.
(20) This crisis, in fact, required growing financial allocations and changes in 
principles of intervention.
(21) This is not the suitable context to deal with the question of whether the latter 
resulted only from the RSD inefficiencies, since the changes in JA FI political 
priorities were fundam ental by themselves.
(22) Op.cit., note 14.
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Chapter 8:
THE PLANNING EXPERIENCE IN WESTERN GAUL: 1975-1986
Introduction
The previous chapter explored the functional 
environment within which planners operate, and the possible 
modes of functioning open to them stemming from their input 
into the process and their locational context. The 
discussion took into account the importance both of the 
institutional context of planning, which in Chapter 3 was 
shown to establish the basis of planning practice, and the 
"clues" planners should be aware of in their attempts to 
promote a certain planning product (e.g., the range of 
possible reactions on the part of decision-makers that might 
be elicited by the planning product's treatment of long-term 
processes and complex systems). In view of the suggested 
usefulness of a strategic approach for coping with regional 
systems and attempting to generate the commitment of 
decision-makers to certain planning products Chapter 4), 
the major elements of the actual planning products concerned 
(Chapter 6) and Western Galil's major characteristics 
(Chapter 5), we may now ask the following questions: At what 
point in the process characterising Western Galil had 
planners been during the late 1970s and early 1980s? And 
what was their contribution to the settlement process and to 
the subsequent Region 2000 initiatives to foster the area's 
development ?
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(23) Interview  with M r.M .Cohen, Tel-A viv, September 1989.
(24) This refers to Western Galil "mitzpim", other "mitzpim" required approval of 
other district commissions.
(25) The process of approval prolonged into the m id-1980s due to the need to change 
the North D istrict master plan by the national planning commission).
(26) M inutes from Fellowship 2000 meeting dated 15.3.1985.
(27) In Israel, this notion officially refers to appartm ent blocks directly built by this
m inistry. It may also apply, in my opinion, to the private construction of housing 
in peripheral areas that are heavily financed by this ministry.
(28) M r. A. Sharon, 17.7.1985. "Coordination and Development of Region 2000 in the 
Galil. A document attached to the proposed governm ent resolution no.931, 
Supplement A, Appendix A. Source: The Knesset Secretariat.
(29) M r.G .Ya’akobi, "Region 2000". A paper prepared for the "Ya’akobi committee" 
meeting scheduled for 19.3.1986.
(30) A letter from Mr.B.Vanger to Prof. Katzir dated 29.11.1987.
(31) M r. Lipka, as quoted by Mr.Cohen in his report of a meeting with M r.E .G era
(the m inister Ya’akobi’s assistant) dated:28.3.1986. Source: W orking files of the 
Planning U nit, RSD North Region office, Haifa.
(32) M r.S.Drori (13.3.1988): A reports summerising his period of employm ent as the 
D irector-G eneral of Fellowship 2000. Source: Private files of Prof. Katzir.
(33) This list does not consist of private bodies since the planning process and the 
planners concerned had almost no relations with such bodies.
(34) Op.cit., note 14.
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In order to facilitate the discussion, the following, 
summary of the information presented in the previous 
chapters may be helpful.
What was the process in which the planners took part?
We are concerned with a process by which one segment of 
Western Galil (i.e., the areas where settlements were 
rapidly constructed in the late 1970s and early 1980s) was 
designated for high-priority intervention. As the new 
settlements were the result of the RSD's policy to populate 
areas with no Jewish presence, however, their consolidation 
required their integration into a wider functional system. 
Indeed, although this initially was not anticipated by the 
RSD, the Western Galil functional system provided the 
immediate environment for promoting the new settlements' 
development; its emerging industrial development, which 
encouraged similar activities in new settlements, the 
established public facilities made available to new 
settlers, and the existing job opportunities, all encouraged 
the new settlements' economic and social growth. Over the 
years, the new settlements gradually became part of the 
Western Galil functional system, and the various public 
bodies (mainly the RSD) reverted from direct intervention 
back to their traditional roles as overall public policy­
makers .
The RSD's role in Western Galil, imposing important 
changes on the area's functional and spatial system and 
impelling numerous public organisations to collaborate in 
its activities, can be classified, according to Hill (1980), 
within the "initiatory" planning system. In his reference to
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the Israeli planning system, Hill made a distinction between 
"statutory" and "initiatory" planning systems, with the 
former referring to the formal, governmental statutory 
system pertaining to the Ministry of the Interior’s legal 
control over land-use patterns. This system tends 
predominantly to serve "negative regulation" functions. The 
latter category, however, refers to public and semi-public 
organisations (such as the Israeli Land Authority) whose 
control over resources and availability of executive 
machinery enables them to bypass the formal statutory system 
in their attempts to further their development initiatives. 
With this process in mind, Region 2000 initiative was meant 
to designate the entire Western Galil (still only part of 
the Galil, and a small part of the entire national 
peripheral areas) for special public intervention, and to 
establish its distinct status vis-a-vis other parts of the 
country. In so doing, there was a hidden attempt and a 
presumed ability to coordinate all political and economic 
forces associated with this area toward one commonly shared 
goal. However, given the lack of any organisation with the 
political or economic power to lead such a coordination, 
this initiative vanished in the "stormy sea" of conflicting 
political interests. Whereas the process originated in the 
1970s by the RSD was justified on the grounds of competition 
between Arab and State land occupation interests (and it was 
initially managed through decisive actions meant to 
restructure the region's distribution of land uses) Region 
2000 redefined the debate over land use distribution: the 
previous preoccupation with Arab-Jewish land control was 
replaced by the question of Jewish-Jewish political control
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over the region's land resources.
In practice, although the governmental system did not 
consider introducing long-run solutions to the Israeli 
aspects of the Arab-Jewish conflict that provoked the 1976 
"Earth Day", the RSD's initiative for coping with the 
problem (i.e., the "mitzpim" project) was initially not 
considered by the political system as a deviation from its 
broadly defined official authority (e.g., its right to 
dictate issues such as the determination of settlement sites 
and their internal land use structure, or the designation of 
forests and nature reserves, was basically accepted), and 
the construction of the "mitzpim" took place at a speed that 
did not leave much opportunity for opposition (Lifschitz and 
Law-Yone, 1990). However, with the emerging interest in 
Region 2000 and its implicit issues of political control of 
elements such as the region's means of production, non­
productive land uses, and the area's potential tax base, no 
political body was eager to cede straightforward control to 
any other organisation.
From the planners' point of view, the course of events 
during the 10 years from 1975 to 1986 went as follows: The 
planning functions associated with the "settlement plans" 
were fairly diverse, reaching a peak of activity during the 
construction of the new settlements of the "mitzpim" project 
(mainly 1978-1982). As an integral part of the RSD 
machinery, the planners were fully dedicated to realising 
this project. The Region 2000 experience was altogether 
different. It was characterised by a constant series of 
struggles with two major aspects: generating public
356
commitment to the project and interpreting the strategy into 
concrete actions. Moreover, in its attempts to resolve these 
aspects under conditions of inefficient RSD machinery, this 
planning function which initially took place within a 
basically given policy framework was gradually geared toward 
"policy-making" and promoting changes with nation-wide 
implications.
With this process in mind, the present chapter 
addresses itself to two major sets of questions:
a. In which dimensions of the planning process did the 
planners operate, and what were their major means of 
promoting the materialisation of their planning 
initiatives?
b. To what degree did planners take advantage of their 
potential conditions for functioning? Which actions can 
be associated with their theoretical potential to 
operate?
These questions are tackled in two stages: first, an 
attempt is made to reveal links between the planning product 
and the regional processes. This, however, does not 
necessarily imply direct links between the regional 
processes and the planning practice.^ Second, we discuss the 
actual planning dimensions in which the planners were 
involved, and the extent to which their involvement can be 
associated with each of the elements determining their 
potential for functioning.
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8.1 The Planning Product - Western Galil Links
During the 10 years from 1975 to 1986, Western Galil 
underwent several changes in its spatial and functional 
system. Some of these changes can be linked to the planning 
initiatives discussed in this dissertation. "Linked", in the 
sense of there being an identifiable harmony between 
specific planning recommendations and actual changes, or 
known connections to activities with which planners were 
associated).
In theory, since the plans proposed the notion of 
"regional development" as a very general objective for the 
area and as the desired consequence of the plans' 
implementation, all types of positive regional processes can 
be linked to these plans. "Positive" - in the sense of being 
in accordance with expectations for improved relative 
condition of the region, measured, for instance, by 
population growth or intensification of industrial 
production activities. None of the plans, however, provided 
concrete measures of "development" and the extent of desired 
"development"; the only criteria that were specified were 
the volume of additional settlements and their population 
capacity, as well as the desired export value of local 
industries by the year 2000. Indeed, notwithstanding this 
general definition of "development", not all changes in the 
regional system can be credited to the RSD planning body's 
actions, as is evident in the case of the industrialisation 
process. In such cases, one may seek indirect links to 
overall RSD activities in the area, with the suggestion that
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its intervention affected the intervention of other bodies' 
(for example, creating opportunities to establish non-public 
settlements, or improving the image of Western Galil). 
Partial assessments of these possible links appear in two 
recent studies (Sofer and Finkel, 1988; Lifschitz, 1990). 
Such an evaluation is beyond our scope. We shall concentrate 
on issues with which planners were concerned that can be 
associated with concrete regional processes. The written 
planning products will be emphasised, as these were utilised 
as the major tools for promoting the planners' ideas.
a. The relative volume of the Jewish population
The issue of Jewish population growth and especially 
its volume relative to the Arab population appears in all 
plans concerning Western Galil; most of them pose it as 
their major concern. Some plans propose concrete targets: 
for example, 2,000 families (about 8,000 inhabitants) in the 
1976 plan,^ and 100,000 Jews by the year 2000 in the Region 
2000 development strategy. All plans maintain (implicitly in 
the Segev plans, explicitly in Region 2000) the role of 
Karmiel as the area's largest centre of population.
In practice, Jewish population growth did occur during 
the years 1978-1987. Table 5 in the appendix indicates a 
population growth of 100% during these years, thus 
increasing the size of the Jewish sector in the total 
regional population (from 12% in 1978 to 17% in 1987), and 
increasing the population's size relative to other parts of 
the country (Table 6, appendix). This growth (from 16.4 
thousands in 1978 to 33.2 thousands in 1987), however, did 
not match the planned targets. Further, of the total Jewish
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population growth, 57% was contributed by the growth of 
Karmiel, 28% by growth in new settlements, and 3% by growth 
in pre-1978 collective settlements (Table 7, appendix). 
Moreover, about 20% of the new settlements’ population 
growth was contributed by the private settlement Kefar- 
Havradim. Finally, although the Jewish growth rate was 
higher than that of the Arab sector, the Arab population 
remained the clear majority (88% in 1978, and 83% in 1987). 
Therefore, Jewish population growth during the relevant 
years is credited primarily to the development of Karmiel.
These growth patterns indicate that the planning 
objectives in this respect have not been satisfied; less 
than 30% of the targeted 8,000 inhabitants was achieved in 
the new settlements, and Region 2000 achieved about 30% of 
its expected 100,000 inhabitants. Assuming that 1978-1987 
growth trends will be maintained, the Region 2000 population 
may reach its target of 100,000 Jews in the year 2022. The 
1988-1990 trends, however, suggest that this projection is 
unrealistic.^
b. The spatial distribution of Jewish settlements
All plans are concerned with the spatial distribution 
of Jews. The 1976 , 1978 , and 1983 Segev plans are
particularly concerned with distributing new settlements, 
and their task is two-fold: to disperse Jewish settlements 
along the entire Western Galil, and to populate areas 
previously unpopulated by Jews. Table 8 in the appendix 
indicates a drastic increase in Jewish settlements, 
especially during the years 1978-1983: from 11 settlements 
in 1978 to 42 settlements in 1987. Map 2 illustrates the
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distribution of new settlements; these undoubtedly 
established the existence of Jews in new parts of Western 
Galil, and changed the region's spatial distribution of land 
use. In fact, this map should be observed in view of two 
additional aspects of the spatial changes during the 
relevant period: first, as noted in Chapter 6, construction 
of Jewish settlements required reorganisation of land 
ownership. Before 1977, all land under the new settlements' 
jurisdiction, industrial zones and service areas, consisted 
of private Arab-owned plots. After 1977, Arab-state land 
transactions redistributed land ownership and created larger 
concentrations of land plots with similar ownership status. 
Hence, most new settlements and associated land uses marked 
on Map 3 reflect these transactions. Second, public 
intervention affected the actual quantity of land designated 
for specific land uses. In contrast to the pre-1977 period, 
in 1990 most land is allocated to specific uses, mainly 
settlements' land reserves and public uses such as forests 
and nature reserves. Kipnis (1990)^ calculated that the 
total land under national ownership increased by about 10% 
during the past 15 years5 and that the volume of land 
actually in use increased from 54% to 84% of the total 
national land. Sofer and Finkel (1988) concluded that "this 
settlement process liquidated all land reserves in the 
Galil ..." (p. 47).6 These changes in the region’s land use 
distribution, which were established in statutory master 
plans, had undoubtedly been part of the settlement process 
of the late 1970s and 1980s, and were strongly linked to the 
RSD planning process.
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In all, these changes can be associated directly with, 
the "settlement plans" and their implementation.
c. Socio-economic population characteristics
A recent study (Carmon, 1990) suggests that the socio­
economic status of the population of the new settlements is
n
higher than the Western Galil average. It is also argued 
(Sofer and Finkel, 1988) that the current social structure 
of the new settlements is closely linked to RSD construction 
procedures: First, the method of populating the settlements 
- the RSD purposefully selected settlers with the above 
characteristics, and the selection criteria are likely to be 
maintained throughout the years of RSD control over these 
settlements; Second, the method of constructing the 
settlements, which attracted only those who could afford the 
risks associated with settling in such "experimental" 
settlements ("afford" in terms of money, and in the 
assurance that alternative jobs and means of livelihood 
could be found in case of departure from the settlement); 
and third, the unique social ideology and financial 
commitments between settlers that form the basis of many 
settlements also tend to attract people from middle-to-upper 
socio-economic classes.
Since the settlements are still very small, questions 
can be raised as to whether these distinct characteristics 
will persist once and if they grow in size and population. 
To be sure, this new settlement social structure has not yet 
been extended to the entire Western Galil.
These characteristics cannot, however, be linked to 
specific planning initiatives. As a consequence of the
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standard RSD perspective on and mechanism for populating 
settlements, planners disregarded the issue of the 
settlements' social composition in their initial 
recommendations. At most, links to the planners' work can be 
found in the actual assistance they provided to RSD 
selection and absorption procedures. The Region 2000 
strategy treats this social structure as a given parameter 
of the area, and assumes it will be maintained.
d. The region's physical infrastructure
An integral aspect of a region’s development processes 
is its physical infrastructure, particularly its accord with 
changing demand. In practice, changes in the region's 
infrastructure were made in areas such as water and sewage 
systems, electric lines, and telephone lines and exchange 
units. Here, "changes" refers to provision of these 
facilities to the new settlements (which in most cases 
required their construction from the bottom up). Such 
facilities were regarded as necessary in the "settlement 
plans", and their development basically matched the outlines 
and estimated demand put forth in the plans. Among the 
infrastructure components, most plans identified the road 
and communication systems as crucial for regional 
development. In this regard, Chemansky (1990) calculated 
that during the relevant years, improvement of existing 
roads and new road construction permitted the regional 
population to save, on average, one hour per working day for 
each commuter (pp. 183-184).
However, most construction was directly related to the
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new settlements' immediate needs. Although they affected 
Western Galil's spatial and functional systems, regionally 
oriented planning recommendations were largely disregarded 
by the RSD and other public organisations (except in the
o
case of the Karmiel-Segev road). A particular example of 
the discrepancy between planning initiatives and the 
operating priorities of public organisations is the 
telecommunication infrastructure (Kela, 1990), and none of 
the planners' efforts (except one specified later) succeeded 
in affecting the relevant organisations' priorities and 
allocation principles(chapter 5). Even an attempt by the 
planners, in cooperation with the chief scientist of the 
Ministry of Communications, to obtain a legal permit to 
construct a satellite station in the Segev area was a
Q
complete failure.
e. Industrial development
The period analysed here is notable for the important 
changes that took place in the industrial system. This 
applies mainly to the Jewish sector, since Arab industrial 
enterprises are still very scarce. These changes are 
specified in Chapter 5.
All plans rank "industrial development" as the most 
important element in generating the region's economic and 
social development: the "settlement plans" reflect the 
attempt to establish settlements on an industrial rather 
than agricultural economic base; Region 2000 urges the 
creation of favourable conditions as a means to foster the 
area's industrial expansion. Yet, an analysis of the actual
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industrial processes reveals meager links to RSD planning 
initiatives. This is true even in the case of the new 
settlements, where production processes were found to be 
related only indirectly to RSD initiatives. Unlike the 
construction of new settlements or development of public 
facilities, in which most RSD activities can be traced back 
to the planning documents that specified these actions, 
industrial development was mainly the result of private 
initiatives. The RSD1s involvement was mainly upon request 
of individual settlers-entrepreneurs. Moreover, even when 
the RSD was involved, this was separate from any planning 
function. Needless to say, industrial enterprises in non-RSD 
settlements were separate from the RSD planning system.
f. The region's administrative structure
Chapter 5 described the administrative fragmentation of 
Western Galil. Within this system, however, the process that 
led to the foundation of the Misgav Regional Council (in 
October, 1982) is a direct result of RDS planners' actual 
involvement in the region's processes, and it is the only 
such case. Unlike Region 2000 strategy, which identified the 
reorganisation of this system and the establishment of a 
"regional" administrative entity as crucial, the "settlement 
plans" did not call for a change in the system. Rather, 
planners, in the course of activities, were actually driven 
to take part in foundation of the Misgav Regional Council. 
Initially, the new settlements' needs for municipal services 
were satisfied by their integration into existing nearby 
regional councils. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory
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(Kipnis, 1982). Consequently, the head of the "settlements, 
committee" (Mr. A. Raz) and an RSD North Region office 
planner (Ms. T. Duchan) agreed "to seek for a way to 
reorganise new settlements within one administrative system, 
thus enabling cooperation between settlements with similar 
interests".^  This initiative was realised in several 
stages. First, an agreement was reached between the above 
parties on the type of administrative structures relevant to 
Western Galil. Second, a professional analysis of these 
alternative structures was ordered. The "Proposal for 
Municipal Organisation of New Settlement Areas in The Galil" 
(Kipnis, 1982), financed by the North Region office, was 
presented to the director of this office (Mr.Y. Friedman) 
and later to the District Commissioner of the Ministry of 
the Interior, to convince them of the need for the 
recommended change in the municipal system. The convincing 
findings of this proposal and elements such as the District 
Commissioner's dedication to the execution of the new 
council idea created the basis for the foundation of the 
Misgav Regional Council (about a year after the initial idea 
was raised).
Other than that, planners were rather remote from the 
region's institutional system, although they expressed high 
interest in it.
g. Patterns of public resource allocation
Patterns of public resource allocation are major 
indicators of the attitude of the public sector toward the 
issues of concern, and the extent of their integration into 
the entire political decision-making processes (assuming
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that "integration" has clear implications in terms of 
allocations).
In this regard, the "settlement plans" implied the 
integration of regional processes into standard patterns of 
government intervention, and hence resource allocations. The 
Region 2000 strategy, in contrast, explicitly suggested 
changes in the nature of public intervention and allocation 
criteria.
In practice, an analysis of the expenditures of 
government ministries and budget reports (including 
specified planned and executed resources) during the 
relevant budgetary years does not provide a firm basis for 
discussing the relations between plans and allocations of 
public financial and land resources (as specified in the 
methodological appendix). Yet, although the contribution of 
such knowledge to our ability to evaluate the condition of 
Western Galil vis-^-vis other parts of the country should 
not be underestimated, the lack of this information does not 
prevent us showing links to the planning products. By 
implication, the fact that the settlement process of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s became an integral component of 
public resource allocation can be seen as satisfying the 
objectives of the "settlement plans". In contrast, the fact 
that traditional patterns of resource allocation have been 
maintained implies complete rejection of the principles 
expressed in the Region 2000 strategy.
367
Summary
Western Galil underwent various changes, of which 
spatial distribution of settlements and industrial 
development are most notable, although one should not 
underestimate the foundation of the Misgav Regional Council, 
the construction of the Segev-Karmiel road, or other 
changes. We focused mainly on the links between these 
changes and the plans, although indirect reference was made 
to features of the entire planning practice, as specified in 
the following section.
An analysis of the links between these changes and the 
planning process in light of the discussion in Chapter 7 
suggests direct relations with RSD activities (i.e., the 
settlement process of the late 1970s and early 1980s). 
Impact on the functional elements of the socio-economic 
system was limited to the immediate environment of the new 
settlements. In contrast, changes in region-wide processes, 
industrial development in particular, but also the growth of 
Karmiel, took place in complete separation from the 
processes in which the RSD and the planners were involved. 
In fact, the regional components and processes with which 
the planners were concerned, and which fell within the scope 
of RSD intervention, were for the most part directly related 
to the physical distribution of land uses (including its 
immediate functional consequences). Moreover, in areas where 
the RSD lacked the appropriate executive machinery and norms 
(and thus was unable to cope with arising needs, e.g., the 
industrial process), or was unwilling to change the scope of
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its activities (e.g., investments in communication 
infrastructure), planning recommendations got no further 
than the written planning product.
Nevertheless, the importance of the "settlement" 
process and its associated planning activities stems not 
only from the establishment of a whole new set of socio­
economic elements, but also from the subsequent chain- 
reaction effect by which their impact extended beyond the 
specific newly constructed areas. Insofar as a "decreased 
uncertainty effect" (Chapter 3) can be associated with the 
activities of the RSD and its planning body, we may note, 
for example, the attraction of skilled labour and the 
incentive to increase local job opportunities for incoming 
population, the opportunity to live in small communities 
with high-quality services, and the opportunity to establish 
private settlements, all of which were due to the RSD's 
establishment of procedural and normative conditions for 
non-government settlements (Kefar-Havradim in Western Galil, 
Timrat and Givat-Ela outside Western Galil). An interesting 
example of the wide range of effects is the change in 
Western Galil's statutory land use system introduced during 
these years.^ Until the late 1970s, the Mandatory Regional 
Plan ("P50") was the major tool guiding the statutory 
system; the initial building permits for the "mitzpim" were 
given on the basis of this plan. These, however, were marked 
as a dot on the map, and amounted merely to approval of 
their initial site and all sites as one bloc. The need to 
approve additional settlement sites and their land use 
plans, and to grant specific uses (e.g., housing, public 
facilities) with building permits, required revision of the
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North District master plan for the first time since the. 
establishment of the State. This in turn resulted in 
updating of the functional national and district sectoral 
plans (e.g., the national master plan for roads), and had 
various implications for different activities elsewhere in 
the Galil. An analysis of the different land use plans 
indicates that they were updated not only in order to 
include the actual changes imposed by the settlement 
process, but to express a different attitude toward the 
area: until 1980, the Western Galil was perceived as one of 
the "dumpers" of the country; it was to be the site of 
various functions usually located in unpopulated areas, such 
as industrial waste disposal collection areas, quarries, and 
prisons. During the 1980s the national planning system's 
(Ministry of Interior) idea of locating "unfriendly" land 
uses in the Western Galil was abandoned and was replaced by 
an emphasis on designated industrial zones, high roads, and 
recreation areas.
The following sections describe the various activities 
planners engaged in that facilitated the above changes, and 
discuss the close links between the scope of RSD activities 
and planning impact.
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8.2 The Planning Function - Decision-Making Links 
and the Dimensions of Planning Practice
The planners discussed in this dissertation viewed 
their role in terms of producing plans and promoting their 
realisation. This perspective was not necessarily shared by 
the administrators and politicians. A general agreement on 
the function of producing plans can be traced, but other 
planning functions were not equally treated. One director of 
the RSD North Region office (Mr. Y. Friedman) suggested he 
"could not manage many issues of the office's affairs under 
my (his O.G.) responsibility without planners' assistance 
and a close working relation with them". In contrast, 
another director of the RSD North Region office (Mr. M. 
Cohen) disagreed with this assessment of the planners' role, 
and thus made a distinction between plans' production and 
their implementation - although stating that "after you 
left, we did not know what to do",1J he previously 
"complained" about "planners' attempts to manage the 
regional office's affairs, rather than concentrating on 
writing plans and detailed programs which other people 
should materialise".1^
A fairly clear perspective on the planners' role was 
expressed by the Katzir Committee, which stated that 
"planners should tell us what, how and when to do".15 
Acknowledging its lack of executive power, this committee 
suggested that the RSD should support its planners' 
involvement in the project since "planning was deemed 
necessary in order to make sure that work commences soon".15 
In other words, in a distinction between "plan-making" and
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"implementation", the former's guidelines are essential for. 
the execution of public policy.
Yet another attitude was expressed by political decision­
makers such as the Minister of Communication, the Mayor of 
Karmiel, and the RSD directors. These emphasised the 
"professional" qualities of planners, expecting them to 
"formulate plans and be able to consult with others who deal 
with actual work in the region, while their not being
directly involved in execution permits them to see processes
1 7m  the right perspective".1 ' These decision-makers 
distinguished between "planning and consultation" functions 
on the one hand, and implementation on the other hand. This 
distinction was of special importance in cases where 
professional justification was required for decisions that 
had already been taken. It should be noted, however, that in 
the case of Mr. N. Zvili (the RSD co-director), there are 
several examples of actions that followed planners' 
recommendations (e.g., proposals regarding the Ta'anach 
area, provided in 1985 by the same planners involved in 
Region 2000).
The actual planning experience during the years 1975- 
1986 can be divided into three dimensions:
1. Production of plans - a process that resulted in two 
different types of written product, described in 
Chapter 6. As noted, when the different planning 
perspectives are put in their historical context, it is 
possible to identify a continuity of links between 
types of issues treated by planners and the conditions 
under which plans were formulated.
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2. Marketing the planning product - the process through 
which information about a planning initiative is 
distributed, meant to generate commitment to plans and 
increase general awareness of them. Planners may not 
always be aware of the importance of this function, nor 
of their actual association with it. In the specific 
planning experience discussed here, awareness of this 
dimension developed in the course of the planning 
process, through the implementation of certain plans, 
actual involvement in regional processes, and attempts 
to promote the implementation of other plans.
3. Contributions to implementation - referring to the 
actual role planners played in the regional processes, 
and the regional processes that can be linked to 
specific planning initiatives.
The different planning experiences are therefore 
discussed according to these dimensions.
8.2.1 Production of plans
Chapter 6 described the basic characteristics of the 
two "blocs" of planning products, the "settlement plans" and 
Region 2000, emphasising the apparent links between their 
time horizons and specifity of recommendations on the one 
hand, and their accommodation to prevailing institutional 
decision-making processes on the other hand. Among the 
aspects that were discussed, the following require further 
elaboration:
a. All plans resulted from the planners' own initiative.
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None of them was a result of some direct instruction 
from other administrators or professionals "to 
formulate a development plan". The difference between 
the planning initiatives, however, lay in their 
relation to their institutional contexts.
The initiation of the "settlement plans" was rather 
obviously a task for the RSD Planning Section of the 
North Region office, which plans for RSD purposes. 
Accordingly, the production of the plans embodied 
prevailing RSD procedures and working standards.
The formulation of Region 2000, although it accorded 
with the principle tasks of the RSD Planning Section, 
is a case in which planners disregarded a basic working 
principle, i.e., the need for authorisation or 
permission to offer their services outside the RSD (to 
Fellowship 2000, in particular). Acknowledging this 
problematic aspect, planners chose to be satisfied with 
the backing of Mr. Friedman, who initiated their 
involvement in the project and managed some of the 
contacts with the Katzir Committee. Mr. Friedman 
provided a certain official legitimacy by virtue of his 
two titles: vice-director general of the Planning 
Authority (refer to diagram 3), and vice-director 
general of the RSD. Indeed, the RSD management was not 
aware of the planners' involvement in Region 2000, and 
planners were not discharged from other missions. In 
practice, however, planners' promotion of the Region 
2000 strategy and its approval by Fellowship 2000 
resulted in a drastic change in the RSD's status in the 
project. As noted, during 1981-83, JAFI's role was
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limited, the RSD had no connections with JAFI's 
allocations, and the Katzir Committee rejected (in 
1983) the RSD's involvement in the project. Judging 
from these events, one can suggest that the full 
acceptance of the RSD by Fellowship 2000 and the 
Minister of Economics and Planning, and their 
subsequent attempts to encourage its active involvement 
in the project (evident from late 1 9 8 4 ) , were 
motivated by the above planning initiative,
b. The next aspect is the relation of the content of the 
planning product with the prevailing institutional 
perspective and procedures. Previous discussion 
suggested that production of plans was an ongoing 
process, with plans being updated as implementation 
proceeded. This "updating" process, also referred to as 
"accommodation", is not as straightforward as was 
initially described. In light of our view of 
"implementation" as the process in which the planning 
perspective guides decision-making in relevant issues, 
the actual application of plans to concrete areas and 
issues and in a specific time context requires the 
maintenance of these plans' relevance vis-a-vis 
changing conditions: issues proven in the course of 
action to be irrelevant should be changed, 
recommendations revised, and future objectives updated. 
At the same time, however, accommodation should not be 
equated with full assimilation to any one 
organisation's conceptual and operational system, as 
this would lead to a loss of the planner's ability to 
perceive events in a larger perspective.
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The "settlement plans"' experience shows that as 
planners became involved in the execution process, they 
gradually limited their concern with the long-run 
nature of the Segev area, concentrating, instead, on 
immediate needs (e.g., relocating public facilities 
when the planned sites were found to be physically 
unsuitable, problems related to settlers' absorption). 
Indeed, a comparison between the 1976 and 1983 
development plans demonstrates a shift from a dynamic 
conceptual framework based on a firm vision of the 
area's future, to a static and somewhat "technocratic" 
approach that merely quantifies future demand for 
different land uses based on official RSD population 
projections. In other words, "accommodation" in the 
case of these plans was not merely a matter of 
adjustment to changing circumstances. Rather, it 
entailed full acceptance of the prevailing 
institutionalised "regional" perspective and executive 
mechanism, at the price of the planners abandoning 
their ability to provide any guidelines for future 
activities other than those found in the system's 
standard procedures for settlement.
Region 2000 challenged this state of affairs: it
rejected the abandonment of concern with future 
processes, and the provision of solutions only in terms 
of the standards of the public apparatus machinery. It 
further challenged prevailing RSD execution standards 
(e.g., size of its planned settlements). In so doing, 
however, Region 2000 planners took "accommodation" to 
the opposite extreme. They not only introduced a
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different perspective on what should be done and the 
issues the RSD should concern itself with (thus making 
it impossible that principles of standard treatment 
would be maintained), but also attempted to dictate the 
RSD's involvement in Region 2000 and restructure its 
traditional relations with Western Galil. In this way, 
they rejected the previous tendency to concentrate on 
solutions to emerging concrete problems, and likewise 
rejected the means to cope with such problems that are 
provided by the RSD apparatus.
The "anti-accommodation" attitude associated with 
Region 2000 was further reflected in the planners' 
attempts to translate the strategy into specific, 
implementable programs. In seeking to specify the 
strategic principles, planners required the 
contribution of experts in such areas as the changes in 
the telecommunication infrastructure and education. 
Professional input was also desired in areas where the 
planners had a greater familiarity with the issues 
concerned (such as the political and administrative 
structure of Region 2000, road construction, and 
industrial development), "to refresh our minds and 
integrate non-institutionalised perspectives into the 
process".^ Contacts with non-RSD professionals were 
initiated for two additional purposes: first, to
acquire services that could not be provided within the 
RSD, such as legal advice regarding the opportunities 
for establishing the Region 2000 firm; and second, as a 
means of establishing "contacts and interactions with 
large industrial firms and businesses related to the
area, through the utilisation of professionals' 
relations with these b o d i e s " . ^
This direction of work, which planners believed was 
important for promoting issues unfamiliar to them and 
the RSD, and the prevention of traditional RSD 
perspectives from dominating concrete proposals, made 
this planning product susceptible to external effects. 
As it depended on both the work of experts and on RSD 
budgeting procedures (the latter required to finance 
the experts' work), the production of the planning 
product fell partially outside of the planners' 
control; the planners could not proceed on their own 
until the experts had completed their jobs and the 
budget for their salaries was obtained. These tactics 
also rendered the experts and their expected 
recommendations vulnerable to pressure from the RSD. 
Examples include the case of D. Gayer, an economist 
whom the head of the North Region office (M. Cohen) 
wished to employ while dictating his areas of 
concern,^ or the attempt of the head of the RSD 
Computer Unit to force the cooperation of Berenstein, 
Ltd., telecommunication experts who manage the 
telephone system of the JAFI offices in Jerusalem.^2 
Consequently, planners failed to make the Region 2000 
strategy specific, and thus failed to provide 
manageable and implementable measures that could be 
promoted within the RSD executive machinery. This was a 
crucial drawback in the planning process - although the 
planners challenged the prevailing perspectives and 
practices of RSD intervention, they did not succeed in
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providing alternative guidelines for directing this
intervention.
8.2.2 Marketing the planning product
Marketing, the distribution of information regarding a 
planning initiative, is meant to introduce plans to 
different decision-makers and generate their support for the 
initiative. In some cases, this is expected to lead to the 
plans' integration into the decision-making processes, and 
hence to their implementation. In other cases, expectations 
may be more moderate, such as contributing to the awareness 
of decision-makers. The "market" for plans can be found in 
different segments of the socio-economic system. The 
discussion in Chapter 3, for example, suggested the 
importance of the political decision-makers among whom the 
specific "partners" of the planning initiatives should be 
chosen. The "market" may also consist of the individuals and 
entrepreneurs expected to respond to planning initiatives.
Planners (and planning theory) tend to regard this 
function as an obvious aspect of the planning process, thus 
underestimating its potential contribution. In our case, 
although the specific planning experience indicates a 
growing awareness of this dimension of planning process, it 
is doubtful that planners exhausted this dimension. Indeed, 
"marketing" as a structured approach seeking means to 
generate commitment to the plans 1 principles and 
recommendations was nonexistent during the entire planning 
process concerned. Nonetheless, several activities in which
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planners were involved can be classified in this dimension:
a. Initial approval of plans.
Obtaining approval of the "settlement plans" was 
regarded both by planners and RSD management as a necessary 
precondition for operating in the RSD, and was an element of 
the planners' institutional status. This task was defined as 
the first objective of the 1976 Segev plan (p. 14). Yet, the 
planners paid no attention to the way this approval was 
given, nor did they pursue approval. The "approval" was 
viewed as outside the range of the planners' activities.
In contrast, in seeking the Katzir Committee's approval 
of the Region 2000 strategy, the planners' presentation of 
the strategy (March, 1985) was based on a study of committee 
members, which led to a determination of the strategic 
aspects to be emphasised in this forum and those members who 
particularly should be addressed. The presentation resulted 
in approval of the RSD Region 2000 strategy. As expressed by 
one of the committee members: "we invited planners of the 
RSD to present their planning proposal in order to secure 
further JAFI funding of the project. Being introduced to the
strategy, however, the Committee is now faced with an
2 3unexpected problem: the choice of the real alternative". 
Planners took a similar tack in presenting the strategy to 
the JAFI Assembly (June, 1986) and to several ministers. 
Each target group was provided with a slightly different 
paper, emphasising aspects of the strategy that seemed to 
the planners most suitable to the target groups' areas of 
interest. As noted, however, approval of the Region 2000 
development strategy was not straightforward: the previous
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commitment of the Katzir Committee to the Lichfield & IDC 
planning group prevented the committee from making an 
official declaration of its decision to follow the RSD 
proposal (on which matter Prof. Katzir refused to be 
interviewed); instead, they issued a letter stating that 
"from now on, we expect the planning section of the North 
Region office to guide the work".^
Furthermore, although the method used to obtain 
Fellowship 2000 approval achieved its expected results, it 
was not very useful in the search for RSD approval at a 
later stage (opposition to the strategy did arise; see Chap. 
6). In the latter case, although planners attempted to 
market the strategy, they did not manage to direct 
discussion in the RSD Executive away from such issues as the 
timing of the strategy's presentation and the previous 
approach to Fellowship 2000 (Chap. 6). In other words, 
although planners correctly judged that RSD approval of the 
strategy was impossible unless Fellowship 2000 approval was 
attained, they did not take advantage of RSD sensitivity to 
issues related to the new settlements' future, and thus 
failed to exploit potentially vulnerable components of the 
RSD decision-making process.
In addition, RSD approval was accompanied by a major 
conflict at the level of departmental management regarding 
the question of who was to lead RSD activities in this 
project. This conflict was exposed in the Director General's 
attempt to form a departmental cooperative committee, which 
was jeopardized by the co-director of the department (N. 
Zvili) and the vice-director general of the Planning 
Authority (Y. Friedman).^5
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b. Distribution of plans.
This "classic" measure - the distribution of basic 
information regarding the planned issues, is meant initially 
to promote a wide awareness of the plans' existence.
In the case of the "settlement plans", the distributed 
information included details such as the specification of 
settlements' sites, their planned population and populating 
stages, the estimated demand for public facilities 
(telephone lines, electric capacity, quantity of public 
buildings), and, sometimes, copies of the available plans 
(land use structure of settlements, architectural design, 
etc.). Plans were distributed to the professional sections 
of public bodies, mainly those that were expected to take 
part in establishing the new settlements. Distribution of 
plans to political decision-makers was managed by the RSD 
director (Mr. Weitz), who published selected and minimal 
details of the plans, changing their content as events 
required.
In the case of Region 2000, distributed information 
included the concept's specification, the proposed 
development stages, and the allocation of responsibility to 
each public organisation. Plans were distributed to 
politicians (e.g., ministers, mayors, elected 
representatives of the area), directors of public companies, 
directors of the major industrial firms located in Western 
Galil and Haifa, and to libraries.
In both cases distribution was accompanied by attempts 
to create personal relationships by initiating meetings with
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professionals in other organisations for the purpose of.
discussing the planning initiative. As will be further
discussed, however, whereas contacts related to the
"settlement plans" were taking place while the "bulldozers
9 fiof the RSD were already in the area", ° contacts regarding 
Region 2000 were based on "a mutual theoretical 
understanding of the need to develop Western Galil".^
c. Marketing in the form of Personal relations.
Marketing can also be associated with actions meant to 
create personal relations and generate a "favourable" 
attitude to specific issues. The measure applied most often 
by all planners over the years was the "sight-seeing" tour 
of Western Galil, during which the person(s) invited was 
introduced to the region’s specific character and the issues 
tackled in the plans.
During the first period, the "targets" were always 
professionals from other public organisations, whereas for 
Region 2000, the targets were mainly politicians and their 
personal assistants. The contribution of personal relations 
to the realisation of plans was made evident in such cases 
as the development of telephone lines in the late 1970s 
(further specified), and the visits of the Director General 
of the Ministry of Economics and Planning (Mr. E. Gera) and 
the chief scientist of the Ministry of Communication (Mr. Y. 
Kela), during which the seeds of cooperation between these 
ministries and the RSD were planted. The Minister of 
Industry's (Mr. A. Sharon) refusal to accept an invitation
O Q
to such a tour (December, 1986 )*6 proves that such 
acceptance was regarded as "an actual declaration of
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support" for the planning initiative.
d. "Aggressive" marketing.
A fairly "aggressive" approach toward motivating other 
organisations to operate according to the plans was 
reflected in three types of activities:
* The provision of RSD professional assistance to other
organisations dealing with execution of the plans. This was
the case (in the late 1970s) with the employee of the
Planning Section of the RSD North Region office who dealt
with land transactions on behalf of the Israeli Land
Authority. The idea was suggested by planners of the
Planning Section and approved by the director of the North
Region office, who noted: "in this way we prevented the
excuses of no budget or no staff available for this 
9 Qmission", * which was crucial for the establishment of new 
settlements.
* Discussions with professionals aimed at generating "a 
feeling of partnership and mutual responsibility" in 
specific projects.^ The important initiative here was the 
discussion with the Director of the North District of the 
Ministry of Education concerning the development prospects 
of the Segev settlements, during which the Director was led 
to approve the Misgav school as a model for "community 
schools" (which did not exist until then) and as the 
structure most suited to the special community emerging in 
this area; construction of these schools thus was carried 
out by the Ministry of Education. It should be noted that 
the "community school" idea was formulated by members of the
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Settlements' Committee (of Segev; see Chap. 5), and was 
executed by planners in the RSD North Region office, who saw 
satisfaction of the settlers' demands as part of their role.
* Furthering a planning proposal on Region 2000's 
development company (Gilat and Duchan, 1986) through the 
mayor of Karmiel (Mr. Vanger) rather than the head of the 
RSD North Region office (M. Cohen). Although both were 
members of the "Ya'akobi committee", Cohen's known 
opposition led to the attempt to use the Mayor's support of 
the proposal in presenting it to the forum. This 
unconventional channel proved inappropriate; had the mayor 
presented the proposal, it would have been regarded by Cohen 
as an act of disloyalty, and North Region office support of 
the project would have been diminished. As noted by Mr. 
Vanger, "it was unwise to take the risk of damaging official 
relations with the RSD".^
e. Professional legitimation of initiatives.
The case of the Misgav Regional Council is a good 
example of concern with advancing a planning initiative. 
Difficulties in convincing the director of the RSD North 
Region office of the need to establish a new regional 
council led planners to bring in a private consultant to 
provide a "professional" opinion on the subject. This indeed 
proved effective - the "Kipnis" Report (1982) resulted in 
the full support of the RSD management and the District 
Commissioner of the Ministry of Interior, thus, the Misgav 
Regional Council was established. Planners were not involved 
in the actual process of designating Misgav; this was done
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by the North District Commissioner (Mr. Kening).
In contrast, reference to consultants by Region 2000 
planners presumably (no written evidence was found) was 
linked to their need for some professional legitimation of 
the strategic recommendations. However, since they raised 
the possibility of long-term use of experts, the idea of 
"legitimacy" began to lose importance as the experts 
themselves were integrated into the executive machinery.
f. Marketing in the form of public relations.
* Region 2000 strategy specified several projects that 
"will be integrated into the overall planning process, 
improve the region's image, and create a base for trust 
between planners, organisations that function in the region, 
and the region's population" (Gilat and Duchan, 1985, p. 
93). The proposed projects included distribution of "Region 
2000 identity cards", establishment of an information 
centre, and construction of a "visitor's centre" (Iyur 
Einav, 1985). None of these proposals was carried out.
* Meetings were held with the secretaries of the Misgav 
settlements (October 1986) for the purpose of "presenting
the idea of Region 2000, receiving feed-back from the
32region's population, and generating their enthusiasm". * The
response to this initiative was mild; not only was no
particular interest indicated, there was also an expression
of a certain degree of mistrust: "first do something and
3 3then come back to us".
* A few attempts were made to encourage public interest
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in Region 2000 project through the newspapers. These, 
resulted in the E. Kimmor article for the Jewish Chronicle 
(13.1.86), and Y. Tal's article for the Ha'aretz daily 
newspaper (13.4.85). Both initiatives were rejected by the 
director-general of the RSD on the grounds that "planners 
should not approach journalists".5^
* Finally, in late 1986 some consideration was given to 
forming a political lobby for Region 2000 (headed by the 
Mayor of Karmiel), and applying for a "public relations" 
consultant "as a means to generate some public support for 
the Region 2000 conceptual perspective",55 none of which 
gained the support of the director of the North Region 
office, who refused to allocate financial resources to such 
projects.
In all, marketing the plans was almost always done on a 
one-to-one, personal basis. The marketing initiatives for 
the "settlement plans" were directed toward professionals, 
never political decision-makers, and always in connection 
with concrete "missions". Nevertheless, available 
documentation indicates that such actions rarely were part 
of a pre-planned scheme on who should be approached, when 
and how. The task of generating commitment on the part of 
political decision-makers was basically left to the RSD 
management, whereas planners concentrated on promoting their 
ideas within their immediate institutional environment, 
i.e., the head of the North Region office. In fact, it was 
not until Region 2000 that planners realised that the above 
activities should be structured into a coherent program in 
which different aspects of the strategy (or the strategy as
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a whole) should be "sold" to different decision-makers, be. 
they political entities or individuals. In this case, the 
targets were political decision-makers.
Further, hardly any approaches were made to "citizens", 
and individuals in other parts of the country. Planners' 
contacts with settlers came by way of their involvement in 
the construction of the new settlements. The same applies to 
all other parts of the national economic system - no 
attempts were made to approach potential entrepreneurs and 
generate their interest in the planning initiatives. 
(Several attempts by Region 2000 planners to establish such 
personal contacts did not have enough time to develop.)
"Marketing" was, therefore, governed by two major 
approaches: the first, expressed in the implementation of 
the "settlement plans", regarded marketing as part of the 
coordination and management dimension. The second, expressed 
in Region 2000 strategy, regarded marketing as a distinct 
dimension of the planning process that required planners to 
deal with public relations, political lobbying, and creation 
of pressure groups (Gilat and Duchan, 1984). This, however, 
is not to imply that purposeful marketing attempts or the 
more sophisticated use of prevailing tools was more 
effective. Because of the lack of concrete products to 
market, the Region 2000 planning body had little opportunity 
to materialise its intentions.
388
8.2.3 Contribution to implementation
As argued, implementation is basically the execution of 
policy formulated on the basis of the plans' conceptual 
perception and concrete recommendations. Planners, 
therefore, depend on an institutional executive mechanism 
(which can be part of one or several organisations) to 
promote implementation. Accordingly, the planning process is 
largely a function of interactions between planners and 
those decision-makers with executive power. Planners may be 
an integral part of an executive mechanism (e.g., those 
employed by the RSD), or their status may be unclear in 
relation to such a system (e.g., the case of Region 2000). 
These vary with the organisation's internal structure and 
the practical implications of the planning initiative. 
Finally, implementation and execution policy should be 
adjusted to meet the new conditions and changing needs that 
emerge as a result of implementation. This assumes that 
although in most cases planners are not direct managers of 
implementation, in their association with policy 
implementation (its application to concrete situations, 
provision of ad hoc solutions to constantly emerging 
problems, and coordination of activities) they may influence 
the consequences of the principal policy.
The implementation of the "settlement plans" was unique 
in two major aspects.
a. It was a process in which their "implementation know­
how" gave the planners an important role in the process 
at a scale and intensity the RSD never experienced. 
This knowledge was acquired as implementation advanced;
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planners were gradually able to identify who should be 
incorporated in the process of settlement construction 
and how their authority was distributed. Equipped with 
this knowledge, planners directly influenced RSD 
activities, mainly at the level of the North Region 
office.38 Two examples illustrate this: First, in 
describing the relations with the official land use 
system and the "mitzpim" project, the following 
statement was made: "luckily a member of our planning 
team (S. Lazar) was previously employed in the Ministry 
of the Interior, so the need for an official building 
permit as a prerequisite to the legal establishment of 
'mitzpim' was brought to our attention, and we started 
to learn the ways to obtain building permits for the 
new settlements".37 Importantly, this "knowledge" was 
acquired after the decision to establish "mitzpim" was 
taken. Second, in describing relations with the Israeli 
Land Authority (ILD), the above planner stated: "we
suddenly realised that we needed permission to utilise 
national land, so we wrote a draft of an agreement 
(with the ILD, O.G.) in order to obtain the land 
owner's signature on our (i.e., the RSD's) land use 
plans - a prerequisite for their approval by the 
planning authorities"38 (i.e., the Ministry of the 
Interior). In verifying this statement, a striking 
similarity between the initial draft and the final
oq
leasing contract was revealed. *
This process was distinguished by the close links 
between planners and the upper managerial positions of 
the RSD. As noted, these links were reflected in
information flows in both directions, in the relative 
freedom planners had in determining activities that 
were backed by the financial resources of the RSD, and 
in the clear distribution of authority within the 
entire system. In all, the role planners played in the 
"mitzpim" project and subsequent RSD activities can be 
linked to their direct acquaintance with the region and 
its related processes. As they were the RSD's chief 
source of immediate knowledge about the processes and 
the agencies involved in it, planners gradually took a 
greater part in most of the North Region office's 
decisions. This position of strength was built in the 
course of implementation: the accumulated information, 
the established relations with different agencies 
working and living in the region, and the familiarity 
with official procedures and legal arrangements were 
the results of working in implementation. It should be 
emphasised, however, that this particular case involved 
the implementation of a certain interpretation of plans 
(the 197 6 plan in particular) with which the RSD was 
not familiar until then. The Region 2000 experience was 
different in the sense that actual implementation of 
the strategy did not take place. Instead, planners 
focused on two types of processes: the interpretation 
of the strategy into concrete and workable programs on 
the one hand, and constant attempts to obtain 
widespread approval of the development strategy, on the 
other hand. This process also can be classified in the 
category of "producing plans".
In' practice, several important functions can be
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classified under the management dimension of the planning 
process:
a. The identification of organisations that should be 
incorporated into specific processes.
This is a rather obvious planning function. One could 
expect that such organisations (at least most of them) would 
be identified during the initial stage of plan formulation, 
on the basis of some sort of regional analysis, and for the 
purpose of forming proposals in a relatively clear 
functional environment. This function, however, took place 
during implementation, and thus is discussed here. Planners 
prepared a list in which different government ministries and 
other public organisations were classified according to 
their authority for each type of action. This list was 
prepared during the first years of the “settlement plans" 
implementation, and particularly during the "mitzpim" 
process. The Region 2000 planning initiative, however, 
integrated this knowledge into the initial proposal. This 
enabled identification at early stages of work of those 
organisations most relevant for different actions to be 
taken during the planning process.
b. Impact on non-JAFI organisations.
An interesting example of active attempts to secure the 
integration of plans into the working programs of other 
organisations is the case of the telephone system. Having 
understood that the Ministry of Communication would not 
supply telephones to the forthcoming settlers unless actual 
requests were advanced (on official application forms), and
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in view of the fact that the provision of telephones might 
be delayed for some time after the settlers' arrival because 
of the required construction of new exchange units, planners 
filled out application forms (about 50 per settlement) on 
behalf of the expected settlers. Unaware that the 
application forms were faked, the Ministry was forced to 
include the settlements in its planned projects, and invest 
in new exchange units and telephone lines.^ Consequently, 
unlike in new settlements in other areas, Western Galil 
settlers were provided with telephones almost upon their 
arrival.4* By contrast, an example of an unsuccessful 
attempt to integrate the Department's plans into other 
organisations' working programs is the case of the 
Electricity Company and Ministry of Communications. Attempts 
to introduce Region 2000 strategy and convince these 
entities to accommodate their working programs failed to 
overcome the barrier exemplified in the attitude of "first 
let the RSD do something and then come back to us".42
c. Establishing working relations with non-JAFI
organisations•
These were created through routine meetings of planners 
with, for example, the District Commissioner of the Ministry 
of the Interior (Mr. Kening), in which both settlement 
master plans and other land use issues (such as fencing in 
areas for agricultural purposes) were discussed with. In 
fact, the result of such meetings was the establishment of 
working procedures and norms of conduct with public 
organisations that up to then (i.e., 1978) had no direct 
relations with the RSD. Such organisations included the
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Ministry of the Interior, the Rural Building Authority of. 
the Ministry of Housing, which became the official 
organisation approving architectural plans of the new 
settlements, and the Ministry of Education. These contacts 
were in addition to the traditional cooperation between the 
RSD and other organisations such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Mekorot. Still, cooperation with ministries 
such as Defense and Industry was generally out of the scope 
of planning function. The most interesting example here is 
the "leasing contract between the RSD and the Israeli Land 
Authority" (Menuhin, Ludmer and Eger, 1983). This was 
formulated on the basis of a draft prepared by one planner 
of the RSD North Region office (T. Duchan) and the director 
general of the ILA North District (Y. Dagan), as quoted 
above. Such contracts were not available until the "mitzpim" 
period. In contrast to this experience, planners' attempts 
to establish working patterns with the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade and the Ministry of Education were in vain; not 
even information flows could be established.
d. Coordination of execution.
This function refers to the coordination of activities 
between different private and public bodies actually working 
in the Segev area. RSD documentation indicates that 
coordination of actual execution (as opposed to coordination 
of policies with politicians and JAFI international 
institutions) was largely carried out by planners. During 
the years 1978-1982, this function covered a wide range of 
activities and organisations. Examples include notifying 
builders when JNF land development work would be terminated
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so that they could be prepared in advance to enter into the 
area when JNF terminated its task; and ensuring that 
detailed plans of road construction would be transferred to 
subcontractors. During these years, there were even cases 
where planners took over some of the tasks of the Water 
Section of the North Region office, such as estimation of 
water demand and coordination of plans with TAHAL and 
Mekorot. This was justified on the need "to make sure that 
work proceeds at the required speed".^ This function was 
gradually limited to traditional land-use issues, such as 
coordinating between settlements' master plans and the 
Ministry of the Interior, and coordinating the demands of 
the different bodies authorising construction.
e. Introduction of organisational changes.
This function refers to an initiative that resulted 
from involvement in the area's activities - the idea of 
Misgav Regional Council. As noted, the official act of the 
Ministry of the Interior resulted from mutual work between 
one planner and the head of the "settlements' committee" of 
the Segev area: "such an organisation suddenly seemed the
most obvious requirement of the system that was developing 
in Segev. However, once we were capable of defining for 
ourselves this type of organisational structure, we were 
faced with the problem of convincing the director of the 
regional office of the relevance of the idea".^ In 
practice, this idea reached fruition. In this regard, two 
actions associated with the Region 2000 experience should be 
mentioned:
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* The attempt to integrate the planners' proposal for a. 
development company that was not considered by the "Ya'akobi 
Forum".
* The attempt to establish a "forum of users", which 
never materialised. This forum, supposedly composed of 
representatives of the region's interest groups (i.e., 
industry, business, local authorities), was expected to form 
the initial basis for cooperation between the various 
economic and social forces in the area. This idea (first 
articulated in 12.4.1986) never advanced beyond the stage of 
one meeting between some of the above forces (mainly the 
representatives of local authorities), during which the 
Mayor of Karmiel was accused by the head of the Ma'alot- 
Tarshiha local council of attempting to "control the entire 
area".
f. Consultation
This function is related to the status of planners in 
their functional environment, and to the attitude taken 
toward their recommendations. By definition, the 
"consultant" position is distinguished from the "decision­
making" function, and implies potentially limited 
opportunities for consultants to pursue their advised 
actions within specific organisations. "Consultants" are, in 
a way, "outsiders" in their institutional system, partially 
as a result of the system's activities and internal 
processes. Accordingly, unlike the planning function during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was an integral part 
of the RSD executive mechanism, planners in the mid-1980s 
were in a clear position of "consultants", remote from major
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decision-making processes. Therefore, although consultation 
was practiced in a wide variety of cases and was related to 
many organisations, its overall impact on decisions related 
to Western Galil was very limited. Several examples 
illustrate this point:
* The relations of planners with Mr. B. Vanger (the 
Mayor of Karmiel, and a member of the Katzir Committee) were 
based on the latter's perception of planners as 
professionals, capable of advising him on issues related to 
Karmiel's internal affairs, such as the problems in 
allocating land reserves to industries (i.e., the case of 
Galram, whose land reserves, in view of its slow 
development, he wished to eliminate), the questions 
associated with the development of "Centre 2000" and the 
ways to attract technological educational institutions to 
it, and issues directly related to Region 2000, such as the 
question of whether or not to integrate the Minister of 
Industry and Trade, A. Sharon, into the project. Needless to 
say, as the Mayor of Karmiel, Vanger was under no constraint 
to accept the RSD planners' advice, nor to incorporate them 
into his considerations.
* The Minister of Economics and Planning, in his attempt 
to realise "Firm 2000", requested planners "to prepare a 
concrete proposal for organising the administrative 
structure of 'Region 2000' and the foundation of the above 
firm, especially for the assessment of Selbst's proposal".4** 
This proposal, however, was never discussed.
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g. The "intermediate agents" between settlers and RSD 
management.
This was another aspect of the planning practice during 
the years 1978-1983. In their constant involvement with the 
construction of new settlements and the absorption of new 
settlers, planners grew familiar with settlers' needs and 
problems. At the same time, their actual presence in the 
area made them available to settlers who wished to make 
contacts with "the authorities", especially the RSD. Over 
time, this resulted in a situation whereby planners 
presented the settlers' interests and needs in the RSD 
system, while presenting the RSD's perspective to the 
settlers. Planners' involvement in local affairs gradually 
extended to include relations with the Settlement Movements 
(chapter 5), and with the RSD professional unit that was 
managing settler absorption and social life. In practice, 
contacts with settlers, and especially their elected 
representatives, were made on a permanent basis. Region 2000 
planners did not serve such function, as many others which 
were exercised during the "settlement plans"' 
implementation.
To sum up, the nature of both regional systems and the 
planning process does not enable the above dimensions of 
planning to be ranked according to their relative importance 
in regional processes. Is production more important than 
marketing? Is the idea of settling an unpopulated area in 
the Galil more or less important than the idea of furthering 
its development? Are attempts to secure telephone lines for 
new settlers more or less important than attempts to
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establish a modern telecommunications system? Is it possible 
to identify comparative criteria or measures? Probably not. 
In fact, ranking them is not very important since, as 
argued, it is the combined effect of all the dimensions that 
creates the planning process, or the implementation process 
through which the plans are produced and marketed and most 
planning functions come together to create a whole.
Nevertheless, the different planning functions 
described above, along with the changing emphasis placed on 
each planning dimension, enable us to identify several major 
characteristics of the planning process:
1. A distinction can be made between the period up to 
1983, associated with the "settlement plans", during 
which the three dimensions of the planning process were 
integrated, and the period after 1983, associated with 
the Region 2000 planning initiative, during which the 
emphasis was on the "production" and "marketing" 
dimensions, leaving implementation to be carried out on 
a very narrow basis.
2. In fact, the planning process associated with the 
"settlement plans" was largely a matter of what to do 
and how to do it. Planners tackled such questions in a 
"trial-and-error" process, through which they learned 
how to cope with implementation as it advanced. The 
Region 2000 planning process, in contrast, was based on 
the question of whether or not to implement the 
planning initiative at all. Emphasis was put on 
attempts to generate commitment of political decision­
makers to the specific planning recommendations, and to 
introduce some manageable programs.
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Over the years, planners acquired important skills, 
stemming from their direct, intensive connections with 
Western Galil (its institutions, individual settlers, 
and private entrepreneurs). This proved an advantage in 
operating within the RSD machinery and in contacts with 
other institutions.
In the first period, involvement of planners in 
regional processes was based on personal relationships 
with professionals from public organisations related to 
the region, and with individuals. Region 2000 planners 
expected their counterparts to be politicians, 
different professionals, and businessmen. Minutes of 
meetings of the planning group involved in this project 
indicate that the planners assumed that their personal 
relations with politicians, for example, would be 
sufficient for generating their commitment to the 
project.
Planning was largely motivated by individual planners, 
who were also influenced by individual decision-makers 
who were steering from "behind the scene" in order to 
convince their organisations to follow a certain 
initiative.
Attitude toward professionals. The "settlement plans" 
were mainly implemented by the RSD apparatus, with its 
different professional sections responsible for 
specific aspects. Region 2000 strategy excluded the RSD 
professional units, instead calling for the integration 
of outside professionals into the process. The planners 
needed outside experts to provide support for their 
ideas, which ran counter to prevailing institutional
planning perspectives and ideologies.
In all, some functions were a consequence of the extent 
to which planners were able to operate and the type of 
activities the RSD was engaged in (i.e., the "paternalistic" 
and aggressive attitude embodied in RSD activities 
[Lifschitz and Law-Yone, 1990] toward regional development 
issues and areas, which was adopted by professional 
planners); other functions resulted from the specific
characteristics of the planners and the way they operated,
as the following section attempts to reveal.
The planning functions associated with the "settlement 
plans" were closely linked to the RSD executive mechanism; 
in producing a planning product that was basically 
accessible to the RSD management in the context of growing 
concern with the Galil's "demographic problem", planners 
unknowingly took advantage of some vulnerable decision­
making determinants. Thus, although the 1976 plan was a 
fairly general statement of the planning perspective, 
planners were encouraged to specify it further and produce 
guidelines for its implementation by the RSD. In turn,
leaving the RSD with the responsibility for implementation
was in accord with the planners' recommendations, which were 
built into this executive mechanism. Region 2000, on the 
other hand, was a case of planners "cutting off the branch 
they sat on"; they challenged the prevailing executive 
mechanism and acted in opposition to accepted norms and 
their official brief in the RSD, but did not provide 
alternative norms and procedures and failed to create the 
conditions for generating other "partners" for
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implementation.
Finally, in accordance with traditional planning 
theories, one may classify the planning experience in the 
category of "planning-bureaucracy". However, whereas during 
the first period planners were maximizing their limited role 
within the RSD, Region 2000 planners attempted to utilise 
their advantages as employees of the RSD not only to serve 
outside organisational interests ("guerrillas"), but to 
promote changes in the RSD itself (Advocates?).
402
8.3 Putting Potential to Use
a. The region in question
Western Galil is not, as noted, an officially 
designated region, neither for administrative nor for 
electoral purposes. In practice, however, it is 
distinguished from other parts of the Galil and northern 
parts of the country by virtue of its demographics and its 
production processes that show a clear tendency to 
concentrate on “high-tech" industries (some labour- 
intensive, some R&D-intensive). Most of the latter's 
distinct characteristics developed since the late 1970s.
In the course of a history that has seen many planning 
initiatives (Chap. 6), Western Galil does not seem to have 
offered exceptional contributions or discouraging conditions 
to planning practice compared with other areas and regions - 
although the 197 6 "Earth Day" was a major stimulus to the 
mass construction of the "mitzpim", which, in turn, 
stimulated some of the processes that are now credited for 
the region's distinctiveness.
Hence, explanations for the planning experience we are 
concerned with here and the implementation of some planning 
products should be sought in the combined effect of 
institutional and planning inputs, rather than in the 
regional characteristics themselves.
b. Input of the written planning products
The 1976 and 1978 Segev development plans created for 
the RSD an initial opportunity to settle those parts of the
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Galil scarcely populated by Jews. This was stimulated by. 
applying the Industrial Village concept, developed in the 
early 1970s, which permitted to abandon the until then 
necessary links between Jewish settlements and land­
consuming agricultural activities. The evolution of these 
plans into the "mitzpim" idea resulted in a project whose 
scale and intensity were not predicted by planners, and 
possibly not even by the RSD management. Nevertheless, by 
presenting a conceptual framework for future development 
into which the RSD mechanism could fit (e.g., the planned 
volume of settlers, spatial structure of settlements, and 
relations with settlers all accorded with prevailing 
standards), the planning product proved a very useful tool" 
for generating the commitment of the RSD management and for 
guiding different RSD activities.
Although they merely stated proposed actions and their 
priorities (referred to as "development stages"), the 
"settlement plans" essentially proposed a change that 
cannot, by any standard, be considered easy to accept and 
implement, in spite of the fact that the Israeli history has 
seen many massive settlement constructions within a short 
period. The establishment of new settlement clusters, even 
by a gradual process, is a very "demanding" process that 
impose a heavy burden on the organisation(s) involved. In 
light of that, it is all the more notable that the actual 
implementation of the plans can partially be credited to the 
nature of the planning product itself (and especially its 
conceptual standing vis-A-vis the RSD operating mechanism).
By contrast, the "grand" idea of Region 2000, which in 
some respects was less costly and less crucial in its
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potential negative externalities, was presented as a large- 
scale, long-term, nation-wide program. In its articulation, 
planners were carried away with Prof. Katzir's point of 
view, emphasising, for example, the "innovative" nature of 
the project, the unique "high-tech" industries to be located 
in Region 2000, and the relatively large number of highly 
skilled and prestigious jobs that were to be available. In 
other words, they emphasised the challenge, the almost 
impossible to attain, and the drastic changes that were to 
be made primarily in Western Galil. Accordingly, proposed 
changes were presented in a such way that even fairly 
straightforward actions seemed complicated and somewhat 
"hostile" or frightening. For example, planners proposed the 
construction of a highway to connect the northern 
peripheries with the central parts of the country, which in 
the context of industrialising Israel should have been 
basically acceptable and feasible, especially since no 
special or unknown technologies were to be applied in its 
construction. In fact, a similar road had already been 
proposed in the national master plan for roads, although it 
had not yet been approved and was far from being built. Yet, 
by referring to the "north-south axis" the planners made 
this project look very complicated. Further, in doing so 
they emphasised the links to the central parts of the 
country and the fact that Western Galil was competing with 
other areas for the same Ministry of Housing budget. These 
areas do indeed compete with each other, but it is doubtful 
whether this was the right place to point this out.
Leaving aside this matter of the strategy's conceptual 
articulation, some of the proposed changes required to
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promote Region 2000 were in themselves difficult to accept, 
by the political system and difficult to implement. Among 
them was the creation of a "regional" elected body that did 
not exist in the Israeli government system. Thus, not only 
did the Region 2000 strategy propose "difficult" solutions, 
but in tackling more straightforward aspects of the regional 
system, it made them look complicated.
Above all, a strategy that by definition was abstract 
formed the major basis on which planners attempted to 
communicate with decision-makers. Unlike the "settlement 
plans", which presented concrete tasks and measures, the 
planning products of Region 2000 scarcely specified how to 
get from present conditions to the desired future, thus 
adding another obstacle to the acceptance of already 
problematic proposals.
In all, the translation of a planning product into 
specific actions, or bridging the "gap" between present and 
future conditions, is difficult. The "settlement plans", by 
leaving much of the "translation" to the prevailing RSD 
executive mechanism, paved the way not only for the 
implementation, but also for planners' abandonment of a 
long-run perspective on the area and their distinct role in 
the system as policy guides. The strategy, however, did not 
provide any guidelines for the RSD mechanism that was 
continuously working in the area, and thus in practice 
maintained the RSD's dominant role in the region. This 
suggests that a regional strategy is important insofar as it 
is accompanied by specific programs or sets of activities 
deduced from it. A strategy may indeed contribute to an
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initial acceptance of ideas and the establishment of 
favourable conditions for the introduction of concrete 
actions. However, commitment to actions can be generated 
only on the basis of specified actions, limited in time, and 
their observable results. Should have Region 2000 planners 
themselves managed the strategy's specification? Yes, since 
this may have created suitable conditions for getting the 
execution started and enable experts' integration at a later 
stage. No, because in planners' perspective, their skills 
were insufficient for the strategy's specification in a way 
that permits to establish the conceptual breakthrough they 
meant to stimulate.
Bearing in mind the tools planners potentially had to 
promote implementation, we can see that the "settlement 
plans" unknowingly made use of vulnerable decision-making 
determinants, benefiting from the bursting of the 
"demographic problem" into public consciousness. The Region 
2000 experience cannot be said to reflect a wise utilisation 
of these determinants on the part of planners, both in the 
formulation of the Region 2000 strategy and in the attempts 
to promote its implementation.
c. The nature of the RSD
As noted, the two blocs of planning products were 
formulated within fairly different institutional contexts; 
the "settlement plans" are associated with the period of 
"institutional integrity", during which planners were an 
integral part of a system that, in turn, was highly 
committed to the settlement process, and was notable for its 
clear policy guidelines and efficient executive mechanism.
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Region 2000 was initiated in a divided RSD that lacked the 
ability to formulate a policy and promote its consistent 
execution. Both products were introduced into a fragmented 
and generally inefficient government institutional system. 
Further, unlike in the previous period, during which the 
planning function was integrated into the RSD decision­
making mechanism, the Region 2000 period saw a change in 
planners' status: planners found themselves at the mercy of 
managerial conflicts, and had to cope with an unwillingness 
and inability to integrate them back into the decision­
making mechanism.
Planning practice went in accordance with these 
conditions. For example, coordination of or contributions to 
the management of the settlement process were facilitated by 
planners' status in the system, their access to different 
sources of information, and their awareness of working 
procedures. This proved most effective when the RSD, with an 
integrated executive mechanism, was determined to attain its 
objectives. Furthermore, these planning functions were 
exercised when commitment to the settlement process was 
interpreted in terms of commitment to planning work; thus, 
planners had relatively broad authority to act on behalf of 
the director of the North Region office (and through him on 
behalf of the RSD).
That planners took on the task of "motivating" other 
public organisations to function according to the plans 
reflects, in this case, the fact that they worked with the 
full backing of their managers (this is also an aspect of 
authority imposed from above). Hence, the planners' ability 
to initiate actions and obtain support for ideas such as the
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foundation of Misgav Regional Council (which required the 
RSD to deal with issues beyond its official scope) was the 
direct result of their status in the organisation. One can 
further argue that this service as the intermediate "agents" 
between public organisations involved in the settlement 
process and the settlers themselves, was most effective 
during the initial years of construction, when the 
dependence of both settlers and other non-JAFI institutions 
on the RSD was rather high.
Region 2000 represents the other extreme, a case in 
which planners functioned as nearly independent agents, 
occasionally backed by individuals in their direct 
institutional apparatus. In taking advantage of the chaos in 
the RSD, planners managed to obtain general approval for the 
strategy and mobilise Fellowship 2000's support in 
convincing the RSD to take over the project. Yet, each of 
the functions associated with this project was carried out 
on a very limited scope, and mainly on the basis of 
individual relations. "Consultation", which was the most 
important function in this period, was rarely accompanied by 
decision-maker commitment to incorporate planners into the 
overall decision-making process, not to mention the lack of 
commitment to apply recommendations.
Planners found they could not carry out functions 
associated with the management of implementation. The stage 
at which the project was, and the principal institutional 
attitude toward it, implied that "coordination" was required 
most between upper levels of the political decision-making 
system, i.e., ministers, the RSD Executive, and Fellowship 
2000. The task here was to gear politicians toward agreement
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on the project, and on the distribution of authority 
inherent in the development strategy. However, without any 
backing from the RSD and its financial resources, planners' 
attempts at coordination were fruitless; there were no 
concrete results, and meetings with politicians were merely 
"friendly personal contacts".
Functions related to marketing the strategy, addressed 
to different types of institutions and decision-makers, 
required skills and experience the planners lacked. Further, 
available tools, such as tours to the Galil and distribution 
of information, were not very effective in obtaining support 
at the first stage, and generating commitment at more 
advanced stages of the project.
In principle, the "ideal" conditions for promoting the 
"settlement plans" amounted to playing according to the 
rules of the game as determined by the RSD. Specifically, it 
was necessary to accept the RSD's focus on short-run 
processes and its ad hoc attitude toward problem-solving. It 
was also necessary to accept a limited regional perspective 
- concern with a small and specific segment of the Western 
Galil system. These principles found their expression in the 
adjustment of plans to changing conditions and RSD demands, 
and in a systematic disregard for the immediate functional 
hinterland of the Segev area.
Nevertheless, if we put the planning experience in the 
perspective of the regional system concerned, this "freedom 
to function" of planners gains an additional meaning: it was 
realised at the cost of contributing to the maintenance of 
the existing institutional system and political status quo 
regarding the role of Western Galil, and thus to the
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maintenance of the region's relatively disadvantaged 
condition and its peripheral role in the national system. 
Did the addition of 30 new settlements really changs the 
condition of Western Galil vis-a-vis other parts of the 
country?
Structural theoretical approaches suggest that by 
harmonising with the institutional perspectives and 
functional machinery, planners were fulfilling their role in 
the socio-economic system (and, indeed, the national and 
regional political, economic and social status-quo was not 
fundamentally affected by the large-scale settlement 
process). However, the fact that the Region 2000 strategy 
was initiated by most of the same planners who had worked on 
the "settlement plans" raises the possibility that they 
rejected this role, and sought for an alternative way to 
realise important changes in the regional system. One cf the 
expressions of this change in planning perspective was the 
shift from serving the direct interests of the RSD, which is 
part of the state apparatus, toward an attempt to serve 
"business sector" interests by creating conditions for the 
maximisation of private profitability in the area (as the 
emerging public opposition proved, this change had a 
potential effect on prevailing socio-economic relations).
The planning function in relation with Region 2000 was 
exercised in totally different spheres from that of the 
"settlement plans", both in terms of institutional context 
and in terms of planners' will and ability to adjust the 
strategy to the "rules of the game". This complicated 
situation existed from the beginning of work on the project.
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Difficulties in respecting the "rules of the game" stemmed 
from several sources: First, in terms of the RSD, the 
familiar "game" had changed - there was not much interest in 
the functional aspects of the area (and especially the 
spatial distribution of activities and population). Rather, 
there was concern with the specific components to vhich 
political parties were committed, regardless of their 
location and linkages with their functional hinterland. This 
was accompanied by a change in the "rules", expressed by a 
limitation of the authority given planners by the upper 
managerial levels of the RSD, and a growing involvement of 
these managers in specific issues which traditionally had 
been managed by the regional office. Thus, the actual act of 
initiating the regional strategy by planners created 
difficulties in integrating it into the RSD functional 
system. Second, in terms of the project as a whole, no 
organisation was dominant, so as to be able to dictate the 
"rules". Third, the "game" was played in an unfamiliar 
arena - at the political level of decision-making. Apart 
from the difficulties in functioning that were imposed on 
the planners, their point of view in the project created 
additional problems: the strategic perspective was based on 
establishing a new "game" with new "rules". The essence of 
the strategic perspective lies in the principle of 
restructuring patterns of public intervention, as previously 
specified. This "invited" immediate opposition fron the 
public sector, stemming from personal interests (i.e., fear 
of losing power) and institutional structure (i.e., the 
difficulty of implementing such changes in complex 
structures). Planners also expected active support for this
principle from the private sector. However, this proved 
unrealistic in view of the nature of the "business sector" 
(i.e., it does not generally support "revolutions", and it 
is essentially a collection of individuals rather than a 
coherent group with an agenda), and the costs that would be 
incurred from taking a leading role in a project such as 
Region 2000. In any event, the evidence shows that planners 
lacked the skills to approach the "business sector" from 
their position in a public organisation.
In all, in the case of the "settlement plans", the 
nature of the planning initiatives and the functional 
environment within which they were exercised resulted in a 
situation in which the commitment of the RSD executive 
mechanism was virtually a foregone conclusion. Region 2000, 
on the other hand, required aggressive methods to generate 
commitment on the part of the RSD and other organisations; 
these proved ineffective for directing actual public 
intervention. This, however, does not negate the basic 
validity of a strategic approach toward regional processes, 
and the validity of the tools planners can apply to improve 
their performance in a concrete decision-making system.
Notes
(1) We shall avoid a thorough evaluation study and estimation of possible fu ture 
im pact, since this is not directly in our scope.
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(2) No target year is stated. This objective refers to the full capacity of settlements, 
as can be attained when settlements, as initially planned, are fully consolidated.
(3) These estimations apply to the pre- Russian m igration period - a trend which 
neither its scale nor its spatial distribution can be predicted at this stage (1990).
(4) Kipnis refers to the M ountainous Galil, whose physical boundaries are roughly 
equal to our definition of Western Galil.
(5) From 650,000 to 710,000 Dunams. Dunam = 1000 square m eter.
(6) We shall refrain  from discussing the question regarding the extent to which new 
settlem ents’ development required to designate all Western Galil (and other areas) 
with specific land uses.
(7) In her study of the population of M ountainous Galil’s new settlem ents, Carmon 
(1990) proposes several socio-economic indicators to support this argument: this 
population consists of young families, in which parents are relatively highly 
educated and work in highly paid, prestigious jobs. The m ajority is of European 
or Am erican origin (a significant indicator in the segregated Israeli society), 
families live in "improved" (i.e., 4+ rooms) conditions, and a m ajority of the 
families owns at least one car. Carmon fu rther states that most of the population 
have "high awareness of life quality, and a tendency to invest in its 
materialisation" (p. 36).
(8) A letter from Mr.Y.Cohen (Director of M A"ATZ - the m inistry of housing road 
construction body) to Mr.B.Vanger (Mayor of Karmiel), dated 6.3.1986, which 
clearly states that "the Galil is not at high priority  for road construction".
(9) A letter from M r.Y.Kela (Chief scientist of m inistry of Communication) to 
M s.O.Gilat (RSD planner) dated 6.1.1986.
(10) M s.T.Duchan, interview. Z icron-Y a’akov, August 1990.
(11) I wish to thank M r.T.Duchan, who initially dew my attention to this example.
(12) Freidm an, Interview , Tel-A viv, September 1990.
(13) Cohen, interview , Tel-A viv, September 1989.
(14) M inutes from meeting of RSD North region office Executive, dated 4.4.1986.
(15) M inutes from "Katzir committee" meeting dated 24.2.1982.
(16) Ibid., 25.11.1985.
(17) A letter from M r.B.Vanger to Prof. Katzir, dated 21.3.1986.
(18) See, for example, minutes from meetings of "Katzir committee" dated 16.9.1982 
and 28.10.1983, as well as a note written by Prof. Katzir dated 28.2.1984.
(19) A letter from RSD Planning U nit to the head of the North Region office, dated
12.4.1986.
(20) Ibid.
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(21) M inutes of meeting between the head of the RSD North region office and 
representatives of the Planning U nit dated 2.5.1985.
(22) A letter from M r.Z.Haim ovitch to Ms.O.Gilat dated 17.3.1986.
(23) Mr.S.Naim, a member of Fellowship 2000, 15.3.1985.
(24) A letter from Prof. Katzir and the Mr. Ya’akobi the m inister of Economy and
Planning) to the JAFI dated 25.12.1985.
(25) A letter of RSD D irector-G eneral (Mr.Y.Dekel) to the head of RSD North region 
office (Mr.M.Cohen) that authorised the Vice D irector-G eneral (M r.Y.Friedman) 
to determine the need to form a departmental steering comm ittee, dated 2.2.1986; 
A second letter from this D irector-G eneral that appoints such committee, dated 
9.2.1986; Internal memorandums between the above persons (separately), the vice 
D irector-G eneral (M r.H.Zaban), and the co-D irector of the RSD (M r.N.Zvili) in 
the period between 28.1.1986-15.2.1986.
(26) Minutes from meeting between Mr.Y.Cohen (director of the m inistry of
Education - North D istrict) and RSD North region office (the head of the office 
and representatives of the Planning Unit), dated 7.11.1985.
(27) Ibid.
(28) A letter from M r.U.Shani (the m inister’s assistant) to M r.B.Vanger, dated
2.12.1986, appologising for the busy schedule of the minister.
(29) Op.cit. note 12.
(30) Op.cit., note 10.
(31) Minutes from a meeting between Mr.B.Vanger and RSD North region office 
Planning unit, dated 29.3.1986.
(32) The RSD North region office - the Planning Unit. A paper distributed among 
participants of this meeting, dated October 1986.
(33) M r.A.Raz (the head of Misgav regional council). Quoted from minutes of this 
meeting.
(34) Letters from M r.Y.Dekel to Mr.M.Cohen (head of North region office) dated 
13.1.1986 and 15.4.1986.
(35) A letter from Ms.T.Duchan (head of planning unit) to M r.M .Cohen (the head of 
North region office), dated 12.4.1986, and a response of the latter, dated
18.4.1986.
(36) Beyond this office, some influence was attained by virtue of the credit planners 
received from Mr.R.W eitz and Prof. Katzir.
(37) Op.cit., note 10.
(38) Ibid.
(39) Source of first draft: RSD North Region Archives.
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Source of the Leasing Contract: M enuhin, Ludm er and Eger, 1983.
(40) Op.cit., notes 10 and 12.
(41) M r.A .M eir (Pifke), M onthly reports of new settlem ents’ development during the 
"mitzpim" project.
(42) Op. cit., note 33.
(43) Op. cit., note 12.
(44) Op. cit., note 10.
(45) M inute from the Forum meeting, 24.11.1987.
(46) Gilat, O. and Duchan, T. (17.3.1985). An Assessment of Region 2000 
O rganisational Alternatives. (Hebrew)
(47) Region 2000 - the researcher’s notes. Refer to the M ethodological Remarks in the 
Appendix.
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSIONS
The following example illustrates the problem planners 
often face, and which this dissertation was written to help 
solve. A few months ago, a friend (Mr. Yriv) who is the 
elected chairman of a regional council in the north of 
Israel (Ha'gilboa) "complained" that if I (the planner, 
O.G.) could have commanded him, back in the mid-1980s, to 
act in a certain case according to my perspective, "the 
regional council would have been much better off in the 
1990s". He then explained that "your ideas seemed, at that 
time, so crazy that I could not afford adopting them. 
Consequently, we are still struggling with the same old, 
familiar problems that are becoming less and less 
manageable". Still, in the 1990s, there is a regional 
council that may or may not have been better off, and a 
planner whose proposals are in the regional council's 
archives. Could the planner have done better in persuading 
the system of the relevance of his idea? Perhaps.
In our attempt to understand previous planning 
experience and put the planning process in an operational 
framework that systematically locates aspects of this 
process along manageable components (although the actual 
planning process cannot be "rationalised" in the sense of 
the systems approach), it is taken for granted that planners 
cannot control "the world", that there are many elements of 
his functional environment that are beyond his control; 
political power distribution and social norms are only two
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examples. Thus, the important matter is how planners- 
integrate their ideas into the existing environment, how 
they evaluate the "working grounds" and apply personal 
characteristics to influence decision-makers.
This dissertation, accordingly, is based on the premise 
that the planning process is a function of how we promote 
the planning product, rather than merely of what is proposed 
by this product. The latter is not thereby less important, 
especially since it is integral to the planner's attempt to 
promote a particular process (and, as we noted, the issue of 
what principles should guide the "regional" planning 
perspective is a subject of extensive concern in planning 
theory). Accordingly, planning practice was elaborated in 
several stages.
Initially, we posed the question of how the "region" 
should be perceived, and concluded that this is basically a 
function of what planners want to see in the complex, 
flexible to the extent of unlimited possible boundaries 
system, and their normative expectations as to what should 
be changed and affected in this system. However, the 
discussion of the "region" and the issue of regional
boundaries that forms the basis of this approach, contended
that regions can be defined only in relation to a specific 
context of time, location, and purpose of concern. 
Therefore, any normative perspective on the region's future 
can be determined only in relative terms (by comparison with
other areas). By implication, the region’s relative
condition may guide the determination of such a future 
perspective.
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This perception exposes the "region" to a potentially 
large variety of criteria for determining its content. 
Nevertheless, the subsequent argument that production and 
socio-organisational activities are at the centre of 
regional operating structure, clarified the process of 
choosing relevant boundaries of concern. These boundaries 
may be further crystallised by identifying "key factors of 
development", which are the specific activities, among the 
above two categories of activities in this specific 
perception, that are of special importance in a given case.
We then discussed the functional environment within 
which the planners practice. In this regard we emphasised 
that in order to operate within the decision-making 
environment and determine their "niche" in it, planners can 
identify several decision-making determinants that are 
relatively vulnerable to planning practice by virtue of 
their being susceptible to context- and issue-specific 
elements. The fact that these determinants can affect 
specific responses to planning initiatives suggests that the 
way planners treat them is important, and may provide a 
basis for the promotion of almost any type of idea (most 
commonly a change-induced idea). Furthermore, in exploring 
those determinants that are potentially vulnerable to the 
planning process and their relevance in concrete contexts, 
planners may gain an insight into where efforts should be 
put and how their initiatives should be practiced. 
Accordingly, planners should focus their attention on the 
types of responses decision-makers make to the planning 
ideas. The question is, what type of response is required?
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In view of the nature of the political decision-making 
system, the regional system, and the planners' role in these 
systems we suggested that commitment to the planning product 
is a major indication of where impact can be made. 
Commitment (i.e., an observable response that reflects both 
interests and wants) to some sort of long-run perspective on 
processes or concrete actions is therefore both important 
and desirable. Especially, it permits planners to choose 
"partners" for the implementation of the planning product, 
and specify the type of impact they can expect from each 
partner separately and from the process as a whole.
Since commitment entails a high degree of economic and 
social risk intrinsic to the uncertainty associated with 
future processes, we suggested that a regional strategy may 
be the most appropriate tool for generating the desired 
commitment, because such a strategy clarifies the future to 
the extent that it is possible to do so. A regional 
development strategy, therefore, was argued to be in the 
best interest of both the "region" and the forces that 
function within it. Notwithstanding, any concern with 
regional strategy requires answers to the question of how to 
cope with external organisational issues. A regional 
strategy whose formulation was stimulated by planners' 
creative, task-oriented ideas and analytic skills (and 
taking into account both vulnerable decision-making 
determinants and the region's relative nature), when coupled 
with the planners' active attempts to promote the planning 
product's integration into a specific decision-making 
environment (rather than handing over responsibility for the 
planning product's implementation to a specific executive
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mechanism), may lead to a strategic breakthrough in the 
realisation of a planning initiative. Acknowledging that 
actual regional strategies and policies historically are 
implemented within the government system, we pointed out the 
possible contribution of the "business sector" to the 
realisation of a given strategy or planning product. 
Accordingly, we suggested that both sectors may in theory be 
important for the execution of a regional strategy, and 
concluded that their relative importance can be determined 
only with reference to a concrete region-planner-planning 
product context. Nevertheless, in acknowledging the nature 
of the functional environment of planning practice, we 
stressed that a strategy should be accompanied by concrete 
recommendations as to the actions (possibly presented as 
"packages of actions") that follow from it. Finally, in 
light of the nature of regions, we suggested that a strategy 
should enhance the region's competitive advantage (i.e., 
should encourage inequalities between regions).
The second part of the dissertation analysed the 
specific planning experience of the Rural Settlement 
Department of the Jewish Agency for Israel in Western Galil 
from 1975 to 1986. This analysis aimed to verify the 
relevance of the methodological framework for actual 
planning practice, and, indirectly, for the assessment of 
historical planning processes.
Starting with a description of the major parameters of 
Western Galil, we emphasised the peripherality of the 
functional and physical role of this area vis-a-vis other 
parts of the country, which is exacerbated by a very
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fragmented institutional system (although this is not 
different from the rest of Israel), and the problem 
(identified by the political system and some scholars) of 
the Arab majority. Planning initiatives were, indeed, 
justified on the basis of Western Galil's peripherality.
This basic justification, however, led to two "blocs" 
of planning products that evolved in the course of planning 
practice. They were identified as the "settlement plans" and 
Region 2000 development strategy. These blocs are distinct 
in terms of their parameters of concern (settlement-centered 
vs. region-wide perspective), their levels of concern with 
regional parameters (specificity vs. abstraction), the 
expected "partners" of the planning process, the type of 
future region envisioned, and the sorts of expectations 
planners had with regard to implementation, insofar as these 
could be identified during the period prior to 
implementation.
These differences became crucial during the attempts to 
exercise these planning products. The response to the 
"settlement plans" from the planners' direct institutional 
environment (i.e., the RSD) was unique, resulting in a 
process it is doubtful the planners foresaw. They enjoyed 
the full commitment of RSD management to their activities, 
which in turn permitted them to become an integral part of 
the plans' execution, and influence the way their planning 
products were implemented. The Region 2000 initiative, 
although it took a more "sophisticated" approach toward 
plan-making, encountered fairly unfavourable operating 
conditions (the standard conditions, I would say). This 
sophisticated attitude, reflected in the way the strategy
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was introduced to the political decision-making system, was 
nonetheless problematic, in the sense of overemphasising the 
"future" and the abstract desired condition, while 
neglecting to create a firm base for actual commitment to 
actions. Thus, in spite of the planners' will and active 
attempts to promote the integration of their written 
planning product into the prevailing decision-making system, 
the content of the strategy itself and its ineffective 
marketing created major obstacles in attaining this goal.
The planning experience studied in this dissertation is 
a specific case of planners struggling to make their 
planning initiative sound and get it implemented. It is a 
study of the planners' role in regional processes, their 
susceptibility to the institutional system affiliated with 
their initiatives, and their vulnerability to the possible 
discrepancies between their idea of what should be done and 
their skills in estimating what can be done. This study, 
which analyses the planning experience in light of the major 
methodological perspective presented in this dissertation, 
developed out of the question, what makes the product of a 
strategic mind-set be adopted by decision-makers and 
actually implemented? Accordingly, particular emphasis was 
placed on the relations between the planners’ potential for 
operating and the extent to which their written product 
embodied this potential, thus establishing initial grounds 
for communication with decision-makers, the types of actions 
that accompanied the "planning" process, the actual choice 
of regional components and decision-makers as a cornerstone 
of the regional development perspective, and, finally, the
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translation of their vision into actual working principles 
and procedures. In all, this planning experience occurred 
during a period in which important changes in Western Galil 
took place. Some of these changes can be directly related to 
this planning process; others seem to have little or no 
direct connection with the overall processes initiated by 
the RSD, of which planners were an integral part.
In view of this experience, several questions raised in 
the first part of the dissertation require modification.
* What is the validity of a regional strategy?
We constantly emphasised that a regional strategy is 
required because of the different forces operating in 
the region, since it is the only way to set up a 
framework for coordinating their different interests in 
the region and encouraging them to function toward 
common future goals in a way consistent with the 
strategic principles. This allows commitment to be 
generated on the basis of clarified future and concrete 
actions.
The Region 2000 experience, however, shows that the 
commitment of decision-makers to a strategy is, in 
general, insufficient for ensuring that actual 
decisions will be made in accordance with the strategic 
principles. Because of its abstraction, the strategy 
permits specific interpretations that can be combined 
to create a different "whole" from the one originally 
envisioned in the strategy. By implication, when the 
strategy does not make concrete recommendations that
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can be translated into concrete actions, one's 
commitment to it merely signals the intent to operate 
according to one's own interests and wants, i.e., to 
maintain prevailing operational methods.
This raises the possibility that, in practice, in 
contrast to our initial expectation, a regional 
strategy is most useful to the planners, who should 
reduce it to measurable and manageable segments, to 
which the specific commitment of "partners" may be 
generated. In order to affect specific decision-makers, 
specification of the strategy is crucial.
What are the tools available to planners in their 
attempts to promote a certain planning product?
This dissertation assumes that planners are equipped 
with sufficient tools to determine the types of change 
required, their objectives, and how to explain the 
regional processes. Our discussion emphasised the 
analytical tools that facilitate identification of the 
environment within which they wish to operate. These 
contribute to the planners' ability to identify the 
type of response the planning initiative might 
generate, and hence the "partners" most relevant for 
specific actions. A special emphasis was given to the 
decision-making determinants that were identified as 
vulnerable to planning practice.
However, the planning experience suggests that though 
they might be aware of vulnerable determinants, 
planners do not really know how to take advantage of 
them in such ways as, for example, articulating a
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certain idea or stimulating their "partners'" interest. 
A clue as to the area where such knowledge might be 
acquired was provided in our discussion of the means 
for attaining a strategic breakthrough (Chap. 4), and 
the classification of planning dimensions, specifically 
in the reference to "marketing" a planning product 
(Chap. 8 ). The Region 2000 experience highlights the 
importance of "marketing" procedures, which, when 
integrated into the planning skills, may enrich the 
methodological basis on which planners construct their 
proposals.
This call for integrating marketing procedures into the 
planning process may seem totally inappropriate to some 
scholars, undermining the belief that any planning 
product is necessarily accepted insofar as it is 
desired and required by the environment within which 
planners operate and the social, economic, and 
political conflicts that make up this environment. We 
argued, however, that the promotion of a planning 
product should be treated like the promotion of any 
other idea or product; not without reason we referred 
to the "planning product" rather than merely to plans, 
strategies, schemes, or documents. I believe that it is 
primarily in the planner's interest to promote the 
implementation of his ideas. Since political decision­
making is outside his direct control, a planner should 
take into account the way in which his product is 
"sold" in the market.
What is to be promoted and how? These are the questions 
addressed throughout the dissertation, although
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admittedly, the tools offered by different business 
theories were not thoroughly discussed (on the 
assumption that planners are capable of acquiring such 
knowledge, we concentrated on proving their relevance). 
Accordingly, it is suggested that some modifications in 
planning education be made to allow planners to acquire 
appropriate knowledge from the area of marketing.I 
would further suggest that a study be conducted to show 
how planners can practice marketing strategies under 
conditions where they lack direct control over 
resources, a not uncommon situation. Although a 
fundamental aspect of planning practice, it is 
presently almost ignored by scholars and planners.
A related aspect of the planning process has to do with 
the types of regional parameters that may be influenced 
by it.
Although generation of commitment was regarded as 
theoretically feasible for any aspect of the regional 
processes, the particular planning experience discussed 
here proves that it was easiest with regard to "land 
use" issues (i.e., recommendations as to what the land 
use structure should be). Issues that can be reduced to 
"land use", such as telecommunication infrastructure, 
also are manageable. Thus, as long as planners 
functioned under the "umbrella" of land-use issues, 
they had the tools and institutional backing to 
influence decision-making. In contrast, attempts to 
deal with administrative and organisational changes 
faced unexpected obstacles. As for economic processes,
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which were almost totally ignored by planners, my 
belief is that they can be reduced to manageable 
measures.
As opposed to traditional "land use" issues, which 
political-administrative systems leave open to 
"penetration" by professionals and non-politicians, any 
attempt to deal with institutional structures and 
distribution of authority proved hopeless. The impact 
of planners in such cases was limited to individuals, 
with one exception (i.e., Misgav Regional Council) of 
an impact on a wider political and administrative 
system, and it does not matter that they were not alone 
in this process - cooperation with an executive 
mechanism is the essence of planning practice.
How then can planners address this difficulty without 
becoming politicians, as Region 2000 planners sometimes 
tried?
The answer is connected with the way planners see the 
scope of their activities. Some expect direct 
involvement in political processes; the Region 2000 
experience shows that such a role is very hard to 
attain. This dissertation suggests that the "marketing" 
of concrete projects may be one direction along which 
planners can increase their potential influence. As 
previously proposed, a study of "marketing" the 
planning product should reveal the way in which this 
difficulty could be solved in practice: How can
planners affect political and administrative systems 
(if this is considered necessary) as planners rather 
than by becoming, in effect, politicians? Which
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indirect measures should be adopted?
In this regard, the dissertation revealed an important 
problem that still is unsolved in practice, namely, how 
can planners cope with the problem of integrating both 
the public and the private sectors into the regional 
processes according to the planning product?
The planning experience discussed here provides an 
example of a rather aggressive solution to this 
problem, by which the RSD managed to pull the 
government executive system into the development of 
Western Galil and influence private business 
entrepreneurs and individuals. This provided planners 
with the "umbrella" for extending their functions 
beyond their immediate institutional environment. This 
kind of attitude is rather unique in the Israeli 
experience and in other parts of the Western world 
(although more common in Third World countries, where 
such roles are played by multinational organisations). 
Further, it was a consequence of the RSD management, 
rather than planners', practice.
The questions are, therefore, how can planners cope 
with the more conventional situations in which many 
organisations with similar political and executive 
capacities stretch regional parameters according to 
their own interests, and how can planners coordinate 
between the possibly conflicting interests of the 
different economic entities, especially in view of the 
fact that planning is commonly practiced within one, 
usually public, organisation? The answers, in my
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opinion, lie in the way the planning product is 
presented to the different segments of the regional 
system, which brings us back to the marketing dimension 
of the planning process.
Finally, in view of the nature of planning practice, 
that is, a process by which planners attempt to 
influence decision-making so as to induce chances in a 
given regional system (regional, in our case), it is 
relevant to raise the question of the difference 
between "incremental" versus "fundamental" changes. The 
literature distinguishes between these concepts, in 
many cases implying that the way changes are attained 
(i.e., incrementally) cannot yield desired results 
(i.e., fundamental changes).
I believe in incrementalism. A change is a process in 
which one adjusts to a different situation. The process 
may be short or long, the objectives guiding the 
process may be desirable or unacceptable. Accordingly, 
the actions formulating the change may be drastic or 
moderate, but the actual process through which the 
system accommodates to a new situation and absorbs new 
ideas is incremental. Even in the case of the Six Days' 
War, a drastic military action in itself, It took 
several years to absorb the new territories and to 
accommodate the entire Israeli socio-economic system to 
its consequences. Needless to say, the process in which 
many planners have been engaged over the last 20 years 
(at least) of formulating an "alternative" planning 
theory, will result in drastic changes in the planning
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profession and its performance. Yet, this fundamentally 
different theory will be the outcome of a long process 
during which many different theoretical insights, 
research studies, and other contributions were brought 
together. Hence, planners are constantly involved in 
everyday affairs, and their influence is incremental. 
This, however, implies nothing about the content of 
their influence.
This dissertation concentrated, then, on a specific 
aspect of planning practice, and suggested that planning 
practice can be made more effective by virtue of the method 
planners adopt to formulate the planning product and advance 
its integration into the decision-making environment.
This dissertation calls for a planning process that is 
at odds with the conventional wisdom of plan production, and 
the more common perception among planners that they have 
accomplished their task by predicting a certain future (that 
cannot be fully predicted) and specifying the means to 
attain certain goals (which are not necessarily either 
feasible or acceptable within specific organisational 
contexts). Indirectly, one wonders at the fact that the 
"rational goals-means-end" attitude is the most common one 
among practitioners.
Planners must accept that the implementation of their 
plans does not necessarily follow from their initiation, 
their production (although someone pays for that), or even 
their official approval. Planners must therefore actively 
pursue implementation. The type of planning function 
envisioned here regards the production of plans as merely
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one aspect of planners' active attempts to promote the 
integration of their ideas into the prevailing system in 
which they have chosen to operate. This requires, apart from 
professional skills, a sensitivity to political processes, 
administrative procedures, and the personal characteristics 
of actors in the relevant functional environment. 
Accordingly, planners should be concerned with interactions 
with individual decision-makers, public relation campaigns, 
lobby groups, etc. It follows that this perception 
restructures the expectations planners have about their 
profession, in terms of their potential strength in the 
planning process and its impact.
According to this rationale, any attempt to evaluate 
planning experience ("regional" and "urban" alike) must 
consider the way a plan responded to the concrete context 
within which it was produced, the means by which 
implementation was promoted, and the different planning 
products created or attempted throughout the planning 
process. By implication, the various reasons specified in 
the literature for the failure of plans' implementation 
should also include (in spite of the practical difficulties 
involved in such research) the means applied by planners to 
promote implementation, rather than implicitly assuming that 
they were irrelevant or at least appropriate.
Further contributions of this dissertation are in the 
following aspects:
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* In determining the set of objects planners should 
concern themselves with: not merely with the region and 
its characteristics as traditionally treated and 
normally accepted in planning practice, but also with 
the institutional context within which the planning 
product is expected to unfold.
* In emphasising how to present ideas and 
recommendations, as a means to generate commitment to 
the planning product or the components being presented. 
Plan-making should therefore be viewed as a process of 
formulating certain visions and marketing the practical 
implications. In this regard, one suggested that skills 
that tend to be excluded from planning practice are 
very important, such as marketing expertise and 
individual capacities for interaction with decision­
makers .
* Indirectly, one also suggest that the planning process 
should not be endless or unlimited. Planners who 
realise that a certain product is not going to be 
implemented should either seek for alternative ways to 
promote it, or stop planning for practical rather than 
academic purposes.
In sum, do I suggest a "super planner"? Is the planner 
who is competent in the production both of plans and the 
other products that must be evolved to promote 
implementation non-existent?
My experience proves that these proposed qualities of 
planners are not unrealistic; first of all because most of 
the required knowledge and skills are available and acquired
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during the academic training of planners. Second, there are 
cases, especially among private practitioners, in which 
planners actually apply some of the principles proposed here 
(for example, they are constantly engaged in "selling" their 
ideas - attempting to convince an organisation to sponsor a 
plan and implement it), only they do not see such functions 
as part of their "planning practice" (just as some scholars 
might also regard them as completely outside of "planning" 
proper). So, we do not require a super planner whose 
professional skills are unattainable; as far as basic 
professional competence and personal attributes are 
concerned, the necessary prerequisites are potentially in 
place. Finally, planners are already engaged (in one way or 
another) in a continuous process of "improving planning" so 
as to make their proposals heard, so my proposals may well 
become elements in this process that planners could adopt.
Nevertheless, the proposed methodological framework, 
especially in the freedom it provides planners to determine 
the specific context within which they operate, may be 
criticised for being "contextless". Indeed, in the same 
sense that I do not believe there is a "right" regional plan 
or strategy and a prescribed structure that can be applied 
anywhere at any time, I do not think that a methodological 
framework should replace the planning theories or 
theoretical approaches that play such an important role in 
planners' determinations of such elements as the type of 
future regional system desired or the socio-political forces 
relevant to particular expectations and needs.
434
This dissertation did not attempt to discuss the 
relevance or suitability of the specific plans' content. For 
example, we did not question the need to establish new 
settlements in Western Galil, nor the validity of a regional 
development strategy that disregards a whole segment of the 
region in question (i.e., the Arab sector). Although I do 
care about the plans' content and their associated impact, 
this is a matter for a separate study. Such aspects should 
be elaborated in a study of the Israeli political and social 
system that questions the practice of assigning crucial 
importance to the actual construction of settlements, while 
largely disregarding the future development prospects of 
such settlements. Such a study should examine why it is 
relatively easy to populate new settlements scattered in 
peripheral areas, the role of "settlements" in the 
territory-based ideologies associated with the existence of 
the Israeli state, and reasons why the nation-wide social 
and economic externalities imposed by the continuous 
construction of new settlements rarely reach the level of 
public debate.
In fact, this dissertation did not discuss a whole body 
of normative questions, including the "should be" goals of 
regional planning, the regional components most crucial for 
stimulating changes, the common implicit assumption that 
regional inequalities should be eliminated, the way in which 
regional (sub-national) areas should be tackled from a 
national perspective, the question of "public interest" 
embodied in many planning products, and the issue of "public 
participation" in the planning process. There are some hints 
as to the direction of my thought on these questions (for
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example, in the proposed analysis of a region, or the 
definition of a regional structure). Nevertheless, a real 
discussion would require an entirely different study in 
order to develop cogent arguments and perhaps generate new 
ideas.
To complement the principal approach and objective of 
this dissertation, I suggest that its continuation will be 
in the analysis of the way in which marketing skills should 
be integrated into the planning process, the way in which 
planners can improve interactions between the "public" and 
"private" sectors, and the way in which planning ideologies 
can be modified in accordance with the premise that plan- 
making is not a distinct profession, but rather a very 
straightforward exercise of knowledge, skills, and personal 
characteristics.
It is my hope that the methodological franework 
proposed here forms a coherent basis for future planning 
practice.
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Source: R.S.D Calan
Table No.l: Israel - Spatial Distribution Of Population1
District Size 
sq. km
of Area 
% Accu %2
Population 1987 
(%) Accu %
Total3 21,501 100.0 — 100.0 —
Jerusalem 627 3.0 3.0 12.3 12.3
Haifa 854 4.0 7.0 13.8 26.1
Central 1,242 5.8 12.8 21.4 47.5
Tel-Aviv 170 0.8 13.6 23.6 71.1
South 14,107 66.0 79.6 12.1 83.2
North 4,501 20.4 100.0 16.8 100.0
Galil
Western Galil
1,667 7.8 
610 2.8
S  =J =  s  ss
9.6
4.4
_ _ _  _
North 4,501 100.0 732.4 100.0
Galil 1,667 37.0 430.3 58.75
Western Galil 610 13.5 193.9 26.45
1. Source: Israel Statistical Abstract, 1988, no.39, Central Bureau Of Statistics.
2. Accum ulated percentage.
3. Land Area, within the "green line" (excluding 1.4% of population from the calculations).
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Table No.2: Western Galil - Population Size (1987)
a. Population size according to main ethnic groups
(Absolute numbers)
W. Galil Galil N. Dist. Israel
Total 195.3 430.3 732.4 4406.0
Jews 33.2 112.7 357.0 3612.0
Arabs 162.1 317.6 375.4 793.6
b. Population size according to main ethnic groups
(Percentages)
W. Galil Galil N. Dist. Israel
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Jews 17.0 26.2 48.7 81.9
Arabs 83.0 73.8 51.3 18.1
Thereof:
Moslems 53.4 68.4 67.5 76.6
Chris. 27.5 16.5 16.6 13.5
Druz & 19.1 15.1 15.9 9.9
Others
c. Western Galil Ethnic Groups' Structure - size of each 
group as % of the same ethnic group in selected 
Statistical areas:
Statistical Areas Galil North District Israel
Western Galil:
Total 45.4 27.0 4.4
Jews 29.5 9.3 0.9
Arabs 51.0 43.2 20.4
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Table No.3: Western Galil - Demographic characteristics
a. Comparative population growth trends
"Western Galil 
Galil
North District 
Israel
Average annual growth rates (in %) 
1972-1978 1979-1983 1984-1987
5.7
4.7 
3.6 
3.1
4.0
3.4
2.8
1.6
4.1
3.5
2.9
2.3
b. Changes in ethnical composition
Western Galil 
Total
Jews
Arabs
1972
100.0
9.2
90.8
1978
100.0
11.8
88.2
1983
100.0
15.4
84.6
1987
100.0
17.0
83.0
c. Changes in size of major ethnic groups, measured in term 
of their relative size out of the same ethnic groups in 
selected Statistical Areas (%):
Jews Arabs
Western Galil 1972 I
1987
|
1972
1
1987
Galil
1
14.5 29.5
1
49.6 51.0
North District 3.8 9.3 43.3 43.2
Israel 0.4 0.9 20.5 20.4
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d. Age Structure (1987)1
Age Israel N. Dis. Galil W. Galil
Group Total J A Total J A Total J A Total J A
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0-14 32 30 42 38 34 42 41 35 43 42 35 43
15-24 17 16 22 20 17 23 21 15 23 21 14 22
25-44 27 28 23 25 28 23 24 30 23 24 32 23
45-64 15 16 10 12 14 9 10 13 9 10 14 9
65+ 9 10 3 5 8 3 4 7 3 3 5 3
e. Natural Increase - Rates per 1000 (1987)2
Ethnic Group 1972 1987
Jews 17.0 13.1
Moslems 43.7 31.0
Christians 19.9 17.0
Druze 37.4 26.9
1. W estern G alil Jews - Generally younger population (larger 0-14 and smaller 45+  groups), mainly in 
comparison to  Israel Jews. Composition of high rates of 0-14 and 25-44 groups - a consequence of migration 
trends of the past 10 years. Arabs - A similar structure is shared by all areas (young population). It if a 
consequence of similar socio-dem ographic determ inants (dominant role to high natural increase rates). Total 
W estern Galil figures - a major statistical impact of the Arab population (the m ajority). Accordingly, any 
comparison to  other areas should take into account the relative sizes of Jews and Arabs.
2. A lthough a steady decrease of "natural increase" rates, most Arab rates are substantially higher than the 
Jewish rates.
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Table No.4: List Of Settlements Located In Western Galil1
Jewish Settlements
Sub-Area
Period of 
establishment
and name of 
settlement
pre-
1977
1977-
1982
1983+ Type of « 
Settlement*^
Pi am 
size'
West Lower Gal:Ll4
1 . Avtalion 1987 coop. Moshav 200
2 . Eshar 1986 community sett- 200
3. Gilon 1980 ii 200
4. Hararit 1980 ll 100
5. Kamon 1980 community sett- 70
6 . Karmlel 1964 Municipality
7. Koranit 1978 industial vg. 200
8 . Lotem 1978 Kibbutz 100
9. Manof 1978 ii 200
1 0. Michmanin 1980 community sett- 70
1 1. Miztpe-
Aviv 1981 ii 200
1 2. Moran 1978 Kibbutz 100
13. Moreshet 1981 ll 325
14. Rakefet 1981 coop. Moshav 215
15. Schania 1976 indistrial vg. 200
16. Segev c
(Atzmon) +b 1978 ii 200
17. Shazor 1953 £ coop. Moshav 60
18. Shorashim 1980 coop. Moshav 200
19. Tzurit 1981 community sett- 200
2 0. Ya'ad 1976 coop. Moshav 150
2 1. Yodfat 1960 ll 80
2 2. Yuvalim 1982 community sett.. 400
23. Zevia 1980 Kibbutz 100
1. Source: The List of Localities - Their Population and Codes, the Central Bureau O f S tatistics, 3.12.1988.
2. "Type'', i.e., their organisational structure, according to official classification.
3. Number o f families, according to  programs approved by the M inistry o f Agriculture. Reference excludes
N ew -Tow ns, andprivate and Arab settlem ents, all are much larger.
4. The list excludes Adi, a com m unity settlem ent located at the south of the arei, fu n ctio n a ry  related to 
Nazareth area, and totally  remoted (both physically and functionally) from oar area of comcem.
5. First site deserted, new site (name marked in brackets) repopulated.
6. T he permanent site was populated in 1984.
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Period of 
establishment
Sub-Area
and name of 
settlement
pre-
1977
1977-
1982
1983+ Type of 
Settlement
Planned
size
West Upper Gal:.1
24. Abirim 1980 community sett. 70
25. Ein -
Ya'akov 1950 coop. Moshav 60
26. Ga'aton 1948 kibbutz 80
27. Gita 1980 community sett. 100
28. Halutz 1985 community sett. 100
29. Hila 1980 community sett. 100
30. Harashim 1980 80
31. Hosen 1949 coop. Moshav 60
32. Kfar
Havradim n 1984 community sett. 500
33. Kishor * ' 1980 kibbutz 70
34. Klil 1979 community sett. 100
35. Lapidot 1978 industrial vg.
36. Lavon 1980 kibbutz 70
37. Ma'alot 1957 local council0
38. Manot 1980 community sett. 70
39. Me'ona 1949 coop. Moshav 60
40. Peki'in 1955 coop. Moshav 60
41. Pelech 1980 Kibbutz 100
42. Tal-El 1978 industrial vg. 100
43. Tuval 1981 kibbutz 100
44. Tzuriel + coop. Moshav 60
45. Yehiam 1946 kibbutz 80
7. Founded in 1976 as a military camp.
8. M a’alot is organized within a Jewish-Arab Ma’alot-Tarshiha local council.
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Arab Settlements
Name of Religious Structure (%)
settlement Christians Moslems Druze
West Lower Galil
1 . Arabe 1 99 -
2 .
3.
Bir El Machsur 
Baeine 20 80
4. Dir El Asad - 100 -
5. Dir Hana 20 80 —
6 . Iblin 53 47 -
7. Kabul — 100 —
8 . Kaoukab — 100 —
9.
1 0.
Karaf Manda 
Madged El Krum 100 —
11. Nahef - 100 -
1 2. Rama 66 10 24
13. Sagur - - 100
14. Sahnin 10 90 -
15. Sha'ab - 100 -
16.
17.
Shfaram
Tamra - 100 -
West Upper Galil
18. Beit Jan 100
19. Julis — — 100
2 0. Jat — — 100
2 1 . Yanuah — — 100
2 2. Yarka — — 100
23. Kisra — — 100
24. Kafar Sarnia 25 - 75
25. Meilia 100 — —
26. Tarshiha 50 50 -
27. Ein El Asad 20 80 -
28. Pki'in - Bukia 72 3 70
29. Sheih Danun - 100 -
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Table no.5: Western Galil Population Growth*
Thousands Percentages Average annual
growth rate 
(% of previous 
period)
Year Total J Non-J Total J Non-J Total J Non-J
1972 103.9 9.6 94.3 100 9.2 90.8 - -  -
1978 139.4 16.4 123.0 100 11.8 88.2 5.7 11.8 5.1
1983 167.5 25.7 141.8 100 15.4 84.6 4.0 11.3 3.0
1987 195.2 33.2 162.1 100 17.4 82.6 4.3 7.3 3.6
(1) Source: The statistical Abstract of Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics, annual reports.
Table no.6: Western Galil - Population Relative Growth Trend
(% of same sector in other areas)1
W. Galil 
(Absolute)
Total 103.9 41.2 22.0 3.3
1972 Jews 9.6 14.5 3.8 0.4
Non-Jews 94.3 49.7 43.3 20.5
Total 139.4 43.2 24.2 3.7
1978 Jews 16.4 20.1 5.5 0.5
Non-Jews 123.0 51.0 44.1 20.6
Total 167.5 44.3 25.5 4.2
1983 Jews 25.7 25.8 7.9 0.8
Non-Jews 141.8 51.0 43.0 20.6
Total 195.2 45.4 26.7 4.4
1987 Jews 33.2 29.5 9.3 0.9
Non-Jews 162.1 51.0 43.2 20.4
Galil N.Dis Israel 
(Precentages)
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Table no.7: Jewish Population - Distribution according to
type of Settlement 1
Settlements 
in West Galil 1972 1978 1983 1987
% of 
total 
pop. 
1987
Karmiel 3,798 9,750 15,629 19,400 58.4
Ma'alot2 3,200 3,879 5,200 5,770 19.5
Total New-Towns 7,000 13,629 20,829 25,870 77.9
Veteran Setts. 
(1950s-1960s)
2,477 2,468 2,759 2,758 8.3
New Setts. 125 203 2,112 4,5723 13.8
TOTAL REGION 9,600 16,300 25,700 33,200 100.0
(1) Source: The Settlem ent List, Central Bureau of Statistics for the relevant years.
(2) The data refers to the Jewish population, about 50% of M a’alot-Tarshiha local council.
(3) About 20% of population is in Kfar-HaVradim (a private settlem ent).
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Table No.8a: Western Galil - Number of Settlements^*
Absolute numbers 
Year 1972 1978 1983 1987
Area T J N. J T J N. J T J N . J T J N . J
Israel 905 802 111 903 795 115 1091 969 130 1151 1030 130
N.D. 309 243 69 306 238 70 385 305 83 399 320 82
Galil2 124 72 54 128 76 53 171 113 60 178 121 59
W. G. 40 12 29 39 11 29 71 42 30 75 46 30
(1) Source: The Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of S tatistics for relevant years.
(2) Some mixed Arab-Jewish settlem ents (e.g., M a’alot-Tarshiha in W estern Galil) are counted within each 
sector (one Jewish and one Arab), but only once in the total numbers.
Table No.8b: Rate of increase of Settlements (%)
Area
1972-1978 
Total J N.J
1978-1983 
Total J N.J
1983- 
Total J
1987
N.J
W.Galil -2.5 -8.0 0 82 280.0 3.5 5.6 9.5 0
Galil 3.0 5.5 -1.8 33.6 48.7 13.2 4.1 7.1 0
N.Dis. -0.1 -2.0 1.4 25.8 28.0 18.7 3.6 4.9 -1.2
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METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
General Remarks on Data Collection and Calculation
The following sources of information were utilised for 
this dissertation:
The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) - most data 
such as size of population, number of settlements, labour 
power characteristics, unless otherwise mentioned, were 
obtained from this source. Differences between various 
sources of information led to the use of CBS data as the 
major source of information and the basis for comparison 
with other sources. Officially restricted data regarding 
most new settlements' size (measured in households and/or 
individuals) were obtained from the settlements themselves. 
Yet, since this information is calculated into total CBS 
figures (e.g., total Jewish population in a certain 
"natural area"), the above data were verified with CBS 
numbers. Consequently, there is the possibility of small 
discrepancies (five families at most) in the actual numbers 
of inhabitants of each settlement. In the case of 
information regarding the industrial system (e.g., number 
of plants, employees), which was insufficiently specified 
in the CBS data-base, detailed information was obtained 
directly from industrial plants and local authorities (as 
specified below). This source affected the choice of the 
year 1987 as the basis for most of the data presented here 
concerning Western Galil and the planning process, as it is 
the year for which the most conclusive data are available 
(some 1987 data was made available only in 1989). After
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1987, CBS data are based on sample data collection.
The North Region Office of the Rural Settlement 
Department provided data on settlements' establishment 
dates, organisational structure, and general information 
regarding Western Galil. As noted, population figures (that 
are provided in terms of households) were used in the 
calculation of the total regional population and its 
spatial-functional distribution (mainly by "natural areas" 
and type of settlement). Most of these data were obtained 
from the working files of the Planning Section. Access to 
this data-base was crucial for the analysis of the planning 
process. Almost all the relevant information was obtained 
before the administrative merging of this Region Office and 
the Galil Region Office (1990).
The Settlement Department Archive - this source 
provided access to minutes from RSD Executive meetings, 
Zionist Congress and JAFI Assembly Resolutions, official 
definitions of planning function, and letters and 
publications regarding the process analysed.
The Ministry of Industry - mainly the New Towns' 
Industrialisation Report (updated until 1983) and data 
collected from the North District office.
Vix Archive, The Weitzmann Institute of Science, 
Rehovot - working files of the "Katzir Committee".
Private working files of Prof. Katzir provided 
directly by him - this includes his documentation of 
meetings, notes on his conversations with different 
decision-makers, information given him, and his notes on 
intentions and expectations.
The Ministry of Interior - the national master plans,
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statutory regional land use maps, and national sectoral 
plans.
The Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Rehovot
- protocols of meetings regarding the Mitzpim project.
The Misgav Regional Council, Karmiel Municipality, and 
Ma*alot-Tarshiha Local Council - data regarding industrial 
plants and small businesses within their jurisdictions, as 
well as population counts and socio-economic 
characteristics.
Private notes of the researcher - documentation of 
selected meetings (of planners, RSD Executive and specific 
persons, Fellowship 2000 meetings, meetings at the 
Municipality of Karmiel, meetings with UJA Settlement 
Committee representatives, meetings in the Ministry of 
Economics and Planning) and of reports by different 
participants in various meetings the researcher did not 
attend (e.g., their impressions and opinions of the 
events). All of this documentation refers to the years 
1985-1988.
A Questionnaire. Due to the unavailability of coherent 
and detailed information regarding industry in Western 
Galil and the discrepancies between the various official 
sources, a questionnaire was distributed by the researcher 
to all industrial plants and small businesses in the area 
investigated. The questionnaire was distributed in 1990. 
Method of distribution: by mail.
Response: the response among the Jewish industrial plants 
was 97%. However, a low response (20%) was marked among 
small private businesses in Karmiel and Ma'alot. No 
response was obtained from the Arab sector.
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Structure of questionnaire: the questions were cast in a 
relatively simple form, and an attempt was made to avoid 
controversial questions (e.g., financial situation, 
investments) or questions that require time-consuming 
answers that would have encouraged non-response. Even so, a 
large proportion (70%) of answers refused to specify the 
proportions of Jewish and Arab employees. This information 
was provided by the local authorities specified above.
The format of the questionnaire was as follows (translated 
from the Hebrew):
Information Regarding the Production System in Western 
Galil
a. Name of plant/business:
b. Year of establishment:
c. Number of employees:
EMPLOYEES
T01
MEN
PAL
WOMEN
JEV
MEN
?S
WOMEN
AI
MEN
IABS
WOMEN
NUMBERS
YEARS OF 
FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
(-6;6-12; 
13-15;18+)
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d. The location of home (or permanent address) of 
employees:
HOME LOCATION 1
TO1]
MEN
[AL
WOMEN
JEV
MEN WOMEN
AI
MEN
IABS
WOMEN
In the sett, 
where plant 
is located
Segev or | 
Tefen (specify;
Other
(specify) |
e. Is there an R&D activity in the plant? Yes/No
f. Is the plant related to a "mother firm"? Yes/No 
If yes of "mother firm": ___________
Is there an R&D activity in the "mother firm"?
Thank you for your cooperation.
On the whole, information regarding the planning 
process associated with the "settlement plans" was supported 
and enriched by interviews with planners directly involved 
in the process. By contrast, such information regarding 
Region 2000 was obtained from the substantial written 
documentation of the process; this documentation was managed 
by planners during the process itself.
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Two problem in gathering information are important:
First, the available data of government ministries' 
expenditures and budget reports (including specified planned 
and executed resources) during the relevant budgetary years 
does not provide a firm basis for discussing the relations 
between plans and the allocations of public financial and 
land resources. This is mainly the result of several 
aspects: a^ _ The way in which government and ministry budget 
reports are structured. Allocations are classified (and 
executed) according to several criteria: specific issues
(e.g., housing, roads, transportation), territorial base 
(e.g., administrative districts which in most cases do not 
overlap), socio-economic characteristics of individuals and 
population quotas (health services, educational facilities), 
and individual firms, b^ Since none of our projects was a 
specifically budgeted item, all allocations were structured 
within standard allocation procedures. Only three 
exceptional cases could be identified: allocations through 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade to the Katzir Committee 
and Fellowship 2000 (e.g., salary of Director General and 
other administrative expenses); Allocations from 1982-1984 
by JAFI to Fellowship 2000; Allocations under the heading of 
"mitzpim", "new settlements" or "Region 2000" within the RSD 
North Region office, and partly in JAFI budget reports. 
Otherwise, resources were allocated through channels such as 
the "investment center" of the Ministry of Industry and
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Trade, "development areas", liability rights for housing 
assistance to individual settlers, and population quotas 
with regard to facilities such as education and health. c_j_ 
The nature of the projects concerned. The entire settlement 
process had not been a government initiative, although 
massive government allocations followed this initiative. 
Thus, it is a matter of speculation as to whether in the 
absence of this initiative similar budgets would have been 
allocated to Western Galil. In fact, the "mitzpim" project 
was based on an assumption that massive government 
allocations were not likely during the "mitzpim" period. In 
this regard, it should be emphasised that, as JAFI's 
project, the establishment of the "mitzpim" had been neither 
a "cheap" nor an efficient project, as is argued by various 
scholars in attempts to estimate the scale of expenditures 
generated by the project (Reichman and Oren, 1984; 
Chemanski, 1990). As for Region 2000, the project never 
reached the stage of fundamental allocations, and thus there 
is little ground to cover with regard to patterns of public 
resource allocation. The only examples are promised budgets 
(by the RSD) that were never executed, and the firm refusal 
of several ministries to allocate resources to this project 
(e.g., the refusal of the Israeli Land Authority to allocate 
land to the Region 2000 Company, and evidence that the 
Minister of Industry and Trade "refused to approve any 
project under the heading of Region 2000" - Mr. Eitan,
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Ministry of Treasury). These deficiencies negate any 
discussion of the following issues: the volume of
allocations to the projects concerned, changes in 
allocations to Western Galil throughout the years, and the 
volume of allocations in comparison to other projects and 
areas.
Second, obtaining data from the Arab sector in Western 
Galil, or indirectly through other sources, was obstructed 
by lack of comprehensive information in official data-bases 
and the absence of alternative sources of information. This 
problem must be solved if further attempts to deal with the 
development of Western Galil are made.
456
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aharoni, Y. (1982). Business Strategy. Zerikover, Tel-Aviv. 
(Hebrew)
Akzin, B. and Dror, Y. (1966). Israel, High-Presure
Planning. National Planning Series, Syracuse University, 
New-York.
Albrow, M. (1970). "The Role of the Sociologist as a
Professional: The Case of Planning." In: Halmos (ed.), 
Sociological Review Monograph, 16: 1-20, University of 
Keele, Keele.
Altshulers, A. (1965). The City Planning Process: A 
Political Analysis. Ithaca Press, N.Y.
------ , (1973). "The Goals of Comprehensive Planning". In:
Faludi (ed.)(1973), pp.193-210.
Ansoff, I.G. (1985). Corporate Strategy, An Analytic
Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion.
Penguin, England.
Appleby, P.H. (1949). Policy and Administration. University 
of Alabama, Alabama.
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1963). "Decision and non­
decision: An Analytical Framework". The American 
Political Science Review, 57: 632-642.
------ , (1970). Power and Poverty. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Baer, W. (1977). "Urban Planners: Doctors or Midwives?" 
Public Administration Review, 35 (6): 671-678.
Baum, H.S. (1980). "Analysts and Planners Must Think
Organizationally". Policy Analysis, 6 (4): 480-494.
------ , (1982). "Policy Analysis, Special Cognitive Style
Needed". Administration and Society 14 (2): 213-236.
Baki, A. (1965). Introduction to Geostatistics. The
Akademon, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Hebrew)
Bergman, A. (1986). The Industry and Industrial Policy in 
Israel. The Research Unit, Israel Bank, Jerusalem. 
(Hebrew)
457
Bilski, R. (ed.), (1980). Can Planning Replace Politics? - 
The Israeli Eperience. The Van Leer Jerusalem 
Foundation, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
Blackburn, R. (ed.), (1979). Ideology in Social Science, 
Readings in Critical Social Theory. Fontana, Great 
Britain.
Blowers, A. (1982). "Much Ado About Nothing?". In: Healey 
P., McDougall G., Thomas M.J (eds.)(1982), Planning 
Theory: Prospects for the 1980's. Selected papers from a 
Conference held in Oxford, pp. 140-160.
Blowers A., Brook C., Dunleavy P. and McDowell L. (eds.),
(1982). Urban Change and Conflict: An Interdisciplinary 
Reader. Harper and Row, in association with The Open 
University Press, London.
Broadbent, T.A. (1977). Planning and profit in the Urban 
Economy. Methuen & Co, London.
Brutzkus, E. (1964). Physical Planning in Israel. The
Ministry of Interior, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Bunce, V. (1976). "Elite Succession, Petrification and
Policy Innovation". Comparative Political Studies, 9.
Buzi, M. and The Regional Planning Section (1983). Segev 
1983 - 1992: A Regional Development Plan. The Jewish 
Agency For Israel, The Settlement Departmen, North 
Region Office, Haifa, Publication No. 3-4-83. (Hebrew 
& English)
Carmon, N. (1990). "Population and Society - Attributes and 
Assessment". In: Lifschitz (ed.)(1990), The New 
Settlement in the Galil, An Assessment Study, pp.122- 
179.
Castells, M. (1977). The Urban Question, A Marxist Approach.
Edward Arnold, London.
Central Bureau of Statistics, (1948-1990). Israel
Statistical Abstract. Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
------ , (1987). Labour Force Surveys 1987. Publication no.
848. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
------ , (1984-9). List of Localities, Their Population and
Codes. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem.
(Hebrew)
458
Chemanski, D. (1990). "Economic Effects of the New 
Settlement". In: Lifschitz (ed.)(1990), The New 
Settlement in the Galil, An Assessment Study, pp. ISO- 
218.
Clavel, P., Forester, J., Goldsmith, W.W. (1980). Urban and 
Regional Planning in an Age of Austerity. Pergamon, New 
York.
Cohen, E. (1970). The City in the Zionist Ideology.
Institute of Urban Studies, The Hebrew University, 
Jerusalem.
Colosi, T. (1983). "Negotiation in the Public and Private
Sectors". American Behavioral Scientist 27 (2): 229-253.
Conyers, D. (1985). "Rural Regional Planning Towards An
Operational Theory". Progress in Planning. 23 (l):l-66.
Dahl, R.A. (1961). Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an 
American City. Yale University Press, New-Haven.
Davidoff, P. (1965). "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning". 
Journal of the American Institute of Planners 31: 596- 
615
Davis, J.G. (1972). The Evengelical Bureaucrat. Tavistock, 
London.
Dennis, N. (1970). People and Planners, The Sociology of 
Housing in Sunderland. Faber and Faber, London.
------ , (1972). Public Participation and Planners' Blight.
Faber and Faber, London.
Diamond, D.R. (1984). "Issues in Public Policy Evaluation: 
the Case of Regional Policy". Geoforum 15, (1): 33-38.
Diamond, D.R. and Spence, N.A. (1983). Regional Policy 
Evaluation, A Methodological Review and the Scottish 
example. Gower, England.
Doron, G. (1986). To Decide and to Execute. Kivunim, Tel- 
Aviv. (Hebrew)
Drucker, P.F. (1986). Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 
Practice and Principles. Pan Books Ltd, London.
Duchan, T. and Gilat, O. (1986). Region 2000, Changing The 
Galil Through Planning. The Jewish Agency For Israel, 
Rural Settlement Department, North Region, Haifa.
459
------ , (1987). Region 2000: Project Aggregates, An
Approach to Integrate Short-Term Regional Development.
Written in cooperation with Cohen, M. and Friedman, Y., 
The State of Israel, Ministry of Agriculture and The 
Jewish Agency for Israel, Rural Settlement Department, 
Tel Aviv.
Dunleavy, P. (1980a). Urban Political Analysis, The Politics 
of Collective Consumption. Macmillan, London.
------ , (1980b). "Social and Political Theory and the
Issues in Central-Local Relations". In G. Jones, (1980). 
New Approaches to the study of Central-Local Government 
Relations.
------ , (1982a). "Perspectives on Urban Studies". In
Blowers A., Brook C., Dunleavy P. and McDowell L. (eds.) 
(1982), Urban Change and Conflict: An Interdisciplinary 
Reader, pp. 1-16.
------ , (1982b). "Protest and Quiescense in Urban
Politics". In Blowers A., Brook C., Dunleavy P. and 
McDowell L. (eds.)(1982), Urban Change and Conflict: An 
Interdisciplinary Reader, pp.190-197.
Einav Systems and Eiur Research and Planning LTD., (1984). 
The Science and Industry Region. Interim Report, Tel- 
Aviv. (Hebrew)
Etzioni, A. (1967). "Mixed-scanning: A 'third' Approach to 
Decision-Making". Reprinted in: Faludi (ed.)(1973), pp. 
217-229.
------- , (1968). The Active Society: A Theory of Societal
and Political Processes. The Free Press, New York.
Eversley, (1973). The Planner in Society: The Changing Role 
of a Profession. Faber, London.
Faludi, A. (ed.), (1973). Planning Theory. Pergamon, Oxford.
Forester, J. (1980). "Critical Theory And Planning
Practice". In: Clavel, P., Forester, J., Goldsmith,
W.W. (1980). Urban and Regional Planning in an Age of 
Austerity. Pergamon, New York.
------ , (1981). "Questioning And Organizing Attention,
Toward a Critical Theory of Planning and Administrative 
Practice". Administration and Society, 13 (2): 161-205.
------ , (1989). Planning in the Face of Power. University
of California, Berkeley.
460
Friedmann, J. (1973). Retracking America: A Theory of 
Transactive Planning. Anchor, New York.
Friedmann, J. and Weaver, C. (1979). Territory and Function, 
The Evolution of Regional Planning. Edward Arnold,
London.
Friend, J. (1976). "Planners, Politics and Organizational
Boundaries: Some Recent Developments in Britain". Policy 
and Politics, 5: 25-46.
------ , (1980) "Planning in a Multi-Organisational
Context". Town Planning Review, 51 (3): 261-269.
Friend, J. and Hickling, A. (1987). Planning Under Pressure, 
The Strategic Choice Approach. Pergamon, Oxford.
Gans, H.J. (1965). Urban Villagers. The Free Press, New- 
York.
------ , (1968). People and Plans. Basic Books, New York.
Gibton, I. (1986). Reinforcing the Agricultural Family Farm 
Sector - Committee Report Presented to the Prime 
Minister Mr. S. Peres. Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Gilat, O. and Duchan, T. (1984). Region 2000: Development 
Senarios - A Methodological Framework for Planning. A
paper for internal use. The Jewish Agency For Israel,
The Rural Settlement Department, North Office, Haifa.
------ , (1985). Region 2000: A Development Strategy, A
Framework for Detailed Planning. Discussion Report, The 
Jewish Agency For Israel, The Settlement Department, 
North Office, Haifa. (Hebrew)
Goldsmith, W.W. (1980). "Marxism and Regional Policy: An
Introduction." In: Clavel, P., Forester, J., Goldsmith, 
W.W. (1980). Urban and Regional Planning in an Age of 
Austerity.
Harloe, M. and Lebas, E. (eds.) (1981). City, Class and 
Capital. Edward Arnold, London.
Hashimshoni, D. (1983). The political Economy of Israel.
Akademon, The (Hebrew) University, Jerusalem.
Hasson, S. (1983). "The Emergence of an Urban Social
Movement in Israeli Society - An Integrated Approach". 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 7
(2): 157-174.
461
Harvey, D. (1973). Social Justice and the City. Edward 
Arnold, London.
Healey, P. (1992). "A Planner's Day, Knowledge and Action in 
Communicative Practice". Journal of the American 
Planning Association", 58 (1): 9-20.
Healey P., McDougall G., Thomas M.J (eds.), (1982). Planning 
Theory: Prospects for the 1980's. Selected papers from a 
Conference held in Oxford, 2-4 April 1981. Pergamon, 
Oxford.
Healey P., McDougall G., Thomas M.J. (1982). "Theoretical 
Debates in Planning: Towards a Coherent Dialogue". In: 
Healey P., McDougall G., Thomas M.J (eds.)(1982), 
Planning Theory: Prospects for the 1980's. Selected 
papers from a Conference held in Oxford, pp. 5-22.
Hebrew Encyclopedia. (1969). Massada, Tel-Aviv.
Hebbert, M., Machin, H. (eds.), (1984). Regionalisation in 
France, Italy and Spain. International Centre for 
Economics and Related Disciplines, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science, London.
Hill M. (1980). "Urban and Regional Planning In Israel". In: 
Bilski R. (ed.)(1980), Can Planning Replace Politics? - 
The Israeli Eperience, pp. 259-282.
Hochman R. (ed.), (1988). Jews and Arabs in Israel. The
School of Education, The (Hebrew) University of Israel, 
Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Hoffman H. and Marcus R. (1986). Ideas for Municipal
Cooperation. The Jewish Agency for Israel - Region 2000, 
Tel Aviv. (Hebrew)
Holland, S. (1976). Capital versus the Regions. The
Macmillan, London.
Horowitz D., and Lisak M. (1977). "The 'Yeshuv' as a
Political Society". In: Lisak and Gutman (eds.) (1977), 
The Israeli Political System, pp.97-131.
Howe, S.W. (1986). Corporate Strategy. Macmillan Education 
Ltd., London.
Hudson, R. and Lewis, J.R. (ed.), (1982). Regional Planning 
in Europe. London Papers in Regional Science - 11. Pion, 
London.
462
Inbar D. (1980). "Planning in the Making". In Bilski R. 
(ed.)(1980), Can Planning Replace Politics? - The 
Israeli Eperience, pp. 11-27.
Israel Institute Of Productivity (1990). Productivity in 
Israel, An International Comparison. No.16. (Hebrew)
Israel Land Authority, (1976). The Galil - A proposed
Planning Framework. Israel Land Authority, Planning and 
Development Unit, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Jowell, J. (1977). "Bargaining in Development Control". 
Journal of Planning Law, June, pp.414-433
Jubran, R. (1985). Region 2000 - The Arab Population. The
Rural Settlement Department, North Region Planning Unit, 
Haifa. (Hebrew)
Katz, S.M., Menuhin, N., Ludmer, H. (1982). Regional
Organisation and Management of Development - Israel and 
Galil Case Study. The Settlement Research Centre, 
Rehovot, Publications on Problems of Regional 
Development No.32. (Hebrew)
Katzir, E. (1978-89). Private notes concerning Region 2000.
Private Files. (Hebrew)
Katzir Committee, (1985). Region 2000, Development Policy, 
The Sub-Committees * Reports.
------ , (undated). Region 2000, High Technology in the
Galilee. Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., on 
behalf of the Katzir Committee, Haifa.
------ , (1978-89). Protocols of meetings, lnetters, and
written documents. Vix Archives, Weitzmann Institute of 
Sciences, Rehovot. (Hebrew)
Kela, Y., Lapid, P., Raviv, J., Shapiro, J. (1985). "Report 
of the Steering Committee for the Development of 
Communication Infrastructure in Region 2000". In: Katzir 
Committee (1985), Section B, pp.1-18.
Kela, Y. (1990). Communication Infrastructure for the
Educational System in Region 2000, Katzir committee, 
Kefar HaVradim. (Hebrew)
Kelman, S., Clevel, P., Forester, J., Goldsmith, W.W.
(1980). "New Opportunities for Planners". In: Clavel,
P., Forester, J., Goldsmith, W.W. (1980). Urban and 
Regional Planning in an Age of Austerity.
463
Kelman, S. (1983). "Limited Government: An Incoherent
Concept". Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 3 
(1): 31-44.
Kimmerling, B. (1982). "Change and Continuity in Zionist 
Territorial Orientations and Politics". Comparative 
Politics", 14 (2): 191-210.
Kipnis, B. (1982). A Proposal for a Municpal Organisation of 
the New Settlement Areas in the Galil, Prepared for the 
Jewish Agency, The Settlement Department, North and 
Galil Region Offices. Itut, Haifa. (Hebrew)
------ , (1990). "Assessment of the Land Policy and its
Implementatiom". In: Lifschitz (ed.)(1990), The Nev 
Settlement in the Galil, An Assessment Study, pp.81-121.
Kirk, G. (1980). Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society.
Croom Helm Ltd., London.
Kleinberg, B.J, (1973). American Society in the Post 
Industrial Age. Merril, Columbus.
Kramer, F .A. (1977). Dynamics of Public Bureaucracy.
Winthrop, Cambridge, Mass.
Landau, M. (1969). "Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem 
of Duplication and Overlap". Public Administration 
Review, 29 (July/August): 345-358.
------ , (1973). "On the Concept Of a Self-Correcting
Organization". Public Administration Review, 33 (6): 
533-542.
Larsen, J.K., and Rogers, E.M. (1984). Silicon Valley Fever, 
Growth of High-Technology Culture. Unwin Paperbacks, 
London.
Law-Yone, H., and Wilkansky, R. (1984). "From Consensus To 
Fragmentation: The Dynamics Of Paradigm In Israel". 
Socio-Economic Planning Science, 18 (6): 367-372.
Lichfield, N. & Partners Planning, Development and Economic 
Consultants Jerusalem, and I.D.C Industrial Development 
Corporation LTD Haifa, (1984). Region 2000: A 
Development Strategy For High Technology in Central 
Galilee. Discussion Report No.l and Interim Report No.l 
(Draft). Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Katzir 
Commission for the promotion of high-technology in the 
Galilee.
464
Lifschitz G. (ed.)/ (1990). The New Settlement in the Galil,. 
An Assessment Study. The National Planning and 
Construction Commission, Ministry of Interior,
Jerusalem, and The Technion - A Technological Institute 
for Israel, The Centre for Urban and Regional Research. 
Haifa. (Hebrew)
Lifschitz, G. and Law-Yone, H. (1990). "The Planning and
Implementation Process". In: Lifschitz (ed.)(1990), The 
New Settlement in the Galil, An Assessment Study, pp. 
42-80.
Lindblom, C.H. (1959). "The Science of 'Muddling Through'". 
Reprinted in: Faludi (ed.)(1973), pp. 151-169.
Lisak, M. and Gutman, E. (eds.), (1977). The Israeli 
Political System. Am-Oved Publication, Tel Aviv.
(Hebrew)
Maclennan, D., and Parr, J.B. (ed.), (1979). Regional 
Policy, Past Experience and New Directions. Galsgow 
Social & Economic Research Studies 6. Martin Robertson, 
Oxford.
Mandelbaum, S.J. (1979). "A Complete General Theory of 
Planning Is Impossible". Policy Science, 11: 59-71
Manners, G., Keeble, D., Rodgers, B., Warren, K., (1980). 
Regional Development In Britain. John Willey & Sons, 
Chichester.
Manners, G. (1980). "National and International
Perspectives". In: Manners, G., Keeble, D., Rodgers, B., 
Warren, K., (1980). Regional Development In Britain,
pp.1-22.
Massey, D. (1984). Spatial Division of Labour, Social
Structures and the Geography of Production. Macmillan, 
London.
Massey, D. and Cataleno, A. (1978). Capital and Land: 
Landownership by Capital in Great Britain. Edward 
Arnold, London.
Maziotti, D.f. (1974). "The Underlying Assumptions of
Advocacy Planning: Pluralism and Reform". Journal of the 
American Institute of Planners, 40 (1): 38-48.
McAuslan, P. (1979). "The Ideologies of Planning Law". Urban 
Law and Policy, 2: 1-23.
465
McGreevy, T.E. and Thomson, W.J. (1983). "Regional Policy. 
and Company Investment Behaviour". Regional Studies, 17 
(5): 347-358.
McKay, D.H. and Cox, A.W. (1979). The Politics of Urban
Change. Croom Helm Ltd., London.
Mellor, R. (1975). "The British Experience: Combined and 
Uneven Development", in Harloe, M. (ed.) 1975, 
Proceedings of the conference on urban change and 
conflict, C.E.S, 14.
------ , (1977). Urban Sociology in an Urbanized Society.
Routledge and Kagan, London.
Menuhin, N. (1980). Perspective to Diagnose and a Strategy 
to deal with Problems of a Critical Region, The Galil. A
PhD Dissertation presented to the Bar-Ilan University, 
Israel. (Hebrew).
------ , (1983). A Collection of Documents that Escort the
Foundation and Development of Rural Settlements. The
Jewish Agency for Israel, Rural Settlement Department, 
Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Michels, R. (1959). Political Parties. Dover, New York.
Ministry of Housing - Programs Division and Urban Planning 
Unit, (1976). An Accelerated Urban Development in the 
Galil. Ministry of Housing, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Ministry of Industry and Trade, (1984-1980). A Report on the 
Industrialisation of the Development Towns. The State of 
Israel, Ministry of Industry and Trade, The Development 
Areas Unit, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
------ , (1989). A Guide to the Investor. The State of
Israel, Ministry of Industry and Trade, The Development 
Areas Unit, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Ministry of Interior - North District Planning
Jurisdictions, (1973). Plan No.852/C - A Master Plan for 
the North District. Ministry of Interior Planning Unit, 
Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Ministry of Interior Planning Division, Treasurer, and the 
Economic Planning Authority, (1985). National Master 
Plan for the Distribution of Israeli Population of 5 
millions. The Ministry of Interior, Jerusalem.
466
Mishal, S. (1971). "Social-Economic Policy and Migration
Absorption: Conflicting Policies". State and Government. 
A (2): 33-42. Hhebrew
Mishan, E.J. (1976). Elements In Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Feorge Allen and Unwin, London.
Myrdal, G. (1957). Economic Theory And Under-Developed 
Regions. Gerald Duckworth & Co. LTD, London.
Nicholls, D. (1975). The Pluralist State. Macmillan, London.
Olson, M. (1965.) The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Pahl, R.E. (1975). Whose City? 2nd Edition, Penguin.
—  --- , (1978). "Will the inner city problem ever go
away?". New Society, 28 September, pp.678-681
Pahl R.E. and Winkler J.T. (1974). "The Comming
Corporatism". New Soiety, 10 October, pp.72-76
Pat U. (1990). Productivity in Israel - An International 
Comparison. The Israel Institute of Productivity, Tel- 
Aviv.
Pickvance, C.G. (ed.). (1976). Urban Sociology: Critical
Essays. Tavistock, London.
Poulantzas, N. (1973). Political Power and Social Classes.
Verso Editions, London.
Rabushka, A. and Shepsle, K.A. (1972). Politics in Plural 
Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability. Charles 
Merril, Culumbus, Ohio.
Ravid, S. (1986). The Family Farm Committee - A Report.
Presented to the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. A. 
Nehemkin. (Hebrew)
Reichman S. (1979). From Footland To Settled Territory, The 
Jewish Settlement 1918-1948, A Geographycal 
Interpretation and Documentation. Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi 
Publications, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Reichman, S. and Oren, E. (1984). The Mitzpim in the Galil 
-A Survey and Major Findings. The Geography Department 
and the Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, The 
Hebrew University, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
467
Region 2000, (1990). Region 2000, Export Industries in the 
Galilee. Unknown Publisher.
Rex J. and Moor, R. (1967). Race, Community and Capital: A 
Study of Sparkbrook. Oxford University Press, London.
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1980). "Some Myths in Central-Local
Relations". Town Planning Review, 51 (3): 270-285.
Royal Town Planning Institute, (1980). Public Participation 
An Issues Report. Royal Town Planning Institute, London
Rural Settlement Department, (1974). The Mountainous Galil 
Propoed Objectives and Tasks for Development, Presented 
to the Inter Governmental Settlement Committe. The 
Jewish Agency for Israel, Rural Settlement Department, 
Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
------ , (1974). The Mountainous Galil - A Propoed Plan for
Rapid Development. The Jewish Agency for Israel, Rural 
Settlement Department, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Rural Settlement Department Planning Unit, (1974). A
Proposal for the Development of Industrial Villages.
North Region office, The Settlement Dep., Haifa.
(Hebrew)
------ , (1976). Segev Block - A Comprehensive Development
Plan. The Regional Comprehensive Planning Team, the 
Rural Settlement Department, Haifa. (Hebrew)
Rural Settlement Department - The Regional Comprehensive 
Planning Team, (1978). A Pproposal for a Regional 
Comprehensive Development in Western Galil. The North 
and Galil Region Offices, Haifa. (Hebrew)
Rural Settlement Department and Segev Bloc Settlements, 
(1980). Segev Region. North Region office, The 
Settlement Department, Haifa.
Saunders P. (1979). Urban Politics, A Sociological 
Interpretation. Penguin Books, England.
Sawers L. and Tabb W.K. (eds.), (1984). Sunbelt/Snowbert, 
Urban Development and Regional Restructuring. Oxford / 
University Press, New York, Oxford.
Schon, D.A. (1982). "Some of What a Planner Knows, A case 
Study of Knowing-in-Practics". Journal of the American 
Planning Association, 48: 351-364.
468
------ , (1983). The Reflective Practitioner, How
Professionals Think in Action. Basic Books, U.S.A.
Sofer A. and Finkel R. (1988). The Mitzpim In The Galil - 
Goals, Achievements, Lessons. The Centre For Regional 
and Urban Research, Rehovot. (Hebrew)
Sofer A. (1985). "Jewish Majority in the Galil - A
Calculated Fantasy". In Ha'aretz Daily Newspaper, 
10.10.1985. (Hebrew)
Stillwell, F.J.B. (1980). Economic Crisis, Cities and
Regions. Pergamon Press, Australia.
Turgovnic, E. (1986). Proposals for Regional Organisation of 
Services and Resources in Region 2000. An Unpblished 
report for the Rural Settlement Department, North Region 
Office, Haifa. (Hebrew)
Vachman, A., and the Planning Team, (1982). The North 
District: A Policy for Long Range Comprehensive 
Planning. The Rural Settlement Department, Galil and 
North regions offices, Haifa. (Hebrew)
Vildavsky, R., Law-Yone, H., Meir-Brodnitz, M. (1988).
"Impact Assessment of Regional Plans - The case of the 
Galil". In: Swartz, D. and Bar-El, R., Topics of 
Regional Development. The Israeli Regional Science 
Association, The Centre for Rural and Urban Settlement 
Research, Rehovot. (Hebrew)
Weaver, C. (1984). Regional Development and the Local
Community: Planning, Politics and Social Context. John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd., Chichester.
Weiss S. (1977). "The Local Government In Israel and its 
Leadership". In: Lisak and Gutman (eds.)(1977), The 
Israeli Political System, pp. 132-154. (Hebrew)
Werner, S.B. (1983). "The Development of Political
Corruption: A Case Study of Israel". Political Studies 
23: 620-639.
Yitzhaki A. (ed.), (1978). Israeli Guide. Keter and Ministry 
of Defence Publications, Jerusalem. (Hebrew)
Zamonski E. (1983). The New Settlement In The Galil.
Teachers' Board for the Jewish National Fund, Haifa. 
(Hebrew)
469
